Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Enhancements 2.0: Self-Creation Might not be as Lovely as Some Think

  • Published:
Topoi Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Recent developments in the study of our brain and neurochemical maps have sparked much enthusiasm in some scholars, making room for speculations over the possibility to shape our morality from within ourselves rather than through [failed] socio-political projects. This paper aims at criticising the prospected scenario put forward by some scholars supporting a specific version of Moral Enhancement as an overly optimistically described manipulative tools. To do so, I will focus on a specific version of Moral Enhancers, namely Emotional Enhancers. By looking from close at this group of enhancers and the potential results of their implementation, I will underline the risks that those could pose to sexual minorities, and I will use this analysis to support a much more cautious assessment of these drugs and a broader assessment of what their social acceptance would mean.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Earp (2012), Earp et al. (2012, 2013, 2014a, b, 2015), Savulescu and Sandberg (2008), Wudarczyk et al. (2013).

  2. It is interesting and important to note that, in Cognitive Science, EE is normally associated with an increase of memory thanks to the overlapping of a given event with an “emotional blast” (Talmi 2013; Kumfor et al. 2014). Here however, EE has been chosen as a terminology to stress a direct connection between the HE project more at large and emotions.

  3. Earp et al. (2014a, b).

  4. Savulescu et al. (2014).

  5. Insel and Young (2001), Fisher et al. (2006).

  6. Young (2009).

  7. Although not able to expand on this point here, it should be acknowledged that, following the epistemological tradition initiated with the Gettier Problem (Gettier 1963), the lack of initial autonomy (also to genuinely love) could be defined as “false premises”, hence rendering the whole chemical make-up aimed at helping us reach a given result (i.e. redirecting our love towards someone we initially did not feel attracted by) pointless. We might end up experiencing the “right feeling”, but in the “wrong way”. Within the HE debate, a partial answer that moral perfectionists could provide in relation to this aspect has been analysed elsewhere –albeit with a focus on Motivational Enhancement and its relationship with our “true identity”, through a limited account on first and second order values and enhancers (Garasic and Lavazza 2015).

  8. Insel and Young (2001).

  9. Bostwick and Bucci (2008).

  10. Garasic (2013).

  11. Gupta (2012).

  12. Sparrow (2015).

  13. Earp et al. (2014a, b).

  14. In their paper, the authors refer to particularly conservative groups within the Abrahamic religions, but there is little doubt that such backward mentality can -unfortunately- be found in other religious contexts or secular ones. Ultimately, one of the strongest prejudice against homosexuality has been historically linked to the incapacity from the couple to reproduce biologically and guarantee the authority in charge (be it religious or political) a required generational renewal.

  15. It should be noted that the authors are aware that these definitions are limited, as well as that the direction of the “conversion” could be reversed, but they intentionally used them to follow the standard (inaccurate) dichotomy heterosexual/homosexual. I decided to adopt the same nomenclature out of simplicity, but it must be clear that there is no intention here to reinforce any prejudice related to the “value” of one way of experiencing and giving love over another.

  16. In relation to this point, reference to Jürgen Habermas’ critique of the HE project would certainly be relevant, but I will not be able to consider it here (Habermas 2003).

  17. Earp et al. (2015).

  18. The authors emphasize this point on page 351 of their article (Parens 2013).

  19. Although it might be argued that such interventions will affect the authenticity of the individual (Ronald Dworkin’s definition of authenticity referred in other contexts comes to mind), I will refrain from entering such a debate in this instance. Rather, I will focus our attention on the fact that authenticity is relevant in EE in a non-individualistic sense. All those of us that have been [un]lucky enough to be engaged in more than one romantic story will agree that each of them was special in its uniqueness. Although each of the partners brings in a predefined structure of an individual, it is the specific way in which the two individuals interact that creates the conditions for love to occur. As this “reaction” cannot be foreseen by even the very protagonists of the experience (it is not rare to have love relationships that evolve in time after an initial disinterest in the future partner), when they occur, they are as authentic as a relationship can be. This, I will argue, is the authenticity we cannot be ready to give up if we still want to be talking about love (Dworkin 1993).

  20. Casado da Rocha (2014).

  21. Hofmann (2002).

  22. Casado da Rocha (2014).

  23. Murray (2007, p. 511).

  24. BBC News (2013).

  25. Garasic (2013).

References

  • BBC News (2013) Belgian helped to die after three sex change operations

  • Bostwick JM, Bucci JA (2008) Internet sex addiction treated with naltrexone. Mayo Clin Proc 83(2):226–230

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Casado da Rocha A (2014) Narrative autonomy: three literary models of healthcare in the end of life. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 23(2):200–208

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin R (1993) Life’s dominion: an argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual freedom. Harper Collins, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Earp B (2012) Love and other drugs. Philos Now 91:14–17

    Google Scholar 

  • Earp BD, Sandberg A, Savulescu J (2012) Natural selection, childrearing, and the ethics of marriage (and divorce): building a case for the neuroenhancement of human relationships. Philos Technol 25(4):561–587

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Earp BD et al (2013) If I could just stop loving you: anti-love biotechnology and the ethics of a chemical breakup. Am J Bioeth 13(11):3–17

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Earp BD et al (2014a) When is diminishment a form of enhancement? Rethinking the enhancement debate in biomedical ethics. Front Syst Neurosci 8:12

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Earp BD, Sandberg A, Savulescu J (2014b) Brave new love: the threat of high-tech “conversion” therapy and the bio-oppression of sexual minorities. AJOB Neurosci 5(1):4–12

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Earp BD, Sandberg A, Savulescu J (2015) The medicalization of love. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 24(3):323–336

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisher HE, Aron A, Brown LL (2006) Romantic love: a mammalian brain system for mate choice. Philos Trans R Soc B-Biol Sci 361(1476):2173–2186

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garasic MD (2013) Anti-love biotechnology: was it not better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all? Am J Bioeth 13(11):22–23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garasic MD, Lavazza A (2015) The neuronal excuse: one can lack motivation and want to be helped with it, while remaining a moral perfectionist. AJOB Neurosci 6(1):20–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gettier EL (1963) Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23(6):121–123

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gupta K (2012) Protecting sexual diversity: rethinking the use of neurotechnological interventions to alter sexuality. AJOB Neurosci 3(3):24–28

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (2003) The future of human nature. Polity, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofmann B (2002) On the triad disease, illness and sickness. J Med Philos 27(6):651–673

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Insel TR, Young LJ (2001) The neurobiology of attachment. Nat Rev Neurosci 2(2):129–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kumfor F et al (2014) Frontal and temporal lobe contributions to emotional enhancement of memory in behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. Front Behav Neurosci 8:225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murray TH (2007) Enhancement. In: Steinbock B (ed) The oxford handbook of bioethics, OUP, p 511

  • Parens E (2013) On good and bad forms of medicalization. Bioethics 27(1):28–35

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Savulescu J, Sandberg A (2008) Neuroenhancement of love and marriage: the chemicals between us. Neuroethics 1(1):31–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Savulescu J, Sandberg A, Kahane G (2014) Well-being and enhancement. In: Enhancing human capacities. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, pp 1–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Sparrow R (2015) Imposing genetic diversity. Am J Bioeth 15(6):2–10

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Talmi D (2013) Enhanced emotional memory. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 22(6):430–436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wudarczyk OA et al (2013) Could intranasal oxytocin be used to enhance relationships? research imperatives, clinical policy, and ethical considerations. Curr Opin Psychiatry 26(5):474–484

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young LJ (2009) Being human: love: neuroscience reveals all. Nature 457(7226):148–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This article is part of a series of works developed and discussed during the productive time at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Tel Aviv University. The author would like to thank that community for all their support throughout the process that has led to this final version.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy

    Mirko D. Garasic

Authors
  1. Mirko D. Garasic
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mirko D. Garasic.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Garasic, M.D. Enhancements 2.0: Self-Creation Might not be as Lovely as Some Think. Topoi 38, 135–140 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9469-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9469-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation