Abstract
Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility.
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Petersen, S. Utilitarian epistemology. Synthese 190, 1173–1184 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9887-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9887-7