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Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions

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Abstract

I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, CA, 90032–8114, U.S.A

    Mark Balaguer

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  1. Mark Balaguer
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Correspondence to Mark Balaguer.

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Balaguer, M. Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions. Synthese 146, 325–355 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6217-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6217-3

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