

## Editorial preface

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The broad theme of the essays collected in this issue is free will, human and divine. The first three articles involve discussions of Plantinga's work in the free will debate. The second two articles introduce the argument of Molinism according to which divine omniscience and libertarian freedom are said to be compatible. The Molinist argument is a theme carried forward in the fourth essay. And finally, the last essay discusses moral agency in terms of differences in the moral psychology of those in heaven as opposed to those who are in hell.

Bernstein and Helms begin by calling into question the widespread assumption that Plantinga's free will defense has solved the logical problem of evil. Recent critiques of Plantinga's defense claim that it does not. These critiques have focused on the plausibility of Plantinga's assumption of universal transworld depravity, the plausibility of which, his defense rests upon. If this assumption is not plausible, then Plantinga's defense cannot be successful. Bernstein and Helms, who concede that the thesis of transworld depravity is possibly not plausible, suggest a way of avoiding this defeat of the free will defense. Contra Plantinga, they argue that the success of the free will defense does not require the possibility of universal transworld depravity or the truth of counterfactuals. They argue for a "simpler" free will defense. This involves making the case that it is conceivable that God can create a world with only saintly agents, agents not morally depraved, and a companion possible world where agents can go wrong. The upshot of this simpler defense comes to something like this: a free person is one who *can* go wrong by disobeying God (E.g. Eve in the garden); this decision creates an instance of evil;

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but this disobedience makes sense only if God exists; so God's existence is compatible with the existence of evil in the world.

In the next essay, Sean Meslar asserts flatly that Plantinga has not solved the logical problem of evil. He accepts the standard view that the thesis of universal transworld depravity is central to Plantinga's argument. As such, if the thesis of transworld depravity falls, so does Plantinga's free will defense. Meslar argues that indeed transworld depravity cannot stand because it is internally inconsistent. Suggestively, and in line with the previous essay, Meslar concludes that the logical problem of evil can be solved independently of the thesis of transworld depravity. But for Meslar this can be done only at the price of embracing a restricted omniscience. If theists find this price too dear, then the search for a solution to this logical problem of evil ought to continue.

Justin Mooney begins his essay recalling William Rowe's famous argument that God does not deserve gratitude or praise for freely creating our actual world since he was not free to do otherwise. Given God's perfect nature, he had to create the best of all possible worlds, and this is it. But, while some theists have suggested that a proper account of divine freedom is consistent with this consequence, this theist strategy seems further to lead to a modal collapse, according to which this actual world is the only world that God could have created. Relying on a distinction made by Wierenga between "feasible and merely possible" worlds, Mooney argues that the modal collapse can be avoided; and avoided on either Molinist or non-Molinist accounts of divine providence.

In the next essay, Wierenga and Molinism resurface. The focus of Yishai Cohen's essay is on what is called the consequence argument. Libertarians use this argument to establish the incompatibility of determinism and free will. Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot endorse the consequence argument and reject the anti-Molinist argument since the two arguments are structurally similar. Cohen carries Perszyk's argument further by arguing that Wierenga has not succeeded in showing that there is a difference between the two arguments. Cohen also points out additional relevant similarities between the two arguments which in turn renders it more difficult for the Molinist consistently to endorse the consequent argument.

In our final essay, the problem of libertarian free human agency comes up in relation to the traditional theistic doctrine of hell. Hell is a problem for classical theism since it seems to fly in the face of the fact that God, as morally perfect, loves all human beings and desires to have fellowship with them. If God really desires such fellowship then there should be no end to God's invitation to his creatures, even the vilest of rogues in hell, freely to enter into this fellowship. Andrei A. Buckareff and Allen Plug have argued that the only way to make hell consistent with God's love is to hold that its inhabitants can positively respond to this invitation and choose to leave hell for higher ground. But Benjamin Matheson has argued (in this journal) that if the inhabitants of hell are free to leave, then the inhabitants in heaven should have that option as well. In response, Buckareff and Plug try to make the case that there is an asymmetry between heaven and hell and that accordingly the inhabitants of heaven are free (metaphysically?) but not free (psychologically) to leave.