Abstract
In his obituary on Mach, Einstein, (Physikalische Zeitschrift, 1916) asked, “It is difficult – and perhaps also not very important – to answer the question: “What has Mach taught, which was principally new relative to Bacon and Hume?” Mach’s teaching had such an influence on people like Einstein that it fundamentally changed their way of thinking. Is this effect reproducible, and if so, how? For answering this question, one needs to research into the historical-genetic origins of Mach’s erkenntnis-theory and its difference to other erkenntnis-theories, namely Platonism and Pythagoreanism. Mach’s empirical-genetic erkenntnis-theory is the only one consistent with the requirements of evolutionary theory, especially regarding psychology and pedagogy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Many people have asked the question, what was different in Mach’s thinking regarding physics. But this question is not specific enough. It was not Mach who developed relativity theory and quantum physics. Mach changed the thinking of the people who did. So, to get a meaningful answer to why these developments happen and how, one has to ask, what it was in Mach’s teaching that enabled others to develop such ideas. Then, one can ask – like Einstein did – if one can replicate this transformative effect on the science of physics in maybe any area of knowledge.
- 2.
Newton intuitively adopted these concepts. Space and time were conceptually separated by Parmenides. Plato established Parmenides’ view as standard and introduced the separation of absolute ideas and sensual (relative) ideas. Aristotle made this metaphysical theory of his teacher into a more physical (less religious) theory by keeping the separation of space and time and separating each into universal form and factual (relative) application. This Platonist theory of Aristotle was then kept as a theoretical basis for Descartes, Newton, Kant, etc.
This theory and its arbitrary metaphysical separations were already criticized in Presocratic times and by Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Siemsen 2017c; Kessler 2011). After the fall of the Roman Empire, it was first criticized by the Oxford calculators after more of the partly lost classical scientific literature became available again, especially the more empirical works of Aristotle, but also Alexander of Aphrodisias. The criticism on the inconsistencies in the Platonist Aristotle was repeated by Gauss, probably in their tradition (see Siemsen 2017d). Beneke had probably discussed this with Gauss in Goettingen, where Hegel had driven him into exile. Beneke (with a brief hint to Gauss) then used the same criticism on Kant’s concept of space and time (Kant adopted it from Newton, see Siemsen 2017a) that Mach later applied to Newton. Mach then also (co-) found the “inner ear”, the labyrinthine organ for space perception. Thereby, contrary to Platonist/Descartian/Newtonian/Kantian assumptions, space is not innate/a priori, but sensually perceived. Geometrical concepts are gestalts from these sensual elements.
- 3.
Why did Mach not do this himself? Probably because the answers provided by Einstein and Planck did not satisfy him. For Mach, they are like interims answers, which contain new unanswered questions, such as empirical/erkenntnis-psychological questions regarding the relation to the senses (physics far away from the daily experience of our senses results in a “bizarreness” dimension of theories). On the one hand, according to Mach’s erkenntnis-theory, each theory is only temporary. On the other hand, each theory tends to cement this interim view in the long run more than is helpful for the scientific process. It is probably this effect that Mach criticized in Newton that he feared happening again for a new theory. Thereby, Mach saw his role more in the methodological process than in the product (thus his Erkenntnis und Irrtum, Mach 1905/1906).
- 4.
Some of the inventors of important scientific concepts inspired by Mach’s teaching: Mautner developed linguistic theory, Otto Neurath the ISOTYPES, von Ehrenfels/Max Wertheimer the Gestalt psychology, Richard Semon (1923) the Mneme, Alfred Binet the Mental Orthopedics (Siemsen et al. 2017), Robert Oppenheimer the Exploratorium science museum, Catharine Stern (1953) the Structural Arithmetic, Georgescu-Roegen the environmental economics, Kaarle Kurki-Suonio the science education in Finland, Martin Cernohorsky many eminent persons in Czech society (scientists, politicians, entrepreneurs, see Siemsen 2011c) or Robert Musil wrote his dissertation on Mach and received the Nobel Prize for literature. Many more less known examples of the effects of Mach’s transformative teaching can for instance be found in the late books of Blackmore et al. (2009, 2010a, b; see Siemsen 2011b).
- 5.
Einstein’s “generation” seems focused on the more eminent Nobel laureates, etc. Here the transformative effect can be traced in detail (see also Siemsen 2014). Mach’s teaching influence furthermore involved hundreds of people from academia. One could also count the millions of students who read Mach’s school books in physics (Hohenester 1988). As there was no OECD PISA comparison, any transformative effects on thinking cannot be traced. Nevertheless, from the effects of Mach-type teaching by Kurki-Suonio and in specific schools, exponential teaching effects are probable (see Siemsen 2011a; see Drucker 1979, or Herdan-Zuckmayer, 1979/1983, for a detailed exemplary account, though they might be partly due to the influence of Beneke via Avenarius, Schwarzwald and Dittes, see Siemsen and Reschke 2013). The intellectual dominance of German speaking physicists can thus only be regarded as a small part of what resulted from Mach’s teaching.
- 6.
Mach had a more general concept of knowledge, where knowledge is a general property of all of nature.
- 7.
Logical empiricism in a way is a more modern version of Porphyrios’ synthesis of Platonist/Pythagorean “logical naturalism”, as will be shown later. The important similarity is not that logic and nature are combined, but that logic comes before empiry, while in evolutionary theory it has to be a genetic result of it. The genetic process/order is distorted.
- 8.
Parmenides in his poem, which is considered the foundation of logic, already takes this anti-evolutionary approach in his distinction between “what-is” and “what-is-not”. He lets “the goddess” proclaim, “So it has to be either total and whole or not at all. Even the power of proof will not allow that something will appear besides what-is-not; thereby Dike has not loosened her fetters and did not allow it to come-to-be or perish, but she holds it tight” (Gemelli Martiano 2013, p. 21).
Dike is the ancient Greek personification of judgement. Logic therefore, right from its beginning, is tied to a concept of knowledge that is fixed and religious, founded in belief, not in science. This is probably the reason why logicists had and still have a hard time in consistently integrating an evolutionary concept of knowledge. As Beneke (1842) has already described in detail, linking logic and a creationist concept of knowledge is not necessary. It is an arbitrary synthesis. Like in biology, some genes are transmitted, because they are close to some highly advantageous genes on the string of DNA, even if the effect of the genes is disadvantageous for survival.
- 9.
The concept of what is “empirical” thereby also transforms empirically. The usages here already hint in this direction.
- 10.
See Cole (2000) for the usage of these concepts from Jerome Bruner.
- 11.
It is not clear, if the model only showed the sphere of the stars from the model or the sphere and the universe as well. Only late in his life, Thales was able to measure the approximate distance of the sun by measuring how often the sun fitted into the half-sphere it made around the earth. Thereby, it was due to his student Anaximander to write about the new consistent cosmological model derived from this knowledge (as basically no original texts have survived from both of them, it is difficult to distinguish their models and the development of them by the secondary doxographic sources). Anaximander then used the “cut-open” world sphere as a basis for drawing the first world-map as part of this model.
- 12.
This is also observable for the Oxford Calculators.
- 13.
The concept of “practical theory” was developed by the gestalt theorist Kurt Lewin on the basis of Mach’s erkenntnis-theory.
- 14.
In this, like with Mach, one can observe that the gestalts necessary for this way of thinking are not easily replicated or reinvented independently. A genetic analysis is thereby possible, but also necessary. The pedagogical element, that the fundamental ideas of the teacher will reappear as basic gestalts in the ideas of the student, is often overlooked in the historical analysis. This is also a requirement of gradual evolution in the area of human culture. As Mach noted, ideas do not fall from heaven, they only grow on fertile fields.
- 15.
The Pythagoreans believed that all experience could be traced back to numbers by a chain of proofs. Mathematical objects were thus ideal entities. They were also physical. The world was number (see Hermann 2004).
- 16.
The cosmological model of Anaximander and probably Thales before him included a sphere of fire around the sphere of the stars. The sun, moon and stars were holes in the inner sphere, through which one could see the light of this fire-sphere. For somebody used to Thales/Anaximander cosmology the Pythagorean cosmology is not very different. It involves some more observational knowledge from later times, though, such as seeing the planets as objects fundamentally differing from the stars.
- 17.
Probably also the ratio of passing the mathematikoi/“mathematics” test is similar: about 10–20% tend to be regarded as understanding mathematics by their teachers nowadays (assuming with Popper that today’s education system is essentially Platonist, see later). If one takes the initial mathematics tests at universities (with about 65% failure rate, at least in Germany), only a small fraction of students (less than 10%) pass Pythagoras’/Plato’s hurdle and can actually begin to study. The rest are sieved out at different levels beforehand. If taught with a Machian empirical-genetic pedagogy, in principle all (i.e. 100%) can pass, i.e. understand mathematics (see Siemsen, K.H. et al. 2014).
- 18.
Katabasis probably derived as a sub-tradition from Asclepios dealing with the treatment of the soul. This psychological function of medicine was taken over by the initiatory cults after Hippocrates split psychophysiological medicine and focused on dealing with the physiology only.
- 19.
This was seemingly influenced by observations of the Spartan system of paideia, i.e. their system of selecting and educating soldiers (see Jaeger 1933/1959, I: pp. 378). In Plato’s Laws, an Athenian discusses education with a Spartan. The Athenian admires the military quality of the Spartan soldiers, but criticizes the inability of the Spartan system to also produce effective administrators.
- 20.
Plato explicitly describes the motive of God/demiurgos/craftsman, who makes a copy of his ideal world (i.e. the ideally moving universe). But the copy is slightly faulty. Humans are faulty copies. These mistakes accumulate over time. Evolution/history is thus a “devolution” process in which everything degrades, especially human society. His Republic is the idea that by reintroducing the initial perfect ideas and deliberately preventing any change, one can keep the ideal, or at least as close to it as possible. For this, any changes in ideas or any new ideas have to be prevented by education/paideia.
In the analysis of Popper, Plato implicitly wants to reinstate the power his family once had/his own power (see Popper 1944/1980 in his The Open Society and Its Enemies for a detailed analysis of this hypothesis). The aristocracy in Athens lost their political primacy to the democratic culture/form of government. The Spartans even subdued Athens with the help of the old aristocratic elites like Plato’s. But through their puppet government from the old elite and even with Socrates’ and Plato’s students as tyrants, they were not able to prevent democracy for more than a few years.
In as much as this plan against democracy failed, Plato sees the only possibility in destroying the whole culture in order to rebuild an autocratic utopia with philosophers and a philosopher king as an oligarchy (which is supposedly staffed by Plato’s friends and relations as he envisions). He was very successful with this goal. Unfortunately, he still is until today. As Popper already noted, Plato’s pedagogy still dominates Western Culture and continues to create existential trouble for democracy (see Siemsen 2017a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). The goal of preventing any new ideas also implies the prevention of science and technology as Mach noted against Planck (see Siemsen 2010).
- 21.
Plato leaves nothing to chance. All his concepts, even the seemingly most unimportant are carefully adapted for leading into a mental frame/cage of concepts. “Getting out” of Plato’s famous cave thus does not lead into freedom of thought, but into mental imprisonment. The cage is carefully made from rubber so that one does not notice its limitations too much until one gets used to it (see Siemsen 2017a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h).
- 22.
Plato defines “oligarchy” only as an oligarchy of wealth, while the ideal philosophers live in a kind of commune “sharing everything” like the Pythagoreans.
- 23.
Aristotle criticizes Plato’s ideal ideas, but adopts them in a down-scaled version of universal forms.
- 24.
For a detailed analysis on the development of Plato’s psychology, see Siemsen (2017e).
- 25.
As Plato readers will know, Plato is of course too clever to describe a world without sensual experience. But he chooses his examples not empirically, i.e. selectively according to his political purposes. Already his student Aristotle indirectly criticized Plato for this. Heraclitus (Kahn 1979, fragment XXV) invented the term of “kakotechnie”, i.e. the technique/art of doing evil, by Pythagoras for applying knowledge for indirect manipulation explicitly against the interests and motives of the learner (from whom Plato adopted it). Popper called this Plato’s “charm” or magic. What Plato states openly and also what he states indirectly are not what he means. His intention, like the intention of the Pythagoreans, was to keep the real motives as hidden as possible, but distinguishable/knowable for the initiated. Parmenides used this method to initiate logic (which is still based on his “magic”). Later Isocrates was an expert at this hiding-motives approach optimized by rhetorical smokescreening.
- 26.
The system reminds one of the academic system in some countries (like in Germany) of becoming full professor. Even Pythagoras’ five years of silence for becoming a member of his inner circle (mathematikoi instead of akusmatikoi) is still mirrored by the five years one tends to need for a doctoral study.
- 27.
The calculators used more the Greek natural philosophy concept of physis and mathematics (like from Thales and Anaximander), where there is no strong Platonist division between the two, because of a common erkenntnis-psychology as the basis. In this philosophy, the physical and the mathematical are two perspectives which can be methodologically combined into a common process (like walking on two legs as Mach suggested).
- 28.
Empirical-genetic is used in order to include what Mach called the “economy” of thoughts/processes. The “origin” (archae) makes a larger part of the process in a gestalt (about 70% according already to Aristotle). “Genetic” emphasizes this “spacetime” process view in the empirical/sensual approach.
- 29.
As Jerome Bruner (2004) observed in retrospect, the most important factor in the behavior of his rats in a maze was not the food as motivator. Instead, the behavior of the rats depended upon his daughter playing with the rat beforehand or not. Unfortunately, he did not publish this observation at the time, because he feared that this empirical result would hurt the metaphysical ideology of his fellow Behaviorists too much for his own good. The gestalt psychologist Wertheimer had already observed (only half-jokingly) that the Behaviorist rats from German professors were rather deep thinkers, pondering long before entering their maze, while the US American rats were pragmatic like their professors and tended to go for their maze task without much ado. In terms of pain and pleasure, the maze tasks were similar.
- 30.
This effect has become even a management tool under the label of “gamification”. The management pulls the Platonist strings by immediately rewarding or punishing the behavior of the employees with allotting points. The idea is not new, but adapted from piece-work pay.
- 31.
Such computer games often do not have the function of learning, but of relaxing because of their ability to distract. But this distraction can also become a waste of time. Computer- or boardgames can instead be used as sophisticated learning tools, especially when combined with gestalt theory, gestalt pedagogy and an erkenntnis-theory that makes the intuitions from the games explicit and analogously applicable to other areas, such as mathematics (see Siemsen 2017d).
- 32.
Plato has a “frame” of concepts, which is designed to keep thinking within it. Mach suggested the concept of a conceptual manifold. Mathematically, one could describe such a manifold as a set, which is probably closest to popular understanding. Wittenberg (1957) uses the concept of “Begriffsgefuege”, i.e. conceptual fabric. Mach and Wittenberg stress the aspect of the structure of the relations between the concepts. A “set” seems empirically more open to adaptations.
- 33.
It is a fundamental “feature” of this framework, that it disguises metaphysics as being empirical. Thus, all “realist” approaches are metaphysical and have “nothing to do with the world”, only superficially, seen from an empirical-genetic perspective (see also Siemsen 2017e).
- 34.
In echocardiography, for example, today there are detailed imaging of inner physiological processes, such as blood flows, etc. Physicians new to this field first must learn that there are structures visible on the screen, which “exist” only because of the “interpretation” of the software, but have no correlate in the body. Also, physiological structures not observable on the screen might cause problems. Such “artifacts” are a result of the programmers using the most probable “interpretation” for the software, like humans use in their gestalts the most probable/suggestive/currently associated interpretation.
- 35.
Heinrich Gomperz even organized a discussion circle as “Sokratiker-Kreis” in which he took the role of the Pythagorean Simmias (Stadler 1994).
- 36.
Beneke taught empirical philosophy in Berlin, but he had to go into exile by decree of the Prussian ministry on behalf of his “colleague” Hegel. When Beneke was tacitly allowed to return, he was not paid for lecturing (though he was obliged to pay the fee for the professor’s widows fund).
- 37.
These are mainly Kant and Hegel at the times. It is probably interesting to note that Bolzano has already criticized Kant and Hegel, while Popper criticized Plato and Hegel. Popper’s criticism of Hegel is mainly the same as Bolzano’s (of using only rhetoric without philosophical substance). Popper’s criticism of Plato in his The Open Society and Its Enemies is more substantial than the Hegel critique. He was probably heavily influenced in his perception of Plato by Heinrich and his father Theodor Gomperz.
- 38.
See also the letters between Mach and Brentano (Thiele 1978). They know that their erkenntnis-theories are different, although they respect each other’s views. Mach was asked to take the chair at the University of Vienna, which was strongly associated with Brentano. Brentano took his erkenntnis-theory from Bolzano.
- 39.
As Beneke (1842) analyzed erkenntnis-psychologically in detail, this process is quite different from the simplifying assumptions of Pythagoras and Plato.
- 40.
The defense of rational/logical thinking by Bolzano, Husserl, Popper, Carnap and others, even sacrificing empirical necessities for their understanding of logos, is thereby not a sign of a scientific attitude, but the opposite in two respects: taking one understanding of a concept as absolute without reflecting why and putting religious beliefs a priori before science. Already Aristotle was more careful with the concept-relation of “logos and error”. Mach uses the concept of logos as adaptive and transformative erkenntnis, not as absolutistically judging rationality (see also William James 1884/1912). Pythagoreans can be very pragmatic in many details, much more than Platonists, but also dogmatic in their fundamentals (see Siemsen 2017h for a detailed analysis regarding the example of Popper).
- 41.
It is somewhat surprising that it was formalism that did away with the assumption that truth is a necessary concept for mathematical systems (Wittenberg 1957, p. 299).
- 42.
The genetic origin of this still needs to be researched. Bolzano’s origins in Bohemia with its link to the Oxford Calculators via Hus or Bolzano’s family origins in Italy might provide some hints. Also, a connection to the historians and mathematicians in Goettingen (Meiners, Gauss) might be possible.
- 43.
Mach wrote similar schoolbooks for physics. These were in use over decades in German-speaking states. The books introduced his adaptive and transformative concepts to, what Einstein’s (1916) called his “generation of physicists” heavily influenced by Mach. Mach published some of his popular science articles in newspapers.
Zimmermann wrote an article about the need of teaching empirical psychology in schools for a newspaper. Because of this, the Austrian ministry of education introduced such courses and asked Zimmermann to write a schoolbook on the topic. The book was in use over a long time and thus influenced many generations of Austrian high-school students.
- 44.
Gomperz quoted in Haller et al. (1994, p.61). It is somewhat puzzling that Gomperz sees the most disputed philosophical question of the time as “uncontradicted” (unwidersprochen). It is doubly puzzling, as Frege based his main discussion regarding the separation of psychology and logic on attacking Mill. Gomperz’s father was known for being the translator of Mill’s works into German. Why did Gomperz relapse to Platonist psychology when he often before used Mach’s? Why did he not defend Mill, siding instead with the Platonist Frege? Similar inner inconsistencies can be observed in Popper (see Siemsen 2017h). But then, Popper had learned from Gomperz.
- 45.
Mach (1896/1923/1987).
- 46.
He seems only lukewarm to the idea in the first place, but he sees no alternative.
- 47.
Carnap (1969, p. vii) still uses partly the Platonist frame for interpreting Mach’s elements. He assumes with Parmenides that these elements are “data” in the sense that an element could be abstracted from its genesis, i.e. its time dimension. But one cannot abstract time from spacetime. Even for Carnap’s revised elements, Kaila’s criticism applies, Carnap still destroys the “inner structure” of Mach’s elements as Gestalts. With his Frege/Platonist/Pythagorean view, he does not see that Mach’s elements are Gestalts (process and product).
- 48.
Mach later tried to change the English subtitle of his Mechanics into historical-genetic instead of critical and historical (see letters from Mach to McCormack in the archive of The Open Court in Bloomingdale).
References
Bacon, F. (1620/1960). The Great Instauration. The New Organon. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
Beneke, F. E. (1833/1861/1877). Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft. Berlin: Mittler.
Beneke, F.E., Erziehungs- und Unterrichtslehre. Erster Band: Erziehungslehre, Ernst-Siegfried Mittler, Berlin, 1835
Beneke, F.E., Erziehungs- und Unterrichtslehre: Zweiter Band: Unterrichtslehre, Ernst-Siegfried Mittler, Berlin, 1836/1842
Beneke, F. E. (1838/2003). Philosophie und Psychologie. Manuscript published by Pettoello, R., Milano: Editioni Universitarie di Lettre Economia Diritto.
Beneke, F. E. (1840). System der Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie aus den natürlichen Grundverhältnissen des menschlichen Geistes abgeleitet. Berlin: Dümmler.
Beneke, F. E. (1842). System der Logik als Kunstlehre des Denkens. Berlin: Dümmler.
Blackmore, J. T., Itagaki, R., & Tanaka, S. (2009). Ernst Mach’s Influence Spreads. Bethesda, MD: Sentinel Open Press.
Blackmore, J. T., Itagaki, R., & Tanaka, S. (2010a). Ernst Mach’s Graz. Bethesda, MD: Sentinel Open Press.
Blackmore, J. T., Itagaki, R., & Tanaka, S. (2010b). Ernst Mach’s Prague. Bethesda, MD: Sentinel Open Press.
Blackmore, J. T. & Hentschel, K. (1985). Ernst Mach als Aussenseiter. Vienna: Braumüller.
Bolzano, B. (1837). Wissenschaftslehre. Versuch einer ausfuehrlichen und groesstentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Ruecksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter. Sulzbach: Seidelsche Buchhandlung.
Broadie, A. (2001/2011). The Scottish Enlightenment. Edinburgh: Birlinn.
Bruner, J. (2004). A Short History of Psychological Theories of Learning. Daedalus 133/1 Winter 2004: 13–20.
Carnap, R. The logical structure of the world: pseudoproblems in philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967
Cole, M. (2000). Bruner and Hybridity. Talk Presented at the Meeting of the American Anthropological Association. San Francisco, Nov. 17th 2000.
Drucker, P. F. (1979). Adventures of a Bystander. Harper & Row: New York.
Ehrenfels, C. von (1890). Über Gestaltqualitäten. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
Einstein, A. (1916). Ernst Mach. Physikalische Zeitschrift, 17/7, 1st of April: 101–104.
Gaukroger, S. (2001). Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haller, R., Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper und die österreichische Philosophie, in: Stadler, F., Seiler, W. (Ed.), Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper und die österreichische Philosophie, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1994 (Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie 22), 47–67
Herdan-Zuckmayer, A. (1979/1983). Genies sind im Lehrplan nicht vorgesehen. Fischer: Frankfurt/M.
Hermann, A. (2004). To Think Like God. Pythagoras and Parmenides. The Origins of Philosophy. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Hohenester, A. (1988). Ernst Mach als Didaktiker, Lehrbuch- und Lehrplanverfasser. In: Haller, R. & Stadler, F. (Eds.), Ernst Mach Werk und Wirkung. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempski.
Jaeger, W. (1933/1959). Paideia. Vol. I-III. Berlin: Gruyter. (an English version is available translated from the second edition)
James, W. (1884/1912). Absolutism and Empiricism. In: Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Longmans, Green: 266–280.
Kaila, E.: Der logistische Neupositivismus: eine kritische Studie, Turku 1930
Kessler, E. (2011). Alexander of Aphrodisias and his Doctrine of the Soul. 1400 Years of Lasting Significance. Early Science and Medicine 16: 1–93.
Kahn, Ch. H. (1979). The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kurki-Suonio, K. (2011). Principles Supporting the Perceptional Teaching of Physics: A “Prac-tical Teaching Philosophy”. Science & Education, 20: 211–243.
Kusch, M. (1996). Psychologism. A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Locke, J. (1690/2014). An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Herfordshire: Wordsworth.
Luchins, A. S. & Luchins E. H. (1959). Rigidity of Behavior. A Variational Approach to the Effect of Einstellung. University of Oregon.
Mach, E. (1866). Einleitung in die Helmholtz’sche Musiktheorie – Populär für Musiker dargestellt. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky.
Mach, E. (1883/1888). Transformation and Adaptation in Scientific Thought. The Open Court: Jul 12 1888, 2/46, APS Online IIA.
Mach, E. (1890). Über das psychologische und logische Moment im Naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht. Zeitschrift für den physikalischen und chemischen Unterricht, 4/1, October 1890: 1–5.
Mach, E. (1896/1923/1987). Populär-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen. Wien: Böhlau.
Mach, E. (1905/1906/2011). Erkenntnis und Irrtum: Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung. Nemeth, E., Stadler, F. (eds.), Ernst Mach Studienausgabe Band 2. Berlin: XENOMOI.
Gemelli Martiano, M. L. (2013). Die Vorsokratiker. Vol. 2. Berlin: Akademie.
Popper. K. R. (1944/1980). Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde. I, II. Tübingen: Francke.
Semon, R. (1923). Mnemic Psychology. London: Allen & Unwin.
Shubin, N. (2008/2009). Your Inner Fish. A Journey into the 3.5-Billion-Year History of the Human Body. New York: Vintage.
Siemsen, H. (2010). The Mach-Planck debate revisited: Democratization of science or elite knowledge? Public Understanding of Science, 19/3: 293–310.
Siemsen, H. (2011a). Ernst Mach and the Epistemological Ideas Specific for Finnish Science Education. Science & Education, 20: 245–291.
Siemsen, H. (2011b). John T. Blackmore: Two Recent Trilogies on Ernst Mach. In: McGuinness, B. F. (ed.), Friedrich Waismann. Causality and Logical Positivism. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Vol. 15, Springer: 311–321.
Siemsen, H. (2011c). Mach’s Science Education, the PISA Study and Czech Science Education. In: Mizerova, A. (Ed.) Ernst Mach: Fyzika – Filosofie – Vzdělávání. Brno: Masaryk University Press, in print.
Siemsen, H. (2014). Ernst Mach: A Genetic Introduction to His Educational Theory and Pedagogy. In: Matthews, M. (ed.), International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Vol. III, Springer: Frankfurt (M.).: 2329–2358.
Siemsen, H. (2017a). The Transformation of Mind. Robertson, Beneke, Mach and the Empirical Genetic World View. working paper.
Siemsen, H. (2017b). Plato’s Education for Preventing Thinking. working paper.
Siemsen, H. (2017c). The empirical-genetic world view: Presocratics, Aristotle, Beneke, Mach. working paper.
Siemsen, H. (2017d). Foundations of Mathematics: Intuitionism and the Inconsistency from Parmenides. working paper.
Siemsen, H. (2017e). Mach’s Origins in Beneke and Their Origins in Aristotle vs. Plato. working paper.
Siemsen, H. (2017f). Ernst Mach, Friedrich Eduard Beneke and Kant: Erkenntnis-theory and Education. Presented at the Kant Congress “Nature and Freedom”, Vienna, 21.-25. September 2015, Book of Abstracts, p. 151. In print for the conference proceedings.
Siemsen, H. (2017g). On the Use of Games in Education and Science Education. In R&R.
Siemsen, H. (2017h). Popper falsified. working paper.
Siemsen, H., Reschke, C. H. (2013). Can one learn to think like Drucker? Lessons in personality and management education. Management Research Review 36/8: 767–787.
Siemsen, H., Testelin, J., Martin-Hansen, L., Siemsen, K. H., Andrieu, B. & Fèvre, J.-M. (2017). An Introduction to A. Binet and V. Vaney on Mental Orthopedics. SpringerBrief Education. In print.
Siemsen, K. H., Schwarz, J. & Siemsen, H. (2014). Mathematische Bildung auf der Fährte der Reproduzierbarkeit. (p. 263–288) and (2014). co-authored by Rabe, D. & Wiebe, J.: An-schauliche Unterweisung mit Spuren von Gestalt. (p. 280–286) In: Gerd-Bodo von Carlsburg, Thomas Vogel (Hrsg./eds.), Bildungswissenschaften und akademisches Selbstver-ständnis in einer globalisierten Welt. Baltische Studien, vol. 28, Lang: Frankfurt.
Speziali, P. (Ed.) (1972). Albert Einstein – Michele Besso: Correspondance. Paris: Hermann.
Stadler, F., Studien zum Wiener Kreis : Ursprung, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Logischen Empirismus im Kontext., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1997
Stern, C. (1953). Children Discover Arithmetic. An Introduction to Structural Arithmetic. London: Harrap.
Sterrett, S. G. (1998). Sounds Like Light. Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity and Mach’s Work in Acoustics and Aerodynamics. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 29/1: 1–35.
Thiele, J. (1978). Wissenschaftliche Kommunikation: Die Korrespondenz Ernst Machs. Kastellaun: Henn.
Wittenberg, A. I. (1957). Vom Denken in Begriffen. Mathematik als Experiment des reinen Denkens. Basel: Birkhaeuser.
Woehrle, G. (Ed), Die Milesier: Thales, De Gruyter, Berlin 2009
Zilsel, E. (1924/1990). Die Geniereligion. Ein kritischer Versuch über das moderne Persönlichkeitsideal, mit einer historischen Begründung. Frankfurt (m.): suhrkamp.
Zimmermann, R. (1852). Philosophische Propaedeutik fuer Obergymnasien. Erste Abteilung Empirische Psychologie. Wien: Braunmueller.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Siemsen, H., Siemsen, K.H. (2019). Transforming Thinking: Can Mach’s Pedagogy Be Replicated?. In: Stadler, F. (eds) Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04378-0_40
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04378-0_40
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-04377-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-04378-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)