Abstract
Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory oftruth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The otherignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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Raatikainen, P. More on Putnam and Tarski. Synthese 135, 37–47 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022910022940
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022910022940