Abstract
In Sense and Content, Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent of one another. However, despite its notoriety, the argument is widely misunderstood and underappreciated. I argue that once the structure of the argument is clarified and the replies that have been offered are considered closely, one must conclude that the trees argument is successful.
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Millar, B. Peacocke’s trees. Synthese 174, 445–461 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9465-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9465-4