Abstract
In his discussion of results which I (with Michael Hayward) recently reported in this journal, Kenneth Aizawa takes issue with two of our conclusions, which are: (a) that our connectionist model provides a basis for explaining systematicity “within the realm of sentence comprehension, and subject to a limited range of syntax” (b) that the model does not employ structure-sensitive processing, and that this is clearly true in the early stages of the network's training. Ultimately, Aizawa rejects both (a) and (b) for reasons which I think are ill-founded. In what follows, I offer a defense of our position. In particular, I argue (1) that Aizawa adopts a standard of explanation that many accepted scientific explanations could not meet, and (2) that Aizawa misconstrues the relevant meaning of ‘structure-sensitive process’.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aizawa, K. (1997), ‘Exhibiting versus Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward’, Minds and Machines.
Aizawa, K. (forthcoming), ‘Explaining Systematicity,’ Mind and Language.
Fodor, J.A. and Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1988), ‘Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis,’ Cognition, 28, 3-71.
Fodor, J.A. and McLaughlin, B.P. (1990), ‘Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn’t Work’, Cognition, 35, 183-204.
Hadley, R.F. (1996), ‘Connectionism, Systematicity, and Nomic Necessity,’ Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Society, San Diego, CA.
Hadley, R.F. (forthcoming), ‘Cognition, Systematicity and Nomic Necessity’, Mind and Language.
Hadley, R.F. and Hayward, M.B. (1997), ‘Strong Semantic Systematicity from Hebbian Connectionist Learning,’ Minds and Machines.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hadley, R.F. Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Kenneth Aizawa. Minds and Machines 7, 571–579 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008252322227
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008252322227