Keywords

Introduction

The US military defines an operation as both “a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme and a military action” and “the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission” (DoD 2020, 159). Applying these definitions loosely, air operations may be described as military actions involving surveillance and defense of air space, intelligence collection, the logistical and maintenance preparation of combat aircraft to make them ready for employment, the actual tactical planning and execution of individual aircraft sorties that, alone, or in combination with other aircraft, execute a particular mission, as part of a larger series of missions during a day, which are all part of the particular phase in a larger sustained air and joint campaign which aims to achieve strategic objectives and where a phase may focus on achieving a mid-course objective such as air superiority. Such activities generate air power, which in turn can be defined as the ability to use air capabilities in and from the air, to influence the behavior of actors and the course of events. Or, to paraphrase US Air Force doctrine, “the ability to project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air […], to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives” (USAFa).

Arguably, while the Western way of war has come to be defined and dominated by the employment of advanced airpower capabilities, how airpower is generated, which logic and considerations inform air operations, and which command processes are involved in planning and conducting air operations are generally poorly understood. Through the lens of the evolution of air warfare, this chapter offers a discussion of air operations: those activities that produce air power. Informed by a Western perspective, it traces the evolution of air power through the decades of interstate warfare to the first decade after the Cold War. These decades of experience spawned current procedures for conducting air operations, which is followed by an overview of developments since 9/11, showing how air operations are now effective in engaging small groups of non-state actors. It concludes with signifying what, as a result of advances in the past three decades, is currently considered the potential military and political value of precision age air operations.

Airpower in Interstate Wars

World War I and the Emergence of the Airman’s Perspective

During WWI the now familiar distinct roles of air power were fleshed out: reconnaissance, air defense, air transport, air support, interdiction, and strategic attack. In addition to conducting reconnaissance and attack missions over the battlefield, this new instrument provided a unique and novel approach for direct attack on enemy rear zones, cities, economies, and civilian populations (Buckley 1999; Olsen 2010a), and a potential way to avoid bloody prolonged battles on the ground (Table 1).

Table 1 Generic definitions of counter-land air power roles (RAF 2017, 43–44)
Full size table

The addition of the third dimension to war changed the character of war radically because of its unique characteristics. As contemporary air power doctrines explain (NATO 2016a, 1–2, 1–3), nicely capturing the characteristic airman’s perspective, air power is pervasive, as aircraft are rarely physically constrained by national boundaries or terrain. Three core air power attributes – speed, reach, and height – enable and enhance air power’s additional attributes of ubiquity, agility, and concentration. Ubiquity results from air power’s reach which creates the sense of being everywhere all the time. This enables employing air power to pose or counter threats simultaneously, and across a far wider area than surface capabilities. Agility refers to the fact that air power can quickly switch the point of application within and between operational theatres, sometimes during the same mission, and create tactical to strategic effects in a variety of air power operational roles. Agility also means a commander can easily scale the scope of operations up or down in response to a change in political guidance or political strategic objectives. Third, concentration: compared to land and maritime power, air power’s speed and reach enable a commander to concentrate military power more responsively in time and space where it is required.

Early airpower theorists recognized these embryonic attributes. Technological and scientific developments – aerodynamics, metallurgy, engines, radio, photography, electronics for instance – fueled speculation that long range bombers would be almost unstoppable, and could strike directly at government centers, civilian population, and key industrial nodes, thus serving as an effective deterrence instrument. Such severe attacks, and the expectation of more to come, would suffice to convince either the population to revolt, the enemy government to cease the war, or make it impossible to sustain a long war. Not the occupation of territory – the preserve of armies – but the side that dominated the skies would be victorious. A bloody attritionist trench war of WWI could thus be avoided.

Achieving command in the air would therefore be the key to success or failure in future wars. In a time where fighter aircraft were slower than bombers, early warning through radar was still unknown, and Western interbellum politicians were war weary, this argument was at least theoretically convincing while also serving the aim of the theorist to establish independent air forces. If airpower was to be employed effectively, these scarce capabilities should not be commanded by, and distributed across tactical ground units, but directed by a dedicated air command organization in a centralized manner in a well-developed air campaign where strategic, operational, and tactical demands for air operations could be prioritized (Meilinger 1997; Faber 2015).

World War II

Yet, during WWII air power integrated in an overall joint strategy dominated air operations. The initial German successes relied on close tactical integration of land and air operations. Air superiority and success in defensive air warfare proved pivotal for the survival of Britain (due to the advanced air defense system connecting early warning radar with air operation centers and fighter squadrons) and for the defense of shipping convoys against German submarines in the Atlantic. Air Superiority, Air Interdiction missions that it enabled, and Close Air Support provided through well-established air-land coordination procedures, proved keys to Allied success in North Africa, the successful Allied invasion in France, and the subsequent advance into Germany, and for the Russian advance to Berlin.

These campaigns demonstrated that air warfare involved attritionist dynamics. As long as the opponent could operate sufficient numbers of aircraft, air superiority was not a given but could only be achieved temporarily and locally. Sophisticated air defense systems, with fighters directed by radar operators toward enemy formations, could wreak havoc among bomber forces resulting in massive and unsustainable attrition rates that sometimes exceeded 10% of a bomber formation. More than land-warfare, the fight for air superiority over Germany evolved into a technological and tactical innovation contest involving radar-jamming techniques, night precision navigation systems, and the development of long range fighters that could escort bombing formations. High attrition rates among German fighters resulted. In the later stages of the war, attacks on German airbases sealed the fate of the Luftwaffe.

Air power also revolutionized maritime warfare. Japanese and American aircraft carriers demonstrated the vulnerability of ships to massed air attacks. The battleship was replaced by the aircraft carrier as the capital vessel in naval warfare. Joint warfare in the Pacific also revolved around airpower: the American island-hopping strategy to defeat Japan centered on obtaining airbases for fighters, which would support the amphibious attack on the next island, and for strategic bombers, that could strike the Japanese homeland.

Strategic bombing certainly had a major impact on WWII, but not necessarily the way envisioned by the early air power theorists. While justifiably critiqued ever since by legal scholars and ethicists (Garret 1993; Biddle 2002; Grayling 2006), the strategic logic of those horrific attacks can be understood in the context of total war and in light of interbellum strategic thinking. Civilian populations were more or less considered legitimate targets. The crippling shipping blockades of WWI had served as precedent, as had the German bombing raids on cities such as Rotterdam, London, and Coventry. Second, aerial bombing offered one of the few options to strike back at Germany in the early stages of WWII, and it sent a supportive political signal to Russia that was suffering massive losses on the Eastern Front. While not designed to be decisive on their own, strategic attacks contributed massively to allied success by crippling the German war industry (Overy 1981), diverting scarce frontline resources to the defense of the German homeland and by causing the defeat of the Luftwaffe which paved the way for the Allied advance into France (Buckley, 166). The Japanese surrender following the dropping of the two atomic bombs by B-29’s is also a dramatic testament of the effects of strategic attacks, and they highlight how air warfare had changed war and strategy. Losing air control meant catastrophe for a country’s cities, its industries and population, and its armed forces.

The Cold War

The East-West confrontation drove air power development post WWII. In addition to an attritionist conventional air war over Europe, the threat of mass destruction inflicted upon city centers and military complexes by bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles dominated strategy and security policy. Air forces focused intensely on the rapid pace of technology advances (engines, avionic, sensors) that resulted in a series of increasingly capable and complex combat aircraft capable of flying at supersonic speeds and high altitude, often specialized in single roles such as intercepting high flying strategic bombers. Advances in radars and missile technology (infra-red and radar-guided) increased intercept ranges. Specialized aircraft were developed for identifying enemy electronic emissions and suppressing the increasingly capable radar-guided ground-based air defense systems (the so-called SEAD role). Air-to-Air Refueling aircraft (modified civilian airliners) were introduced extending the range and endurance of bombers, transport aircraft, and fighters. Strategic and theater transport aircraft with increasing capacity ensured rapid massive reinforcement options in times of crises from the USA to Europe. Maritime patrol aircraft benefited from technologies that enabled detection of submarines in the vast oceans such as the Atlantic.

The defense of the Inner German Border weighed heavily on air power developments (McCrabb 1997). Air defense was a major priority for NATO and reflected the wars for air superiority of WWII, the Vietnam War, and the Israeli experiences of 1967 and 1973. With ground troops facing a numerically superior opponent, control of the air – denying its use to the enemy – was essential. Doctrine recognized two degrees of control of the air: (1) air superiority which refers to a local and temporal degree of dominance in the air battle which permits the conduct of operations (by maritime, land, and air forces) at a given time and place, without prohibitive interference by the opposing force; and (2) air supremacy which is achieved when the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. Both would require a persistent campaign of counter air operations comprising two key missions: Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA). OCA targets enemy air capabilities as close to their source as possible, seeking to dominate an adversary’s airspace, and preventing the launch of threats against one’s own forces by striking air assets and command facilities on the ground. DCA is generally reactive in nature and seeks to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air and missile threats. Active defensive measures involve a system of layered defense-in-depth using reactive air-to-air fighters, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and additional aircraft placed on ground or airborne alert. Passive measures include the defense and protection of friendly forces through early warning; camouflage, concealment, or deception; hardening, dispersal, or low observable “stealth” capabilities (RAF 2017, 27–29; NATO 2016a, 1–8, 1–9).

The second primary role for air forces was air support to ground units which aims to defeat an adversary’s fielded forces, destroy their supporting infrastructure, or generate psychological effects to shatter their cohesion or will to fight. While Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction were considered necessary but also ineffective and wasteful in light of the capabilities of modern surface to air missiles, NATO doctrine expected airpower to play a major role in stopping Warsaw Pact ground advances on or near the frontline. In order to circumvent air defense systems, aircraft such as the F-111 and Tornado were designed for flying extremely low, and fast (also during night) to conduct AI and OCA missions against targets deep in the enemy rear area. Others were ruggedized, such as the robust A-10, designed for attacking enemy armored ground units in the front line. Precision weapons were gradually introduced, their costs and limited numbers restricting their use against high value targets only. In the later stages of the Cold War multi-role aircraft such as the F-16 replaced single role systems thereby increasing the flexibility of available air power assets for a commander.

Airpower in Interventions 1990–2000

Operation Desert Storm

The end of the Cold War heralded an optimistic decade in which the Western world took on responsibility for maintaining and bolstering the international liberal order, advocating democratic values, and protecting humanitarian interests. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the first touch-stone for this policy and with the campaign to liberate Kuwait in winter 1991, airpower started to define the new image of modern warfare and heralded a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Olsen 2010b; Shimko 2010). The nonstandard air centered joint campaign managed to produce a lopsided victory that only took 39 days of intensive air bombardment (including strategic strikes in downtown Baghdad) and a short – 4 days – ground war (Hallion 1992, 252). Apart from high training standards and an abundance of combat aircraft, Stealth aircraft, the proliferation of precision weapons, and information technology were key as was doctrinal innovation.

From day one F-117 Stealth aircraft – with a radar reflection surface of a golf ball – could operate almost unseen deep into Iraqi airspace, enabling strategic attacks against command centers and radar systems. Second, even a limited number of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) enabled a dramatic rise of intensity, lethality, and efficiency of air attacks. Whereas a typical non-stealth attack package required 38 aircraft to enable eight of those to deliver bombs on three targets, only 20 F-117s were required to simultaneously attack 37 targets successfully in the face of an intense air defense threat. This enabled achieving air superiority in just a number of days and implied a new dominance of the offense over the defense in air warfare. By rapidly crippling enemy air defense radars and SAM systems and effectively blinding the opponent, a virtual sanctuary in the third dimension was created that could be exploited for various purposes, such as Reconnaissance, Surveillance, interdiction, CAS, and Strategic Attacks. PGMs then offered the ability to accurately strike targets even from high altitude (Osinga and Roorda 2020, 167–168).

Technology also drove doctrinal innovation. In what amounts to a rediscovery of conventional strategic attack theory, John Warden, the architect of the strategic part of the air campaign, had recognized that precision weapons and accurate target information, stand-off and stealth capabilities offered new possibilities for strategic attacks against multiple target-categories of a nation state (military units, political and military leadership, and critical infrastructure). It was now possible to attack these near simultaneously and accurately, even if targets were in the vicinity of civilian objects. This would rapidly degrade the functioning of the entire “enemy system” (Warden 1995), and could cripple the strategic command capabilities before attacking fielded forces (Davis 1998).

PGMs also greatly improved the lethality of air-to-ground attacks for now one fighter could attack several targets in one mission, including dug-in tanks and artillery. The impact on the ground war was massive: Iraqi ground units were decimated from the air and roads and bridges leading into Kuwait were interdicted, isolating the Iraqi forces and destroying sometimes in excess of 50% of Iraqi armor and artillery equipment. The result was a drastically shortening of the time required and the risk involved for ground units to complete the coalition victory, suggesting also that modern military operations could avoid the traditional high numbers of civilian casualties and “collateral damage” to civilian infrastructure. The age of mass warfare – industrial age warfare – was over.

Airpower and Peacekeeping Operations

The employment of precision airpower became, not surprisingly, the option of choice for Western politicians in the politically, ethically, and legally highly sensitive and constrained (and poorly understood) environments post-Cold War peacekeeping operations in the Balkan (Cohen 1994). Traditionally air assets in peacekeeping operations played a very limited role with tasks such as liaison, humanitarian aid transport, and medevac. Now, in the more contested and threatening environment of the ongoing civil war, with lightly armed peace keepers on the ground, NATO army commanders and politicians alike turned to air power for protection. A search for ways to deter or if necessary coerce political and military leaders of the various ethnic factions amounted to transporting idea from nuclear deterrence theory to this very different and conventional strategic context (Mueller 1998; Byman et al. 1999; Jakobsen 2020). In addition to familiar strategies such as Punishment (increasing the cost of achieving a strategic aim) and Denial (eliminating the means to carry out the strategy thus decreasing the chances of success), PGMs now also suggested (virtual) Decapitation and Incapacitation (paralyzing the country or its military apparatus by eliminating command nodes or disrupting command processes) as viable options.

Strategy in practice did not benefit from this exploration. NATO’s air operation Deny Flight in the Balkan’s highlighted the conditional nature of the advantage high technology may offer when not tied to a proper strategy and suitable context. Western forces operated under a limited UN mandate, and in a politically constrained environment, where pin-pick air strikes on targets with limited strategic value were unsurprisingly ineffective. Fearing peacekeeping forces would be taken hostage by the warring factions, NATO commanders, instead of escalating to achieve dominance, were required to de-escalate tense situations. Moreover, any targeting error, no matter the precautions taken, could result in civilian casualties that would produce dramatic media footage and, so it was feared, undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the NATO mission. Only when, in the tragic aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre in summer 1995, the NATO alliance created proper conditions for the effective use of force did coercive air operations achieve desired effects. The 18 day Operation Deliberate Force against Bosnian Serb forces (in fortuitous simultaneity with a Croat ground offensive) resulted in the Dayton Accords (Osinga and Roorda 2020, 171).

Strategy and political context were also unfavorable in the run-up to, and initial phase of Operation Allied Force over Kosovo, between March 24 and June 27, 1999, the limited air campaign to halt the continuing Serbian human-rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of the Kosovo province. The low level of intensity of the first air strikes (only 48 sorties a day, versus 1300 daily during Desert Storm) and limited set of targets that could be attacked did not translate into coercive effect. The campaign initially involved only 50 targets aiming for five limited objectives: (1) minimizing loss of friendly aircraft; (2) impacting Serb military and security forces in Kosovo; (3) minimizing collateral damage; (4) achieving the first three in order to hold NATO together; and (5) protecting allied ground forces in neighboring Bosnia, especially, from Serb raids. Targets such as Serb forces, tanks, and artillery in Kosovo (while uncontroversial politically and legally), however, represented little coercive value and, being small and fleeting, proved hard to detect and engage from high altitude. A wider set of targets only became politically acceptable when NATO credibility came to be at stake, resulting in strikes against railroad and highway bridges, ammunition storage facilities, petroleum reserves and oil refineries, command posts, military airfields, electrical and broadcast services, news media, and two of Milošević’s homes. After 78 days, Milosevic gave in to NATO demands due to this continuous onslaught (38,000 combat sorties), combined with a shift in Russia’s diplomacy away from Serb leadership, the increasing intensity of Albanian Liberation Army activities and the exhaustion of possible Serb countermoves without marked effects (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000; Lambeth 2001). By flying at high altitudes and by launching weapons from stand-off ranges, allied casualties were avoided (McInnes 2002, 92). Interventions through PGM equipped air operations had now become the norm because public and political sensitivity for own losses, collateral damage, and civilian casualties had risen dramatically. Precision age air power had the advantage political pressure could be exerted without putting large numbers of army boots on the ground and without the risks for civilians traditionally associated with air strikes. Air power had become the icon of “humane warfare” (Coker 2002).

Commanding Air Operations

The Challenges

Desert Storm and the Balkan air campaigns demonstrated commanding air operations is highly challenging. In short, air commanders must develop an air operations plan that accommodates the demands and constraints set at the political and military strategic level, cater to the support requirements submitted by army (and perhaps navy) operational level commanders, ensure air superiority, and synchronize air operations with the overall joint campaign plan. The Air C2 system must be able to analyze intelligence from a wide variety of sources, translate it into operations plans for the next days, detailing precisely for the entire force (sometimes involving several hundreds of aircraft) which squadron needs to prepare for a specified number of sorties against specified targets using a specified type of ordnance, while also communicating relevant frequencies of, for instance, AAR assets en-route or those of a Forward Air Controller. At the same time, planners need to accommodate for political sensitivities, and stringent Rules of Engagement all the while focusing on achieving political, military strategic, and operational level objectives.

These challenges are partly due to organizational lack of priority for command and control issues (McInnes 2018; Pratzner 2015). Compared to armies that have well-established and doctrinally institutionalized command structures – army corps HQ, divisional headquarters, etc. – in the West the command of air operations has only recently been codified in doctrines and standing organizations and even then only a few countries – the USA in particular, the UK, France, and Australia for instance – have created effective operational Air C2 capabilities. During crisis management operations in the Balkan and as recently as Operation Unified Protector over Libya, NATO has struggled to create effective Air C2 structures and proved overly dependent on US Air C2 capabilities in terms of supporting ICT and expertise.

But challenges also result from several structural factors inherent to the nature of air power, and from different views among armed services concerning the proper roles of air power. First, complexity arises from the fact that air operations “work” at all levels of war. It is intensely dependent on massive flows of accurate and timely intelligence concerning not only the dynamic tactical situation on the battlefront, but also about developments deep in enemy theater, including the political dimension. Second, complexity arises from the need to orchestrate the operations of hundreds of air assets which are physically dislocated across hundreds if not thousands of miles. Third, air assets are scarce resources relative to the constant high demand. A variety of commanders of tactical ground units require intelligence, CAS and AI, while at the same time air commanders need to achieve objectives set at the operational level (for instance achieving air superiority) and strategic level (attacking regime targets). No other service knows a similar demand challenge. As a result, there is significant potential for fragmentation of the air effort. A request for tactical air support could compete with the allocation of the same air resource for operational or strategic objectives. Therefore “competing demands must be prioritized and apportioned accordingly, hence the requirement for centralized control, which ensures that aircraft are used as efficiently as possible to achieve military objectives. It prevents them from being inappropriately tasked by uncoordinated users against impractical objectives, or being divided into small packages of air power that would inhibit flexibility and hinder any requirement for a rapid concentration of force” (RAF 2017, 41).

This concern reflects harsh historical lessons and heated interservice debates going back to the early airpower theorists who advocated an independent role for air forces and centralized command of air power to ensure air superiority and strategic attack would get the priority it needed. Armies however feared they would be left without sufficient air cover and air support, thus advocating allocating dedicated air assets to ground commanders to use as their organic air assets, similar to their command over tanks and organic artillery units. During WWII initial US Army setbacks in North Africa were caused by penny-packing air assets, which was resolved when the RAF-British Army air-land C2 structure was adopted in which the air and land commander were fully “in synch” about operational plans and mutual capabilities, demands, and priorities. In the preparation of the Allied invasion in France, intense debate revolved around the requirement to start using strategic bombers for interdiction missions in France and the desire of some air commanders to continue with the ongoing strategic bombing campaign against the industrial heart of Germany. In the similar debates marred air operations in Vietnam (Osinga and Roorda 2015). During the Cold War NATO solved this problem in a hybrid manner: certain squadrons had dedicated air defense roles in the NATO’s Integrated Air Defence System while army groups responsible for holding the line in central Europe each could call upon, and plan with, a dedicated numbered Allied Tactical Air Force. Scarcity was more or less circumvented by ensuring sufficient numbers of assets and splitting up air power into two separate command structures and processes.

The Tasking and Targeting Process

Desert Storm saw the maturation of the air campaign planning and air tasking process. Avoiding a repetition of the Vietnam War era fragmented planning of air operations, for the first time, a single commander for air operations – a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) controlled all the theatre aircraft, including those of the Navy. His Combined Air Operations Centre mustered numerous tactical experts on specific roles, aircraft types and weapon systems, intelligence analysts, strategy advisors, and liaison officers from other services from. Based on political objective and an analysis of Iraq’s centers of gravity, the JFACC staff developed the air part of the join campaign plan. The air campaign consisted of a phase that focused not exclusively but predominantly on air superiority and strategic attack, which, once certain criteria had been met, would be followed by an intensive AI campaign to “prepare” the ground offensive, which in turn would be massively supported in a phase where CAS would be a dominant role. In the first phase the JFACC would be the “supported commander” while the Joint Land Component Commander was the “supported commander” for the later phases. To cater for the demands of ground commanders a Joint Targeting Coordination Board was established, which was responsible for reviewing the targets nominated by the ground commanders and apportioning aircraft in support of the battlefield preparation plan, to ensure all services saw their interests appropriately cared for in the air sortie apportionment (Osinga and Roorda 2015, pp. 42–50).

Based on these phases, the JFACC promulgated an Air Operations Directive which laid out his priorities, objectives, and special instructions for the next 72 h. The planning process followed a generic cycle of six steps: Commander’s Objectives, Guidance and Intent; Target Development, Validation, Nomination and Prioritisation; Capabilities Analysis (including Weaponeering); Force Planning and Assignment; Mission Planning and Execution; and finally, Combat Assessment/Measurements of the Effectiveness of the Attack (Pratzner 2015, p. 80). His emphasis would be expressed in terms of allocation of air assets and apportionment of the air assets by roles (in terms of numbers or percentage of sorties). A Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) would be developed involving selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate tactics and weapons for striking those. This targeting process resulted in detailing which targets would be attacked the next 24–72 h which would then form the basis for developing offensive strike packages, defensive operations and supporting sorties.

The resulting Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Airspace Control Order (ACO) would spell out for the next 24 h what sorties each squadron was to execute, when, against what targets, their position in a strike package, their role as escort fighter, or the location of the Combat Air Patrol track, and all the necessary details concerning routes, AAR slots and related frequencies. With hundreds of sorties per day, the ATO’s during Desert Storm could amount to 700 pages. During the Balkan air operations, the JFACC would add SPINS (special instructions) anytime he saw the need to communicate additional concerns, priorities, specific constraints and restraints such as the requirement to only drop ordnance if the target could visually be identified. Following sorties, Battle Damage Assessment would be conducted which would inform the ongoing MAAP and ATO development cycle, and informing decisions whether or not to shift to the next phase in the campaign plan, to increase the intensity of attacks, change the composition of strike packages and tactics, re-attack targets, adjust apportionment of assets for certain roles, relax constraints, or accept higher risk (NATO 2016b).

Air Power Against Violent Non-state Actors

The Problem of Small and Mobile Targets

While the initial very short joint campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was a resounding military success, exploiting air dominance and an impressive level air-land integration, leading to the fall of Saddam Hussain (Perry et al. 2015; Andres 2007a; Andres 2007b), it is the increased effectiveness of air power in irregular wars against violent non-state actors (demonstrated in operations against the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas and ISIS) that stands out, demonstrating that several persistent Air C2 problems had been solved.

Traditionally air power played primarily a supporting role in particular in mountainous or forested areas where finding and engaging small groups of fighters is extremely difficult. In 1991 the USA failed to suppress the launches of Iraq Scud missiles despite a massive air effort to locate them. It took up to 14 h between target detection and that information arriving at a pilot. In the Balkan the Serbs exploited caves and underground facilities, dispersed equipment and troops, used decoys, and skillfully moved outdated SA-3 systems every few hours forcing NATO planners to apportion 30% of every wave of attackers to the SEAD mission during Allied Force (Lambeth 2001; Mason 2010). NATO’s Air Operations Centers lacked the capability for timely identification and tracking of such emerging targets. US Air Force’s leadership recognized the need to speed up the level of responsiveness – the kill chain – and started to datalink the CAOC, other command and intelligence centers, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and “shooters” such as F-16s or B-2 bombers. This greatly enhanced rapid dissemination of information throughout the units, enabling engaging so–called time-sensitive-target, and fostered air-land integration (Osinga and Roorda 2015, 56–57).

Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF

The political order to retaliate for the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 presented US military planners with an enemy trained in guerilla fighting in landlocked mountainous terrain, without significant infrastructure offering strategic coercive leverage. Pakistan denied it the option of a large ground invasion from it soil (Lambeth 2005; Lambeth 2010; O’Hanlon 2002). The default option was the employment of air strikes in close cooperation with only 300–500 Special Forces physically within Afghan territory, which liaised and empowered local opposition factions totaling no more than 15,000 men. The fall of the Taliban came after 78 days of on average 100 combat sorties a day, amounting to 38,000 sorties flown. The operation was however extremely complex for it involved a US/UK force of approximately 60,000 men supporting this operation, dispersed over 267 bases, on 30 locations in 15 countries. Relying predominantly on PGM’s (60% of total bombs dropped), in essence it was an air campaign conducted in conjunction with, and supported by special operations forces, who acted as FACs, and friendly indigenous fighters.

These special forces benefited from the initiatives to shorten the kill chain. Equipped with laser range finders and data-links to connect them to command centers and strike aircraft, they enabled responsive air strikes against so-called emerging targets such as small Taliban troop contingents. Midway the operation, “flex-targeting” dominated: 80% of sorties took off without specific assigned target. Instead, airborne reconnaissance systems and special forces acted as eyes, spotting pop-up targets and relaying time-sensitive up-to-date accurate target information to shooter platforms inbound or already circling in the vicinity. Response times averaged only 20 min (and sometimes within minutes). This practice has given rise to the so-called SCAR role: Strike, Coordination And Reconnaissance, which is a hybrid of the air interdiction, CAS, and ISR missions, where combat aircraft detect and subsequently coordinate air attack or reconnaissance of targets.

When NATO launched ISAF from 2003 onward, its ground forces, spread out over a vast terrain, encountered a growing opposition from returning Taliban elements and other militant groups. In this environment intense air-land integration was both challenging (vast distances, many national caveats on the use of their units, few NATO Air C2 capabilities) and essential: without a continued effort involving thousands of sorties providing strategic and in theater air transport, logistical supply, air mobility, timely Medevac, rapid and precise offensive air support for troops in contact, air reconnaissance for convoy protection and detection and tracking of enemy movement, operations with lightly armed ground forces would be very risky, ineffective, and sometimes simply unfeasible. Enhanced precision air strike capabilities and better communication equipment for FACs created trust among ground troops in calling in CAS strikes well within the traditional thousand-meter safe distance from their own position while still avoiding fratricide. Due to these force protection tactics, compared to other COIN operations, ISAF, like OEF, was fairly successful in limiting casualties and engaging small groups of irregular fighters (Sinterniklaas 2019).

Proxy Warfare

The so-called Afghan Model (Andres 2007b) – the combination of special forces, acting in tandem with local – proxy – fighters, and offensive air assets that proved successful during Enduring Freedom – has fruitfully also served as a de facto template for the concept of operations in operation Unified Protector over Libya in 2011. With a UN Security Resolution ruling out the employment of ground troops in Libya (and absent Western political appetite for such an adventure) NATO had to rely on a maritime blockade and air power to protect the Libyan civilian population against Gadhafi’s troops. Air strikes managed to counter the immediate threat and a six-months air operation followed – exploiting air dominance, a range of reconnaissance assets, AAR refueling aircraft (indispensable considering the long flying distances and air patrol times), and new generation of small caliber precision weapons (averaging 36 bombs/day a total of 7642 bombs were dropped in 9700 strike sorties). But real progress stalled until special forces of several nations, covertly inserted, helped train and organize rebel forces and facilitated air-ground cooperation (Chivvis 2014; Engelbrekt et al. 2014; Mueller 2015).

Similarly, since 2014 the proxy warfare model has been successfully employed (under the guise of the “by-with-through” approach) by the US led coalition in Operation Inherent Resolve, the campaign against ISIS. Iraqi politics, Western political reluctance, and casualty sensitivity precluded returning to Iraq with massive ground formations. Instead, a limited number of US and coalition ground units trained Iraqi army troops and assisted them in fighting ISIS, all under the umbrella of, and in close cooperation with, coalition ISR and offensive air assets which in 2016–2017 delivered several thousands of bombs monthly on ISIS targets. This combination managed, slowly but steadily, to destroy ISIS forces, even in urban environments, liberate Iraqi villages and drastically diminished their hold on Iraqi territory (Votel and Keravuori 2018; Garrett et al. 2018; Work 2018).

These operations all demonstrated the progress the USA had made in effectively mastering time-sensitive-targeting. This novel dynamic targeting cycle, or F2T2EA – Find, Fix, Track, Target, Execute and Assess – emphasizes speed and focus on a target, track it wherever it goes, and then execute a military option as expeditiously as possible (Pratzner 2015; Fyfe 2005, 18–19). This process operates alongside, and within, the deliberate tasking cycles described above. As NATO doctrine states, “dynamic targeting normally prosecutes targets known to exist in the area of operations. They have received some target development but were not detected, located or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in the deliberate process. Dynamic targeting also applies to unexpected targets that meet criteria specific to operational objectives; on these occasions, resources are required to complete the target development, validation and prioritization. Prosecuting these targets may be possible by redirecting existing assets” (NATO 2016b, 1–1, 1–2). Institutionalization of this new process involved setting up new dedicated “cells” within the Combined Air Operations Center that were mandated to monitor incoming information and, if necessary, break into the ongoing ATO execution and re-direct airborne assets to engage those high-value targets.

Targeting Terrorists

These F2T2EA capabilities have also been employed for counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and Iraq, along with, a novel capability: armed UAVs. Indeed, what stands out in recent Western air operations is the increasing employment of armed UAVs, or a combination of manned fighters and a targeting pod equipped UAV for so-called targeted killing actions against key leaders and small groups of Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS insurgents and in politically delicate missions in Somalia and Yemen where substantial presence on the ground is inadvisable. Drones engaging in leadership-targeting missions are the final link in a long, intricate targeting chain involving numerous military and civilian intelligence agencies, foreign intelligence sources, legal advisors, and sometimes even senior political leadership.

Initially the effectiveness, legality, and ethics were hotly debated, leading to accusations of “dehumanization of war” and the “dronification of foreign policy” (Osinga 2013; Strawser 2013). Research has since revealed the legal and accountability framework guiding such operations and has indicated that strikes (by drones or fixed wing aircraft) against key members of insurgent and terrorist groups (bomb-making experts, ideological leaders, media-producers), but also “foot-soldiers” caught laying road-side bombs, operating mortar tubes or driving missile systems in pick-up trucks, have an attrition effect on such groups and affect their lethality and attractiveness for potential recruits (Pryce 2012; Johnston 2012).

This is also the Israeli experience. In the summer of 2006, when Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets against Israeli communities and abducted two Israeli soldiers, air strikes were the default retaliation instrument, eliminating about 500 of Hezbollah’s most advanced fighters, destroyed about half of the unused longer-range rockets, and much of Lebanon’s infrastructure which was used to re-supply Hezbollah. Although the Second Lebanon War was marred by huge IDF deficiencies in joint warfare and Hezbollah claimed victory, strategically it was a success: it subdued Hezbollah for a considerable period.

The logic of crime prevention rather than the search for battlefield victory informs such operations: Israel aspires not for absolute deterrence but for restrictive deterrence, attempting to limit the risks and impact of terrorist attacks rather than absolutely preventing it. While violence may not be eliminated, it is limited to a level with which Israeli society can cope (Henriksen 2012; Inbar and Shamir 2014; Brun 2010). This logic also informed Israeli operations such as Cast Lead (2008), Pillar of Defence (2012), and Protective Edge (2014) where the IDF managed to inflict considerable punishment upon Hamas through an established network of multiple UAVs, fighter aircraft, and artillery in which the IAF managed to strike targets within minutes and after a launch had been detected, and follow on joint air-land operations in the dense urban environment of the Gaza strip (Cohen et al. 2017).

Targeted killing operations which aim for strategic effect and joint tactical operations which emphasize responsive support for ground units each require a specific Air C2 approach. Recent practice has given rise to three modalities. First, sometimes centralized control and centralized execution is called for when the stakes are particularly high, where the highest-value assets are being employed or when there is a requirement to closely manage air activities that might have strategic effects, even though this may adversely affect tactical efficiency. However, centralized execution can also restrict tactical flexibility and is not responsive enough to local conditions. Second, sometimes centralized control and decentralized execution may be the proper approach when air activities take place simultaneously across single or multiple theatres of operation and no single entity may have the level of awareness required to manage all concurrent activities. Modern, networked communications have increasingly enabled execution authority to be decentralized, allowing on-scene commanders to make rapid decisions in complex, dynamic situations, including the delegation of weapons-release authority to aircrew, shortening the decision cycle and increasing speed of action. It can also be the only feasible option for complex air campaigns, where beyond line-of-sight communications may be degraded or denied. Decentralized control and execution, the third approach, may be allocated to subordinate commanders for specific periods of time to improve responsiveness. Nominated air units could integrate as specific task-focused and organized joint teams for certain operations (RAF 2017, 42). This demonstrates how the technology and organization of targeting, developed for conflict between States, has matured to enable effective engagement of even small groups and individuals with single PGMs from remote distances.

Conclusion: Postmodern Air Power and the Western Way of War

These experiences are indicative of the increased versatility of air power and thus its military and political utility. PGMs have altered the relationship between land and air power. First, the new ability to quickly achieve air superiority on a theater wide scale offers joint commanders a valuable asymmetric “sanctuary” to be exploited for various purposes, and provides new levels of protection for ground forces, lines of supply and logistics sites. Second, exploiting air superiority, airborne sensor platforms can provide unprecedented levels of situational awareness to the ground force commander and thus detect, and if necessary prevent, an adversary from massing armored forces, and delay, disrupt and destroy follow-on forces, thereby diminishing an enemy’s range of options. Third, rapid dissemination of accurate target information enhances precision of air strikes and reduces response times, enabling effective engagement of small and mobile targets such as insurgents, thus improving air support. Fourth, these capabilities enable an increased level of intensity of the air offensive, thus allowing a higher operational tempo for the entire campaign.

Finally, those new capabilities provide new options for coercive diplomacy, and even enable targeting individual terrorist leaders. Or, to paraphrase UK doctrine, airpower can be applied, at short notice, across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war simultaneously, significantly increasing the options available to national leadership. It can potentially negate the requirement to deploy a larger force over a broader timescale by land or sea and by minimizing or removing the requirement for land forces, air power can make it easier to commit in politically ambiguous circumstances. Air power’s agility also means the scale and scope of operations can be rapidly escalated or de-escalated in response to a change in political guidance or political strategic objectives (RAF 2017).

In a sense, the post-Cold War air power revolution has spawned a mode of warfare that suits and feeds Western societal changes in norms, expectations, and aspirations toward the use of force. Postmodern air power may indeed have become a cultural and normative expression of the Western Way of War (Shaw 2005; Thomas 2001; Coker 2002; Farrell 2005). Societal sensitivity also explains why targeting errors gain instant critical (social-)media attention and therefor political scrutiny, even when legitimate targets are struck and civilian casualties are the result of deliberate and unlawful negligence of the defenders that exploit Western sensitivities. “Risk-free” air strikes have also led to critical claims that Western politicians and ground commanders in close combat with insurgents tended to resort to force more liberally than previous eras when such aims could only be achieved by risky and costly deployments of ground troops. The trends toward further automatization of war in the form of widespread employment of armed UAVs reinforce this critique. Yet, this only underlines the conclusion that contemporary Western air warfare stands in stark contrast to the massive destruction air attacks wreaked in the total wars of the twentieth century. Expectations sometimes exceeded what lack of strategy, inadequate resources, the operational environment, opponent actions, or the constrains of politics allowed but the images of, and successes achieved with the employment of precision age air power – in concert with ground forces or independently in an expanding variety of operations highlights the new face and dramatically enhanced effectiveness of modern air operations.

Cross-References