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Participatory Rights in Criminal Proceedings. A Comparative-Law Analysis from a Human Rights Perspective

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Personal Participation in Criminal Proceedings
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Abstract

The present study provides a comparative-law examination of the requirements concerning the involvement of private parties in criminal proceedings, as well as the national procedures that rule out any participation of the accused. This research cuts across the solutions emerged from EU law and international human rights law, comparing them with the requirements set forth by domestic law from a constitutional and substantive criminal law perspective. The results of this analysis highlight a complex scenario. A systematic view not only of the procedural safeguards enshrined in the European Convention, but also of the constitutional and criminal law requirements make it extremely difficult to maintain the traditional schemes applied to criminal proceedings conducted against absent defendants, justified on the perspective of a retrial or a remedy that is often unable to compensate the accused for the opportunities lost. Doubtless, the solutions provided by the Strasbourg Court on in absentia trials had large influence not only on national legislation and case-law practices but also on the rapid evolution of EU law in the field of transnational and domestic criminal justice. Yet the legislative instruments adopted at all these levels are not always in line with the European jurisprudence. Further human rights concerns arise from the proceedings held inaudito reo, which, depending on the solutions provided by domestic law, can often not even ensure a subsequent remedy corresponding to the accused’s intentions.

A comparative analysis of the developments that have occurred in international, domestic and supranational law in the last years, moreover, allows us to reconstruct a problematic area, which goes far beyond the issues of in absentia trials and inaudito reo procedures, thus posing a number of difficult challenges arising from a participatory understanding of criminal proceedings. The examination of the Strasbourg case-law and EU law, in particular, enables us to define the qualitative requirements that should be satisfied with a view to ensuring effective participation in criminal proceedings. Along these lines, the present study has firstly examined the fair trial safeguards that the accused should be granted, by focusing on four main issues, namely (a) the information rights, (b) the right to understand and to be understood in the criminal trial, (c) the relationship between legal assistance and the right to self-defence, and finally (d) the right to make one’s voice heard fairly. Furthermore, the increasing tendency to enhance an overall consideration of criminal proceedings by international human rights law and EU law suggests further broadening the research area. Therefore, this investigation was extended to the analysis of whether and to what extent individuals other than defendants, who are also (and often coercively) involved in criminal proceedings, also have the right to be heard fairly and to make their own contribution to fact-finding.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Pollicino and Bassini, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  2. 2.

    It is worth mentioning that the 2002 EAW legislation was somehow anticipated by the bilateral extradition treaty between Italy and Spain, signed in 2000 with a view to providing an alternative to the ordinary extradition proceedings. See among others Grevi (2000).

  3. 3.

    This expression was used by Vogler (2014), p. 182, who developed the approach of Slaughter (1994), pp. 99 ff.

  4. 4.

    CJEU, Grand Chamber, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, judgment of 26 February 2013, C-399/11.

  5. 5.

    On the relationship between EU law and constitutional law in the Melloni judgment see, from different perspectives, Demetrio Crespo and Sánz Hermida, in this volume, Sect. 3.1; Pollicino and Bassini, in this volume, Sects. 5 and 6.1; Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.3.2.

  6. 6.

    See among others Ruggeri (2015), pp. 10 ff.; Böse (2015), pp. 141 f.

  7. 7.

    Böse (2015), p. 142.

  8. 8.

    Ruggeri (2015), pp. 10 ff.

  9. 9.

    STC 26/2014.

  10. 10.

    Ruggeri, in Part V of this volume, Sect. 2.2.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Demetrio Crespo and Sánz Hermida, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  12. 12.

    In this sense see also Villamarín López, in this volume, Sect. 7.1.

  13. 13.

    Recital No. 1.

  14. 14.

    Recital No. 8.

  15. 15.

    Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  16. 16.

    In this sense see instead Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.3.2.

  17. 17.

    On this argument, which was, however, not taken into consideration by the Luxembourg Court in the Melloni judgment, see Ruggeri (2015), p. 23.

  18. 18.

    BVerfG, decision of 15 December 2015, Az. 2 BvR 2735/14. On this decision see Vogel, in this volume, Sect. 1; Pollicino and Bassini, in this volume, Sect. 6.2; Demetrio Crespo and Sánz Hermida, in this volume, Sect. 3.1; Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.3.2.

  19. 19.

    Below, Sect. 3.2.1.

  20. 20.

    For references to German constitutional case-law in relation to the problem of in absentia trials in the field of extradition cf. Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.3.2.

  21. 21.

    In this sense see Pollicino and Bassini, in this volume, Sect. 6.2.

  22. 22.

    See the recent judgment 269/2017 of the Italian Constitutional Court.

  23. 23.

    See especially the solutions adopted in the Aranyosi and Căldăraru case. Cf. CJEU, Grand Chamber, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, judgment of 5 April 2016, C-404-15 and C-659/15. Even more significant developments are apparent in the Taricco saga, if one compares the rigid solutions of the 2015 ruling (CJEU, Grand Chamber, Taricco and others, judgment of 8 September 2015, C-105/14) with the more flexible findings of the judgment issued in December 2017 (CJEU, Grand Chamber, M.A.S. and M.B., judgment of 5 December 2017, C-42/17).

  24. 24.

    CJEU, Covaci, judgment of 15 October 2015, C-216/14.

  25. 25.

    CJEU, Dworzecki, judgment of 24 May 2016, C-108/16 PPU.

  26. 26.

    See below, Sects. 3.2.3.1 and 3.3.

  27. 27.

    CJEU, Sleutjes, judgment of 12 October 2017, C-278/16.

  28. 28.

    CJEU, Tranca, Reiter and Opria, judgment of 22 March 2017, C-124/16, C-188/16 and C-213/16.

  29. 29.

    ECtHR, Colozza v. Italy, judgment of 12 February 1985, Appl. No. 9024/80, para 29.

  30. 30.

    Art. 1 Law 81/1987.

  31. 31.

    Cf. ECtHR, 1st Chamber, Sejdovic v. Italy, judgment of 10 November 2004, Appl. No. 56581/00; and ECtHR, Somogyi v. Italy, judgment of 18 May 2004, Appl. No. 67972/01.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Art. 603 CCP-Italy (version 2005). On this point cf. critically Negri (2005), p. 268.

  33. 33.

    Carini (2008), p. 283.

  34. 34.

    Chiavario (2005), p. 256.

  35. 35.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Sejdovic v. Italy, judgment of 1 March 2006, Appl. No. 56581/00.

  36. 36.

    In several decisions the Supreme Court, while deeming the notification at the law firm equivalent to a personal notification, charged defendants again with the burden of proving the reasons for which they had remained unaware of the notification made at their legal domicile. See CCass, judgment of 12 December 2007, Ciarlantini, in CED rv. 239207; CCass, judgment of 10 May 2006, Gherasim, in Rivista penale (2007), p. 234.

  37. 37.

    ECtHR, Cat Berro v. Italy, decision of 25 November 2008, Appl. No. 34192/07.

  38. 38.

    These developments are apparent particularly in the case-law of the Italian Supreme Court. After the 2005, some decisions followed a different approach than that adopted by the Sections indicated in footnote 36, offloading onto the competent authority the task of demonstrating the interruption of any contact between the defendants and their lawyers, if the conviction issued in absentia was notified at the law firm chosen by the defendants as their legal domicile. Cf. CCass, judgment of 1 March 2006, Bidimost, in CED rv. 233614.

  39. 39.

    ECtHR, Mariani v. France, judgment of 31 March 2005, Appl. No. 43640/98.

  40. 40.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Öcalan v. Turkey, judgment of 12 May 2005, Appl. No. 46221/99.

  41. 41.

    ECtHR, Jones v. the United Kingdom, decision of 9 September 2003, Appl. No. 30900/02.

  42. 42.

    In this sense cf. Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 2.4.

  43. 43.

    To be sure, in the Cat Berro case the Court was not called upon to scrutinise whether the right to evidence could be properly satisfied in the appeal proceedings instituted after the accused’s application for leave to appeal against the conviction. However, the European judges examined, albeit incidentally, the merits of the Italian reform by providing a response to the question, left open by the Grand Chamber in the Sejdovic case (fn. 35), of whether the 2005 legislation fit the requirements set forth in the European Convention. The response was that this reform enabled the individuals convicted in their absence to obtain a facilitated access to the second instance, which allowed a re-determination of the case and the exercise of the defence rights. In this way, therefore, the Strasbourg case-law accepted a solution that, viewed as a whole, still limited the defendant’s right to evidence in the second instance.

  44. 44.

    On this legislative reform see Mangiaracina, in this volume, Sect. 5. Cf. also Quattrocolo (2014); Vigoni (2014); Daniele and Paulesu (2015).

  45. 45.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (No. 2), judgment of 11 July 2017, Appl. No. 19867/12.

  46. 46.

    Art. 14(3)(d) ICCPR.

  47. 47.

    Art. 8(2)(a) ACHR.

  48. 48.

    Art. 6(3)(a) ECHR.

  49. 49.

    Arts. 6(2) ECHR and 14(2) ICCPR.

  50. 50.

    Art. 48(1) CFR.

  51. 51.

    Cf. Mangiaracina, in this volume, Sect. 5.2.

  52. 52.

    Art. 604(5-bis) CCP-Italy.

  53. 53.

    Art. 629-bis CCP-Italy.

  54. 54.

    Art. 14(3)(d) ICCPR.

  55. 55.

    Art. 48 CFR.

  56. 56.

    ECtHR, Stanford v. United Kingdom, judgment of 23 February 1994, Appl. No. 16757/90.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., para 25.

  58. 58.

    Trechsel (2005), p. 253 fn. 41.

  59. 59.

    Arts. 6(2)(d) ECHR and 14(3)(e) ICCPR.

  60. 60.

    ECtHR, Kremzow v. Austria, judgment of 21 September 1993, Appl. No. 12350/86.

  61. 61.

    Cf. among others CCass, judgment of 1 December 2010, De Falco, in CED rv. 248963. On this case-law see critically Caprioli (2013), p. 446.

  62. 62.

    Art. 111(4) Const.-Italy.

  63. 63.

    Cf. Arts. 3(2) DIT and 6 DICP.

  64. 64.

    Art. 8(2)(b) DPIRPT.

  65. 65.

    In this sense Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  66. 66.

    Above, Sect. 2.1.

  67. 67.

    BVerfG, decision of 15 December 2015 (fn. 18), para 2.a.aa.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    Art. 27(2) Const.-Italy.

  70. 70.

    Billis and Gkaniatsos, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  71. 71.

    In these terms see Vogel, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  72. 72.

    Art. 30(3) Const.-Portugal.

  73. 73.

    Art. 32(6) Const.-Portugal. See Costa Ramos and Churro, in this volume, Sect. 4.1.

  74. 74.

    Art. 9 Decree of the President of the Republic 448/1988, which provides a comprehensive statute on the criminal proceedings against minor offenders.

  75. 75.

    CCass, 29 April 2010, n. 24004, in www.dejure.giuffre.it This jurisprudence relies on a ruling of the Joint Sections of the Supreme Court under Royal Legislative Decree 1404/1934, which laid down the previous statute on juvenile criminal justice. See CCass, Joint Sections, judgment of 26 January 1985, Tammaro, in Cassazione penale 1985, p. 1333 ff. For further references and a critical analysis of Italian case-law see Panebianco (2012), pp. 157 f.

  76. 76.

    Art. 31(1) of the Decree of the President of the Republic 448/1988. See Bargis (2017), pp. 157 ff.

  77. 77.

    Thus Article 1(1) of the Decree of the President of the Republic 448/1988, which contains a general reference to the ordinary rules on criminal proceedings, allows for provisions of Articles 420-bis et seqq. CCP-Italy to be applied to the intermediate phase in the proceedings against minors. Cf. Cesari (2017), pp. 137 ff.

  78. 78.

    Art. 31(1) of the Decree of the President of the Republic 448/1988.

  79. 79.

    Similarly Cesari (2017), pp. 139 ff.

  80. 80.

    To be sure, in Colozza v. Italy, the Court left open the question of whether the right to personal participation could be waived. Cf. Trechsel (2005), pp. 255 f.

  81. 81.

    Cf. Ruggeri, in Part V of this volume, Sect. 2.2.

  82. 82.

    ECtHR, Poitrimol v. France, judgment of 23 November 1993, Appl. No. 14032/88, para 35.

  83. 83.

    CJEU, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal (fn. 4), para 49.

  84. 84.

    In this regard see Böse (2015), p. 142, as well as in this volume Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 4.1.

  85. 85.

    Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 4.1.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    ECtHR, F.C.B. v. Italy, judgment of 28 August 1991, Appl. No. 12151/86.

  88. 88.

    Recital No. 38 DPIRPT.

  89. 89.

    See below, Sect. 3.2.3.2.

  90. 90.

    ECtHR, Mattoccia v. Italy, judgment of 25 July 2000, Appl. No. 23969/94, para 65.

  91. 91.

    ECtHR, T. v. Italy, judgment of 12 October 1992, Appl. No. 14104/88, paras 28 et seq.

  92. 92.

    Trechsel (2005), pp. 193 ff.

  93. 93.

    Art. 4a(1)(a)(i) FD EAW.

  94. 94.

    CJEU, Dworzecki (fn. 25), para 32. On this point see Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.1.

  95. 95.

    Cf. in this volume Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.1.

  96. 96.

    ECtHR, Jones v. the United Kingdom (fn. 41).

  97. 97.

    Cf., e.g., ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Hermi v. Italy, judgment of 18 October 2016, Appl. No. 18114/02.

  98. 98.

    For a comparative analysis of this point in the selected countries see Quattrocolo, in this volume, Sect. 5.2.

  99. 99.

    This can happen under Italian law pursuant to the new procedure for absent defendants. Cf. Mangiaracina, in this volume, Sect. 5.

  100. 100.

    Under Spanish law, the judicial order declaring rebeldía entails the suspension of the proceedings. See Villamarín López, in this volume, Sect. 3.1.

  101. 101.

    In Italy, Law 67/2014 reform coupled the suspension of the proceedings with the suspension of the limitation period for the prosecution of the offence, which, however, cannot exceed the maximum time limits laid down in Article 161(2) PC. See Art. 159(1 n. 3-bis) PC, introduced by Article 12 of Law 67/2014. It is worth noting that Article 159(1 n. 3-bis) PC was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it allowed for the suspension of the time limits for the prosecution of the offence even in the cases in which it was judicially ascertained that the accused’s mental state irreversibly prevented him from taking part consciously in the proceedings. Cf. Constitutional Court, judgment 45/2015.

  102. 102.

    Outside Europe, this result materialises under Brazilian law, thus posing delicate problems from the viewpoint of constitutional, substantial and procedural criminal law. See Lopes Jr. (2017), pp. 552 ff.

  103. 103.

    Art. 3(3) DIT.

  104. 104.

    In this sense see Böse (2015), p. 142.

  105. 105.

    Art. 420-quater CCP-Italy (version before 2014).

  106. 106.

    Above, Sect. 2.1.

  107. 107.

    See Recital No. 10 Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA. On this point see Böse (2011), p. 506, as well as Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  108. 108.

    For this concern see extensively Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 4.2.

  109. 109.

    Recital No. 10 Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA.

  110. 110.

    This solution is provided for by the Italian code. See Art. 97(4) CCP-Italy.

  111. 111.

    Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 4.2.

  112. 112.

    ECtHR, Medenica v Switzerland, judgment of 14 June 2001, Appl. No. 20491/92.

  113. 113.

    Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 2.3.

  114. 114.

    ECtHR, F.C.B. v. Italy (fn. 87).

  115. 115.

    ECtHR, Colozza v. Italy (fn. 29), para 29.

  116. 116.

    Above, Sect. 2.2.

  117. 117.

    Ibid.

  118. 118.

    Siracusano (2011), p. 96.

  119. 119.

    Of a different view Siracusano (2011), p. 97, who considered that the granting of proper information could justify a presumption of waiver in the case of the accused’s absence. In the light of the approach followed in this study, it can be doubted that the mere absence can be interpreted in this way and that so delicate decisions, such as waiver of the right to take part personally in the proceedings, can be presumed.

  120. 120.

    See in this volume Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.

  121. 121.

    Ibid., Sect. 3.2.1.3, according to whom the importance of this information for the defence should require the individuals concerned to be “informed directly, not by proxy”. Although this solution surely enhances the protection of the sought person, I personally consider this interpretation to be perhaps excessively optimistic. It is true that, in the light of the indications provided by the Covaci judgment (below, Sect. 3.3), we might conclude that the possibility of challenging a penal order and the exercise of the right to a retrial after a decision rendered in absentia presuppose personal information being ensured to the accused. Yet we shall see that the Covaci judgment did not provide the convicted person with sufficient safeguards in order to decide whether or not to lodge an objection. Furthermore, there are considerable differences between a summary procedure aimed at a decision inaudito reo and a trial in absentia, which differences mainly concern the structure of the two proceedings. Since inaudito reo proceedings generally exclude any hearing before the rendering of the guilty verdict, the objection aims at compensating the accused for not being involved in the procedure prior to the conviction. Therefore, it is logical that he is to be granted personal information about this remedy, as confirmed by the Court of Justice in the aforementioned Sleutjes judgment (fn. 27, paras 30 et seqq.). Retrial or a remedy subsequent to a decision held in absentia should instead constitute exceptional tools where it was impossible to involve the accused in an ordinary criminal trial, which should therefore have been instituted after performing all means aimed at ensuring their ‘unequivocal’ knowledge of the proceedings. In the field of international cooperation, however, the main problem lies in the fact that both the notice of the proceedings through a means aimed at granting such unequivocal knowledge of the scheduled trial and the information of a retrial, as noted, constitute disjoined conditions of surrender under Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA.

  122. 122.

    Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.3.

  123. 123.

    Heger and Wolter (2015), p. 349.

  124. 124.

    Art. 8(3) DPIRPT-proposal.

  125. 125.

    Art. 8(3)(a) DPIRPT-proposal.

  126. 126.

    Art. 8(3)(b) DPIRPT-proposal.

  127. 127.

    Critical remarks on this case were also expressed by the CCBE. Cfr. http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/EN_04042014_CCBE_Res1_1399968822.pdf.

  128. 128.

    Art. 8(3) DPIRPT-proposal.

  129. 129.

    Art. 8(3) DPIRPT.

  130. 130.

    For similar criticisms see Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 4.3.

  131. 131.

    Art. 8(2)(a)(i) DPIRPT-proposal.

  132. 132.

    Art.8(2)(a) DPIRPT.

  133. 133.

    Art. 8(2)(a)(i) DPIRPT-proposal.

  134. 134.

    Recital No. 35 DPIRPT. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the 2016 Directive can be used to attach a reductive meaning to the provisions of Framework Decision 2009/299 in relation to international surrender procedures. On this point see Schneider, in this volume, Sect. 3.2.1.1.

  135. 135.

    Art. 8(2)(b) DPIRPT-proposal.

  136. 136.

    Art. 8(2)(b) DPIRPT.

  137. 137.

    ECtHR, Colozza v. Italy (fn. 29), para 29.

  138. 138.

    On the need for a ‘reasonable balance’ among conflicting interests see also Bachmaier Winter, in this volume, Sect. 4.1.

  139. 139.

    ECtHR, Colozza v. Italy (fn. 29), para 29.

  140. 140.

    For in-depth comparison of the solutions enacted in Brazil and the statutory arrangements made by Spanish law see Lopes Jr. (2017), pp. 354 f.

  141. 141.

    In this sense, from the viewpoint of Brazilian law, cf. Lopes Jr. and Badaró (2009), p. 14.

  142. 142.

    Tourinho Filho (2010), p. 929; Lopes Jr. (2017), p. 553 fn. 18.

  143. 143.

    Recital No. 29 DVR.

  144. 144.

    The first doubts regarding the incompatibility with Italian constitutional law were raised under the 1930 code. Cf. Tranchina (1961), pp. 516 ff. The solutions enacted by the 1988 code have aggravated the inconsistency with the Constitution and particularly with the constitutional model of fair trial, introduced in 1999. See Ruggeri (2009), pp. 133 ff.

  145. 145.

    The penal order procedure (procedimiento por aceptación de decreto) was enacted by Law 41/2015. See Villamarín López, in this volume, Sect. 5.3.

  146. 146.

    In Gray v. Germany, the Strasbourg Court was called upon to examine German penal order procedures. See ECtHR, Gray v. Germany, judgment of 22 May 2014, Appl. No. 49278/09. Although the European judges did not take the opportunity to deal with the problem of the lawfulness of inaudito reo convictions in general, they have provided some indications on the particular viewpoint of the participatory rights in these summary proceedings of the aggrieved parties and their relatives.

  147. 147.

    Art. 8(6) DPIRPT.

  148. 148.

    Art. 47(2) CFR.

  149. 149.

    Recital No. 41 DPIRPT.

  150. 150.

    CJEU, Covaci (fn. 24).

  151. 151.

    Directive 2013/48/EU. See among others Bachmaier Winter (2015), pp. 111 ff.

  152. 152.

    Art. 3(1) DirAL.

  153. 153.

    Art. 2(1) DAL.

  154. 154.

    In the Sleutjes judgment, moreover, the Luxembourg judges pointed out the double relevance of the information on the penal order, which “represents both an indictment and a judgment within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 2010/64”. Cf. CJEU, Sleutjes (fn. 27), para 31.

  155. 155.

    CJEU, Covaci (fn. 24), para 20.

  156. 156.

    CJEU, Tranca, Reiter and Opria (fn. 28), para 41.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., paras 47 et seqq.

  158. 158.

    See among others BVerfGE 37, 93, 96. For further references to German constitutional case-law in this regard see Roxin and Schünemann (2017), para 22/19.

  159. 159.

    Art. 803-bis i LECrim.

  160. 160.

    Art. 803-bis g LECrim.

  161. 161.

    Art. 803-bis h(3) LECrim.

  162. 162.

    Art. 803-bis h(4) LECrim.

  163. 163.

    Art. 460(3) CCP-Italy, as amended by Law 60/2001.

  164. 164.

    CConst, decision 323/2007.

  165. 165.

    This approach mixed the doctrine elaborated by two outstanding scholars of civil procedural law during last century, i.e., Piero Calamandrei, who advocated the idea of subsequent involvement of the defendant, and Francesco Carnelutti, who focused on the eventual nature of his participation. See, respectively, Calamandrei (1926), and Carnelutti (1924), pp. 270 ff. Carnelutti’s doctrine was first imported to penal order procedures by Girolamo Bellavista. Cf. Bellavvista (1952), p. 47.

  166. 166.

    CConst, 23/2015.

  167. 167.

    CConst, 46/1957.

  168. 168.

    CConst, 8/2003, 32/2003, 131/2003, and 257/2003.

  169. 169.

    See among others Marzaduri (2000), pp. 767 f.

  170. 170.

    Art. 111(2) Const.-Italy.

  171. 171.

    In Italy, Law 103/2016 has strengthened the possibility of appeal proceedings being held in camera by enabling the parties to agree on the acceptance, in whole or in part, of the arguments for appeal. Cf. Art. 599-bis CCP-Italy.

  172. 172.

    Under Italian procedural law, defendants are entitled to apply for the abbreviated proceedings, which aim at a decision on guilt in the intermediate phase and in a closed session, unless a public hearing is requested by all the accused. See Art. 441 CCP-Italy.

  173. 173.

    The first ruling was the Constitutional Court’s judgment 25/1965. For further references to Italian constitutional case-law see Chiavario (1984), pp. 277 ff.; Di Chiara (2009), pp. 294 f.

  174. 174.

    CConst, judgment 17/1981.

  175. 175.

    Cf. Art. 360 CCP-Hungary, which was declared unconstitutional by decision 20/2005. See Gácsi et al., in this volume, Sect. 3.3.3.

  176. 176.

    For criticisms against the statutory solution cf. Gácsi et al., in this volume, Sect. 3.3.3.

  177. 177.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, A. et al. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 19 February 2009, Appl. No. 3455/05.

  178. 178.

    ECtHR, Stanford v. United Kingdom (fn. 56).

  179. 179.

    Ciopec and Roibu, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  180. 180.

    This reference holds particular relevance in countries, such as Bulgaria, which lacks a set of specific participatory safeguards acknowledged at the constitutional law level. See Petrova, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  181. 181.

    Villamarín López, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  182. 182.

    Costa Ramos and Churro, in this volume, Sect. 1.2.

  183. 183.

    Art. 32(6) Const.-Portugal.

  184. 184.

    In Austria, the Rome Convention is deemed to have constitutional rank. See Golser, in this volume, Sect. 1; Bassini and Pollicino, in this volume, Sect. 6.3. In Luxembourg, the adoption of a monist approach by domestic case-law has led to the increasing enactment of the fair trial safeguards acknowledged by Strasbourg jurisprudence. Cf. Covolo, in this volume, Sect. 1. The Romanian Constitution does not only provide for a rule governing the cases of inconsistencies between national law and international covenants and treaties on fundamental human rights, which rule establishes the clear precedence of international law instruments. Furthermore, it requires even constitutional provisions concerning the citizens’ rights and freedoms to be interpreted and enforced in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to the covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to. See Ciopec and Roibu, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  185. 185.

    Cf. Leader, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  186. 186.

    See Drevet, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  187. 187.

    Ibid.

  188. 188.

    ECtHR, Döry v. Sweden, judgment of 11 November 2002, Appl. No. 28394/95. See Ruggeri, in Part V of this volume, Sect. 2.3.

  189. 189.

    ECtHR, Mattoccia v. Italy (fn. 90).

  190. 190.

    In this sense cf. Trechsel (2005), p. 194 f.

  191. 191.

    Art. 6(3)(a) ECHR. Therefore, some commentators interpreted the right to information as relating to the act through which the court proceedings are instituted. See among others Trechsel (2005), pp. 198 f.

  192. 192.

    Cf. inter alia ECtHR, Brozicek v. Italy, judgment of 19 December 1989, Appl. No. 10964/84.

  193. 193.

    To ensure the proper fulfilment inter alia of the duty of providing information about the charges, the Directive also proposes the adoption of non-legislative means, such as a Letter of rights aimed at providing defendants with information of their rights in a “simple and even non-technical language so as to be easily understood by a person without specific knowledge of criminal procedural law”. See Recital No. 38 DICP.

  194. 194.

    Recital No. 14 DICP.

  195. 195.

    Art. 6(1) DICP.

  196. 196.

    Art. 6(3) DICP.

  197. 197.

    In these terms cf. Mattoccia v. Italy (fn. 90), in which the Court clearly stressed that information “rests entirely on the prosecuting authority’s shoulders”.

  198. 198.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Pélissier and Sassi v. France, judgment of 25 March 1999, Appl. No. 25444/94.

  199. 199.

    Art. 6(4) DICP.

  200. 200.

    Art. 24(2) Const.-Spain.

  201. 201.

    On this constitutional reform see among others Marzaduri (2000), pp. 762 ff.

  202. 202.

    Art. 111(3) Const.-Italy. In this regard see Mangiaracina, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  203. 203.

    Marzaduri (2000), p. 777.

  204. 204.

    Art. 24 Const.-Italy.

  205. 205.

    Art. 111(3) Const.-Italy.

  206. 206.

    Marzaduri (2000), p. 778.

  207. 207.

    Art. 8(2)(b) ACHR.

  208. 208.

    IACtHR, Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, judgment of 17 November 2009, Serie C No. 206, para 128.

  209. 209.

    IACtHR, Tibi v. Ecuador, judgment of 7 September 2004, Serie C No. 114, para 188.

  210. 210.

    In the Sleutjes judgment, the Luxembourg judges deemed the sole information on the objection insufficient. See CJEU, Sleutjes (fn. 27).

  211. 211.

    Trechsel (2005), p. 222.

  212. 212.

    See among others ECtHR, Haxhia v. Albania, judgment of 8 October 2013, Appl. No. 29861/03.

  213. 213.

    For instance, Italian law allows this result for the purposes of the ordering of wiretapping or other pre-trial measures, such as restrictions on freedom.

  214. 214.

    Trechsel (2005), p. 225.

  215. 215.

    ECtHR, Edwards v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 February 1992, Appl. No. 13071/87, para 36.

  216. 216.

    ECtHR, Jasper v. United Kingdom, judgment of 16 February 2000, Appl. No. 27052/95.

  217. 217.

    For in-depth analysis of this problem cf. Vogel (2016), pp. 28 ff.

  218. 218.

    ECtHR, Sher et al. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 20 October 2015, Appl. No. 5201/11.

  219. 219.

    Art. 7(2) DICP.

  220. 220.

    Art. 7(1) DICP.

  221. 221.

    Art. 7(4) DICP.

  222. 222.

    Ibid.

  223. 223.

    Marzaduri (2000), pp. 781 f.

  224. 224.

    Vogel, in this volume, Sect. 3.3.

  225. 225.

    Art. 111(3) Const.-Italy.

  226. 226.

    Art. 3(2) DIT.

  227. 227.

    CJEU, Covaci (fn. 24), para 49.

  228. 228.

    Gialuz (2015), p. 6 f.

  229. 229.

    CJEU, Covaci (fn. 24), para 50.

  230. 230.

    Art. 20(2) Const.-Portugal.

  231. 231.

    Art. 208 Const.-Portugal.

  232. 232.

    See Costa Ramos and Churro, in this volume, Sect. 2.2.

  233. 233.

    On these cases and the problem of self-defence in Italy see among others Chiavario (1979).

  234. 234.

    CConst, judgment 125/1979 and decision 188/1980.

  235. 235.

    CConst, decision 421/1997.

  236. 236.

    See Ruggeri, in Part V of this volume, Sect. 6.2.2.1.

  237. 237.

    ECtHR, Croissant v. Germany, judgment of 25 September 1992, Appl. No. 13611/88, para 27.

  238. 238.

    ECtHR, Trymbach v. Ukraine, judgment of 12 January 2012, Appl. No. 44385/02, para 61.

  239. 239.

    See Costa Ramos and Churro, in this volume, Sect. 2.2.

  240. 240.

    Cf. Mangiaracina, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  241. 241.

    Art. 111(3) Const.-Italy.

  242. 242.

    Art. 461(1) CCP-Italy.

  243. 243.

    CConst, judgment 504/2000. In the same sense see CCass, 4th Section, 29 November 2000, Kusi Kwaben. In: Archivio della nuova procedura penale (2002), p. 226.

  244. 244.

    Agreements can be reached either at the end of the pre-trial phase(s), i.e. at the time in which the two files are set up, or at a later stage of the proceedings. Cf. Arts. 431(2), Art. 493(3) and 500(7) CCP.

  245. 245.

    Therefore, defendants should be made aware of the consequences of this decision, and should be able to express their intention to consent to the proposal of agreement. In this sense see Marzaduri (2009), pp. 215 f.

  246. 246.

    Art. 111(5) Const.-Italy. In this regard, Marzaduri (2009), p. 215 f., deems an intervention of the Constitutional Court unnecessary to enable the defendant to personally consent to the use of untested evidence.

  247. 247.

    Thus, the International Covenant ensures to the person charged with a criminal offence the right to “be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”. Cf. Art. 14(3)(d) ICCPR.

  248. 248.

    CCass, 1 December 2010, De Falco, in CED rv. 248963.

  249. 249.

    Drevet, in this volume, Sect. 2.

  250. 250.

    Cf. Costa Ramos and Churro, in this volume, Sect. 2.2.

  251. 251.

    An exception among the Constitutions of the countries examined in this research is that of the German Basic Law, which expressly recognises to every person the right to a court hearing in accordance with law. Cf. Art. 103(1) Basic Law. See Vogel, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  252. 252.

    Arts. 24(2) and 111(2) Const.-Italy. See Mangiaracina, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  253. 253.

    Above, Sect. 3.2.5.1.

  254. 254.

    Art. 5(3) ECHR.

  255. 255.

    Ubertis (2009), p. 49.

  256. 256.

    Art. 8(1) ACHR.

  257. 257.

    It is noteworthy that the English version of Article 6(1) ECHR acknowledges the right to ‘a fair hearing’, whereas the French text may seem to adopt a more subjective perspective by granting the accused the right that ‘sa cause soit entendue équitablement’. Most translations into Romance languages have followed the same perspective.

  258. 258.

    Below, Sect. 4.3. On this delicate question see already Chiavario (2001), pp. 938 ff.

  259. 259.

    ECtHR, Piersack v. Belgium, judgment of 1 October 1982, Appl. No. 8692/79. See Trechsel (2005), p. 66 f.

  260. 260.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, John Murray v. United Kingdom, judgment of 8 February 1996, Appl. No. 18731/91. See also later ECtHR, Magee v. United Kingdom, judgment of 6 June 2000, Appl. No. 28135/95.

  261. 261.

    Villamarín López, in this volume, Sect. 2.

  262. 262.

    Recital No. 25 DAL.

  263. 263.

    Bachmaier Winter (2015), p. 114.

  264. 264.

    Art. 2(1)(a) DLA.

  265. 265.

    For in-depth analysis of the Strasbourg case-law see Arslan (2015), pp. 34 ff.

  266. 266.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Saunders v. United Kingdom, judgment of 17 December 1996, Appl. No. 19187/91.

  267. 267.

    See Vollamarín López, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  268. 268.

    In France, for instance, the Conseil constitutionnel has for the first time in 2016 considered the right to silence as a constitutional principle in the light of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. See Drevet, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  269. 269.

    Zacchè (2008), p. 180.

  270. 270.

    See, for instance, Art. 503(1) CCP-Italy.

  271. 271.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Gäfgen v. Germany, judgment of 1 June 2010, Appl. No. 22978/05, para 107.

  272. 272.

    See ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September 2001, Appl. No. 44787/98, in relation to vocal sample with a view to a confrontation.

  273. 273.

    ECtHR, Funke v. France, judgment of 25 February 1993, Appl. No. 10828/84.

  274. 274.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Jalloh v. Germany, judgment of 11 June 2006, Appl. No. 54810/00.

  275. 275.

    Zacchè (2008), p. 190 f.

  276. 276.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, O’Halloran and Francis v. United Kingdom, judgment of 29 June 2007, Appl. No. 15809/02 and 25624/02.

  277. 277.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Saunders v. United Kingdom (fn. 266), para 67.

  278. 278.

    ECtHR, Shannon v. United Kingdom, judgment of 4 October 2005, Appl. No. 6563/03.

  279. 279.

    See already Trechsel (2005), p. 345, who detected the different approach from that used (prior to the Al-Khawaja judgment) in relation to the right to confrontation.

  280. 280.

    ECtHR, John Murray v. United Kingdom (fn. 260).

  281. 281.

    In Italy, the 1988 code enabled the suspect to appear at the public prosecutor’s office and to give spontaneous statements. Italian law, moreover, makes it clear that the suspect’s conduct does not prevent the application of pre-trial measures. See Art. 374 CCP-Italy.

  282. 282.

    Art. 111(3) Const.-Italy.

  283. 283.

    Marzaduri (2000), p. 783 f.

  284. 284.

    It should be noted, however, that under the Italian constitutional law the accused’s right to evidence, along with the right to confrontation, must be satisfied “before a judge”. See Art. 111(3) Const.-Italy. Moreover, it is apparent that the prosecutorial and police questionings do not properly fulfil the constitutional requirement of equal treatment of the parties, set forth by Article 111(2) Const.-Italy.

  285. 285.

    Cf. Arts. 64, 65 and 364 CCP-Italy.

  286. 286.

    Art. 374(2) CCP-Italy.

  287. 287.

    See respectively Legislative Decree 101/2014 and Legislative Decree 184/2016.

  288. 288.

    Art. 3(3)(a-b) DAL.

  289. 289.

    Art. 100(1) CCP-Italy.

  290. 290.

    Ciopec and Roibu, in this volume, Sect. 1.

  291. 291.

    Above, Sect. 4.1.

  292. 292.

    Art. 10 DVR.

  293. 293.

    Recital No. 41 DVR.

  294. 294.

    Costa Ramos and Churro, in this volume, Sect. 1.2.

  295. 295.

    CConst, judgment 23/2015.

  296. 296.

    Art. 111(2) Const.-Italy.

  297. 297.

    ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. United Kingdom, judgment of 15 December 2011, Appl. No. 26766/05 and 22228/06. See also ECtHR, 5th Section, Schatschaschwili v. Germany, judgment of 17 April 2014, Appl. No. 9154/10. This case was, moreover, referred to the Grand Chamber, which, despite not denying the Al-Khawaja doctrine, strengthened the defendant’s right to examine incriminating witnesses by holding that confrontation should at least be ensured at the pre-trial stage through a defence lawyer. Cf. ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Schatschaschwili v. Germany, judgment of 15 December 2015, Appl. No. 9154/10.

  298. 298.

    The Strasbourg Court was called upon to examine this issue in van Mechelen v. The Netherlands. See ECtHR, van Mechelen v. The Netherlands, judgment of 23 April 1997, Appl. No. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93. In this case, however, the European judges considered the domestic arrangements to be inadequate to compensate the accused for the restrictions suffered on his right to confrontation, although both the defendant und his counsel had been placed in an adjacent room and could follow the witness’ examination and ask questions. This result was probably influenced by the fact that the witnesses were police officers. It was a rather unfortunate conclusion, taking into consideration that the Convention’s protection of the right to life, physical integrity and security must certainly be ensured to all the persons involved in a criminal law action. It is noteworthy that the Strasbourg Court has broadened the trade-offs concerned with the right to confrontation even beyond the sphere of the parties of the proceedings in a strict sense, taking on the protection of the families of prosecutorial witnesses and their next of kin. In this sense cf. Trechsel (2005), pp. 319 f.

  299. 299.

    ECtHR, Gray v. Germany (fn. 146), para 91.

Abbreviations

ACHR:

American Convention of Human Rights

BVerfG:

Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court)

CCass:

Corte di Cassazione (Supreme Court)

CConst:

Constitutional Court

CCP:

Code of Criminal Procedure

CFR:

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

DAL:

Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings

DICP:

Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings

DIT:

Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings

DLA:

Directive on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings

DPIRPT:

Directive on certain aspects on the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings

DVR:

Directive on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime

EAW:

European arrest warrant

ECHR:

European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR:

European Court of Human Rights

EU:

European Union

ICCPR:

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

LECrim:

Ley de enjuiciamiento criminal (Spanish law on criminal procedure)

PC:

Penal code

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Ruggeri, S. (2019). Participatory Rights in Criminal Proceedings. A Comparative-Law Analysis from a Human Rights Perspective. In: Quattrocolo, S., Ruggeri, S. (eds) Personal Participation in Criminal Proceedings. Legal Studies in International, European and Comparative Criminal Law, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01186-4_21

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