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National In/Security on a Universal Scale¹

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Since the early 1980s, the US government launched a neo-liberal political offensive designed to restructure three main aspects of world order: (i) the internal social relations of capitalist states (for example, to strengthen capital relative to labor); (ii) the geopolitical and economic relations between the major capitalist states (the G7) and the rest of the world (North–South and East–West relations), and (iii) to create a more integrated world market.

In this regard I shall seek to show how, after the fall of the USSR, American global strategy has consisted of two main components:

1. efforts to mobilize and to lock in new constitutional governance frameworks; and
2. threatened/actual use of US military power to police, discipline and extend a globalizing world order.

The latter involves capacities for surveillance, rapid intervention and mass aerial warfare governed by new doctrines of “preventive” and “pre-emptive” war – against countries that potentially threaten not only the US homeland, but also its foreign assets.

Freed of the constraints of a significant traditional adversary that could countervail its military power, after the Soviet collapse the USA intensified the restructuring of its military to construct the capacity for unilateral military action as well as to extend its already significant surveillance technologies. There was a strategic shift away from containment of communism to a much more expansionist economic and military stance. It focused on combating terrorism, policing the so-called “rogue states” and perhaps more fundamentally, extending globalization.

Indeed, since 9/11 we have seen the extended use of this disciplinary apparatus, steered by a more conservative vision of American strategy than was manifest in the Clinton Administration, in ways that are connected to and build upon the ontology of fear and insecurity that seems to beset American society, and that was described in Chapter 10. This strategy has invoked the use of pre-emptive and preventive war, against actual or potential US adversaries, in contravention of international law in ways that suggest a radical restructuring of the normative structures of world order, with consequences for the international rules and statutes governing the use of organized violence that are only gradually being perceived (Falk 2003).

At the same time, building from the analysis of Chapter 10, we might suggest that because of the dominant American role in shaping particularly the military structures of world order, part of what is being globalized (universalized) in these processes is the redefinition of the nature and priorities associated with a much more assertive and conservative projection of US national in/security perspectives and interests.

With such issues in consideration, Chapter 11 highlights aspects of American economic and military strategy associated with the extension and policing of globalization. Indeed, Chapter 11 builds on and is inextricably linked to the arguments made in Chapter 10, which described how the social reproduction of affluence within the USA is linked to the extension of disciplinary neo-liberalism, and how this tends to generate corresponding patterns of human insecurity, not only in the USA but also worldwide. The result is that progressive forms of provisioning for social reproduction for the mass of the world's population have either been eroded, or are under attack.

Securing the world market

In what follows I focus on the two main dimensions of US strategy: the institutionalization of a new constitutionalist framework for the governance of the political economy ("securing the world market"), and the building of an extended coercive apparatus linked to new doctrines of national security premised on unchallenged American military predominance. At the end of the chapter I discuss the links between the new strategy and the 2003 war in Iraq. Here it might be noted initially, however, that the main aim of this new type of war is not the enlargement of territory, but the opening up of nations to freer flows of capital and enterprise and obtaining access to the oil that is central to the reproduction of the US "lifestyle."

In this section I focus on US efforts to create a more liberalized framework for globalization in trade and investment and a related world market in intellectual property, the latter being formalized in the WTO, and finally a brief discussion of efforts connected to creating a more integrated world capital market through the abolition of capital controls and other methods to lock in free international capital mobility. This dimension of US strategy

helps American corporations to maintain access to foreign markets, supplies of foreign labor, raw materials and goods. Freer capital mobility also facilitates inflows of capital into the USA thus helping to fund its balance of payments deficits (the latter is of course a double-edged sword, since a crisis of confidence in the US economy could reverse these capital flows very rapidly indeed). Another flank of this strategy involves efforts to globalize US-style corporate governance structures/securities markets with freedom of corporate takeover/transfer of ownership titles. Thus American corporations can therefore find it easier to acquire overseas firms and assets previously shielded from “hostile” or foreign takeovers. Indeed, the vast majority of foreign direct investment in the 1990s was through mergers and acquisitions, not new investment. This type of investment does not expand productive potentials, indeed it is an effort to gain greater *control over* production structures.

If we recall the discussion in Chapter 10 of the wealthiest Americans we can indicate one way to start to understand how these governance initiatives are concerned with a particular pattern of the general reproduction of capital, and how this is linked to the social order within the USA. Indeed, as *Forbes* magazine’s annual survey of billionaires illustrates, US plutocrats with the highest net worth have their money concentrated in software and computers (for example, Microsoft, Oracle, Dell), in media and entertainment (for example, Metromedia, Viacom) and in investment houses. The other main area of massive accumulation of wealth is retailing. For example, five members of the Walton family who own Wal-Mart stores (the world’s biggest company in 2002) were tied as the seventh richest people on the planet, each with an estimated net worth of \$16.5 billion (Kroll and Goldman 2003: 132). Not surprisingly each of these areas is reflected in the emphasis given in US foreign economic policy to creating new governance structures (new constitutional agreements): locking in guarantees for investment overseas, guaranteeing intellectual property rights for owners of software, as well as ensuring continued access to global sourcing for American brands to feed the endless US appetite for inexpensive consumer goods. As noted in Chapter 10, the shelves of Wal-Mart stores are packed with goods manufactured by cheap labor from China. This explains why the USA was keen to facilitate China’s entry into the WTO and to lock in Chinese commitments to full repatriation of profits, and eventually to allow full foreign ownership of private enterprise, investment and sourcing for American corporations.

It is in this context we might note that governance regimes have been reshaped in the past 20 years in accordance with new constitutionalism and disciplinary neo-liberalism. The USA has tended to initiate many of these changes, and in turn, its corporations and consumers have tended to benefit most directly from the restructuring of trade, investment and financial and international business regulation during the past decade (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).

In what follows I will simply indicate some of these trends and refer the reader to related work for a more in-depth and complete picture (Gill 2002a, 2002b, 2002c).

First, in *trade and investment* deeper and more extensive global economic integration has been associated with widening jurisdiction and competence of international organizations with new legal frameworks strongly influenced by the USA (for example, WTO, NAFTA). In addition, thousands of bilateral trade and investment agreements also form part of this deeper integration. This situation is also being ratified in the negotiations to institutionalize the General Agreement on Trade in Services in the WTO since in significant respects GATS can be seen as an investment agreement that includes rights of establishment and non-discrimination for foreign services firms. As noted in Chapter 2, GATS is intended to advance the liberalization process across not only communications services, but also in basic institutions of social reproduction such as education, as well as other social and cultural sectors; it may also serve to constrain certain types of social and health policies (Sinclair 2000).

US models have informed not only accounting standards but also legal concepts and dispute resolution procedures. Thus the US constitutional mechanism of judicial review has been reformulated internationally in the creation of dispute resolution mechanisms, with binding enforcement such as in the NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. Other US legal principles and concepts such as transparency are at the heart of trade and investment regulation. The institutionalization of American legal principles were central goals in US negotiating strategies for liberalization of trade and investment although, of course, the outcomes of such negotiations cannot be simply reduced to the effects of American power and strategy *per se* (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).

Indeed, intellectual property rights are now treated increasingly as commodities, an issue that has become deeply controversial because of the ways that these affect rights to livelihood (see Chapter 9) as well as to health – for example, patent protection restricts access to medicines and vaccines to deal with epidemics and other diseases, in rich and especially poorer countries. This is an increasingly urgent concern since we have witnessed a re-emergence of serious global health problems involving growth in contagious diseases once thought conquered (for example, cholera), a proliferation of diseases associated with environmental degradation and pollution (for example, asthma among children, allergies), and new viruses (such as AIDS and SARS).² This has occurred amid a worldwide crisis in public health funding, that has been especially acute in Africa (Benatar 2001, 2002). Indeed, after World War II life expectancy increased throughout the world. This process has now apparently gone into reverse in a number of countries (notably in former communist-ruled nations of Eastern Europe and in much of Africa).

How such global health issues are treated is now partly shaped by the new trade and investment agreements. For example NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions give private companies the right to sue governments for "takings" (expropriation of property) a concept again drawn from US jurisprudence (Schneiderman 2000). Takings can include actions that *might* lead to a decline in the expectation of future profits even when a government seems to be acting in the public interest to protect its industries for reasons of public health (the same would apply with respect to culture and information industries). Similar issues have arisen concerning the availability and cost of AIDS drugs, where the pharmaceutical firms have been drawn into litigation with South Africa. The drug corporations have resisted efforts to violate their legal rights related to Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). Also, TRIPs include detailed enforcement procedures which mirror step-by-step the administrative and judicial mechanisms in the USA (Correa 1999).

Among other things these institutional initiatives have allowed the USA to lock in access to foreign markets and to protect its firms' high technology and other intellectual property so as to strengthen American-owned capital relative to rivals (Barlow and Clarke 2000). In this context, the USA has established a commanding lead in core technologies associated with the information, communications and other industries of the so-called new economy (including defense). The period of accelerated globalization of intellectual property rights really began in earnest when the USA succeeded in linking trade to intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations in 1994. American software, entertainment and pharmaceutical companies then successfully lobbied for an agreement with global coverage and enforcement mechanisms.³

Yet TRIPs has little to do with free trade since it involves locking-in rights of private monopolies over innovations, and so on; for example, through patents and other protections. This is why even some Neo-Classical economists have argued that TRIPs may undermine global welfare (and health) by preventing competition (for example, more open supply of medicines), an argument used very frequently by Third World governments. At the same time more left-leaning agencies such as UNCTAD and UNESCO were marginalized from any jurisdiction largely because they (like many Third World nations) favored principles to enhance technology transfer from North to South as well as binding codes of conduct for transnational corporations. The two UN organizations supported the principle that technology was part of the common heritage of humankind. Indeed, many developing countries and NGOs have strongly denounced particular aspects of TRIPs and call for its removal; for example, because of ethical objections to specific provisions such as Article 27.3(b), which deals with the patenting of life forms.

Prior to and in parallel with these initiatives, the USA, or more precisely its financial complex, has been at the vanguard of *restructuring and deregulation of the world financial system* (Cohen 1998; Helleiner 1994). Indeed, in significant

respects the more liberalized system that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s has worked to recycle the trade surpluses of other nations (especially from Japan and South Korea, as well as from the European Union) to fund American expansion (and fund massive US payments deficits). The USA has also sought to press other governments not only for deregulation and privatization but also for changes in tax and bankruptcy policy, favoring higher indirect taxes, lower income and corporate taxes, as well as new legal protections for investors from expropriation – all measures that tend to reinforce the power of capital, including financial capital. Under pressure from the USA, the IMF and World Bank now use conditionality to give institution-building and policy advice on banking law, contract law, company law, and more generally on the role of the judiciary and specifically judicial review mechanisms modeled on American jurisprudence. It is worth noting that liberal reforms are more fully institutionalized when locked-in by law and backed by sanctions. Thus when liberalization and protection for private property rights are locked-in governments must accept not only privatization but also full *entry and exit rights* for investors, including rights of establishment and rights to repatriate capital or to move it offshore.

Pressing for many of the initiatives we have discussed in this section is what I call a supremacist historical bloc of public/private forces in the US state–civil society complex, along with its principal counterparts in the EU and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the G7 and other states (see Gill 2003a for discussion of the supremacist bloc). In the specific cases noted above, the most active elements of this historical bloc of forces involve a combination of the US government and a range of interests within American capitalism, for example, the financial complex (particularly huge institutional investors and Wall Street) and those associated with protection of intellectual property rights (for example, Silicon Valley, Hollywood and the image complex, the giant drug corporations, and so on).

Nevertheless, as capital has become more liberalized and globalized, the frequency and depth of economic crises has worsened and material dimensions of human insecurity may have increased, especially in much of the Third World. The 1997–98 global crisis was the worst since the Great Depression, with tens of millions of people impoverished and it illustrated the destabilizing effects of the free movement of transnational capital, such that even Neo-Classical economists have come to question the legitimacy and efficiency of free capital mobility (Bhagwati 1998). Many large institutional investors, corporations and super-wealthy individuals were bailed out when their investments went sour, ostensibly to prevent a more general financial collapse (that is, the risks of large investors or depositors were socialized). By contrast the costs of adjustment have been dumped on unprotected capital, unprotected workers and the most vulnerable members of society (that is, their risk has been privatized), and ultimately it will be ordinary taxpayers that meet the costs. Indeed, borrowers were generally forced to accept austerity

frameworks as a condition of IMF and G7 loans. As Chapter 5 illustrates, this often meant reduced expenditures on programs of vital importance to most people and especially to the poor (social, health, education, and so on) in ways that have undermined human security and social welfare. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, the Bush Administration was pressing for free trade agreements to prohibit controls on capital movements (even in the event of an economic crisis) along the lines of two model bilateral agreements recently made with Chile and Singapore.⁴

Full spectrum dominance and globalization: US National Security Strategy

I now shift from a focus on issues of global economic governance to the use of military and surveillance power in emerging world order. So in this section, I initially discuss some of the ways in which this new apparatus of extended surveillance and military power have been developed by the USA, and then conclude with a reflection on how these are being used, and for what purposes, in the aftermath of 9/11.

Indeed, whilst there has been a great deal of continuity in both facets of US strategy (economic and military) since the end of the Cold War, the war in Iraq in 2003 seems to reflect an historical turning point. One can only speculate as to what this is ultimately likely to entail, although clearly, the war in Iraq has extended the Bush administration's open-ended war on terrorism to a strategy of pre-emption and regime change. This could mean not a new World War based upon mutually assured destruction and mass annihilation as some expected during the Cold War, but rather a combination of ongoing interventions and wars linked to the new US strategy of military dominance to not only police, but also to extend the frontiers of neo-liberal globalization.

One of the features of this type of warfare is the use of planners and software/weapons control so that the maximum amount of engagement is done from a distance, using bombing and other means to deny adversaries the chance of responding, inflicting casualties almost entirely to the "enemy" on the ground. This extended use of organized violence thus involves, as Bauman notes, a form of impunity. Its technical aspect relies on "electronic technology, which renders time instantaneous and annihilates the resistance of space" (Bauman 2001: 218).

It is in this context that we now explore some of the USA's plans for military globalization. In 1997 the Pentagon released a strategy document that promulgated the concept of "full spectrum dominance" maintained into the future through "full force integration." Its goal was to sustain superiority by synergizing US military technologies on land, sea, and air and in space. Indeed, the rapid militarization of space is seen as the most important strategic initiative for the USA in the twenty-first century to protect "US national

interests and investments,” not only from traditional rivals, but also from new challenges including those stemming from “a widening between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’” (US Space Command 1997).⁵ The new US conventional wisdom on strategy that emerged following the end of the Cold War was that challenges to its primacy were likely to be more diffuse, which implied that even its “friends” were potential targets of surveillance. Needless to say this created concerns in the European Union and elsewhere given the extensiveness of American intelligence networks.

When the airplane attacks destroyed the World Trade Center and hit the Pentagon, the rest of the world subsequently witnessed the use of American military power projection in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the US leadership made it clear that this power would be used irrespective of whether it was sanctioned or legitimated by a UN mandate.

On June 6, 2002, the USA created the Department of Homeland Security, involving the most extensive reorganization of the US security apparatus since World War II, going well beyond an *ad hoc* system that combined 17 separate executive agencies. And, whereas one would have expected that the generality of the threat from mega-terrorism would have forged a bipartisan consensus on the enabling legislation of the new Department, “special interests” directly connected to the Republican Party benefited from various “riders” attached to the legislation. Thus giant pharmaceutical companies and US corporations that had registered in offshore jurisdictions such as the Bahamas had specific provisions inserted into the Homeland Security legislation so that they were, respectively, made exempt from class-action liability suits and from certain forms of taxation. In neither case did these provisions seem to have anything to do with the stated purposes of the legislation.⁶

However in this context, with very conservative figures such as Attorney General John Ashcroft at the vanguard, the federal government intensified domestic policing and surveillance, in ways that critics claimed threatened civil liberties and rights.⁷ Indeed, although the US Constitution does not give sweeping emergency powers to the federal government, in practice these powers exist and are rarely subject to full judicial review. Such newly extended powers are now codified in a number of recent statutes, the most significant of which is the USA Patriot Act, which became law in October 2001.⁸

In addition, Admiral Poindexter, the former Reagan National Security Adviser who narrowly escaped imprisonment for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal, was made Director of the Office of Information Awareness at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, charged with developing new surveillance technologies in light of 9/11.⁹ Needless to say, Poindexter’s appointment, and the wide remit attached to the new DARPA office has alarmed large numbers of civil libertarians in the USA. It is difficult to imagine this initiative – and related initiatives detailed below – will be confined to internal matters, since the USA has shaped the creation of universal international standards for data protocols. US strategists consider control over the

basic infrastructure of networks an important power resource. The USA has both the largest corporations in these fields, as well as a massive intelligence apparatus associated with network capitalism. Indeed, US military theorists emphasize the need for US control over strategic nodes within global systems and networks, controlling rules of access and participation. This is viewed as part of a shift from old forms of war to “information age warfare,” involving cyberwar and global communication systems (Fast 2001).

The above provides some of the background to the new *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which spells out changes stemming from conservative thinking since the late 1980s. At that time Secretary of State Powell, Vice President Cheney, and others attempted to formulate a new rationale for the military after the Cold War. The centerpiece of NSS is a reconfiguration of US strategy around two primary organizing principles: pre-emption and global dominance (US Government 2002).¹⁰ The NSS document argues that the US is “menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had earlier fleshed out the implications of this when he argued that the USA is moving away from “threat-based” strategy toward “a new capabilities-based approach to counter any potential threat through a variety of means” (Rumsfeld 2002). This includes the prerogative to strike first against actual or potential enemies.¹¹ On the other hand, Rumsfeld argued that twenty-first-century wars would entail the use of all elements of power, economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence as well as overt and covert military operations. With respect to the latter the Pentagon is creating “an elite secret army with resources stretching across the full spectrum of covert capabilities.”¹²

However, notwithstanding its commitment to the war on terrorism the present Bush Administration has been consistently clear that its military priorities lie in full spectrum dominance and this includes not only developing Star Wars (missile defense) but also increasing space-based and terrestrial surveillance structures. It has also stressed the need to build up US capacities to engage in information warfare, including a new secret agency located in the White House and in the Pentagon, called the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), an initiative strongly criticized by many Americans after members of the Bush Administration made it clear that the OSI would use propaganda and disinformation campaigns to combat “anti-American” forces throughout the world. Also in July 2002, the Bush Administration announced the creation of the Office of Global Communications, a PR department to try to rehabilitate the US image abroad, especially in the Middle East and Europe. The department apparently grows out of the Coalition Information Center, partly established with British Prime Minister Blair’s media guru, Alastair Campbell, to promote US–UK views during the Afghan war.¹³

A political counterpart to the military goals of the NSS has been dubbed the “Rice Doctrine” of “Realist multilateralism,” the brainchild of Condoleezza

Rice that is consistent with the general goal of American strategy of establishing free markets, democracy and free trade, backed by US military force, if necessary to ensure “regime change.”¹⁴ Of course it is widely noted that the USA rejects multilateralism when it can, for example, rejecting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for its citizens (reflecting an imperial conception of citizenship rights, with US citizens above international law), refusal to ratify the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, the rejection of the Kyoto Environmental Protocol and the scrapping of the ABM Treaty. On the other hand, the USA embraces multilateralism when it is needed, for example, in its war against terrorism and in the early stages of its preparation for the war against Iraq, planned long before 9/11 (Armstrong 2002).¹⁵ It has also been widely noted that the USA tried to put together what it calls a “coalition of the willing,” that is, a group of allies that would back its military action. Diplomats of the United Nations came to refer to this as the “coalition of the billing,” since it was premised upon effectively buying votes at the UN to gain some legitimacy for its policy of war, a tactic that ultimately failed despite initial successes.¹⁶ Indeed, such brittle commitment to multilateralism as is reflected in the Bush Administration is a position that prominent liberal internationalists firmly reject as counterproductive (Nye 2001).

With respect to issues of military surveillance, the Bush and Clinton Administrations reflect a considerable continuity. Thus in April 2001 it was announced that the secret National Reconnaissance Office of the USA had been authorized to undertake a massive expansion of its spy satellite systems (partly because other nations such as Russia, France, India and closer American allies such as Israel and Canada have satellite surveillance systems), in an initiative called Future Image Architecture. FIA is the most expensive venture ever undertaken by its intelligence agencies and will cost \$25 billion over 20 years – by contrast the Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb during World War II cost \$20 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. The new systems are intended to give a unilateral capacity for certain types of military action such as that recently witnessed in Iraq, allowing for more accurate targeting and bombing. This system fits well with the Bush Administration’s priority of developing the military uses of space and the use of cyber warfare. It will be linked to powerful ground station computers that can analyze and distribute imagery (for example, battlefield pictures) rapidly to US government agencies.¹⁷

Prospects for World War III?

Many of the surveillance and other military technologies just discussed were used in the war in Iraq in 2003, which demonstrated the potency of the American military machine, as well as the American willingness to use its strategic power to extend its dominance over the resources and region of the Middle East.

Of course it is very well known that the current White House is both very sympathetic to the oil corporations and has concerns over long-term US energy security.¹⁸ Much of the Bush Administration's immediate motivation for an attack on Iraq seems to be linked to this goal – to reassert and gain more fundamental long-term control over oil in the Middle East. (The US Department of Energy has estimated that Iraq may be able to provide the USA with up to half of its oil needs, and US energy and other corporations were lining up well before the war started – ready to take advantage of a post-war Iraqi oil boom.)

However, this war also might be the first of a new series of interventions designed to militarily lock-in and extend the US-led globalization project worldwide. In this regard, some may recall, that during one of the high points of the Cold War, the American sociologist C. Wright Mills published a book called *The Causes of World War Three* (1958). The argument of this book was built from his earlier thesis in *The Power Elite* (1956): that unaccountable elite power in the USA and in the Soviet Union, coupled to weapons of mass destruction, would inevitably lead to the outbreak of global war, unless rulers could be forced to turn scientific research into peaceful channels and break the drift towards war. With the benefit of hindsight, the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union showed that Mills was very wide of the mark: the leaders of the Soviet Union effectively surrendered of their own accord, although nuclear war was close on a number of occasions. However, now that the Cold War is over there are no significant military rivals on the horizon that might countervail American military power, in the way that the former Soviet Union was able to do.

It may well be, however, that future historians will argue in retrospect that 9/11 triggered the onset of a different kind of world war, one waged in the name of a new and perhaps more conservative and aggressive form of American imperialism, again with the very important caveat that no countervailing social and political forces prevent conservatives in the US government from pursuing their full-blown imperialist vision.

What seems to have occurred, with 9/11 as the catalyst, is that the USA has shifted its strategy well beyond President Clinton's concept of "democratic enlargement." Clinton's strategy tended to focus more on the institutionalization of disciplinary neo-liberalism using diplomatic and economic means to reshape the internal structures of governance of other states, of course, with the goal of making them more conducive to the expansion of American interests. By contrast, the Bush Administration's foreign policy team is a mixture of traditional Realism and different strands of Conservatism, with the latter greatly strengthened by the administration's responses to the mega-terrorist attacks. Thus whilst the administration contains not only traditional realists/assertive nationalists (such as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice) realist/pragmatists such as (Secretary of State Colin Powell), and traditional conservatives (such as Vice

President Cheney) of growing importance is a neo-conservative grouping that has been called the “democratic imperialists.” Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense) is the leader of this faction in the administration, which has some of its intellectual roots in the Project for the New American Century.

Indeed, some believe that the democratic imperialists are becoming more influential within the Bush Administration. As Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations has put it, these new imperialists have the (counter-) revolutionary aims of “transforming the world in America’s image,” or put differently they seek to extend the US-led globalization project on a worldwide basis.¹⁹ Here it should be noted that Paul Wolfowitz was the principal author of a 1992 Pentagon strategy report for the first Bush Administration, one that had to be toned down before its publication since it was deemed to be too controversial at the time, although many of its ideas subsequently re-emerged in the new National Security Strategy document (US Government 2002). Wolfowitz is also the principal architect of the American strategy in Iraq, and many within American ruling circles are coming to the view that the decision to go to war there may galvanize a broader shift in American foreign policy – in a similar way to how the North Korean invasion of the South led to the adoption of the Truman Doctrine, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan set the stage for the Reagan Doctrine.²⁰

The strategy of pre-emptive war and imperialism, if it continues, is bound to encounter massive resistance and seems likely to engender an increase in mega-terrorist threats. Resistance would, of course, assume many different forms. Some of it would involve traditional interstate realignments associated with a reformulated balance of power, and as such could be subject to institutionalization, diplomacy and negotiation. Some would take the form of popular resistance throughout the world, especially in the Middle East (for example, centering on the Palestinian question), and of course some of this would be peaceful, some more violent. In particular, significant conflicts could develop if the fall of Saddam’s secular regime in Iraq were to be followed by a more fundamentalist Iraq, governed by forces akin to the Iran of the Ayatollahs. This would increase the forces hostile to the US presence in the region, and mishandling this challenge might portend greater use of suicide attacks on the USA and its allies, in so far as many of these more fundamentalist forces of resistance involve cults of martyrdom.

Thus it is worth concluding this volume by indicating some aspects of the viewpoint that lies behind this new American imperialist perspective. One rather stark example is the thinking of Thomas Barnett, an adviser to Secretary Rumsfeld and a Professor at the US Naval War College. Barnett outlined a theory behind a new US global strategy in an article for *Esquire* magazine in March 2003. Welcoming and anticipating the long-planned war in Iraq, he stated it “will mark the historical tipping point – the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization.”²¹

Barnett believes the central strategic principle is that a country's potential to warrant a US military response is "inversely related to its globalization connectivity" (Barnett 2003: 4). Thus the new security paradigm for the USA is that "*disconnectedness defines danger*" (Barnett 2003: 1, emphasis in original).

Indeed, stripped bare of the moralistic rhetoric of President Bush, with its propensity to divide the world into a Manichean universe of good and evil, the new strategic map apparently circulating within Pentagon and intelligence services is avowedly materialistic. It is also equally simplified: it is premised upon a state's degree of integration into globalization (and thus its willingness to welcome and support capital and free enterprise).

This image of the global political economy is akin to that of World Systems theorists, however divided between countries integrated into the flows, transactions and networks of globalization and those who lie outside the globalization processes. Those most integrated, according to Barnett, have stable governments, rising living standards, and are aligned to the basic purposes of American power (these states comprise the "Core"). The Core would come to include states such as China who are increasingly integrated through trading capital flows, and although not democratic, at least have "stable government." Outside the Core are two categories of countries: (a) flanking or semi-peripheral states that are neither fully integrated into, nor fully outside globalization (the "Seam" states), and (b) those states that lie outside the globalization project and that constitute the main "strategic threat environment" to the US ("The Gap").

Thus Barnett proposes that US strategy should be to:

- 1) Increase the Core's immune system capabilities for responding to September 11-like system perturbations;
- 2) Work the Seam states to firewall the core from the Gap's worst exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and, most important,
- 3) shrink the Gap... the Middle East is the perfect place to start... (Barnett 2003: 4-5)

Barnett is fully aware that globalization creates winners and losers and that it can be a wrenching process, but stresses that the main resources for the new strategy will come from private investment, rather than from the public sector. However, its success requires expansion of the US military beyond its success in "detering global war and obsolescing state-on-state war" to move into the "far more difficult sub-national conflicts and the dangerous transnational actors they spawn". He adds, in ways that refer us back to the earlier discussion of the lifestyles and paranoia of the affluent outlined in Chapter 10:

I know most Americans do not want to hear this, but the real battlegrounds in the global war on terrorism are still over there. If gated communities and rent-a-cops were enough, September 11 never would have happened...

We ignore the Gap's existence at our own peril, because it will not go away until we as a nation respond to the challenge of making globalization truly global. (Barnett 2003: 7)

Notes

1. I thank Tyler Attwood and Tim Di Muzio for research for this chapter, and Isabella Bakker for comments.
2. Rates of asthma in America have doubled since 1980, and about 6% of all Americans have the disease. US asthma rates are much higher in poor urban areas, and a recent study has found that one in four children in central Harlem, a heavily polluted, poor and predominantly black area in New York City, has the disease. See Richard Perez-Pena, "Study Finds Asthma in 25% of Children in Central Harlem." *New York Times*, April 19, 2003.
3. United States corporations have influential business NGOs such as the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) (members: Pfizer, IBM and DuPont, Bristol-Myers, FMC, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Rockwell and Warner). IPC coordinated with Japan's Keidanren and with the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) to shape US positions. Others include the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), the most important copyright lobbyist in the world, an umbrella group of eight trade organizations including those in the music, movie, publishing, business equipment and information technology industries, and the Business Software Alliance (BSA).
4. Edward Alden, "US Backs Curbs on Capital Controls." *Financial Times*, April 2, 2003.
5. I am grateful to Tim Di Muzio for this example.
6. David Firestone, "Senate Votes, 90-9, to Set Up Homeland Security Department Geared to Fight Terrorism." *New York Times*, November 20, 2002; Jesse J. Holland, "Security Showdown Could Impact Future." *Washington Post*, November 18, 2002; Dan Morgan, "Homeland Bill Rider Aids Drugmakers." *Washington Post*, November 15, 2002.
7. For example, efforts by Attorney General Ashcroft to create (offshore) prison camps for US citizens declared as enemy combatants. See Jonathan Turley, "Camps for Citizens: Ashcroft's Hellish Vision." *Los Angeles Times*, August 14, 2002. The Bush Administration has also declared so-called First Amendment Zones (referring to the First Amendment right to freedom of speech). FAZs, now the norm at Bush public appearances, take the form of fenced-off areas for protesters that are usually several hundred yards away from the target of the protest. At a Florida rally for Jeb Bush in the 2002 gubernatorial election his brother, the President, appeared and seven protesters were arrested for refusing to move into such a Zone. The Secret Service claimed that such Zones are necessary for the President's safety, although they seem to have allowed Bush supporters much closer to the President. See "Zones Hinder Free Speech." *St Petersburg Times*, November 9, 2002.
8. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) is intended to better allow the US government "To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." HR 3162 RDS: 107th Congress, October 24, 2001. The full text is posted

by the Electronic Privacy Information Center <www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html>

9. The "Total Information Awareness System" aims to create an electronic dragnet of email, calling records, credit card and banking transactions and travel documents, without requiring a search warrant. It uses data mining techniques (used by scientists and marketers) to gather information from various databases, pursue links between people and groups and thus to respond to automatic alerts and share information more efficiently. See John Markoff, "Pentagon Plans a Computer System that Would Peek at Personal Data of Americans." *New York Times*, November 9, 2002. See <www.darpa.mil/jao/index.htm>
10. The document also devotes attention to management of regional conflicts, arms control and the promotion of global economic growth and alleviation of poverty through free markets, free enterprise and announcing a new Millennium Fund to aid the poor.
11. Max Boot, "Doctrine of the 'Big Enchilada.'" *Washington Post*, October 14, 2002; Max Boot, "Who Says We Never Strike First?" *New York Times*, October 4, 2002.
12. Rumsfeld's Defense Science Board 2002 Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism, recommended combining "special ops, intelligence, cover and deception, information warfare, psyops, and covert forces" from the CIA and military agencies – the world of so-called "black operations" – into a single group called the Proactive, Pre-emptive Operations Groups (P2OG). This runs parallel with efforts to improve and link information databases and networks in the "war on terror." According to Rumsfeld, "Prevention and pre-emption are... the only defense against terrorism. Our task is to find and destroy the enemy before they strike us." Cited in William M. Arkin, "The Secret War." *Los Angeles Times*, October 27, 2002.
13. The office will apparently use Hollywood-style and Madison Avenue techniques to subtly spread its message, unlike the more upfront Voice of America radio network. It will work with foreign broadcasters and journalists to create positive images of the USA. Such an effort was called for by a Council on Foreign Relations taskforce, made of government officials, advertising and media executives who pointed out that the USA is seen by many abroad as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-absorbed. I thank Tyler Attwood for this point.
14. Walter Russell Mead, "Misunderstanding the Rice Doctrine." *Financial Times*, October 2, 2002.
15. It should also be emphasized that the NSS was not simply the result of 9/11 since it is built on the framework of conservative thinking that emerged in the late 1980s. More recently the conservative Project for the New American Century produced a strategy document in September 2000 called *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century*. In effect, this document is also a blueprint for US global domination, preserving primacy for unilateralism, with multilateral action only when it does not compromise US interests. William Kristol headed PNAC and its report was created by the key figures in the Bush administration foreign policy apparatus when they were out of office, for example, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush and Lewis Libby (now Cheney's chief of staff).
16. Thalif Deen, "US Dollars Yielded Unanimous UN Vote against Iraq." Inter Press News Service, cited November 11, 2002, <www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1111-02.htm>

17. Joseph Fitchett, "Spying from Space: US to Sharpen the Focus." *International Herald Tribune*, April 10, 2001. Here it is worth adding that the US benefits from intelligence inputs from its major allies. Many of the electronic surveillance facilities of the English speaking countries are combined in the so-called ECHELON system that was enlarged between 1975 and 1995 to encompass virtually all electronic and telephone communications in Europe, analyzed through data mining software operating through Internet servers, with the information fed into huge computers known as "Dictionaries." Proof of this was found in 1998–99 by US intelligence specialist Jeffrey Richelson, via the Freedom of Information Act. He obtained documents that confirmed the existence, scale and expansion of the ECHELON system. See <www.zdnet.co.uk/news/2000/25/ns-16204.html>
18. Vice President Cheney chairs the White House Energy Policy Development Group, which in April 2001 commissioned the Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute for Public Policy to produce a report on "energy security." The report concluded that the USA remained vulnerable to Iraq's destabilizing effect on the Middle East supply of oil and recommended that the USA build a new energy policy central to US domestic economic and foreign policy interests, revise strategy toward Iraq and rebuild a cohesive coalition of allies. Those advising on the report included Kenneth Lay (former Chief Executive of Enron), and executives of Shell, BP and Chevron-Texaco, as well as a former Kuwaiti oil minister.
19. Quoted by Stephen Fidler and Gerard Baker, "America's Democratic Imperialists." *Financial Times*, March 5, 2003.
20. Fidler and Baker, "America's Democratic Imperialists." *Financial Times*, March 5, 2003.
21. Barnett's website describes his work as follows: "At the Naval War College, Dr. Barnett serves as Director of the NewRuleSets.Project, an ambitious effort to draw new 'maps' of power and influence in the world economy so as to expand the US Military's – and specifically, the US Navy's – vision of where and how it can wield maximum influence across the international security environment of the Era of Globalization... The first phase of the project (January 2000–October 2001) was conducted in partnership with the Wall Street broker-dealer firm Cantor Fitzgerald, which hosted three full-day 'decision event' workshops atop World Trade Center 1 (Windows on the World). These workshops brought together elite leaders from the worlds of finance, national security, think tanks and industry to discuss the crucial 'flows' of globalization, with a special emphasis on Developing Asia." <www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/thomas_barnett.htm>