Market Games and Clubs
 Myrna Wooders
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Definition of the Subject
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different –markets and games. Shapley and Shubik [60] demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets withconcave utility functions generate totally balanced games where the players in the game are the participants in the economy and (2) every totally balancedgame generates a market with concave utility functions. A particular form of such a market is one where the commodities are theparticipants themselves, a labor market for example.
But markets are very special structures, more so when it is required that utility functions be concave. Participants may also get utility frombelonging to groups, such as marriages, or clubs, or productive coalitions. It may be that participants in an economy even derive utility (or disutility)from engaging in processes that lead to the eventual exchange of commodities. The question is when are such economic s ...
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 Title
 Market Games and Clubs
 Reference Work Title
 Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
 Pages
 pp 53595377
 Copyright
 2009
 DOI
 10.1007/9780387304403_318
 Print ISBN
 9780387758886
 Online ISBN
 9780387304403
 Publisher
 Springer New York
 Copyright Holder
 SpringerVerlag New York
 Additional Links
 Topics
 eBook Packages
 Editors

 Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. ^{(1)}
 Editor Affiliations

 1. RAMTECH LIMITED
 Authors

 Myrna Wooders ^{(1)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA
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