Abstract
Quite a few authors have dealt with the influence of Karl Jaspers’ work on Husserlian thought. Wiggins and Schwartz (Philos Psychiatr Psychol 4:15–36, 1997) as well as Luft (In S. Rinofner-Kreidl and H. Wiltsche (Eds.), Karl Jaspers’ Allgemeine Psychopathologie Zwischen Wissenschaft, Philosophie Und Praxis, 2008) explore this connection in Jaspers’ General Psychopathology (1997) and beyond. At the same time, relatively little attention has been paid to the contribution Jaspers made to Phenomenological Psychiatry within the fourth edition of his General Psychopathology. This essay unfolds Jaspers’ critique of concepts put forward by von Gebsattel and Straus and of early Phenomenological Psychiatry in general. As it turns out, this critique is an allegation of causalism against explanatory theories of human existence—an existence which for Jaspers can only be understood philosophically. However, Jaspers’ allegation is ambiguous. On the one hand, he accuses early Phenomenological Psychiatry of claiming to be a causalistic theory of human existence, yet on the other, he faults it for not fulfilling the requirements of causalistic theory. This contradiction raises the question as to whether Jaspers’ account of phenomenological theory in psychiatry as causalistic is valid at all. In particular, the phenomenological claims of a more recent thinker in Phenomenological Psychiatry, Arthur Tatossian, criticize reductive and naturalistic approaches to the patient and aim to enable communication with the patient. According to Tatossian’s account, since its outset, the phenomenological movement in psychiatry has therefore been very similar to Jaspers’ own philosophical attempts.
Translation: Kelly Mulvaney.
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Notes
- 1.
As already mentioned, Jaspers accords to phenomenology a fundamental task for psychopathology. The conviction that a truly specific and valid diagnostic is only possible through orientation around a first-person perspective is also reflected in Kurt Schneider’s first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, and from this it was also included in the ICD-10 Manual. Mainstream psychiatry today has distanced itself as far as possible from this supposedly unreliable first-person perspective, replacing it with an allegedly more objective third-person perspective.
- 2.
It is interesting at this point that Jaspers considers the possibilities for understanding (verstehen) psychic phenomena to be limited (which can especially be seen in his understanding of primary experiences of delusion). However, he does not take up such a limit for explanation: “understanding is limited, explanation unlimited.” (Jaspers 1997, p. 305)
- 3.
Incorrect translation: “im richtigen Verstehen” translates more accurately to “with proper understanding” rather than “rightly understood. ” The quotation reflects this revision.
- 4.
“Gegenständliche Verdinglichung” translates more accurately to “concrete objectivization” rather than “concretization.” The quotation reflects this revision.
- 5.
In this sentence, Jaspers’ use of the German term “erschliessen”was originally translated into English as “deduced.” This English translation does not contain a second meaning of the term “erschliessen,” which refers to attaining knowledge through experience or practice, as opposed to by means of scientific method. This second meaning of “erschliessen” has been demonstrated by Heidegger in Being and Time (Heidegger 2008).
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Acknowledgement
Special thanks to Johanna Thoma for insightful remarks.
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Thoma, S. (2014). Karl Jaspers Criticism of Anthropological and Phenomenological Psychiatry. In: Fuchs, T., Breyer, T., Mundt, C. (eds) Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy and Psychopathology. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8878-1_6
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