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Handbook of Neuroethics pp 423–439Cite as

Extended Mind and Identity

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Abstract

Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psychological continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative or autobiographical memory of some kind, and special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person’s psychological states can physically extend beyond that person’s body. Since “person” is a term of both metaphysical and moral significance, and discussions of both extended minds and personal identity have often focused on memory, this article explores the relevance of extended cognition for the identity of persons with special attention to neuroethics and memory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, 2-40 Assiniboia Hall, Edmonton, AB, T6G2E7, Canada

    Robert A. Wilson & Bartlomiej A. Lenart

Authors
  1. Robert A. Wilson
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  2. Bartlomiej A. Lenart
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Correspondence to Robert A. Wilson .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

    Jens Clausen

  2. The Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia

    Neil Levy

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Wilson, R.A., Lenart, B.A. (2015). Extended Mind and Identity. In: Clausen, J., Levy, N. (eds) Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_14

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  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-4707-4

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