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Mean Field Games

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Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

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Abstract

The notion of the infinite population limit of large population games where agents are realized by controlled stochastic dynamical systems is introduced. The theory of infinite population mean field games (MFGs) is then presented including the fundamental MFG equations. Proofs of the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solutions to the MFG equations are discussed, and systems possessing major agents along with the standard asymptotically negligible agents are introduced. A short bibliography is included.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Peter E. Caines

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  1. Peter E. Caines
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Correspondence to Peter E. Caines .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

    John Baillieul

  2. Automation and Control Solutions, Honeywell, Golden Valley, MN, USA

    Tariq Samad

Section Editor information

  1. Coordinated Science Laboratory and Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

    Tamer BaÅŸar

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Caines, P.E. (2019). Mean Field Games. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_30-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_30-2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference EngineeringReference Module Computer Science and Engineering

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Mean Field Games
    Published:
    24 September 2019

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_30-2

  2. Original

    Mean Field Games
    Published:
    28 February 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_30-1

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