

Erratum to: Explanation, Entailment, and Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments

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In the original article the abstract is not correct.
Here we display the abstract as it should have appeared.
Everything else in the paper remains correct.

Abstract: I argue that there are Leibnizian-style cosmological arguments for the existence of God which start from very mild premises which affirm the mere possibility of a principle of sufficient reason. The utilization of such premises gives a great deal of plausibility to such types of argumentation. I spend the majority of the paper fending off three major objections to such “mild” premises *viz.*, a reductio argument from Peter van Inwagen and William Rowe, which proffers and defends the idea that a necessary proposition cannot explain a contingent one. I, then, turn to an amelioration of the Rowe/van Inwagen argument which attempts to appeal to an entailment relation between explanans and explanandum that is fettered out in terms of relevance logic. Subsequent to dispelling with that worry, I tackle objections to the utilization of weak principles of sufficient reason that depend essentially upon agglomerative accounts of explanation.

The online version of the original article can be found at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0042-y>.

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