Abstract
Animal models are used in experiments in the behavioural neurosciences that aim to contribute to the prevention and treatment of cognitive and affective disorders in human beings, such as anxiety and depression. Ironically, those animals that are likely to be the best models for psychopathology are also likely to be considered the ones that are most morally problematic to use, if it seems probable that (and if indeed they are initially selected as models because) they have experiences that are similar to human experiences that we have strong reasons to avoid causing, and indeed aim to alleviate (such as pain, anxiety or sadness). In this paper, against the background of contemporary discussions in animal ethics and the philosophy of animal minds, we discuss the views that it is morally permissible to use animals in these kinds of experiments, and that it is better to use less cognitively complex animals (such as zebrafish) than more complex animals (such as dogs). First, we criticise some justifications for the claim that human beings and more complex animals have higher moral status . We argue that contemporary approaches that attribute equal moral status to all beings that are capable of conscious strivings (e.g. avoiding pain and anxiety; aiming to eat and play) are based on more plausible assumptions. Second, we argue that it is problematic to assume that less cognitively complex animals have a lesser sensory and emotional experience than more complex beings across the board. In specific cases, there might be good reasons to assume that more complex beings would be harmed more by a specific physical or environmental intervention, but it might also be that they sometimes are harmed less because of a better ability to cope. Determining whether a specific experiment is justified is therefore a complex issue. Our aim in this chapter is to stimulate further reflection on these common assumptions behind the use of animal models for psychopathologies. In order to be able to draw more definite conclusions, more research will have to be done on the influence of cognitive complexity on the experience of (human and non-human) animals.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Indeed, virtue ethical accounts in animal ethics aim to base duties to animals in our sympathy for them (eg. Walker 2007).
- 3.
Hume appears to be describing human nature; explaining what human beings do when they make moral judgments. One can question whether and why we should take such a common point of view. We describe a utilitarian and a Kantian argument for a similar idea in the next section.
- 4.
Note that it is our aim here to introduce the philosophical reasoning of Singer, and not to add new insights to the debate about what constitutes animal welfare. More in general, suffering could be described as ‘strong, negative affective states such as severe hunger, pain, or fear’ (Fraser and Duncan 1998) and can result from ‘experiencing a wide range of unpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger’ (Dawkins 1990). A discussion is possible about the question whether all negative affective states in fact amount to suffering as such. After all, animals can often adapt their behaviour to short-term negative states, such as hunger or fear, in a way that is rather functional for them. Real suffering may result only from intense or prolonged exposure to negative stimuli combined with a negative stance towards such experiences.
- 5.
An external criticism of this view has been given on the basis of the previously mentioned analogy with humans without rational capacities: if we do not have direct duties to animals because they are not rational, what about human beings with similar lack of rational capacity, such as babies or severely mentally challenged people? Should we only not treat them cruelly because of the implications for other beings? Such an argument (e.g. Singer 1999; also Regan 2004) points to an inconsistency in the way that we treat different kinds of beings with similar capacities.
- 6.
Note that Korgaard is making a philosophical argument here to the effect that those animals who actually experience pain and pleasure and have positive or negative emotions care about their own good in a way that insensate beings cannot. Of course, her argument does not hold for the group of animals who do not have these experiences. To what group of animals such emotions are restricted is a question that should be answered by use of biological research together with reflection about the philosophy of animal minds.
- 7.
Other animal ethicists, such as Taylor (2011) or Rollin Smulewicz-Zucker (2012) have also emphasised that animals have moral status because they have a good of their own. Korsgaard’s theory differs to Taylor’s in the sense that in her view, animals should care about their own good in order to have moral status. She differs from Rollin in the structure of her moral theory. Korsgaard tries to show that, as rational agents, we cannot rationally avoid accepting moral duties to all conscious animals.
- 8.
Thanks to Ruud van den Bos for pointing this out to us.
- 9.
Note that a distinction is sometimes made between consciousness and awareness. We will use the terms interchangeably.
- 10.
Note that the analogy postulate would more aptly be named the ‘homology postulate’, as it is looking at homologous structures and functional homology.
- 11.
New research indicates that crayfish show anxiety-like behavior, which led to an increase in serotonin in the brain and was suppressed by the injection of opiates. See Fossat et al. 2014.
- 12.
It is as yet unclear whether animals besides mammals, such as fish, have something functionally similar to an anterior cingulate cortex. More research is needed into this question.
- 13.
- 14.
This lawsuit was filed on December 2, 2013, by the Non-human Rights Group with the help of animal rights lawyer Steven Wise. See http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/lawsuit-filed-today-on-behalf-of-chimpanzee-seeking-legal-personhood/.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Franck Meijboom, Frauke Ohl, and several anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. Work for this chapter was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant number 275-20-038.
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Bovenkerk, B., Kaldewaij, F. (2014). The Use of Animal Models in Behavioural Neuroscience Research. In: Lee, G., Illes, J., Ohl, F. (eds) Ethical Issues in Behavioral Neuroscience. Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, vol 19. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/7854_2014_329
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