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The Dictator’s Knowledge Problem

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Economic and Political Institutions and Development

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Abstract

How does a dictator remain a dictator? Current economic models of dictatorship treat a dictator’s survival as a function of their ability to solve a simple utility maximization problem. These models make sense given the common assumption of complete information. But what about situations where dictators face incomplete information? When we move from theory to practice, the central problem is how a dictator finds the information so critical to his survival. This chapter analyzes the “dictator’s knowledge problem” with particular emphasis on the process through which a dictator discovers the necessary information to maintain his position of power. Three alternative information revelation mechanisms employed by “real world” dictators—legislatures, business and professional associations, and protests—are analyzed. The analysis clarifies these features of real-world dictatorships which are not explained by existing economic models. In doing so it explains why institutional arrangements that at first appear counterintuitive to the principles of dictatorship make sense when one realizes the primacy of the dictator’s knowledge problem.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

    Charity-Joy Acchiardo

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  1. Charity-Joy Acchiardo
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA

    Joshua C. Hall

  2. West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA

    Sara Harper

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Acchiardo, CJ. (2019). The Dictator’s Knowledge Problem. In: Hall, J., Harper, S. (eds) Economic and Political Institutions and Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06049-7_1

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