Abstract
Roffe et al. (Hist Philos Life Sci, 2108. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0208-z) develop a rather creative line of response to Pearson’s (Hist Philos Life Sci 32(4):475–492, 2010) critique of pattern cladisma response centering on a structuralist approach to the homology concept. In this brief reply I attempt to demonstrate, however, that Roffe, and Ginnobili, and Blanco subtly mis-characterize the target of Pearson’s critique. The consequence of this mischaracterization is that even though the structuralist framework may help make sense of pattern cladism, it does not undermine Pearson’s critique of it.
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References
Lankester, E. R. (1870). On the use of the term homology in modern zoology, and the distinction between homogenetic and homoplastic agreements. Journal of Natural History, 6(31), 34–43.
Pearson, C. (2010). Pattern cladism, homology, and theory neutrality. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 32(4), 475–492.
Roffe, A. J., Ginnobili, S., & Blanco, D. (2108). Theoricity, observation and homology: A response to Pearson. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0208-z.
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Pearson, C.H. Theoricity and homology: a reply to Roffe, Ginnobili, and Blanco. HPLS 40, 62 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0226-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0226-x