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Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies

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Palgrave Dictionary of Emerging Markets and Transition Economics

Abstract

Starting from the early 1980s, the legal status of central banks all over the world has changed substantially in the direction of getting greater independence. The move towards greater degrees of CBI has been especially prominent in the emerging economies, including transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe. In this chapter we assess political and economic arguments for establishing independent central banks. Furthermore, we analyse and critically evaluate different indices that attempt to quantify the extent of legal and actual CBI. In addition, we provide a comprehensive overview of the evolution of CBI in former transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, we provide a critical assessment of the empirical literature on CBI-inflation relationship.

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Authors
  1. Jane Bogoev
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  2. Goran Petrevski
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Bournemouth University, UK

    Jens Hölscher (Professor of Economics and Head of Department) (Professor of Economics and Head of Department)

  2. Freie University Berlin, Germany

    Horst Tomann (Jean Monnet Professor for European Economic Policy) (Jean Monnet Professor for European Economic Policy)

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© 2015 Jane Bogoev and Goran Petrevski

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Bogoev, J., Petrevski, G. (2015). Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies. In: Hölscher, J., Tomann, H. (eds) Palgrave Dictionary of Emerging Markets and Transition Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-37138-6_2

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