Skip to main content

The Political Context 2013–2018

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Italian General Election of 2018

Abstract

This chapter argues that explanations of the outcome of the potentially landmark election of 2018 require reference to general factors, including but going beyond Italy, as well as to factors specific to that country. And, as in the case of any election, the outcome (conceived as the shift in the distribution of parliamentary seats and therefore of power among parties) can be analysed by reference to the operation of three sets of factors: those that will explain the specific configuration of the parties and party coalitions among which voters are called upon to make their choices to begin with; the social and political events and processes driving their choices; the rules governing the translation of given vote distributions into given seat distributions. While none of the three can be analysed in isolation, in describing the long-term developments associated with each of them, the chapter provides an interpretation of the outcome that is organised in terms of these three categories.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    For the Chamber of Deputies parties had to achieve at least four percent of the valid vote nationally if they were running independently or as part of a coalition achieving less than ten percent, or else two percent if running as part of a coalition with more than ten percent. Seats were also available to the best-performing party below the two-percent threshold, and for the purposes of allocating the majority premium, the votes of all parties running as part of a given coalition would count, not just those of parties overcoming the thresholds.

  2. 2.

    On the grounds that the first was not linked to the achievement of any minimum proportion of the vote and the second deprived the voter of the right to express a preference among candidates.

  3. 3.

    ‘Compatibility’, meaning laws providing reasonable certainty that a majority in one chamber will also be a majority in the other, is a requirement of symmetric bicameralism. The Italicum, which came into force on 1 July 2016, had applied to the Chamber only (on the assumption that December’s referendum would result in popular endorsement for a package of constitutional reforms that included abolishing symmetrical bicameralism by limiting the Senate’s legislative powers and by depriving it of the power to remove governments from office through the confidence vote). It had envisaged a run-off ballot between the two most voted lists in the event that none achieved 40% of the vote nationally, with the winner being assigned a majority premium of 340 (or 54%) of the 630 seats, and the losers, provided they had won at least 3%, sharing 278. (The remaining 12 seats were assigned to the overseas constituency for Italians resident abroad.)

  4. 4.

    The Court’s judgement retained the majority premium provided for by the Italicum but abolished the run-off ballot and reduced the power of party leaders who would no longer be able to decide which of the colleges to represent in the event that they were elected in more than one of them. This, in future, would be decided by drawing lots.

References

  • Banca d’Italia. 2018. Survey on Household Income and Wealth—2016. https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/indagine-famiglie/bil-fam2016/index.html.

  • Bull, Martin J., and James L. Newell. 2009. Still the Anomalous Democracy? Politics and Institutions in Italy. Government and Opposition 44 (1): 42–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fabbrini, Sergio, and Marc Lazar. 2013. Still a Difficult Democracy? Italy Between Populist Challenges and Institutional Weakness. Contemporary Italian Politics 5 (2): 106–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Floridia, Antonio. 2018. Electoral Systems and Concepts of Democracy: Electoral Reform as a Permanent Policy Issue in the Italian Political System. Contemporary Italian Politics 10 (2): 112–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibelli, Antonio. 2010. Berlusconi passato alla storia: L’Italia nell’era della democrazia autoritaria. Roma: Donzelli editore.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hay, Colin. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ignazi, Piero. 1996. The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties. Party Politics 2 (4): 549–556.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. (2017), Party and Democracy: The Uneven Road to Party Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair. 2009. The Cartel Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives on Politics 7 (4): 753–766.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd, J. 2012. Beppe Grillo: The Anti-politics Politician. http://blogs.reuters.com/john-lloyd/2012/05/17/beppe-grillo-the-anti-politics-politician/. 17 May.

  • Mair, Peter. 1984. Party Politics in Contemporary Europe: A Challenge to Parties. West European Politics 7 (4): 170–183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Molina, Oscar, and Martin Rhodes. 2007. Industrial Relations and the Welfare State in Italy: Assessing the Potential of Negotiated Change. West European Politics 30 (4): 803–829.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pasquino, Gianfranco. 2016. The Second Republic That Never Was. In Crisis as a Permanent Condition? The Italian Political System Between Transition and Reform Resistance, ed. R. Kaiser and J. Edelmann, 99–111. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Pasquino, Gianfranco, and Marco Valbruzzi. 2012. Non-partisan Governments Italian-Style: Decision-Making and Accountability. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 17 (5): 612–629.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pasquino, Gianfranco, and Riccardo Pelizzo. 2016. Qual’è il parlamento piú produttivo? Casa della cultura. http://www.casadellacultura.it/431/qual-e-il-parlamento-piu-produttivo-.

  • Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Enquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. Houndmills: Macmillan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Urbani, G. 2009. Interview with Aldo Cazzullo, ‘Urbani: il progretto del “nuovo” Pdl? La debolezza del Pd ci contaggia’. Corriere della Sera: 6. 15 January.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vignati, R. 2013. La sfida del Movimento 5 stelle. In Politica in Italia, ed. A. Di Virgilio and C. M. Radaelli, 2013 ed., 83–99. Bologna: Il Mulino.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Newell, J.L. (2019). The Political Context 2013–2018. In: Ceccarini, L., Newell, J. (eds) The Italian General Election of 2018. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13617-8_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics