



Correction to: Thanks, We're good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable

David Enoch¹

Published online: 12 September 2020
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Correction to: Philos Stud <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01507-x>

In the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. The corrected references are provided below.

References

- Enoch, D. (2014). A defense of moral deference. *Journal of Philosophy*, 111, 229–258.
- Enoch, D. (2018). Review of David Sobel's From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism. *Ethics*, 128, 672–677.
- Enoch, D. (2019). How Principles Ground. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 14, 1–22.
- Enoch, D., & Weinshtock-Saadon, I. (forthcoming). "Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! Or: Why Care about Morality, Robustly Realistically Understood". Forthcoming in David Copp and Paul Bloomfield (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism*.

Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

The original article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01507-x>.

✉ David Enoch
David.Enoch@mail.huji.ac.il

¹ The Philosophy Department, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel