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The No Probabilities For Acts-Principle

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Abstract

One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.

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  1. Cowell College, University of Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, 95064, U.S.A

    Marion Ledwig

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  1. Marion Ledwig
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Correspondence to Marion Ledwig.

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Ledwig, M. The No Probabilities For Acts-Principle. Synthese 144, 171–180 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-2010-6

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