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Algorithmic Mechanism Design

1999; Nisan, Ronen

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This model was not explicitly studied in classic auction theory, but standard results from there can be easily adjusted to this setting.

Recommended Reading

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa, Israel

    Ron Lavi

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  1. Ron Lavi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceMcCormick School of Engineering and Applied Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Ming-Yang Kao Professor of Computer Science

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag

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Lavi, R. (2008). Algorithmic Mechanism Design. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_9

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