CORRECTION



## Correction to: Practical knowledge without practical expertise: the social cognitive extension via outsourcing

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In the original article, Section 3 had a formatting issue, and the reference list had several errors. As per the author's request, the article is retrospectively processed as open access with funding notes added.

The original article has been corrected.

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