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Notes
- 1.
This model was not explicitly studied in classic auction theory, but standard results from there can be easily adjusted to this setting.
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Lavi, R. (2008). Algorithmic Mechanism Design. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_9
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