Abstract
Dissociative identity disorder (DID) has been a subject of fascination to clinicians, philosophers, and the general public for well over a century. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which is the way in which this disorder challenges ordinary understandings of personal identity. It is not easy to say how many people are present in an encounter with a DID patient. Since facts about personal identity are intimately connected to prudential reasoning and the assignment of moral responsibility, perplexity about identity in these cases has potentially important practical implications. This chapter offers a theoretical framework for the fruitful investigation of questions of personal identity in DID in the form of the Narrative Self-Constitution View which argues that individuals constitute themselves as persons by developing and operating with an implicit autobiographical narrative in which they apply the normative constraints of personhood to their own lives. The Narrative Self-Constitution View does not deliver a definitive answer to the question of how many persons one is confronted with in encountering a DID patient, but it does provide important insights into why a definitive answer should not be expected and sheds light on the role of embodiment in personal identity. The further value of this approach is demonstrated by showing how it can illuminate questions of moral and criminal responsibility in DID.
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Schechtman, M. (2015). Dissociative Identity Disorder and Narrative. In: Clausen, J., Levy, N. (eds) Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_113
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_113
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