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Scientific models and fictional objects

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Abstract

In this paper, I distinguish scientific models in three kinds on the basis of their ontological status—material models, mathematical models and fictional models, and develop and defend an account of fictional models as fictional objects—i.e. abstract objects that stand for possible concrete objects.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, K1S 1Y4, Canada

    Gabriele Contessa

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  1. Gabriele Contessa
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Correspondence to Gabriele Contessa.

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Contessa, G. Scientific models and fictional objects. Synthese 172, 215 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9503-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9503-2

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