Abstract
The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which ends are implicated in which decisions (e.g., do individual goals guide particular choices? do different ends jointly pick out courses of action?). Unfortunately, such an account is lacking. As a result, there is a gap (at least) in our most basic account of human behavior. In this paper I explore that gap and examine some proposals for closing it.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
George Ainsle (2001) Breakdown of Will Cambridge University Press New York
Elizabeth Anderson (1997) ‘Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods’ Ruth Chang (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Kenneth Arrow (1983) Social Choice and Justice Belknap Press Cambridge, MA
Isaiah Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty Oxford University Press New York
John Broome (1997) ‘Is Incommensurability Vagueness?’ Ruth Chang (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Ruth Chang (1997) ‘Introduction’ Ruth Chang (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Donald Davidson (1980) Essays on Actions and Events Clarendon Press Oxford
Daniel Ellsburg (1968) ‘Classical and Current Notions of ‘Measurable Utility’’ Alfred Page (Eds) Utility Theory: A Book of Readings Wiley New York
Amitai Etzioni (1986) ArticleTitle‘The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception’ Economics and Philosophy 2 IssueID2 159–183
Phillipa Foot (1959) ArticleTitle‘Moral Beliefs’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series 59 83–104
Gerd Gigerenzer (2000) Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World Oxford University Press New York
Gerd Gigerenzer Selten (2000) Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox MIT Press Cambridge, MA
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Peter M.Todd, and the ABC Research Group (2000) Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, Oxford University Press, New York.
James Griffin (1997) ‘Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?’ Ruth Chang (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Louis Guenin (2001) ArticleTitle‘The Set Theoretic Ambit of Arrow’s Theorem’ Synthese 126 443–472 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1005255924462
John Harsanyi (1955) ArticleTitle‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualist Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ Journal of Political Economy 63 IssueID4 309–321 Occurrence Handle10.1086/257678
Daniel Hausman (2000) ArticleTitle‘Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory’ Economics and Philosophy 16 IssueID1 99–115 Occurrence Handle10.1017/S0266267100000158
Hobbes,Thomas (1996) Leviathan, J.C.A. Gaskin (ed.), Oxford University Press, New York.
Daniel Kahneman Tversky Amos (1979) ArticleTitle‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ Econometrica 47 IssueID2 263–290 Occurrence Handle10.2307/1914185
Gregory Kavka (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory Princeton University Press Princeton
Gregory Kavka (1991) ArticleTitle‘Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?’ Economics and Philosophy 7 IssueID2 143–165 Occurrence Handle10.1017/S0266267100001371
Ralph Keeney Howard Raiffa (1976) Decisions with Multiple Objectives Wiley New York
David Kreps (1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory Princeton University Press Princeton
Isaac Levi (1986) Hard Choices Cambridge University Press New York
Christian List Philip Petit (2004) ArticleTitle‘Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared’ Synthese 140 207–235 Occurrence Handle10.1023/B:SYNT.0000029950.50517.59
Steven Lukes (1997) ‘Comparing the Incomparable: Trade-offs and Sacrifices’ Ruth Chang (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Howard Margolis (1982) Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality Cambridge University Press New York
Mill, John Stuart (1988) Utilitarianism, George Sher (ed.), Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis.
Mihnea Moldoveanu Stevenson Howard (2001) ArticleTitle‘The Self as a Problem: the Intra-Personal Coordination of Conflicting Desires’ Journal of Socio-Economics 30 295–330 Occurrence Handle10.1016/S1053-5357(01)00096-8
Thomas Nagel (1979) ‘Fragmentation of Value’ in Mortal Questions Cambridge University Press New York
Plato (1974) Plato’s Republic, G.M.A. Grube. (trans.) Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis.
Michael Resnick (1987) Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory University of Minnesota University Press Minneapolis
Thomas Schelling (1984) Choice and Consequence Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Frederic Schick (1984) Having Reasons Princeton University Press Princeton
Frederic Schick (1991) Understanding Action Cambridge University Press New York
Frederic Schick (1997) Making Choices Cambridge University Press New York
Frederic Schick (2003) Ambiguity and Logic Cambridge University Press New York
Amartya Sen (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare Cambridge University Press New York
Amartya Sen (1997) ArticleTitle‘Maximization and the Act of Choice’ Econometrica 65 IssueID4 745–779 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2171939
Amartya Sen (2002) Rationality and Freedom Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Amartya Sen (2004) ArticleTitle‘Incompleteness and Reasoned Choice’ Synthese 140 43–59 Occurrence Handle10.1023/B:SYNT.0000029940.51537.b3
Cass Sunstein (1997) ‘Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law’ Ruth Change (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Amos Tversky (1972) ArticleTitle‘Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice’ Psychological Review 79 281–299 Occurrence Handle10.1037/h0032955
John Von Neumann Oskar Morgenstern (1980) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior EditionNumber3 Princeton University Press Princeton
David Wiggins (1997) ‘Incommensurability: Four Proposals’ Chang Ruth (Eds) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
Bernard Williams (1981) Moral Luck Cambridge University Press New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ellis, S. Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action. Synthese 153, 313–338 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5751-y
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5751-y