



# The Dichotomized States of Shame in the Scholastic Buddhism

Hao Sun<sup>1</sup>

Accepted: 14 November 2021 / Published online: 29 December 2021  
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## Abstract

Shame is by and large dichotomized into *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* in the Buddhist context. In the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism, both *hrī* (in Chinese translation: 慚 *cán*) and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* (in Chinese translation: 愧 *kui*) are subsumed under the wholesome (*kuśala*) states (*dharmas*). In this paper, firstly, previous studies and the etymologies of the two terms above will be closely reviewed; secondly, the exposition and contrast of *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra will be minutely contextualized; thirdly, the merit of possessing dichotomized states of shame will be thoroughly investigated. Central to my research is a glimpse of the scholastic Indian Buddhist sophistication, exemplified by two kinds of shame, as well as the initial consideration of *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* in the context of shame, guilt, and conscience in the Anglophone philosophy, while also taking their association with Buddhist morality (*śīla*) and concentration (*samādhi*) into account.

**Keywords** Shame · Guilt · Buddhist *dharmas* · Scholastic Buddhism

## Background of This Study<sup>1</sup>

The dichotomized states of shame, *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya*, occur frequently in the Buddhist scriptures. Both terms, *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya*, are chiefly glossed by *lajjā/lajjanā*,<sup>2</sup> meaning ‘shame’, ‘bashfulness’, or ‘embarrassment’. Nevertheless, these

<sup>1</sup> I am deeply grateful to the generous financial support of the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development under the project I-136–107.1–2017 on my current study of the ethical framework for Buddhist meditation practice. I have also deep gratitude to the most valuable suggestions from the reviewers of *Journal of Dharma Studies*, especially to their advising me on relating shame in the Indian context to the Anglophone philosophy. All errors in this paper remain mine.

<sup>2</sup> According to the authoritative Sanskrit English dictionary, the *Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary*, *lajjā* means ‘shame’, ‘embarrassment’, and ‘bashfulness’. And the word *lajjanā* is a variant of *lajjā* with the same meaning. Among all the definitions of *lajjā*, its basic meaning would be ‘bashfulness’, derived from its verbal root  $\sqrt{lajj}$ , meaning primarily ‘turn red in face’.

✉ Hao Sun  
hao.sun@uni-hamburg.de

<sup>1</sup> Numata Center for Buddhist Studies, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

two kinds of shame are almost always told apart in the scholastic Buddhism. Shame is in Sanskrit not one concept, just like its complexity and multifacetedness in the Anglophone philosophy.<sup>3</sup> Starting from the concept of shame, the distinction of ‘guilt-cultures’ and ‘shame-cultures’ was popularized specially by American anthropologists (Atkins, 1960; Benedict, 1946; Cottingham, 2013; Deigh, 1996). Studies on the shame cultures represent a growing field in this field. In one recent article, it is summarized (Cottingham, 2013) that ‘the guilt-cultures of society places great emphasis on ideas of conscience, personal accountability and liability to blame and punishment, while shame-cultures emphasises personal status or standing, as measured in terms of public esteem or its forfeiture’. Whether such contrast of guilt and shame is also related in the Buddhist context is one of my major concerns in this paper. As far as I know, *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* in the scholastic Buddhism are most eligible equivalent terms for comparing to guilt and shame in the Anglophone philosophy.

In Sanskrit, both *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* are categorized into wholesome (*kuśala*) states (*dharma*s) in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism. The existing studies on the wholesome (*kuśala*) and unwholesome (*akuśala*) states (*dharma*s) in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholastic Buddhism are also relatively extensive, yet have not particularly focused on certain (pairs or sets of) these Buddhist *dharma*s. In fact, recent years have witnessed a growing global academic interest in providing an overall feature for the ground-breaking study of these intriguing *dharma*s in the framework of scholastic Buddhism. Some representative works in this field include *Kuśala and Akuśala* (Schmithausen, 2013), *A Study of the Saṃskāra Section of Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka* (Kramer, 2013), *The One Hundred Elements (dharma) of Yogācāra* (Saito et al., 2014), and *The Seventy-five Elements (dharma) of Sarvāstivāda* (Saito et al., 2018). Overall, research on Buddhist *dharma*s in the context of scholastic Buddhism has received considerable scholarly attention worldwide, and especially in the past ten years.

That being said, the juxtaposition and contextualization of two kinds of shame in the scholastic Buddhist *dharma*s have hitherto received scant attention by Buddhist scholars, let alone are they put under discussion in association with the shame and guilt cultures mostly interested by American scholars. It is a great pity. However, it also leaves abundant room for me to conduct this study. One might regard inquiry into shame and its related states as weighing too heavily on mind. But for me, the discussion and thorough study of these two Buddhist terms are not oppressive or shameful; rather, it is beneficial. In the scholastic Buddhism, *hrī* and (*vy*)*apatrāpya* are indeed characterized as wholesome (*kuśala*) *dharma*s, and their antipodes, two kinds of shamelessness (*āhrīkya* and *anapatrapā*), are designated as unwholesome (*akuśala*). This lends support to my research. More pragmatically, two kinds of shame (*hrī* and *apatrāpya*) are credited with being conducive to attaining one

<sup>3</sup> Many thanks to the kind suggestion from the reviewers of *Journal of Dharma Studies*, who suggested me to read a paper (Cottingham, 2013) on the complexity of shame and its relationship to conscience and guilt in the Anglophone philosophy. This work enables me to reach a better understanding of these English key words and revise my translation of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the framework of the Anglophone philosophy.

essential Buddhist meditation called *samādhi*,<sup>4</sup> as illustrated in the *Samāhitābhūmi* (literally: The Level of Concentration) of the Yogācāra School. The passage on the detailed account of the beneficial factors for attaining *samādhi* runs in the *Samāhitābhūmi* as follows<sup>5</sup>:

What is conducive to *samādhi* (*samādhisāmpreya*)? Such as *hrī*-liked shame, *apatrāpya*-liked shame, joy and respect (*premagaurava*), religious confidence and motivation (*śraddhā*<sup>6</sup>), right attention (*yoniśomanaskāra*), mindfulness and clear comprehension (*smṛtisamprajanya*), sensory restraint (*indriyasamvara*), right conduct of self-discipline (*śīlasamvara*), freedom from regret (*avipratisāra*) and so on, until pleasure (*sukha*) as the last one.

The citation above draws our attention to the important role of two kinds of shame, as they strikingly take up the first two positions of the beneficial factors to *samādhi* meditation. This paramount position again justifies the importance of this study, as not only many scholars are fascinated by the shame and guilt cultures, but also Buddhist practitioners without academic background longing simply for meditative silence would be very interested in this topic. Having prioritized the two kinds of shame for the sake of *samādhi* meditation, the passage above truly attracts us to further consider the exact meaning and possible divergence of these two Sanskrit terms.

To get a full appreciation of them, I will first turn to its definition in the authoritative Sanskrit dictionary. In *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Monier-Williams, 1899), *hrī* is translated as ‘shame’, ‘modest’, ‘shyness’, and ‘timidity’; while the verbal form *apa* √*trap* for (vy)*apatrāpya* is construed as ‘to be ashamed or bashful’. The definition in the dictionary demonstrates that *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* are synonyms; each denotes a state of shame. Though the juxtaposition of two kinds of shame is not explicitly clarified, we can somehow get the impression from the *Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary* that unlike *apatrāpya*, *hrī* is the kind of shame, largely related to (1) one’s moral integrity, as the definition ‘modest’ conveys and (2) embarrassment, as ‘shyness’ and ‘timidity’ suggest. According to the studies conducted by experts on the nuanced contrast of guilt and shame (Atkins, 1960; Cottingham, 2013; Dodds, 1951), ‘guilt’ system stresses in personal responsibility and inner moral integrity. In this sense, the first layer of *hrī* can be well related to the ‘guilt’ systems, while the second layer of *hrī* conveys to a large extent the embarrassment, in accord with the definition of shame in the broadest sense (Cottingham, 2013).

That the *Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary* has not sharply juxtaposed *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* may well result from the quite undifferentiated usage

<sup>4</sup> Vajirañāna (1962) summarized that *samādhi* signifies the concentration of the mind upon one object, and its chief characteristic is freedom from wavering (p. 34). Adam (2002) added that *samādhi* is perhaps the broadest term for meditative state. In general, it denotes ‘concentration’ as a state of non-distraction (p. 38).

<sup>5</sup> Its Sanskrit version reads: *samādhisāmpreyaṃ katamat? tadyathā hryapatrāpyaṃ premagauravaṃ śraddhā yoniśomanaskāraḥ smṛtisamprajanyam indriyasamvaraḥ śīlasamvaro’vipratisāradayaś ca yāvat sukhaparyavasānāḥ*. See Delhey (Ed.), 2009, § 4.2.3.8.1.

<sup>6</sup> On the thorough study of the term *śraddhā*, see Zimmermann 2013. On the extensive study of Yogācāra Buddhist theory of metaphor, see Tzohar, 2018.

of these terms in the *Mahābhārata*, one of the oldest and longest Indian epics. There the term *hrī* and *apatrapā* can be both compounded with *adhomukha* (having face downwards as a gesture of feeling shame). Moreover, according to the previous study (Hara, 2006), on the one hand, the word *trapā*, which shares the same verbal root with *apatrāpya*, is used in the similar context of *hrī* and expresses in like manner the sense of shame. On the other hand, *hrī* alone can convey one's shame imbued with the sense of pride and honour. It may explain the first layer of *hrī* given in the *Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary*. However, in the *Mahābhārata* not only *trapā*, but also *lajjā* (bashfulness or shame) can be interchangeable with *hrī*, these terms are often interwoven and not clearly distinguished. It suggests that in the earliest work of Indian epics such notion of dichotomized shame did not exist.

Before some new convincing evidence for the counterargument might emerge in the future, we can give credence to the theory that Buddhist sources for the first time systematized the states of shame. Previous research (Harvey, 2000) shows that a clear distinction of shame is drawn in the Pāli Buddhist literature. There, *hiri*, the equivalence of Sanskrit *hrī*, is 'self-respect', which causes one to seek to avoid any action one feels is not worthy of oneself and lowers one's moral integrity. *Ottappa*, the equivalence of *apatrāpya*, is 'regard for consequences', being stimulated by concern over reproach and blame for an action (whether from oneself or others), embarrassment before others (especially those people one respects), legal punishment, or the karmic results of an action (p. 11).

When I apply Cottingham's philological studies and analyses to Harvey's interpretation *hiri*, it appears that the Pāli word *hiri* is akin to 'clear conscience'<sup>7</sup> other than 'guilt conscience'. Clear conscience goes beyond the compass of the term 'shame' could ever cover, because shame is a matter of being 'embarrassed' (Cottingham, 2013, p. 737). It follows that in the Pāli, Buddhist context 'shame' would be not a perfect translation of *hiri*. Although the term *hiri* in Pāli Buddhism is not the major concern of this paper, its interpretation of 'self-respect' for *hrī* is echoed in the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist scholasticism. It will be discussed in the third chapter of this paper.

The Pāli Buddhist scriptures initially put forward the contrast of two kinds of shame by providing juxtaposition of their application and semantic contents. The Sanskrit scholastic Buddhism, marked out by Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra Buddhism, carefully contrived the seventy-five *dharmas* by the former one hundred *dharmas* by the latter, aiming at systematizing all the phenomenon, subsuming, and expounding them in their systems. Among the well-devised seventy-five or one hundred *dharmas* in the scholastic Buddhism, shame is always divided into two: *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* with elaborate contrast. In the pages that follow, I will minutely investigate the well work-out dichotomy of shame in the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda scholastic Buddhist sources. Not only will I provide English translation for the relevant passages, but also attempt to appreciate the climax of Indian Buddhist exegeses: the scholastic Buddhism, taking two kinds of shame as example. Another main issue of this paper

<sup>7</sup> A clear conscience occurs "when someone's inner reflection leaves him in the happy position of finding nothing wrong with how he has behaved." See Cottingham, 2013, p. 731.

is the initial consideration of *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* in the context of shame, guilt, and conscience in the Anglophone philosophy, while also taking their association with Buddhist morality (*śīla*) and concentration (*samādhi*) into account.

At this stage, I really do not want to keep the audience in suspense, and wish to preview my following studies on *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the Sanskrit scholastic Buddhism. In the Yogācāra scholasticism, *hrī* denotes guilt-liked shame (*lajjā*) of one's own accord in his or her transgression. It is guilt-liked shame because it largely accords with the emphasis of guilt on ideas of conscience, personal accountability, and liability (Cottingham, 2013); *apatrāpya* or its variant *vyapatrāpya* is in general the shame (*lajjā*) out of fear of public blame or bad reputation. This squares more with shame, as shame-cultures emphasize personal status or standing, measured in terms of public esteem or its forfeiture (Cottingham, 2013). By comparison, in the Sarvāstivāda two interpretations of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* were given: their first explanation is quite complicated and mingled, *hrī* is interpreted as endowed with respect (*sagauravatā*), veneration (*sapratīśatā*) and submission to fear (*bhayavaśavartitā*), while *apatrāpya* as seeing or perceiving fear (*bhayadarśitā*) on account of one's own transgression (*avadya*). Neither of them can be rendered exactly as 'shame', perhaps they are a bit closer to the concept of 'conscience'; however, the second explanation preserved in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* sees nearly eye to eye with the Yogācāra's definition of *hrī* and *apatrāpya*: *hrī* (慚 *cán*) is defined as being blushful/ashamed in the transgression when considering oneself, and *apatrāpya* (愧 *kuì*) as being blushful/ashamed in one's own transgression when considering others.

## ***hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the Yogācāra Scholasticism**

Let me take Yogācāra works as a starting point. In the Yogācāra scholasticism, following works are taken into consideration in my paper: (1) the *Pañcaskandhaka*, which in most cases gives the briefest explanation of the Buddhist *dharmas*; (2) the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, which frequently amplifies the explanation in the *Pañcaskandhaka*; and (3) the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Samāhitābhūmi*, the core constituents of the *Yogācārabhūmi* aiming chiefly not at the elucidation of the Buddhist *dharmas*, however, incorporating their explication into its works.

First of all, the definition of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* is given in a brief manner in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, where two *dharmas* are both related to bashfulness/shame (*lajjā*) but contrasted sharply as follows<sup>8</sup>:

What is *hrī*? It is the bashfulness/shame (*lajjā*) with regard to one's own (*ātmānam*) conduct due to [his or her] transgression (*avadya*). What is *apatrāpya*? It is the bashfulness/shame (*lajjā*) caused by worldly (*loka*) [judgment] on [one's own] transgression.

<sup>8</sup> Its Sanskrit version reads: *hrīḥ katamā? ātmānam dharmam vādhipatiṃ kṛtvā vadyena lajjā. apatrāpyam katamā? lokam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā vadyena lajjā*. See Steinkellner and Li (Eds.), 2008, p. 6.7–10.

The passage clearly illustrates that *hrī* and *apatrāpya* are intimately associated with one common physiological phenomenon in daily life: *lajjā* (bashfulness). When realizing something done wrong by oneself, that person would be bashful. In Sanskrit *lajjā* stems from the verbal root  $\sqrt{\text{lajj}}$ , literally means ‘to turn red in face’ with derived meaning ‘to be ashamed’. Here the citation in the *Pañcaskandhaka* illustrates that some fresh interpretation has been added to the pretty much interchangeable phrases *lajjā*, *hrī*, and *apatrāpya* in the *Mahābhārata*. That putting new wine in old bottles by investing well established Sanskrit words with extended meanings is paradigmatic of the scholastic Buddhism. In the *Pañcaskandhaka*, *lajjā* (shame/bashfulness) is employed as the gloss or anchor of *hrī* and *apatrāpya*, while *hrī* is construed as caused by one’s own self, *apatrāpya* as triggered by worldly or better to say social assessment and judgement. And when we apply Cottingham’s theory to the Sanskrit terms *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in this context, *hrī* denotes more precisely the guilt-liked shame than conscience-liked shame, for it arises under the circumstance of one’s transgression, but a clear conscience does not need to presuppose one’s fault, while *apatrāpya* encompasses the shame caused by others like worldly judgement. In the Anglophone philosophy, *apatrāpya* appears to be closer to the semantic domain of shame, as Cottingham (2013) summarized ‘shame is being embarrassed seen by others in a setting where your untoward behaviour is the object of a certain class of ‘participant-reactive attitudes’.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, supplemented by an expressive internal monologue and the relationship between shame and one’s future conduct, *Triṃśikavijñāptibhāṣya* provided an enlarged exegesis for *hrī* and *apatrāpya* as follows<sup>10</sup>:

*hrī* is the bashfulness/shame (*lajjā*) due to [his or her] transgression (*avadya*) through [facing] oneself or the doctrine [to which one is adhered]. Transgression is actually evil from the nature of being blamed by virtuous people, because of its unfavourable result/consequence. The [sort of] the shame/bashfulness, which is the timidity in mind due to a committed or [yet] not committed transgression, called *hrī*. It (*hrī*) has the function of giving basis for restraint from misconduct. *apatrāpya* is the bashfulness/shame (*lajjā*) on account of worldly [affairs] (*loka*) due to [his or her] transgression. One is blushful by the transgression [and] from the fear (*bhaya*) of being infamous

<sup>9</sup> Schmithausen (2013) once briefly touched on the definitions of our concern in the Sanskrit Yogācāra sources as ‘*hrī* is shame one feels of one’s own accord, *apatrāpya* is shame in the sense of being afraid of public blame or bad reputation’ (p. 477). I subscribe to his interpretation, and consider that interpretation of *hrī* as ‘guilt-liked shame’ and *apatrāpya* as the ‘shame caused by others (like worldly judgement)’ does well reflect Schmithausen’s understanding of these two terms.

<sup>10</sup> I am very grateful to Dr. Toshio Horiuchi for his kind proofreading of my translation. The Sanskrit text reads: *hrīr āmānaṃ dharmāṃ vādhipatiṃ kṛtvāvadyena lajjā, sadbhir garhitatvād aniṣṭavipākatvāc ca pāpam evāvadyam, tenāvadyena kṛtenākṛtena vā yā cittasyāvalmatā lajjā sā hrīḥ, iyañ ca duṣcari tasamyamasamṇisrayadānakarmikā. apatrāpyaṃ lokam adhipatiṃ kṛtvāvadyena lajjā, loka hy etad garhitam māṃ caivaṃ karmāṇaṃ viditvā garhiṣyaty aślokādibhayaḥ avadyena lajjate, idam api duṣ caritasamyamasamṇisrayadānakarmakam. See Buescher (Ed.), 2007, p. 76.13–20. On the relationship between *Triṃśikavijñāptibhāṣya* and *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, see Kramer, 2016.*

(*aśloka*) and so on, thinking that: “after having known that because I am doing what is blamed in the world, one will blame [me].” It (*apatrāpya*) also has the function of giving basis for restraint from misconduct.

The quotation above shows that *Triṃśikavijñaptibhāṣya* has amplified the definition of *hrī* in the *Pañcaskandhaka* by (1) adding [facing] doctrine (*dharma*), to which one is adhered, also as the circumstance, under which shame/bashfulness arises in case of *hrī*; (2) giving further explanation of transgression (*avadya*) as being blamed by virtuous people, because of its unfavourable result/consequence; and (3) extending transgression that is yet not committed also to the cause of shame/being bashful (*hrī*), so as to taking precautions against future misconduct.

In case of *apatrāpya*, it is another sort of the shame/bashfulness, ensuing from the fear of being infamous, due to one’s transgression. *apatrāpya* presupposes the fear of being blamed in the world, though such kind of blame may even not take place, but could just exist in one’s mind. It is indeed the fear of being blamed due to one’s transgression, that *apatrāpya* arises. This strengthens my interpretation *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the earlier part of this chapter: *hrī* is very much analogous to ‘guilt-liked shame’, while *apatrāpya* is the shame out of fear of public blame.

It is notable that the function as ‘giving basis for restraint from misconduct’ was supplemented in the *Triṃśikavijñaptibhāṣya* for two kinds of shame. This function can lead to upholding morality, though not articulated here. But it is attested in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

Thirdly, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* has given minute account of *vyapatrāpya* and then measured it against *hrī*. The following passage focuses on the relationship between (1) possessing the dichotomized states of shame, (2) upholding morality, and (3) being free of regret<sup>11</sup>:

In this respect through adopting the [Buddhist] morality (*śīlasamādāna*) from another person, when violating any code of moral discipline (*śikṣāvvyatikrama*), a *bodhisattva* develops *vyapatrāpya* when comparing with others. Through having an extremely pure attitude towards the morality, a *bodhisattva* develops *hrī* in comparison with self, when violating any code of moral discipline... In this way, by adopting [the Buddhist morality] and relying on a pure attitude (*āśayaviśuddhi*) [toward the morality], this *bodhisattva* generates *hrī* and *vyapatrāpya*. Through these [dichotomized] states of shame one upholds morality. The one upholding morality is free of regret.

<sup>11</sup> Its Sanskrit version reads: *tatra parataḥ śīlasamādānād bodhisattvasya param upanidhāya śikṣāvvyatikrame vyapatrāpyam utpadyate, suviśuddhāśayatayā śleṣu bodhisattvasyātmānam upanidhāya śikṣāvvyatikrame hrī utpadyate. śikṣāpadānām vyatikramapratyāpattiyā ādarajātasya cādita evāvvyatikramād bodhisattvo dvābhyām ākārabhyām niṣkaukṛtyo bhavati. evam ayaṃ bodhisattvaḥ samādānam āśayaviśuddhiṃ ca niśritya hrīvyapatrāpyam utpādayati. hrīvyapatrāpyāt śīlam samāttam rakṣati. rakṣamāno niṣkaukṛtyo bhavati.* See Dutt (Ed.), 1966, p. 95.11–15.

The passage above exhibits the contrast of *hrī* and *vyapatrāpya* in the first place, their merit as leading to upholding morality, and resulting in being free of regret in the second place. Despite the discussion in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* ends up there in being free of regret, we can carry on its explication by relating free of regret to the attainment of concentration (*samādhi*), because the procedure starting from freedom from regret moving towards attaining concentration is well established and widely transmitted in the Buddhist tradition.<sup>12</sup>

Now revert to the benefit of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* as conducive to concentration (*samādhi*) in the *Samāhitābhūmi*, despite that its reason was not explicated there, I postulate that it is the function of giving basis to the restraint from misconduct and consequences of upholding morality and being free from regret that facilitate one's attainment of concentration. Both *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Samāhitābhūmi* belong to the voluminous *Yogācārabhūmi*, the compendium of the Yogācāra scholasticism.

To summarize, in the Yogācāra scholastic scriptures, *hrī* is the guilt-liked bashfulness/shame (*lajjā* or *lajjanā*) of one's own accord due to [his or her] transgression (*avadya*), while (*vy*)*apatrāpya* is the bashfulness/shame out of fear (*bhaya*) of, or respect for (*bhayagaurava*) others. Both kinds of shame give basis for restraint from misconduct, and further result in upholding one's morality and being free from regret. And this may render their merit as being conducive to attaining concentration (*samādhi*), as articulated in the *Samāhitābhūmi*, since upholding morality and being free from regret are integral to concentration in Buddhism.

## ***hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the Sarvāstivāda Scholasticism**

The existent Sarvāstivāda scholastic scriptures<sup>13</sup> are chiefly preserved in their Chinese translation by Xuanzang 玄奘. The sources of my citations are as follows: (1) 阿毘達磨集異門足論 *Ā-pi-dá-mó jí-yì-mén-zú-lùn* (the *Samgūtiparyāyaśāstra*), 阿毘達磨品類足論 *Ā-pi-dá-mó pīn-lèi-zú-lùn* (the *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra*), and 阿毘

<sup>12</sup> One example cf. *Aṅguttara Nikāya V,V*, see Hardy (Ed.), 1900, p. 312.16–29: *Dhammatā esā, bhikkhave, yaṃ sīlavato sīlasampannassa avipparisāro uppajjati... Dhammatā esā bhikkhave, yaṃ avipparisārisa pāmujaṃ uppajjati... Dhammatā esā bhikkhave, yaṃ pamuditassa pīti uppajjati... Dhammatā esā bhikkhave, yaṃ pītimanassa kāyo passambhati... Dhammatā esā bhikkhave, yaṃ passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vediyati... Dhammatā esā bhikkhave, yaṃ sukhino cittaṃ samādhīyati*. The translation of the above citation from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya V* reads: Oh, Bhikkhus, it is natural (*dhammatā*) that the freedom from regret (*avipparisāra*) arises in a well-conducted (*sīlavat*) person... It is natural that gladness arises in a person free from regret... It is natural that joy arises in a person endowed with gladness... It is natural that one endowed with joy eases his/her body... It is natural that a person endowed with ease senses pleasure... It is natural that one concentrates his/her mind when endowed with pleasure. See also *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, cf. Dutt (Ed.), 1966, p. 50.22–23: *tathā sīlavato vipparisārah prāmodyaṃ yāvac cittasamādhīh*. The translation of the above quotation from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* reads: A well-conducted (*sīlavat*) person is free from regret (*avipparisāra*), that person is glad and up to concentrated (*samādhi*).

<sup>13</sup> On the origin of the Sarvāstivāda scholastic Buddhist tradition, see Willemen et al., 1998, p. xi, 139, 187, 220. On the research review of the relation between Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, see Kritzer, 2005, p. xxviii–xxx.



達磨發智論 *Ā-pí-dá-mó fā-zhì-lùn* (the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*),<sup>14</sup> (2) 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 *Ā-pí-dá-mó dà-pí-póshā-lùn* (the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*),<sup>15</sup> (3) the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>16</sup> (*AKBh*), and (4) 阿毘達磨順正理論 *Ā-pí-dá-mó shun-zhèng-lǐ-lùn* (the *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra*).<sup>17</sup> (1) and (2) are known as orthodox Sarvāstivāda scriptures, while (3) and (4) are framed within the broad Sarvāstivāda lineage.

Same as the Yogācāra sources,<sup>18</sup> *hrī* and *apatrāpya* are translated in the *AKBh* also as 慚 *cán* and 愧 *kuì* respectively. The Sanskrit *AKBh* stated two groups of explanations (*kalpa*) of *hrī* and *apatrāpya*. In its first group of explanation, *hrī* is interpreted as endowed with respect (*sagauravatā*), veneration (*sapratīṣatā*), and submission to fear<sup>19</sup> (*bhayavaśavartitā*); *apatrāpya* is rendered as seeing or perceiving fear (*bhayadarśitā*) on account of transgression (*avadya*).<sup>20</sup> Moreover, *AKBh* added a second group of definition of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* relating them to the root  $\sqrt{\text{lajj}}$ , where *hrī* (慚 *cán*) is defined as being bashful/ashamed in the transgression when considering oneself, *apatrāpya* (愧 *kuì*) being blushful/ashamed in one's own transgression when considering others.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Yaśomitra and Pu Guang, the author of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* and *jū-shě-lùn jì* (Note on the *Abhidharmakośa*) respectively, both mentioned that *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* as the body, in the sense of containing the most extensive doctrinal perspectives of the Sarvāstivāda, while *Samgṛtīpariyāyāśāstra* and *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra* as two of its six feet. According to Pu Guang, *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra* was composed in the Buddha's time, *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra* around 100 BCE, i.e., the third century after the Buddha's demise, see Dhammajoti, 2015, p. 93ff. On the study of the *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra* and *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*, see also Frauwallner, 1995, p. 14, 26, 36. *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra*, *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra*, and *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* are now only existent in Xuanzang's Chinese translation. In the paper, I follow the standard citation formatting of Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka preserved in the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經 (T), that is to say, the *Taishō* Text number, volume number, page, register, and line number. Thus, for example, T1558: vol. 29, p. 21a22–23 is text number 1558, volume 29, page 21, first register, line 22 to 23.

<sup>15</sup> Subsequent to the definitive establishment of the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma doctrines by *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*, there followed active and creative study, discussion, elaboration, and systematization of these doctrines, the result of which was the compilation of *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, which was composed around the middle of second century A.D and is now only extant in Xuanzang's Chinese translation, see Dhammajoti, 2015, p. 116f.

<sup>16</sup> The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is an influential scholastic treatise attributed to Vasubandhu (active in fourth or fifth century A.D). The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* consists of two texts: the root text of the *Abhidharmakośa*, composed in verse (*kārikā*), and its prose auto-commentary (*bhāṣya*); this dual verse-prose structure comes to be emblematic of later Sarvāstivāda abhidharma literature.

<sup>17</sup> The *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra* is extant only in Chinese translations by Xuanzang. It is intended to safeguard Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika (one sub-school of the Sarvāstivāda) orthodoxy by demonstrating the erroneous interpretations in Vasubandhu's auto-commentary *AKBh*. See Willemen et al., 1998, p. 244.

<sup>18</sup> In Chinese translation of the *Pañcaskandhaka*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and *Samāhitābhūmi*, *hrī* is translated as 慚 *cán*, *apatrāpya/vyapatrāpya* as 愧 *kuì*.

<sup>19</sup> In Sanskrit *vaśa* can mean 'power', 'control' (in Chinese translation 自在 *zì-zài*), but when it is placed at the latter part of a compound, it means 'controlled by' or 'submitted to'.

<sup>20</sup> The corresponding Sanskrit passage cf. *AKBh*, see Pradhan (Ed.), 1975, p. 60.4–6: *viparyayeṇa hrīr apatrāpyam ca vedītavyam, pratāmena tāvat kalpena sagauravatā sapratīṣatā na bhayavaśavartitā (sic) hrīḥ, avadyeṣv abhayadarśitā (sic) patrāpyam, dvitīyena kalpenāmaparāpekṣābhyaṃ lajjane*. Its corresponding Chinese translation of the *AKBh* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó jū-shě-lùn* 阿毘達磨俱舍論) see T1558: vol. 29, p. 21a22–23.

<sup>21</sup> The Sanskrit passage see *AKBh* 60.6: *dvitīyena kalpenāmaparāpekṣābhyaṃ lajjane*. Its corresponding Chinese translation of the *AKBh* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó jū-shě-lùn* 阿毘達磨俱舍論) see T1558: vol. 29, p. 21a23–25.

It is clear that the second group of explanation of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the *AKBh* largely squares with the definition in the *Yogācāra* scriptures as discussed before, whereas the first group of explanation of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the *AKBh* may have its root in some orthodox Sarvāstivāda works. More precisely, *Samgūtiparyāyaśāstra*, *Prakaranapādaśāstra*, *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*, and *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* and the first group of explanation of the *AKBh* are solid on the definition of *hrī* (慚 *cán*) and *apatrāpya* (愧 *kuì*). In these works, 慚 *cán*, the Chinese translation of *hrī*, covers a wide variety of meanings: (1) possessing shame (in Chinese: 有羞 *yǒu-xiū*, cf. *lajjā* in the *AKBh*), (2) possessing respect<sup>22</sup> (in Chinese: 有敬 *yǒu-jìng*, cf. *sagauravatā* in the *AKBh*), and (3) possessing the submission to fear (in Chinese: 於自在者有怖畏轉 *yú zì-zài-zhě yǒu-bù-wèi-zhuǎn*, cf. *bhayavaśavartitā* in the *AKBh*), while 愧 *kuì*, the Chinese translation of *apatrāpya*, encompasses the following dimensions: (1) possessing the sense of shame (in Chinese: 有恥 *yǒu-chǐ*, cf. \**lajjā* in the *AKBh*) and (2) [being able to] perceive fear (in Chinese: [能]見怖畏 [*néng*] *jiàn-bù-wèi*, cf. *bhayadarśitā* in the *AKBh*<sup>23</sup>). This suggests that the traditional interpretation in the Sarvāstivāda School largely dissents from the outlook of the *Yogācāra* scholasticism. However, the *AKBh*, *Mahābhārata*, and Pāli sources are on the same page of ascribing respect to the interpretation of *hrī*; this implies that the same Sanskrit word *hrī* might have undergone some change of primary meanings in the course of history.

That being said, *hrī* and *apatrāpya* are analogized in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* to the cloth of *dharmakāya* on every sentient being in the Form Realm (*rūpadhātu*), whereas the generality of sentient beings located in the Desire Realm (*kāmadhātu*) is lack of such cloth due to their absence of *hrī* and *apatrāpya*, with exception of *bodhisattvas* and untainted *bhikṣunis*.<sup>24</sup> The Buddha thus instructs people to cultivate and practice *hrī* and *apatrāpya* diligently, in order to protect the world.<sup>25</sup> In

<sup>22</sup> The *AKBh* touched elsewhere upon the relation of *hrī* and *gurutva* as follows: *hrī* is respect (*gurutva*), and respect is with veneration [*sapratīṣatā*]. (Yet), some other schools [argue]: *hrī* is the bashfulness/shame (*lajjā*) preceded by respect; thus, *hrī* is not just (*eva*) respect. See *AKBh* 60.16–18: *gurutvaṃ hrīḥ, gauravaṃ hi nāma sapratīṣatā, tatpūrvikā ca lajjā hrīḥ. ato na gauravam eva hrīr ity apare*. Its corresponding Chinese translation *Ā-pí-dá-mó jù-shě-lùn* 阿毘達磨俱舍論 see T1558: vol. 29, p. 21b3–6.

<sup>23</sup> The corresponding passage of the Chinese translation of the *Samgūtiparyāyaśāstra* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó jǐ-yì-mén-zú-lùn* 阿毘達磨集異門足論) see T1536: vol. 26, p. 370a1–9, the Chinese translation of the *Prakaranapādaśāstra* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó pīn-lèi-zú-lùn* 阿毘達磨品類足論) see T1542: vol. 26, p. 925a5–10, the Chinese translation of the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó fā-zhī-lùn* 阿毘達磨發智論) see T1544: vol. 26, p. 925a5–11, the Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó dà-pí-pó-shā-lùn* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論) see T1545: vol.27, p. 180b18–c15, Xuanzang's translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó jù-shě-lùn* 阿毘達磨俱舍論) see T1558: vol. 29, p. 21a22–23.

<sup>24</sup> See Chinese translation of the *MVŚ* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó dà-pí-pó-shā-lùn* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), T1545: vol. 27, p. 362b14–19: 問中有生時為有衣不。答色界中有一切有。以色界中慚愧增故。慚愧即是法身衣服。如彼法身具勝衣服生身亦爾。故彼中有常與衣俱。欲界中有分無衣。以欲界中多無慚愧。唯除菩薩及白淨苾芻尼所愛中有恒有上妙衣服。 Cf. also *AKBh*, p. 124.13–16: *rūpavacaro'py antarābhavaḥ saṃpūrṇapramāṇaḥ savastraś ca prādurbhavati, apatrāpyotsadvāt, bodhisattvasya savastraḥ śuklāyās ca bhikṣuṇyaḥ prañidhānaśād yāvantaṃ eva pariveṣitā nirdagdā, anyo nagnaḥ, kāmadhātō anapatrāpyoasadataḥ*.

<sup>25</sup> See Chinese translation of the *MVŚ* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó dà-pí-pó-shā-lùn* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), T1545: vol. 27, p. 180b11–13: 謂慚與愧。欲顯其相令勤修習。復次如是二法守護世間。如世尊說有二法能護世間。謂慚與愧。 Cf. also *Anguttara Nikāya I*, see Morris (Ed.), 1885, p.51.15–21: *Dve 'me bhikkhave dhammā sukkā. Katame dve? Hiri ca ottappaṃ ca. Ime kho bhikkhave dve dhammā sukkā ti. Dve 'me bhikkhave sukkā dhammā lokam pāleni. Katame dve? Hiri ca ottappaṃ ca*. Its English translation reads: Oh, bhikkhus, there are two kinds of bright qualities, namely *hiri* and *ottappa*. Oh, bhikkhus, *hiri* and *ottappa* protect the world.

comparison, in the exegeses of the *AKBh*, those shameless ones, who are absent of *hrī* and *apatrāpya*, are compared to ones who are drunk.<sup>26</sup> They are likened to charred seeds and impotent to uphold moralities.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, regarding the time sequence of arousing *hrī* and *apatrāpya*, the *AKBh* held that these two are asynchronous, because looking at self and looking at others cannot take place at the same time.<sup>28</sup> On the contrary, *\*Nyāyānusāraśāstra* argued that *hrī* and *apatrāpya* arise simultaneously.<sup>29</sup>

## Conclusion

In the scholastic Buddhist *dharma*s, shame is mainly dichotomized into *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya*. Both are regarded as wholesome (*kuśala*) *dharma* in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism. Nevertheless, Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra dissent from each other on their definition of these two terms.

In the Yogācāra sources, both kind of shame are glossed by one common physiological phenomenon in daily life: *lajjā* or its variant *lajjanā* (bashfulness with shame), whereas *hrī* is very much analogous to ‘guilt-liked shame’, arising on the occasion of one’s transgression after facing oneself or the doctrine, to which one is adhered; (vy)*apatrāpya* is the bashfulness/shame out of fear of being infamous from others’ judgement and criticism in one’s transgression. Following Cottingham’s elucidation of shame and shame-liked states, I provide my working definition ‘guilt-liked shame [of one’s own accord]’ for *hrī*, while ‘shame [out of fear of others]’ for *apatrāpya*. If we compare *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* with the shame and guilt cultures in the Anglophone philosophy, it reveals that *hrī* squares more with the notion of guilt, while (vy)*apatrāpya* more with shame. Possessing shame is not shameful; on the contrary, it is celebrated as wholesome *dharma*s and factors conducive to concentration (*samādhi*), one fundamental Buddhist meditation. The function of possessing two kinds of shame is described in the *Triṃśikaviññaptibhāṣya* as giving basis for the restraint from misconduct. In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, one who possesses *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* is characterized as upholding morality and being free of regret. These functions form the merits of *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* for one’s behaviour and cultivation.

Quite the contrary, the Sarvāstivāda School has not related *hrī* and *apatrāpya* to *samādhi*, but *hrī* and *apatrāpya* were praised as they protect the world. Moreover, the traditional Sarvāstivāda works have interpreted two kinds of shame in a twofold manner. In the first group of interpretation, *hrī* and *apatrāpya* are not just

<sup>26</sup> It reads: 如人醉酒即無慚愧。See T1822: vol. 41, p. 469c20. T1822 俱舍論疏 (*Jū-shě-lùn shū*) is the commentary of the *AKBh*, composed by 法寶 Fabao in the Tang Dynasty.

<sup>27</sup> It reads: 經部答:由身已為無慚愧壞,無力發戒,如焦種故不復生芽。See T1821: vol. 41, p. 237b13–14. T1821 俱舍論記 (*jū-shě-lùn jì*) is the commentary of the *AKBh* narrated by 普光 Puguang in the Tang Dynasty.

<sup>28</sup> Its Sanskrit version reads: *na khalūcyate yugapad ātmānaṃ paraṃ cāpekṣata ity*. See *AKBh* 60.1–2, meaning ‘We certainly do not say looking at oneself and others is simultaneous (*yugapad*)’.

<sup>29</sup> It reads: 由此慚愧,一心並生。See the Chinese translation of the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* (*Ā-pí-dá-mó shūn-zhèng-lí-lùn* 阿毘達磨順正理論), T1562: vol. 29, p. 393b17.

shame: *hrī* (慚 *cán*) covers a wider range of (1) possessing shame, (2) possessing respect, (3) possessing the submission to fear; while *apatrāpya* (愧 *kui*) is construed as (1) possessing the sense of shame and (2) [being able to] see or perceive fear. In the second group of interpretation, which correspond closely to their explanation in the Yogācāra sources, *hrī* is explained as shame/bashfulness (*lajjanā*) when considering oneself, *apatrāpya* as shame/bashfulness (*lajjanā*) when considering others. It appears that my working translation of *hrī* as ‘guilt-liked shame [of one’s own accord]’ and *apatrāpya* as ‘shame [out of fear of others]’ can only be partly applied to their second group of interpretation in the Sarvāstivāda sources. The first group of interpretation of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* is quite conflated, but it may well reflect the traditional Sarvāstivāda exegeses on these terms, revealed by the majority of existent Sarvāstivāda sources. And when we put the first group of interpretation under the microscope, the *AKBh*, *Mahābhārata*, and Pāli sources are on the same page of attributing respect to the interpretation of *hrī*. And in case of *apatrāpya* (愧 *kui*), it overlaps the feeling of shame. The Sanskrit terms *hrī* and *apatrāpya* must have undergone the change of their primary meanings in the different contexts in the course of history.

The Chinese translation *hrī* and *apatrāpya* would be one typical example of Chinese reception of Buddhist terminology into its culture. More than one thousand years has passed since the dichotomized states of shame were first translated into Chinese as 慚 *cán* and 愧 *kui*. In modern Chinese 慚 *cán* connotes the worm of conscience arising when a person realizes he or she cannot meet the requirements set up by him- or herself; 愧 *kui* connotes the worm of conscience arising when a person realizes he or she cannot meet the requirements by others. The distinction of *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the Buddhist scholasticism might have well crept into the Chinese language and helped form Chinese philosophy on shame. In fact, in modern Chinese language, 慚愧 *cán-kui* is mostly used as one phrase, which exactly means ‘shame’. As *hrī* and (vy)*apatrāpya* are not easy to distinguish in the Indian context, people in China barely reflect upon the divergence of 慚 *cán* and 愧 *kui*, while using the phrase 慚愧 *cán-kui* very often when expressing ashamed, bashful, or embarrassed feelings.

When we talk about the shame, guilt, and conscience cultures in the Anglophone contexts, as far as I know, *hrī* and *apatrāpya* in the scholastic Buddhism are most eligible Sanskrit equivalent terms. Up to now, these terms are quite understudied. I hope my paper could make some contribution to this study.

**Funding** Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

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