Abstract
We provide a new technique to derive group strategyproof mechanisms for the cost-sharing problem. Our technique is simpler and provably more powerful than the existing one based on so called cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods given by Moulin and Shenker [1997]. Indeed, our method yields the first polynomial-time mechanism for the Steiner tree game which is group strategyproof, budget balance and also meets other standard requirements (No Positive Transfer, Voluntary Participation and Consumer Sovereignty). A known result by Megiddo [1978] implies that this result cannot be achieved with cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods, even if using exponential-time mechanisms.
Work supported by the European Project IST-2001-33135, Critical Resource Sharing for Cooperation in Complex Systems (CRESCCO).
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Penna, P., Ventre, C. (2005). More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods. In: Persiano, G., Solis-Oba, R. (eds) Approximation and Online Algorithms. WAOA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3351. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31833-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31833-0_10
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