Skip to main content
Log in

Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Based on archival material from the Carnap and FeiglArchives, this paper re-examines Carnap's approach tothe issue of scientific realism in the 1950s and theearly 1960s. It focuses on Carnap's re-invention ofthe Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theoriesand argues that Carnap wanted to entertain a genuineneutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate.Following Grover Maxwell, it claims that Carnap'sposition may be best understood as a version of`structural realism'. However, thus understood,Carnap's position faces the challenge that Newmanraised against Russell's structuralism: the claim thatthe knowledge of the unobservable is limited to itspurely structural characteristics is eitheruninformative or unsustainable.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Carnap, R.: 1946[1949], 'The Two Concepts of Probability', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5, reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds), Reading in Philosophical Analysis, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., pp. 330-348.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1947[1956], Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, Third Enlarged Edition 1956, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1950[1956], 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', Revue Intérnationale de Philosophie 4, 20-040, reprinted in Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1956, 'The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts', in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 38-76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1958, 'Observation Language and Theoretical Language', in J. Hintikka (ed.), Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist (1975), Reidel, Dordrecht-translation of 'Beobachtungssprache und Theoretische Sprache', Dialectica 12, 236-248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1961, 'On the Use of Hilbert's -Operator in Scientific Theories', in Y. Bar-Hillel et al. (eds), Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics, The Magnes Press, Jerusalem, pp. 156-164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1963, 'Replies and Systematic Expositions', in P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle IL, pp. 859-1013.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1966, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Basic Books, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1974, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Basic Books, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Creath, R.: 1985, 'Carnap's Scientific Realism: Irenic or Ironic?', in N. Rescher (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism, University of America Press, Lanham.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demopoulos, W. and Friedman, M.: 1985, 'Critical Notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis ofMatter: its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest', Philosophy of Science 52, 621-639.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl, H.: 1943[1949], 'Logical Empiricism', in D. D. Runes (ed.), Twentieth Century Philosophy, Philosophical Library, New York-reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds), Reading in Philosophical Analysis, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, pp. 3-26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl, H.: 1950, 'Existential Hypotheses: Realistic versus Phenomenalistic Interpretations', Philosophy of Science 17, 35-62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwich, P.: 1982, 'How to Choose Between Empirically Indistinguishable Theories', Journal of Philosophy 79, 61-77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1970, 'How to Define Theoretical Terms', Journal of Philosophy 67, 427-446.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D.: 1984, 'Putnam's Paradox', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62, 221-236.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maxwell, G.: 1962, 'Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology', Philosophy of Science 29, 132-138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maxwell, G.: 1970, 'Theories, Perception and Structural Realism', in R. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 3-34.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maxwell, G.: 1970a, 'Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms', in Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 181-192.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newman, M. H. A.: 1928, 'Mr. Russell's “Causal Theory of Perception”', Mind 37, 137-148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parrini, P.: 1994, 'With Carnap, Beyond Carnap: Metaphysics, Science, and the Realism/Instrumentalism Controversy', in W. Salmon and G. Wolters (eds), Logic, Language and the Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 255-277.

  • Psillos, S.: 1999, 'An Introduction to Carnap's “Theoretical Concepts in Science”', (together with the hitherto unpublished lecture by Carnap: “Theoretical Concepts in Science”), Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40, (4).

  • Quine, W. V.: 1966, 'Carnap's Views on Ontology', in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V.: 1985, 'Carnap's Positivistic Travail', Fundamenta Scientiae 5, 325-333.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramsey F.: 1929, 'Theories', in R. B. Braithwaite (ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays 1931, RKP.

  • Ramsey F.: 1991, 'Notes on Theories', in F. Ramsey Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics, M. C. Galavotti (ed.), Bibliopolis, pp. 228-236.

  • Russell, B.: 1927, The Analysis of Matter, RKP.

  • Salmon, W.: 1994a, 'Carnap, Hempel and Reichenbach on Scientific Realism', in W. Salmon and G. Wolters (eds), Logic, Language and the Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 237-254.

  • Salmon, W.: 1994b, 'Comment: Carnap on Realism', in W. Salmon and G. Wolters (eds), Logic, Language and the Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 279-286.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Psillos, S. Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism. Erkenntnis 52, 253–279 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005589117656

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005589117656

Keywords

Navigation