TwoSided Matching Models
 Marilda Sotomayor,
 Ömer Özak
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Definition of the Subject
This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative and non‐cooperative approaches fortwosided matching models and analyzes the fundamental differences and similarities between someof these models.
Basic Definitions
Feasible outcome
is an outcome that is specified by the rules of the game. In thediscrete case, a feasible outcome is a feasible matching μ or at least corresponds toa feasible matching. The usual definition is the following. The matching μ is feasibleif it matches every agent to an allowable set of partners and\( { \mu(f) \in Ch_{f} (\mu(f) \cap W) } \)and\( { \mu(w) \in Ch_{w}(\mu (w) \cap F) } \)for every\( { (f,w) \in F \times W } \). Then, if preferences areresponsive, every matched pair is mutually acceptable. An implication of this definition is thata feasible outcome is always individually rational.
In the continuous case, the rules of the game may specify, for example, whether the agentsnegotiate their payoffs individually within each ...
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 Title
 TwoSided Matching Models
 Reference Work Title
 Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
 Pages
 pp 96549678
 Copyright
 2009
 DOI
 10.1007/9780387304403_572
 Print ISBN
 9780387758886
 Online ISBN
 9780387304403
 Publisher
 Springer New York
 Copyright Holder
 SpringerVerlag New York
 Additional Links
 Topics
 eBook Packages
 Editors

 Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. ^{(1)}
 Editor Affiliations

 1. RAMTECH LIMITED
 Authors

 Marilda Sotomayor ^{(1)} ^{(2)}
 Ömer Özak ^{(2)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Department of Economics, University of São Paulo/SP, São Paulo, Brazil
 2. Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, USA
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