Abstract
While governance in multilevel systems involves many processes, legislation at the upper jurisdictional level is at its core. The lower levels of jurisdiction are represented at the upper level through a second legislative chamber. The exact competences of the second versus the first chamber are indicative of the degree of integration of a multilevel system. This chapter explores the evolution of the relationship of the two chambers in the European Union: the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The authors develop an empirical approach to evaluate the gradual change of their relative legislative influence. The Consultation, Cooperation and Codecision II procedures are analysed for the period from 1976–2009, covering the most important changes. Parliament has clearly gained influence on legislation through Cooperation and, most prominently, Codecision II. Whereas a unanimous Council could mostly have its will in Consultation, Parliament and Council are on equal footing in Codecision II.
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Notes
- 1.
Most of the larger federal states follow a modified Senate’s model (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Australia, India).
- 2.
Belgium and Austria do not have a Senate but their second chamber is built on legislative representation.
- 3.
With some exceptions, e.g. the House of Representatives has full sovereignty in budgetary matters; the Senate is sovereign in respect to ratification of international treaties and consent to members of the presidential administration. Again, there is great variation across countries in detail.
- 4.
We do not analyse Codecision I because it was applied only for a short period (1993–1999) and its scope of application was rather limited.
- 5.
If an institution does not act on a proposal, we treat this in the same way as acceptance, because it has the same effect.
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Holzinger, K., Biesenbender, J. (2019). The Evolution of Legislative Power-Sharing in the EU Multilevel System. In: Behnke, N., Broschek, J., Sonnicksen, J. (eds) Configurations, Dynamics and Mechanisms of Multilevel Governance. Comparative Territorial Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05511-0_18
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