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I am indebted to Hao Wang and The Rockefeller University for a visiting appointment which provided the freedom to do much of the work on this paper. I presented an early version in January 1972 to John Wallace's seminar at Rockefeller and a version closer to the present one in lectures in March 1973 at the University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, and Stanford University. Among those from whose comments or discussion the paper has benefited are Rogers Albritton, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, James Higginbotham, David Kaplan, George Myro, Thomas Nagel, and John Wallace. I owe much to the writings of Hans Herzberger. I am grateful to Bas van Fraassen and the referee for pointing out misunderstandings and questionable interpretations of van Fraassen's work.
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Parsons, C. The liar paradox. J Philos Logic 3, 381–412 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00257482
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00257482