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Gene Synthesis

Volume 852 of the series Methods in Molecular Biology pp 285-296

Date:

DNA Synthesis Security

  • Ali NouriAffiliated withProgram on Science and Global Security Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University Email author 
  • , Christopher F. ChybaAffiliated withProgram on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

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Abstract

It is generally assumed that genetic engineering advances will, inevitably, facilitate the misapplication of biotechnology toward the production of biological weapons. Unexpectedly, however, some of these very advances in the areas of DNA synthesis and sequencing may enable the implementation of automated and nonintrusive safeguards to avert the illicit applications of biotechnology. In the case of DNA synthesis, automated DNA screening tools could be built into DNA synthesizers in order to block the synthesis of hazardous agents. In addition, a comprehensive safety and security regime for dual-use genetic engineering research could include nonintrusive monitoring of DNA sequencing. This is increasingly feasible as laboratories outsource this service to just a few centralized sequencing factories. The adoption of automated, nonintrusive monitoring and surveillance of the DNA synthesis and sequencing pipelines may avert many risks associated with dual-use biotechnology. Here, we describe the historical background and current challenges associated with dual-use biotechnologies and propose strategies to address these challenges.

Key words

DNA engineering DNA synthesis Biosecurity Biotechnology Pathogen Toxin