Abstract
Jennifer Saul’s puzzle, a generalized version of Frege’s puzzle concerning opacity, poses troublesome triads such as: (i) Superman = Clark Kent; (ii) Superman does not wear glasses; (iii) Clark Kent does wear glasses. Proposed resolutions of the puzzle variously deny the identity claim (i) (Graeme Forbes, Joseph Moore, David Pitt); deny one or other of the predication claims (ii)/(iii) (Jennifer Saul, David Braun, Alex Barber, Alessandro Capone); or postulate equivocation (Stefano Predelli, Laurence Goldstein). I myself develop an equivocation account, using the resources of cognitive semantics (e.g. Gilles Fauconnier, George Lakoff, and Ray Jackendoff). My work shares Saul’s psychologistic turn but reaches very different conclusions. Whereas Saul regards (i) as semantically true, and others regard it as false, I regard each of (i–iii) as both true and false (true in one way and false in another). This is not to say that they are lexically, structurally, or illocutionarily ambiguous; but they do possess a kind of pragmatic indeterminacy that generates what I call ambivalence ambiguity. If my account is correct, ambivalence ambiguity is due to inconsistencies intrinsic to our mental models. My mentalist account of linguistic interpretation is both clarified and supported by analogy to cartographic interpretation, and it is additionally supported by virtue of its power to solve problems that confront referential semantics: the notorious aspect problem and the heretofore unrecognized parity problem.
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Notes
- 1.
Challenging the relevance of (5), Moore (2000) suspects that ‘successful’ induces opacity because it implies an attitude. Moore is correct if success is understood in terms of attractiveness, but success could just as well be measured by sexual activity. I’m not suggesting that male success with women should be measured that way, only that that’s surely the intent behind (5). Moore’s objection therefore misses the point.
- 2.
Material in this paper is part of two larger projects. In one I apply my thesis, that aspects are projections, to the problem of personal identity. In the other I develop solutions for puzzles involving the opacity of identities and non-identities beyond those discussed in the existing literature, including names, predicates, and other syntactic types. Some of the material herein has been presented at Semantics & Philosophy in Europe (Bochum, Germany, 2011) and the International Conference on Pragmatics and Philosophy (Palermo, Italy, 2016). For stimulating comments, I thank James Myers and the event organizers and audiences, especially Jay Atlas and Mitch Green. This work is dedicated to the memory of Justin Leiber.
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Saka, P. (2019). Superman Semantics. In: Capone, A., Carapezza, M., Lo Piparo, F. (eds) Further Advances in Pragmatics and Philosophy: Part 2 Theories and Applications. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00973-1_10
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