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Election Integrity in Ensuring Accuracy

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The Future of Election Administration

Part of the book series: Elections, Voting, Technology ((EVT))

Abstract

Current concerns regarding the integrity of elections and ensuring accurate ballot counts and outcomes are addressed. The chapter specifically focuses on the federal policies and variations in state policy that contribute to an environment in which ensuring confidence in the accuracy of election outcomes presents a challenge for election administrators. This discussion begins with the adoption of the Help America Vote Act in 2002 and traces the intricacies and tools utilized in ensuing election accuracy and citizen confidence in a system that is highly decentralized.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Internationally, the foundation of election standards is in Article 21(3) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The declaration states, “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” These commitments were further developed in Article 25 of the UN International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR of 1966), namely the need for: periodic elections at regular intervals; universal suffrage that includes all sectors of society; equal suffrage, in the idea of one-person, one-vote; the right to stand for public office and contest elections; the rights of all eligible electors to vote; the use of a secret ballot process; genuine elections; elections that reflect the free expression of the will of the people.

  2. 2.

    U.S. Constitution Article 1, Sections. 2 and 4.

  3. 3.

    The 15th Amendment to the Constitution provided that the “right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”

  4. 4.

    The 19th Amendment to the Constitution guaranteed women the right to vote.

  5. 5.

    The Enforcement Acts during reconstruction attempted to enforce suffrage of African-American men guaranteed by the 15th Amendment, but ultimately failed. See Stephen Cresswell, “Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in Northern Mississippi, 1870–1890.” The Journal of Southern History, 53, no. 3 (August 1987): 421–440.

  6. 6.

    The NVRA exempted some states on the basis of either not having voter registration, or having same-day registration: North Dakota (no voter registration), Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Maine lost its exemption when it ended same-day registration in 2011, though it subsequently reenacted same-day registration by referendum later that year.

  7. 7.

    “Voter registration is the backbone of election administration in the United States. Registration lists are used to establish eligibility to vote, to determine the offices for which one can vote, to communicate to citizens when elections occur and where and how to vote, to validate people at the polls, and to audit elections after the fact. … Election administrators and the public as a whole place a premium on accuracy of the lists. Poorly maintained lists can make it difficult for administrators to communicate with voters or to run the election at the polls. Errors in the lists used by the local election offices can prevent some legitimate voters from participating and may be abused by those seeking to perpetrate voter fraud. Election administrators devote considerable effort to continual management of the voter lists. This is a difficult task, especially in less well-staffed offices, and errors do occur. Any effort to improve the quality of lists can be greatly informed by data about the accuracy of the voter files” (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2014).

  8. 8.

    One exception is California, which only complied with the requirement to develop its HAVA-compliant statewide voter registration system six months before the 2016 general election.

  9. 9.

    California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, and New York all reported more than 100% of Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Election Assistance Commission (2016).

  10. 10.

    The Government Accountability Institute asserts, “Extending GAI’s conservative matching method to include all 50 states would indicate an expected minimum of 45,000 high-confidence duplicate voting matches.” And, “GAI was unable to obtain voter roll data from all 50 states, but nevertheless identified 8471 potential cases of illegal duplicate voting across 21 states. These instances should be investigated to determine whether two votes were cast by the same person or if identity theft occurred” (Government Accountability Institute 2017).

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc., et al. v. Dean C. Logan, et al., 2:17cv08948 (D.C.Cal. 2017), complaining that in 2017 Los Angeles County, the largest voting jurisdiction in the United States, had registered voters totaling 112% of CVAP, including 1,515,330 inactive registrations, as reported to the EAC, found at http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/JW-v-CA-NVRA-complaint-08948.pdf.

  12. 12.

    Sometimes these dates are “legacy” voters for whom the elections office does not have a correct birthdate, therefore they insert a fake date, often January 1, 1900, into the database. However, that fact does not help that there are many cases of dead voters not being removed from the rolls or that voters read and hear these stories, which can increase suspicion of fraud, or at least opportunity for fraud. Also, these types of numbers indicate that the voting rolls are not being kept up-to-date (Civitas 2010), found at https://wwwcache.wral.com/asset/news/state/nccapitol/2012/10/31/11722418/SBOE_Response_to_Civitas_Report.pdf.

  13. 13.

    60% of Hispanics, 62% of African-Americans, and 27% of white voters express concerns about eligible voters being denied the right to vote (Vandermaas-Peeler et al. 2018). These numbers are in spite of the fact that HAVA requires the use of provisional ballots in cases where an eligible voter’s name does not appear on the voter registration list. That so many believe that there is rampant denial of the vote in the United States should be of great concern and the source of that belief or evidence of it should be investigated and addressed.

  14. 14.

    A recent survey showed that 67% of likely US voters think voters should be required to show identification such as a driver’s license before being allowed to vote (Rasmussen 2018b).

  15. 15.

    Report of the Commission on Federal Election Reform, Commission Letter to the President, found at https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.

  16. 16.

    Sources include the Social Security Administration’s master death index, the US Postal Service’s National Change of Address dataset, several databases maintained by the US Department of Homeland Security, state and local tax agencies, federal and state courts, vital records departments, the corrections divisions, voter registration data sharing groups such the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), of which 24 states and the District of Columbia are members, and the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck (IVRC) program (now under politically motivated criticism, but which was started by the secretaries of Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska in 2005), which approximately 25 states utilize. Some jurisdictions such as Orange County, California, also employ commercial credit bureau data (Experian) and ancestry databases, found at http://www.ocvote.com/election-library/docs/2012%20Voter%20List%20Maintenance.pdf.

  17. 17.

    States should also consider legislation to require state and local election officials to report on their voter registration and list maintenance activities. This would help motivate and identify jurisdictions that are not currently doing effective list maintenance.

  18. 18.

    The EAC’s EAVS survey reported that the 47 states and territories that responded to this inquiry on the survey sent a total of 19,058,066 confirmation notices to registrants during the 2016 election cycle. The response rate by voter registrants to confirmation notices nationwide was just 12.8% (Election Assistance Commission 2016).

  19. 19.

    See generally, A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted, 584 U.S. ___ (2018).

  20. 20.

    The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) has outlined some of the cyber risks to online voter registration systems and recommends ways to protect them. See US-CERT Security Tip (ST16-001) Securing Voter Registration Data (September 30, 2016), found at https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST16-001.

  21. 21.

    Bad actors seem very interested in selling voter information, even when not obtained for purposes of interfering in elections (Latek 2018).

  22. 22.

    See Designing Usable Ballots, The Center for Civic Design, found at https://civicdesign.org/fieldguides/designing-usable-ballots/.

  23. 23.

    Voting Rights Act, Section 208 codified as 52 US Code § 10508: Any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.

  24. 24.

    Voting Rights Act, Section 11 (b) codified in 18 US Code § 594: “Whoever intimidates, threatens, coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, at any election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing such candidate, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”

  25. 25.

    See, e.g., https://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2017/10/voter_fraud_alleged_in_bostons.html; https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/work-ag-paxtons-election-fraud-unit-results-arrests-4-members-organized-voter-fraud-ring-north-fort.

  26. 26.

    See Signature Verification Guide, Colorado Secretary of State, Overview (September 13, 2018), found at https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/docs/SignatureVerificationGuide.pdf.

  27. 27.

    Area Mail Processing Consolidations, Report Number: NO-AR-15-007, United States Postal Service Office of the Inspector General (June 5, 2015), found at https://www.uspsoig.gov/document/area-mail-processing-consolidations.

  28. 28.

    https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-task-force-united-states-postal-system/.

  29. 29.

    https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/16/2017-05399/comprehensive-plan-for-reorganizing-the-executive-branch; https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article214080449.html.

  30. 30.

    https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Government-Reform-and-Reorg-Plan.pdf.

  31. 31.

    A butterfly ballot shows names down both sides of a ballot with a row of holes in the center where a voter is to punch his or her selection in the corresponding hole. The design is confusing to many voters, especially because the second name on the left side of the ballot corresponds to the third hole in the center of the ballot (the second hole corresponds to the first name on the right side of the ballot).

  32. 32.

    See http://americanhistory.si.edu/vote/florida.html.

  33. 33.

    See comments of West Virginia Secretary of State Mac Warner at the EAC Election Readiness Summit, Washington, DC (October 3, 2018), see transcript, 30, found at https://www.eac.gov/events/2018/10/03/eac-election-readiness-summit/.

  34. 34.

    See, for example, H.R. 6449, found at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/6449/text. Several similar bills have been proposed in Congress.

  35. 35.

    See DHS Cybersecurity Services Catalog for Election Infrastructure, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (undated), found at https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/DHS_Cybersecurity_Services_Catalog_for_Election_Infrastructure.pdf.

  36. 36.

    The most common forms of tabulation are by mechanical counting (similar to an odometer), where the voting machine records each vote and totals are taken from the machine at the end of the day and written on paper documentation, by memory cards or thumb drives that track the votes on each machine over the day, or by manually counting the actual physical ballots, or a combination of these. Totals, whether on paper, memory card, thumb drive, or ballot, are transferred to election headquarters for either central tabulation or manual counting.

  37. 37.

    Incorrect reporting of election results has happened before, the most famous being the Truman v. Dewey Presidential contest in 1948. That was, of course, a much less technologically and informationally connected time (National Constitution Center 2017).

  38. 38.

    Election Management Guidelines, EAC, 133 (2010), found at https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/EMG_chapt_13_august_26_2010.pdf.

  39. 39.

    Election certification usually includes documentation of reconciled precinct, vote center, and write-in ballot totals, including provisional and challenged ballots, UOCAVA ballots, any duplicated ballots, and an accounting for spoiled and rejected ballots.

  40. 40.

    Procedural audits should include a review and reconciliation of ballot accounting logs, voting system zero tapes from the beginning of election day and the results tapes from the end of the day, number of ballots cast, number of voters who signed in, number of provisional ballots, absentee and UOCAVA ballots, etc. All unusual incidents should be documented (such as spoiled ballots, challenged ballots, or voters signing in, but leaving without casting a ballot). All ballots should be accounted for and any discrepancies reconciled.

  41. 41.

    Sarah Bloom, “Uncounted Richmond Voting Machine Flips Attorney General’s Race.” NBC12.com., November 11, 2013, found at http://www.nbc12.com/story/23938466/uncounted-richmond-voting-machine-flips-attorney-generals-race/.

  42. 42.

    NPR/Marist Poll Results September (2018): Election Security, 25, found at http://maristpoll.marist.edu/?page_id=42883.

  43. 43.

    NPR/Marist Poll, 21.

  44. 44.

    Concerns about the vulnerability of election system ahead of the 2018 Midterms, Associated Press and NORC, 2 (October 2018), found at http://www.apnorc.org/PDFs/Harris%20Poll%20Survey%201/UChicago%20Harris%20APNORC%20Poll%201%20Final.pdf.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., 7.

  46. 46.

    While the federal government requires election materials to be retained for 22 months (42 U.S.C. § 1974), election officials need to have good retention policies to be able to recreate what has occurred to address any errors, or assuage and suspicion that something was awry.

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Correspondence to Christy McCormick .

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McCormick, C. (2020). Election Integrity in Ensuring Accuracy. In: Brown, M., Hale, K., King, B. (eds) The Future of Election Administration. Elections, Voting, Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14947-5_13

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