

Erratum to: Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital

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During article processing, the abstract was not included but should have been and should be regarded as the final version by the reader.

Abstract We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property rights protection and separation of powers in a political system have on economic growth. Using analysis of panel data from more than 100 countries over the period 1970–2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto players (political institutions) and partisan veto players (fractionalization among political parties), we further find that the growth effects of property rights are driven mainly by checks on the chief executive (in bicameral systems) and primarily found in countries with large stocks of democratic capital.

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