Abstract
The chapter identifies the ways Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has positioned itself as a member of international organizations and how it has used consequent rights and obligations to achieve its own foreign policy goals. It elaborates the foreign policy hardware that enables multilateral action for BiH, elucidates how BiH has contributed to forwarding international organizations’ missions, as well as how meeting international commitments has helped or hindered internal political consensus and consolidated foreign policy priorities and capacities. The analyzed memberships, in the United Nations (UN) and in the Council of Europe (CoE), clearly show that BiH’s diplomacy positioned itself as a recognizable actor among small European countries. The objectively limited foreign policy capacities were not an obstacle to the development of dynamic and moderately successful diplomatic activities that allowed BiH to punch above its international weight when necessary.
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Notes
- 1.
Interviews were conducted with the following diplomats: Ivan Barbalić—Ambassador, former BiH Ambassador to the UN; Josip Brkić—Ambassador, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Stability Pact Coordinator and head of Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI); Mirsada Čolaković—Ambassador, former BiH Ambassador to the UN and member of the mission; Muaz Dedajić—Minister-Counsellor—former member of the temporary Mission to the EU, member of the UN Department, member of the BiH Mission to UNESCO; Edin Dilberović— Ambassador, Director of the Directorate for European Integration, former head of BiH’s Mission to the OSCE; Dražen Gagulić—Minister-Counsellor, member of the BiH Mission to the UN in Geneva and BiH’s temporary Mission to the EU; Nedžad Hadžimusić—Ambassador, former Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs and head of RACVIAC; Azra Kalajdžisalihović—Ambassador, former Head of the UN Department; Branimir Mandić—Ambassador, former Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs and head of RACVIAC;. Miloš Prica—former BiH Ambassador to the UN and member of the mission; Almir Šahović—Ambassador, Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs, and former head of the BiH Mission to CoE.
- 2.
In 1994, the Republic of BiH acquired observer status in two international organizations with a large and varied membership—the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Although it was not interested in full membership, thanks to its observer status, BiH had access to these important diplomatic forums and a large number of countries it would otherwise not have the opportunity or capacity to approach bilaterally. BiH is also an associate or observer member in three other international organizations—OIF—Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, BIPM—Bureau international des poids et mesures, and AU—African Union.
- 3.
A recent example is a question asked by Saša Magazinović, Member of the Parliament, in September 2017 about the amounts paid for individual memberships and an estimate of the benefits of membership. The response submitted by the Council of Ministers of BiH included the amounts of membership fees paid in 2017 and noted that a cost-benefit analysis of the memberships was conducted in 2014–2015, and that the ‘joint position of the ministries and institutions was that memberships in international organisations are more than justified, that they are of signal importance for each individual institution and that the benefits of membership are multifaceted, which is why the payment of contributions should not be brought into question.’—Response of the Council of Ministers to the delegate question of Saša Magazinović issued on December 28, 2017 (05-50-1-2544/17).
- 4.
- 5.
The Department for Economic Multilateral Relations and Reconstruction at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains records on international membership fees and prepares budget projections of BiH institutions for meeting the financial obligations issuing from international treaties on membership in international organizations (programs, initiatives, and associations). The payment order is forwarded to the BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, with the invoice from the international organization attached.
- 6.
When it comes to politically appointed ambassadors, respondents from the profession particularly point out as problematic the time that is effectively lost on familiarizing heads of missions with their tasks, the mandate, and rules of the organization where they represent BiH and their general socialization in diplomatic life. Both the heads and the staff at missions report that management within the mission is often undermined and compromised precisely due to the lack of diplomatic experience of the head of mission. The heads of missions, for their part, complain about understaffing and being prevented from participating in the selection of their associates, that is, members of the mission. Ambassadors do not participate in selecting members of the mission and are unable to request terminations based on performance, except in the event of more serious disciplinary violations. The only exception is the technical/local staff that may be engaged, subject to approval by MFA BiH, at the insistence of the heads of mission, and the hiring of interns.
- 7.
Although the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an Office for Training, the existing level of professional education and training is not tailored to the needs of multilateral relations. The training provided to appointed heads of missions, both bilateral and multilateral, is general in nature, while familiarization with the portfolio takes place within the desk. Diplomats preparing for a mission at an international organization point out that learning with and from colleagues forms the most important part of their preparations. A spontaneous and informal internal capacity-building has been created among diplomats, developing professional solidarity, collegiality and information-sharing. Still, there is no organized or systematic approach to training or specialization.
- 8.
The symbolic message of the international community and the UN standing behind Bosnian independence would be brutally put to the test in BiH itself, and in international forums where the act of international recognition became the only capital of the war-engulfed country and leverage for its survival. Throughout its history, the UN has had numerous successes and failures in its peace operations, but it was only the tragic scale of the crimes and genocide in Rwanda and BiH that brought changes to the peacekeeping culture developed within the UN Secretariat, a body ‘that professed humanitarian goals [but] used peacekeeping rules to conclude that a humanitarian intervention was not warranted to stop crimes against humanity’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 122).
- 9.
The Mission to the UN had to particularly focus on engaging with numerous UN resolutions, attempts to lift the UN arms embargo from September 1991 (established by UNSC Resolution 713) that affected mostly the Bosnian government, identifying and protecting UN safe areas (Srebrenica, established in April 1993 by UNSC Resolution 819, and another in May 5 of the same year by UNSC Resolution 824), as well as bilateral information and lobbying with a large number of UN Member States who had automatically transferred their foreign policy sympathies and friendship with SFRY to the rump state of Yugoslavia. Although the UN did not lift the embargo, and the Bosnian Serb military and police forces committed genocide in the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa, this should not be understood as a failure of BiH diplomacy, because it was a failure of the UN system in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 122).
- 10.
Recognizing and upholding ICTY judgments, as well as the continuation of support for the work of the Mechanism for International Crime Tribunals are also part of the most recent EU Enlargement Strategy published in February 2018.
- 11.
Ambassador Sacirbey also became Bosnia’s Agent before the International Court of Justice, leading the country’s genocide case against Serbia/Montenegro from 1993 to 2001.
- 12.
The chapter by Tanya L. Domi and Davor Petrić elaborates on this further.
- 13.
Views in BiH were divided. The Bosniak Member of the Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović, following the advice of MFA BiH, was in favor of rejecting the decision, that is, supporting the resolution, while the President of the Republic of Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, demanded that the Serb Member of the Presidency, Mladen Ivanić, ensure the support of BiH for the decision, that is, its vote against the resolution. Given the unprecedented threats issued by the current US administration to countries supporting the resolution and the special relationship of BiH with the US , abstaining was, in fact, the only rational choice from the perspective of BiH’s national interest.
- 14.
The Council of Ministers expanded the staffing positions at MFA BiH and established a new section for relations with the UNSC, while additional diplomatic and technical staff was employed at the Mission in New York. The Ministry of Finance provided the budget, and the BiH Presidency set up a special team of advisors who coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure complete information and participation of Members of the BiH Presidency in daily activities.
- 15.
The CoE opened the Office of the Secretariat of the CoE in BiH in April 1996 in Sarajevo, based on Annex 6 (Agreement on Human Rights) of the DPA, under which it was to contribute to the establishment of the Human Rights Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, help the Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman and appoint foreign judges in accordance with Annexes 4 and 7. In addition to providing active assistance with the implementation of Annex 6, the task of the Office initially was to help prepare BiH to reach the standards necessary for full membership in the CoE while also promoting the organization’s values.
- 16.
Radovan Karadžić was arrested after 13 years of being a fugitive, on July 21, 2008, in Belgrade, and Ratko Mladić three years later, on May 26, 2011, in Lazarevo, Serbia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted to CoE a year after BiH, in April 2003.
- 17.
Following addresses by the political rapporteur Laszlo Surjan and the legal rapporteur Anneli Jaatenmaki at the plenary session of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly on January 22, 2003, who recommended admitting BiH, the prevailing logic was that the political situation in the country could be more readily influenced through membership mechanisms.
- 18.
Although the parliamentary delegation of neighboring Croatia supported admitting BiH, one member of the delegation, a representative from HDZ, Zdravka Bušić, voted against it. Bušić was later a member of the European Parliament, representing HDZ, from 2013 to 2014, and today she is the State Secretary at the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.
- 19.
The first judge from BiH (2004–2011) was a professor of law from Banja Luka, Ljiljana Mijović. Currently, Faris Vehabović is the BiH member of ECHR. Of the 668 employees at the Court Registry, five are BiH nationals.
- 20.
Cases can be brought to the Court against one or more states that are bound by the Convention, by individuals, companies, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) having a complaint about a violation of their rights. States can also bring cases against one another, but that almost never happens.
- 21.
For integrated and updated information on applications and court proceedings, see http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_ENG.pdf
- 22.
Working with domestic bodies found to have violated a right protected by the Convention and bodies responsible for implementing judgments was particularly demanding also because of the fact that the European Convention and access to the ECtHR were complete novelties for BiH, since the former Yugoslavia had not been a member of CoE or a party to the Convention. The Office of the Agent, established at the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, was thus additionally engaged in activities of informing and organizing primary education for various judicial bodies in BiH about this new normative framework and has particularly contributed to raising the level of overall capacity and quality of judicial institutions in BiH.
- 23.
Although, ten years earlier, in a similar case regarding savings at Ljubljanska Bank, the ECtHR did not find Slovenia responsible, in the case of Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia which concerned the applicants’ inability to recover ‘old’ foreign currency savings—deposited with two banks in what is now BiH—it found Slovenia to be responsible and obliged it to repay the depositors from BiH and other countries.
- 24.
The Sejdić-Finci Group of judgments includes the judgments in Pilav v. BiH and Zornić v. BiH, which are also concerned with discrimination in electoral rights.
- 25.
BiH is by no means the only country admonished by the Committee of Ministers for failing to implement judgments, especially when it comes to judgments requiring major constitutional changes. It cannot be said that politicians in BiH have been ignoring this issue, or that there is no long-term intention to solve it, because all concrete attempts and various political ideas about how to reform the Dayton constitution start from the need to implement these judgments.
- 26.
In the period from 2010 to 2014, the BiH Delegation did not elect a Head of Delegation.
- 27.
The BiH Presidency decides on candidates in line with its constitutional competences and the decision on the procedure for nominating and appointing BiH representatives to international organizations and institutions.
- 28.
In the same period, neighboring Serbia presided over the OSCE.
- 29.
The chairmanship was accompanied by a host of cultural, arts, and other promotional events within the organization and in Strasbourg, initiated and organized by MFA BiH, but actively supported by other levels of government and the BiH business community. The chairmanship provided an opportunity for greater flexibility and innovation and was used to strengthen and demonstrate potential for long-term cooperation of relevant state bodies and stakeholders.
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Džananović, N. (2019). BiH’s Engagement in Multilateral Fora: Key Foreign Policy Positions Within International Organizations. In: Hasić, J., Karabegović, D. (eds) Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Foreign Policy Since Independence. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05654-4_3
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