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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1–4Cite as

Anarchy

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Abstract

Anarchic environments are ubiquitous. Unable to rely on government, individuals in such environments develop private institutions of governance to promote social cooperation. Private governance consists of privately created social rules and mechanisms of their enforcement. Anarchy may secure better socioeconomic development than government in least-developed countries.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Peter T. Leeson

Authors
  1. Peter T. Leeson
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Correspondence to Peter T. Leeson .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Leeson, P.T. (2016). Anarchy. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_87-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_87-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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