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The Players: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in the Humanitarian Space

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Conflict and Catastrophe Medicine

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Abstract

The change in the post-Cold War climate has seen states and international organisations turn to the private sector for services which were traditionally considered the reserve of the armed forces and the state, i.e. military- and security-related tasks often involving the application of lethal force. It is now widespread practice for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations to use private companies for security and logistical support. Of importance is the claim that the new PMSC approach represents a new paradigm, which has irrevocably changed the wider international context. This account neither admonishes nor encourages the new PMSC paradigm but recognises that these actors are present in the humanitarian space and that those working in this sphere must understand the drivers and motivations of such companies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Jenkins [4]. At the time of writing the case is still being heard in the US Federal Criminal Court.

  2. 2.

    United Nations [5]. The document contains details of hired soldiers involved in conflicts in a variety of locations including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Angola, Rwanda, Zaire and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to name but a few.

  3. 3.

    A unit of the South African Defence Force responsible for commando-type operations throughout southern Africa, destabilising operations and the intimidation of anti-Apartheid campaigners.

  4. 4.

    Executive Outcomes first became involved in Angola in March 1993 when it assembled a force of 50 men to free an Angolan mine from UNITA. Against the background of this success, in September EO negotiated what is reported to have been a $40 million contract to protect a diamond mine in Canfunfo, Lunda Norte.

  5. 5.

    Deen. “On present showing, EO will become even richer and more potent, capable of exercising real power, even to the extent of keeping military regimes in being”. Inter Press Service, 1997. In effect, this never happened as EO was curbed by the legislation brought into force in South Africa.

  6. 6.

    Harris [9]. MPRI was awarded the contract to introduce the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicle to the National Guard and is responsible for the administration of the University Reserve Officer Training Corps.

  7. 7.

    Located at Hadzici, west of Sarajevo, central Bosnia.

  8. 8.

    Article 47 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949. This at present represents the UN definition of a mercenary.

  9. 9.

    The only enforceable international legal instrument on mercenaries is the OAU’s Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa which was signed by the member states in 1977 and came into force in 1985. The 1972 organisation of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries represented the first attempt to establish a definition in the context of international law. It does not include any mention of PMCs or PSCs.

  10. 10.

    This international convention requires 22 signatories for ratification. It was finally ratified on 20th October 2001 when Costa Rica became the 20-s signatory. The British government has not signed, claiming that the form of the Convention does not provide the means for a successful prosecution under international law.

  11. 11.

    Makki et al. [19]. This does not appear to take any account of more sophisticated classifications such as Singer’s combat, support, provider model. See Singer [6].

  12. 12.

    Poole [20]. In 2004, there were 30 PMCs/PSCs operating in Iraq providing 20,000 employees to satisfy 3,000 contracts awarded by the Pentagon. The rate of growth is significant. By December 2003, there were a reported 10,000 private military contractors on the ground. Compared with the 1991 Gulf War, there has been a tenfold increase in the number of operatives working. See Traynor [29]. However, evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee Inquiry suggested that only six or so PMCs were based in Great Britain

  13. 13.

    David Claridge [22]. It has been suggested that prior to the campaign in Iraq, the British PMC / PSC industry made $200 million but after the end of the war the industry was making more than $1 billion, making it Britain’s leading export to post-war Iraq.

  14. 14.

    Odierno R. Memorandum “increased employment of Iraqi civilians through command contracts”. Multi-national force-Iraq. 31 Jan 2009. Cited in Schwartz and Swain [24].

  15. 15.

    Patreus D. “COMISAF’s COIN contracting guidance”. ISAF/United States Forces – Afghanistan. 8 Sept 2010. Cited in Schwartz and Swain [24].

  16. 16.

    D Leigh, ibid. It should be noted that some PMCs have reacted to this and are against such a move. For example, Chris Bertelli, a Washington lobbyist for Blackwater, has described the proposed action as unworkable.

  17. 17.

    These views, concerning the transition from the PSC to the PMC role, were expressed by Duncan Boulevant, the Managing Director of Henderson Risks International in the Radio 4 broadcast, File on Four.

  18. 18.

    Wilson [28]. One source quoted in the article who wished to remain anonymous said “Our job is to move people as quickly and safely as possible…we are not sending soldiers to fight in battles, we are sending civilians to provide a service for civilians”.

  19. 19.

    Becirbasic E. Bosnian military official involved in managing the Bosnian side of the MPRI “Equip and Train” program. “I had some problems with the American generals…I represent the national interest, but they’re businessmen. I would have preferred …state organisations like NATO or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. But we had no choice. We had to use MPRI”. Quoted in Traynor [29].

  20. 20.

    Montreux Document: A Swiss initiative that brought experts on the PMC industry together from 17 countries and set out a set of core responsibilities for Contracting, Territorial and Home states with regard to PMCs. It does not provide new legislation but clarifies existing domestic and international law for all parties involved with PMCs.

  21. 21.

    UN SCR [30].

  22. 22.

    Official Report, published 2nd July, 2001. From the outset it is important to realise that the paper does not represent policy, but is intended as a consultative document designed to stimulate debate.

  23. 23.

    Private military and security companies (PMSCs): summary of public consultation working group, foreign and commonwealth office. April 2010.

  24. 24.

    By way of comparison the UN Observer mission in Angola cost approximately $I million per day in 1997.

  25. 25.

    P.L. 110–181, sec 862. Cited in Schwartz and Swain [24].

  26. 26.

    P.L 110–118, sec 841. Cited in Schwartz and Swain [24].

  27. 27.

    During the 1980s, extensive US and British efforts were made to train the Mujahedeen in their war against the Soviets. The consequence, following Russian withdrawal, was the creation of a demobilised, highly politicised military clique, many of whom went onto fight for the Taliban regime or international Islamicist terror groups. See Rashid [35].

  28. 28.

    The approach to classification is illustrative in itself. In 1997 David Isenberg published Soldiers of Fortune Ltd: Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms. In 2003 P W Singer published Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Whether greater respectability is implied by the differences in titles remains contentious.

  29. 29.

    Shearer [36] refers in particular to Christopher Clapham’s categories of insurgency which delineate the main driving forces behind civil wars and conflicts. The categories are warlord insurgencies, liberation movements, separatist insurgencies and reform insurgencies. See Clapham [37].

  30. 30.

    Foreword by the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. PMCs: Options for Regulation. February 2002.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Emergency Medicine Cadre, Defence Medical Services, London, UK

    James Grant MPhil, MRCSEd, MCEM, DTM&H, RAMC

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  1. James Grant MPhil, MRCSEd, MCEM, DTM&H, RAMC
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Cardiac and Vascular Sciences, St George's University of London, London, United Kingdom

    James M. Ryan

  2. Buma Health Care Services, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Adriaan P.C.C. Hopperus Buma

  3. Department of Military and Emergency Medicine, Center for Distaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, Uniformed Services, University of Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland, USA

    Charles W. Beadling

  4. Defence Medical Services-Whittington, Lichfield, Staffordshire, United Kingdom

    Aroop Mozumder

  5. Department of Surgery, Chelsea and Westminster Hospital, London, United Kingdom

    David M. Nott

  6. The Norman M. Rich Department of Surgery, Uniformed Services, University of Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland, USA

    Norman M. Rich

  7. Formerly of Department of Surgery, University Hospital, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Walter Henny

  8. Department of Gastroenterology, Royal Surrey County Hospital, Guildford, Surrey, United Kingdom

    David MacGarty

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Grant, J. (2014). The Players: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in the Humanitarian Space. In: Ryan, J., et al. Conflict and Catastrophe Medicine. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2927-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2927-1_5

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