



Sāṃkhya's Challenge to the Buddhist Claim of the Identity of a *Pramāṇa* and Its Result

Ołena Łucyszyna¹

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Abstract Sāṃkhya, in its commentary *Yuktidīpikā*, responds to the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and a valid cognition (*pramā*), its result (*phala*), are identical. The response of Sāṃkhya was pioneering: it is one of the two earliest responses to the Buddhists in the lively polemic on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result. (The other of these two earliest responses is in the *Ślokavārttika* by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa.) Sāṃkhya's voice in this polemic is earlier than that of Nyāya, which is, as well as Mīmāṃsā, the main rival of the Buddhists in addressing this issue. This study provides a translation and detailed reconstruction of the *Yuktidīpikā*'s polemic with the Buddhist opponent, which has not been researched before, as well as a critical assessment of the Sāṃkhya position. The *Yuktidīpikā* polemicalizes against Dignāga. It aptly questions the standpoint of the Buddhist opponent and presents an alternative standpoint, contrasting its own view with that of the opponent. Though the Sāṃkhya position formulated in the *Yuktidīpikā* evokes several critical remarks, the *Yuktidīpikā*'s response is an important contribution to Indian thought.

Keywords Sāṃkhya · *Yuktidīpikā* · Dignāga · Indian epistemology · Means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) · Valid cognition (*pramā*)

Introduction

One of the most lively polemics in Indian epistemology is devoted to the question of whether a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and valid cognition (*pramā*), its

✉ Ołena Łucyszyna
oluczyszyna@iksio.pan.pl

¹ Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures, Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland

result (*phala*), are identical to or different from one another. The Buddhists, by which I mean here Dignāga and those who followed in his footsteps, claimed that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical. Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas were their main rivals.

It appears that Sāṃkhya, too, participated in this polemic. In my study, I explore Sāṃkhya's voice in this discussion. The aim of my research is to reconstruct and critically evaluate the position of Sāṃkhya.

Sāṃkhya's polemic against the Buddhists on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result is presented in the *Yuktidīpikā* (YD; ca. 7th c. CE; the author is unknown),¹ a classical Sāṃkhya commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SK; ca. 350–450 CE). This commentary is unique. It is the most detailed and polemical of all classical Sāṃkhya commentaries. It sheds light on many issues not addressed in other Sāṃkhya texts.

The polemic on whether a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical to or different from one another is part of the YD's commentary on the 5th *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's SK. Sāṃkhya's opponent is most likely Dignāga. The YD contains different polemics challenging Dignāga.² As to our polemic, the opponent's view is similar to the view of Dignāga formulated in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) with the autocommentary *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV).³

It is necessary to emphasize that in the YD, we discover one of the two earliest responses to Dignāga. The other of these two earliest responses is in the *Ślokavārttika* by the great seventh-century Mīmāṃsaka Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa. It has not yet been determined by scholars which of these two texts—the *Ślokavārttika* or the YD—is earlier.⁴ In any case, the YD's answer is earlier than that of Nyāya, the main rival of the Buddhists. Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara⁵ does not propose a response to the Buddhist identification of a *pramāṇa* and its result in his *Nyāyavārttika*. The *Nyāyavārttika* includes, like the YD and the *Ślokavārttika*, different polemics against Dignāga,⁶ but the *Nyāyavārttika* was probably composed earlier than those two texts.⁷

¹ The dates of all Sāṃkhya texts mentioned in this article are given according to Larson (1987, pp. 15–16, 19–22). See also the valuable observations of Mejer (2004) on the date of the YD.

² For example, on whether reliable verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*, *śabda*), Sāṃkhya's third *pramāṇa*, can be reduced to inference (*anumāna*). See YD 5 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 87.14–17) and 6 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 100.10–105.9). The critical edition prepared by Wezler and Motegi is cited by page(s) and line(s); thus, 100.10 means page 100, line 10. Harzer writes that the YD was created largely as a response to Dignāga's criticism of Sāṃkhya and an attempt to reform and modernize its system, especially epistemology, to make it less vulnerable to the criticisms of its opponents (2006, pp. 16–19).

³ As I do not read Tibetan, I rely on Steinkellner's reconstruction of the Sanskrit text and Hattori's English translation from Tibetan.

⁴ On this matter, which requires further research, see Mejer (2004).

⁵ For the dates of Uddyotakara and his *Nyāyavārttika*, see Potter (1977, pp. 9, 303–304); Bronkhorst (2019, pp. 318, 323).

⁶ For example, on the Buddhist theories of *apoha* and momentariness—see *Nyāyavārttika* II, 2, 66 and III, 2, 14, respectively.

⁷ Philosophers of different *darśanas* responded to Dignāga. Pre-Dharmakīrti philosophers polemicizing with Dignāga are mentioned by Hattori—see PS (1), (1968, pp. 15–16).

Current State of the Research

As far as I know, the YD's polemic against the Buddhist position on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result has not been researched before.⁸ Bandyopadhyay (1979, pp. 65–66) and Chattopadhyay (1979, p. 15) make several remarks on this polemic; they do not present it or analyze it in detail. Bandyopadhyay cites a small excerpt⁹ from the polemic; in this excerpt, the author of the YD states that a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*) cannot be identical because their substrata (*āśraya*) are different: a *pramāṇa* is located in the *buddhi* (the highest psychic organ and subtlest product of *prakṛti*), whereas its result (*phala*) is located in *puruṣa*. Relying upon Sāṃkhya teaching, according to which *puruṣa* cannot undergo any transformation, Bandyopadhyay correctly observes that “the object-shaped *buddhi* can find a location in *puruṣa* only in the form of an image” or “false ascription”. Bandyopadhyay also holds that if the *buddhi* is reflected in *puruṣa* or the *buddhi*'s experience is falsely ascribed to *puruṣa*, the position of Sāṃkhya, in fact, implies the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its *phala* asserted by the Buddhists.¹⁰ I cannot agree with this. As to the *buddhi*'s reflection in *puruṣa*, *puruṣa*, who is changeless and fundamentally different from *prakṛti*, cannot—unlike the *buddhi*—assume the form of the object. As to the false ascription of the *buddhi*'s experience to *puruṣa*, the falsity of this ascription implies that *puruṣa*, in fact, remains unaffected by the *buddhi*'s modification.

Chattopadhyay's remarks are very different from Bandyopadhyay's. Chattopadhyay says that unlike the Buddhists, for whom “the distinction between *pramā* and *pramāṇa* is only imaginary”, the author of the YD and Vācaspati Mīśra (the author of the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, the last classical Sāṃkhya commentary) “draw a real distinction between *pramā* and *pramāṇa*”; Chattopadhyay also calls this distinction “fundamental”. On the other hand, Chattopadhyay writes, “*Pramāṇa* is the unconscious mode of the intellect whereas *pramā* is the same mode illuminated.” This contradicts, first, Chattopadhyay's own statement about the fundamental difference between a *pramāṇa* and its *pramā*. Second, the position of the author of the YD is that the substrata of a *pramāṇa* and its result are fundamentally different from one another, for a *pramāṇa*, which is a modification of the *buddhi*, is located in *prakṛti*, whereas a *pramā* is located in *puruṣa*.

Kumar (1984, pp. 26–27) provides a brief summary of the polemic; the summary informs us about the standpoint of the Buddhist opponent and of the author of the YD. The summary is accurate. What I disagree with is Kumar's opinion that in this polemic, a *pramāṇa* is understood as a process. In this polemic, a *pramāṇa* is

⁸ Given the enormous and rapidly growing number of publications in different languages available today, it is hardly possible to be sure about the current state of the research.

⁹ It consists of two lines in the edition prepared by Wezler and Motegi (1998, pp. 77.20–78.1–2).

¹⁰ Bandyopadhyay argues that not only Sāṃkhyas' position entails the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its result. At the beginning of his article, he says, “The Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the Advaita Vedānta and some Mīmāṃsakas also, despite their possible disclaimer, finally cannot dispense with the relation of identity in one way or other” (1979, p. 45). An evaluation of the applicability of Bandyopadhyay's opinion to *darśanas* other than Sāṃkhya lies beyond my study.

understood as the instrument / instrumental cause (*kaṛaṇa*) of valid cognition (see my translation and reconstruction of the polemic in the next chapter of this article).

Harzer (2006, p. 79) and Kondō (2010, pp. 1134–1135) present the following argument for the difference of a *pramāṇa* and its result the author of the YD used in this polemic: a *pramāṇa*, which is located in the *buddhi*, and its result, which is located in *puruṣa*, have different substrata.¹¹

I would also like to mention Harzer's helpful observations on this polemic, contained mostly in the notes to her translation of YD 5. She correctly points out that the Buddhist opponent's position is the same as the position of Dignāga presented in his PS and PSV, chapter 1, *kārikā* 8cd with the commentary (2006, p. 79; 113, note 33). Harzer also observes that both the author of the YD and his Buddhist opponent share the *sākāra* theory,¹² according to which cognition assumes the form/shape (*ākāra*) of the object to be cognized, and that Sāṃkhya is *sākāravādin* and *nirākāravādin* at the same time because changeless *puruṣa*, unlike the *buddhi*, does not take on any *ākāra* (2006, p. 113, note 34).¹³

Translation and Reconstruction of the *Yuktidīpikā's* Polemic against the Buddhist Position on the Relationship between a *Pramāṇa* and Its Result

Translation of the Polemic

I will first cite the whole passage containing the YD's polemic and next provide its reconstruction. The editors of the YD Wezler and Motegi use boldface type to highlight the *vārttikas*. They distinguish two levels in the YD—the *vārttika* and the *bhāṣya*—functioning as parts of one whole and probably belonging to the same author.¹⁴

[Sāṃkhya adherent]:¹⁵ ... Perception (*dṛṣṭa*)¹⁶ is that which follows the modification (*vṛtty-upanipātin*) of the senses (*indriya*) that seized [their respective] objects; [perception is that which is] neither tamasic nor rajasic due to the preponderance of *sattva* [and] has the nature of light. [*Dṛṣṭa*] means

¹¹ Kondō also notices that according to *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* I, 7, like in this passage of the YD, a *pramāṇa* belongs to the psychic apparatus, which is a product of *prakṛti*, whereas its result, *pramā*, belongs to *puruṣa*.

¹² For the main Buddhist argument for the *sākāra* theory, see Hattori in PS (1), (1968, p. 98, note 1.55), and Kellner (2014, p. 277). On the concept of *ākāra* in Buddhism, see Moriyama (2008), Kellner (2014), and other articles published in the same special issue of the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.

¹³ This Harzer's observation will be cited below, in the section "Critical Evaluation ...".

¹⁴ About the two layers in the YD, see Bronkhorst (1990) and Wezler and Motegi (1998, pp. XXV–XXVIII).

¹⁵ In the YD, the words of the Sāṃkhya proponent are introduced by *ucyate* ("it is said"), and the words of the opponent are introduced by *āha* ("[he] speaks"). I do not translate *ucyate* and *āha*.

¹⁶ After Wezler and Motegi, editors of the YD, I italicized the SK word "perception" the YD comments on.

‘perception’ (*pratyakṣa*). It is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).¹⁷ The favor done by it for the power of consciousness is the result (*phala*). The objects of valid cognition (*prameya*) are sound (*śabda*), etc. Below, too, the relation between a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and [its] result (*phala*) will be considered.

[Sāṃkhya opponent]: Is this result (*phala*) different or not different from the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*)?

[Sāṃkhya adherent]: How indeed (*tāvat*) can it be?

[Sāṃkhya opponent]: It is not different. Why? **Because it has the form of apprehension (*adhigama-rūpa*)**. For the cognition (*jñāna*) has the form of apprehension—an object (*artha*) is apprehended (*adhigata*) through the rise of that [apprehension]; therefore (*iti*), how can the [cognitive] result (*phala*) be different [from its *pramāṇa*]?

[Sāṃkhya adherent]: How can there be an instrument (*karaṇa*) [of valid cognition] in this case?

[Sāṃkhya opponent]: But it is [only] because of the general opinion that there is an instrument (*karaṇa*) [of valid cognition]. For the rise of the cognition (*jñāna*) possesses the semblance (*nirbhāsa*) of the object. Though it [the rise of the cognition—*jñānasya utpattiḥ*] has the form of apprehension, on the worldly level (*loka*), it is considered as that which performs an operation (*savyāpāra*); [the fact that] there is an instrument [of valid cognition] is accepted due to the conceptual construction (*kalpanā*), not from the ultimate point of view (*paramārtha*).

[Sāṃkhya adherent]: **The result (*phala*) is different from [the *pramāṇa* by which it is achieved] because of the difference of [their] substrata**. For a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), called ‘ascertainment’ (*adhyavasāya*), is located in the *buddhi*, [and its] result (*phala*), called ‘favor’ (*anugraha*) [done for *puruṣa*], is located in *puruṣa*. And two [things] which have different substrata cannot be the same [thing]. As to [your] words that a mere (*eva*) cognition (*jñāna*) is a [cognitive] result (*phala*) because it has the form of apprehension (*adhigama-rūpa*), this is unestablished. Why? **[And] because this is unproved**. For just as without cognition (*jñāna*), it is impossible to grasp that such things as a pot are thus formed (*tad-rūpa*) or not thus formed (*atatad-rūpa*), in the same way, without *puruṣa*’s intelligence, a cognition is

¹⁷ In this article, I translate Sanskrit terms *jñāna*, *pramāṇa*, and *pramā* as ‘cognition’, ‘a means of valid cognition’, and ‘valid cognition’, respectively. I am aware of the difficulties in finding their accurate English equivalents. *Pramāṇa* can also be translated as ‘a means of knowledge’, and *pramā* as ‘knowledge’. To mention only some of the many important publications discussing these Sanskrit terms: Bilimoria (1985), Mohanty (2001), Matilal (2002), Balcerowicz (2009, pp. 139–144, note 4), and Ganeri (2018).

neither having the form of the object nor devoid of the form of the object. And likewise [our] authoritative text (*śāstra*) will [further] say:

“That is why due to their [*puruṣa*’s and *prakṛti*’s] contact (*saṃyoga*), unconscious subtle body (*liṅga*) is as it were endowed with consciousness (SK 20ab).”

Hence, for Sāṃkhya, it is not established that cognition (*jñāna*) has the form of apprehension without *puruṣa*’s intelligence. The discussion refers to the well-known [opposing] positions of both¹⁸ [that is, of Buddhists and Sāṃkhyas]. **If [you object] that it is incorrect (*ayukta*) because *puruṣa* does not exist, [we answer:] no, for it is substantiated later.** We will substantiate the existence of *puruṣa* in this [*kārikā*]: “Because that which is an aggregate of parts exists for someone else” (SK 17a). Therefore, for an adherent of the theory that a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is the ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*), [which is the modification of the *buddhi*], it is established that a [cognitive] result (*phala*) is different from the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).¹⁹

¹⁸ I am not sure about the meaning of “both” (*ubhaya*) and present here two interpretations that seem possible to me. The first one, proposed by Hattori, is that “both” refers to Yogācāras and Sautrāntikas. Hattori notices that the theory “that the *sākāra* cognition is both *pramāṇa-phala* and *pramāṇa*” we deal with in Dignāga’s PS and PSV (chapter 1, *kārikā* 8cd) “is amenable to both schools (*ubhaya-naya*)” of Buddhism. Hattori mentions the YD fragment from our polemic that presents this Buddhist theory (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 77.11–15). See Hattori’s note to his translation of the PS with PSV: PS (1), (1968, p. 98), note 1.55. The second interpretation is that Buddhists and Sāṃkhyas are what is meant by “both” in this context. In this case, the translation is as follows: “The discussion refers to the well-known [opposing] positions of both [that is, of Buddhists and Sāṃkhyas].”

¹⁹ *ucyate: ... upātaviṣayāñām indriyāñām vṛtyupanipāti sattvodrekād arajastamasam yat prakāsarūpaṃ [yad dṛṣṭam iti yāvat] tad dṛṣṭam / pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ / etat pramāṇam / anena yaś cetanāsakter anugrahas tat phalam / prameyāḥ śabdādayaḥ / evam uttaratrāpi pramāṇaphalabhāvo draṣṭavyaḥ / āha: kiṃ punar idaṃ pramāṇāt phalam arthāntaram āhosvid anarthāntaram / <ucyate(?):> <ka> <taṃ tāvad bhavitum arhati / anarthāntaram ity āha / kasmāt / **adhigamarūpatvāt** / adhigamarūpaṃ hi jñānam, tasyotpattyavādhi-gato 'rtha itī kutaḥ phalabheda itī / ucyate: karaṇabhāva idāniṃ katham syāt / āha: karaṇabhāvas tu prasiddhivaśāt / viṣayanirbhāsā hi jñānasotyopattiḥ / adhigamarūpāpi loke savyāpāreva <prāṭīr itī(?)> kalpanayā karaṇabhāvo 'bhyupagamyate na paramārthataḥ / ucyate: **phalasyārthāntarabhāvaḥ adhikarāṇabhedāt** / buddhyāśrayaṃ hi pramāṇam adhyavasāyākhyam puruṣāśrayaṃ phalam anugrahalakṣaṇam / na ca bhinnādhikaraṇayor ekatvam arhati bhavitum / yat tūktam adhigamarūpatvāj jñānam eva phalam itī tad anupapannam / kasmāt / **asiddhatvāt** / yathaiva hi ghaṭādayo 'rthā jñānam antareṇa na tadrūpā nātadrūpā itī na śakyaṃ pratipattum evaṃ jñānam api puruṣapratyayam antareṇa na viṣayarūpaṃ nāviṣayarūpaṃ / tathā ca śāstram— tasmāt tatsaṃyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgam / (SK 20ab) itī vakṣyati / ataḥ puruṣapratyayam antareṇa jñānam adhigamarūpaṃ itī sāmkhyaṃ praty asiddham etat / ubhayapakṣaprasiddhena ca vyavahāraḥ / **puruṣābhāvād ayuktam itī cen na uttaratra pratipādanāt** / “saṅghātaparāthavāt” (SK 17a) ity atra puruṣāstitvaṃ pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ / tasmāt siddham adhyavasāyapramāṇavādīnaḥ pramāṇāt phalam arthāntaram itī / (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 77.6–78.12.)*

The YD editors Wezler and Motegi use [] to mark their deletions and < > to mark their additions and corrections. I do not translate parts of the text deleted by the editors.

What *Pramāṇas* Does the Polemic Deal with?

In the YD, like in Dignāga's PS with its autocommentary and in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika* (IV, 74–79),²⁰ who responds, like the author of the YD, to Dignāga, the passage on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result is embedded within the discussion of perception. Dignāga deals with this issue in the first chapter of his PS and PSV, which is a chapter on perception (*pratyakṣa*). He explicates his position that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical in section 1 of this chapter, *kārikās* 8cd–10 together with the commentary.²¹ This is a section containing a general presentation of the Buddhist theory of perception. He returns to this issue in two other sections of the chapter on perception: in section 3, devoted to a critical examination of the Nyāya theory of perception, *kārikās* 3cd–4 with the commentary,²² and in section 6, devoted to a critical examination of the Mīmāṃsā theory of perception, *kārikā* 9 with the commentary.²³

However, the Sāṃkhya perspective in the YD that a *pramāṇa* and its result are different from one another refers to all three *pramāṇas*. This follows from the YD's passage, as well as from Sāṃkhya epistemology in general. In this passage, the author of the YD holds that a *pramāṇa* is a modification of the *buddhi* and its *pramā* is this modification transmitted to *puruṣa*. In Sāṃkhya, every valid cognition is a modification of the *buddhi* transmitted to / influenced by *puruṣa*.

I did not find any passage in which Sāṃkhya says that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical. Indeed, I did not find any such comment in extant classical Sāṃkhya texts or in the following postclassical Sāṃkhya texts: the *Tattvasamāsa* (ca. 14th c. CE) with its commentary *Kramadīpikā* (ca. 14th c. CE) and the *Sāṃkhyasūtras* (ca. 15th c. CE) with Aniruddha's commentary *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* (ca. 15th c. CE). Extant classical Sāṃkhya texts comprise the SK and eight commentaries on it: the commentary that survived in the Chinese translation of Paramārtha²⁴ (composed ca. 500 CE, translated into Chinese between 557 CE and 569 CE), the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (ca. 6th c. CE), the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (ca. 6th c. CE), the *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* (or *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*; ca. 6th c. CE) by Gauḍapāda, the *Yuktidīpikā* (YD; ca. 7th c. CE), the *Jayamaṅgalā* (ca. 700 CE or later), the *Mātharavṛtti* (ca. 800 CE or later) by Māthara, and the

²⁰ For a translation, Sanskrit text, and analysis of the whole *Ślokavārttika* chapter (IV) devoted to perception (*pratyakṣa*), see Taber (2005).

²¹ *Kārikās* 8cd–10 in PS (2), 2005. In the main text of my article, the numbers of the chapters and *kārikās* are given according to Hattori's translation: PS (1), 1968. In the footnotes, the numbers of the *kārikās* are given according to Steinkellner's reconstruction: PS (2), 2005.

²² *Kārikās* 19cd–20 in PS (2), 2005.

²³ *Kārikā* 42 in PS (2), 2005.

²⁴ I do not know Chinese; I rely on Aiyaswami Sastri's reconstruction in Sanskrit and on Takakusu's French translation.

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī (or *Tattvakaumudī*; TK; ca. 841 CE or ca. 976 CE)²⁵ by Vācaspati Miśra.²⁶

Sāṃkhya refers to the etymology of the word *pramāṇa*, which means ‘measure’, that is, an instrument/tool for measuring, and compares achieving valid cognition (*pramā*) by *pramāṇas*—perception (*dr̥ṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and reliable/authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*, *śabda*)—to measuring different things (like corn and sandalwood) by using the measure appropriate for them—see, for example, *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* 4, YD 4 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 67.11–13),²⁷ *Mātharavṛtti* 4, *Kramadīpikā* 22. For Sāṃkhyas, a *pramāṇa* is an instrument (*karāṇa*) for achieving a valid cognitive result, and an instrument cannot be identical to the result of the act carried out by this instrument. I cite the YD, “That by which something is validly cognized (*pramīyate*) is called ‘an instrument of valid cognition’ (*pramāṇa*). [The affix] *lyuṭ*²⁸ denotes an instrument (*karāṇa*)” (YD 4; Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 67.6–7)²⁹. Much as how the measure called *prastha* can be identical with neither the corn measured nor with the result of the act of measuring, a *pramāṇa* can be identical neither with the object to be cognized (*prameya*) nor with the cognitive result achieved by it (*pramā*). In the YD’s polemic explored in this study, too, the author of the YD understands a *pramāṇa* as an instrument/instrumental cause (*karāṇa*) of valid cognition; he holds that an instrument cannot be identical with the result of this instrument’s act (YD 5; Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 77.16).³⁰

²⁵ According to Acharya, Vācaspati composed his famous works, including the TK, in the second half of the 10th c. (2006, p. XXVIII).

²⁶ Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s SK till Aniruddha’s *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* express the same system of philosophy. The next text *Sāṃkhyappravacanabhāṣya* (ca. 1550–1600 CE) by Vijñāna Bhiṣu, which is a commentary on the *Sāṃkhyasūtras*, treats Sāṃkhya not as an independent *darśana* but as part of the Vedānta system of this philosopher. On Vijñāna’s attitude toward Sāṃkhya and its place in Vijñāna’s hierarchy of teachings, see Larson (1987, pp. 35–41) and Nicholson (2014, pp. 84–123). Nicholson’s (2014) excellent monograph explains Vijñāna’s role in Indian philosophy and culture, his attitude toward different *darśanas*, and his interpretation of *āstika darśanas* as complementary ones. Sāṃkhya texts that have been composed since the time of Vijñāna need to be examined by researchers (see Krishna, 2006, pp. 97–120). The questions whether they contain important material not found in earlier works and whether they are Sāṃkhyan should be answered. The revival of Sāṃkhya-Yoga by Hariharānanda Āraṇya (1869–1947) and his followers is worth special attention (see Jacobsen’s and Jakubczak’s publications, of which I mention only two: Jacobsen 2018; Jakubczak 2020).

²⁷ The YD’s explanations of the *kārikās* are usually more extensive than the explanations of the *kārikās* or *sūtras* by other Sāṃkhya commentaries, which is why when citing the YD, I also give the page and line numbers of Wezler’s and Motegi’s edition besides the numbers of the *kārikās*.

²⁸ The author of the YD refers to the rule formulated in *sūtra* III, 3, 117 of Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2002, p. 546). According to this *sūtra*, the *kṛt* suffix *lyuṭ* can be added after a verbal root to derive nouns that denote instruments (*karāṇa*) and loci (*adhikarāṇa*). *Lyuṭ* is the technical term for the suffix *ana*—see the rule formulated in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* VII, 1, 1, by which the suffix *yu* is replaced with the suffix *ana* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2003, pp. 1–3). Thus, the word *pramāṇa* (literally, ‘a measure’) is derived from *pra-√mā* (literally, ‘to measure’), to which the suffix *ana* is added to form a noun that denotes an instrument (*pramāṇa* is a measuring instrument).

²⁹ *pramīyate* ‘neneti *pramāṇam* / *karāṇa-sādhanam* *lyuṭ* /

³⁰ For this passage’s translation and analysis, see my translation and reconstruction of the polemic in the previous and following section, respectively.

The last sentence of the YD's polemic may seem to evidence that it discusses the relationship between perception (*dṛṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*) and the result of this *pramāṇa*, not the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result in general. It may seem so because the term *adhyavasāya* ('ascertainment'), used in the Sāṃkhya definition of perception, appears in this sentence. SK 5 defines perception (*dṛṣṭa*) as *prativīṣayādhyavasāya*. The last sentence of our polemic runs as follows: "Therefore, for an adherent of the theory that a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is the ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*), [which is the modification of the *buddhi*], it is established that a [cognitive] result (*phala*) is different from the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*)." From the Sāṃkhya perspective, however, not only perception but each of its three *pramāṇas* can be characterized as *adhyavasāya*—for we read in SK 23: *adhyavasāyo buddhir ...* ("the *buddhi* is the ascertainment"). Each of the *pramāṇas* is a *sāttvika* modification (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi*, and therefore each of the *pramāṇas* is *adhyavasāya*. During the discussion of the Sāṃkhya definition of perception and right before the polemic on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result, the author of the YD cites *adhyavasāyo buddhir* from *kārikā* 23 (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 77.4), which confirms that he keeps in mind that according to Sāṃkhya, not only perception but also other *pramāṇas* are *adhyavasāya*. Thus, the appearance of the term *adhyavasāya* in the last sentence of the polemic on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result does not evidence that the polemic deals with perception only.

As to Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's position that a *pramāṇa* and its result are different from one another, defended in the *Ślokavārttika*'s chapter devoted to perception, encompasses all *pramāṇas*. This follows from his treating a *pramāṇa* as a means (*sādhana*) / an instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) and from his view that a means / an instrument must be different from the result produced by it (*Ślokavārttika* IV, 74–75, 77).

In Nyāya, too, its position that a *pramāṇa* and its result are not identical refers to all *pramāṇas*. Nyāya, as well as Mīmāṃsā, is the main rival of the Buddhists in the polemic on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result, but it joined the polemic later than Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya. For Nyāya, too, a *pramāṇa* is a *kaṛaṇa* and an instrument is not the same as the result achieved by it. Neither Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* nor Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* participates in this polemic against the Buddhists. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (840–900)³¹ includes the polemic in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (1969, pp. 38–45), in its first chapter (*āhnika*), which is devoted to a general investigation of *pramāṇas*. Disagreeing with the Buddhists that hold that a *pramāṇa* is identical with the *pramā* achieved by it, Jayanta argues that a *pramāṇa* is an instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) by which we get a valid cognitive result, and an instrument cannot be identical with the result produced by it (*Nyāyamañjarī* 1969, pp. 38–39).³²

It is very probable that also the Buddhist opponent's position in the YD covers not only perception but also inference, that is, both of the *pramāṇas* that are

³¹ Jayanta's dates are given according to Potter (1977, pp. 6, 9).

³² Jayanta understood a *pramāṇa*, which is a *kaṛaṇa*, as a collection (*sāmagrī*) of causal factors (*Nyāyamañjarī* 1969, pp. 31–38).

accepted by Dignāga and his followers. Dignāga's pupil Śāṅkarasvāmin in his *Nyāyapraveśa* (or *Nyāyapraveśakasūtra*) directly says that in the case of both perception and inference, a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical (*Nyāyapraveśa* 4.3).³³

Reconstruction of the Content of the Polemic

The Buddhist opponent asks whether the cognitive result achieved by a *pramāṇa*, a means of valid cognition, is different from it or not. He next states that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical. He gives the following substantiation: because the cognitive result has the form of apprehension (*adhigama-rūpa*).³⁴ According to the text's editors Wezler and Motegi, this substantiation belongs to the *vārttika* level of the YD. The *bhāṣya* explains: the cognition (*jñāna*), that is, the cognitive result, having the form of apprehension, is achieved through the rise of this very cognition, or apprehension; if the cognitive result is achieved through its own rise, the cognitive result cannot be different from the *pramāṇa* causing it. The Buddhist opponent holds that a valid cognition is produced by itself and therefore a valid cognition is at the same time the *pramāṇa* that produces this cognition.³⁵ This is the

³³ The Buddhist view that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical evokes the question how this view can be applied to inference (*anumāna*). Buddhists accept two *pramāṇas*—perception and inference. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is a means of valid cognition of the momentary, unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇa*, 'own feature,' 'that which is its own attribute'), which are the only reals. Perception is understood first of all as pure sensation, free from conceptual constructions (*kalpanā*) and linguistic elements. Inference (*anumāna*) is a means of valid cognition of the universals (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, 'common feature'), which are mental constructs. The Buddhists claim that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical because a *pramāṇa* is itself a cognition having the image/copy of the object to be cognized. How should the object's image/copy that is a *pramāṇa* causing a valid cognitive result (*pramā*) should be interpreted in the case of inference, whose object to be cognized is *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*? How can cognition take the form of the object to be cognized in the case of inference? I will cite the explanation proposed by Stcherbatsky: "When we, e.g., infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke, we imagine the fire, it is *prima facie* a fire in general. But the second step in this act of cognition will be to imagine it as a real fire, a possible object of purposive action, a possible sense-datum. Thus the particular sense-datum will also be an object cognized ultimately through inference, but indirectly. The result (*pramāṇa-phala*) of both modes of cognition ... is the same ..." (Stcherbatsky 1962, p. 38, note 3). A critical analysis of the Buddhist view lies beyond the scope of my study.

Stcherbatsky's monumental publication *Buddhist Logic* includes his translations of passages from Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers in which they discuss the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result (Stcherbatsky 1962, pp. 341–400). As to Brahmanical philosophers, Stcherbatsky translated the passages from Vācaspati Miśra's Mīmāṃsā work *Nyāyakaṇikā* and from Udayana's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikāparisuddhi*.

³⁴ In the PS and PSV, the term *adhigama* appears also in section 6 of chapter 1, in the Vṛtti's commentary on the 9th *kārikā*—see footnote 36, in which I cite this *kārikā* together with part of the commentary on it. We also find the term *adhigama*, for example, in Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa* 4.3, where it occurs, like in the YD, in the compound *adhigama-rūpa*.

³⁵ In this polemic, a cognition (*jñāna*), that is, a valid cognitive result, and "the rise of the cognition" (*jñānasya utpattiḥ*) are both described as *adhigama-rūpa* ('having the form of apprehension') by the Buddhist opponent (see Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 77.14 and 77.18, respectively). It is because for him, a cognitive result, *jñāna*, and that through which it is achieved, *jñānasya utpattiḥ*, are not different from one another. In his opinion, the rise of a cognition is the same as this cognition because it is this very cognition that arises. On *jñānasya utpattiḥ*, see footnote 37 below.

first of the two Buddhist opponent's arguments for the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its result.³⁶

The author of the YD asks his opponent how there can be an instrument / instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of valid cognition in this case. In Indian philosophy, generally speaking, achieving a valid cognitive result, or knowledge, requires an instrument (*karaṇa*), and a *pramāṇa* is this instrument. If a *pramāṇa* is the same as its result, *pramā*, how can a *pramāṇa* be the instrument of achieving the *pramā*? The same argument is used by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his attempt to refute the Buddhist position that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical. Kumārila says that the Buddhist position contradicts the common practice to differentiate between a means (*sādhana*) and the result (*sādhya*) achieved by it: in ordinary life, people do not identify an axe with the cutting off done by the axe (*Ślokavārttika* IV, 74–75).

The Buddhist opponent responds by distinguishing between the worldly point of view (*loka*), or general opinion (*prasiddhi*), and the ultimate point of view (*paramārtha*). From the worldly perspective, a *pramāṇa* is different from its result, *pramā*. The existence of a *karaṇa* of valid cognition is merely a general opinion. From the worldly point of view, which is caused by the conceptual construction

³⁶ Dignāga expresses this argument in section 6 of the first chapter of his PS and PSV, *kārikā* 9. He polemicalizes there with Mīmāṃsakas. Cf. the YD passage, Wezler and Motegi (1998, p. 77.14–15), to the citation from the PS and PSV I attach below. Dignāga argues that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical. I cite the *kārikā* together with part of the commentary on it (namely, with the commentary on 9cd). This is Hattori's translation of the text (I used the boldface type to highlight the *kārikā*)—see PS (1), (1968, pp. 68–69):

**9a. if one holds to “the rise of cognition” (*buddhi-janman*) [as a definition of perception]—
9b. a result that is different [from this means] could not be found.**

9cd. inasmuch as the cognition itself has arisen, there would be no result other than that [cognition].

That which results from the means of cognition is the apprehension (*adhigama*) [of an object], which, however, is nothing other than the cognition (*buddhi*) itself. Therefore, were the cognition [itself to be regarded as] a means of cognition, there could be no result [to be distinguished from the means of cognition].

In Steinkellner's reconstruction of the PS and PSV, this is *kārikā* 42—see PS (2), (2005, pp. 22–23). Steinkellner italicized parts of the text not attested in Sanskrit sources and retranslated from Tibetan; he used the subscript + to indicate vowel *sandhis* between the retranslated words and attested words. I attach his reconstruction together with my translation:

buddhijanma yadīṣyeta

phalam anyan na labhyate |

buddhāv eva hi jātāyāṃ tato 'nyan na phalaṃ bhavet || 42 ||

adhigamo hi phalam avasitam. sa cet pramāṇam, buddher ananyatvāt phala+abhāvah.

If “the rise of cognition” (*buddhi-janman*) is accepted [by you as part of your definition of perception, which is given in *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* I, 1, 4],

a [cognitive] result that is different [from the *pramāṇa* causing it] is not found.

As the cognition (*buddhi*) itself (*eva*) has arisen, the result cannot be different from that [i.e., from the rise of the cognition].

It is because apprehension (*adhigama*) is acknowledged as the result. If [we say that] it [i.e., apprehension] is the *pramāṇa*, since it [i.e., the *pramāṇa*] is not different from the cognition (*buddhi*), there is no [cognitive] result [that is different from the *pramāṇa* causing it].

(*kalpanā*), “the rise of the cognition” (*jñānasya utpattiḥ*)³⁷ is understood as encompassing the *karaṇa* and its operation (*vyāpāra*). However, from the ultimate point of view, there is no *karaṇa* of valid cognition, and a *pramāṇa* is identical to its result. In fact, “the rise of the cognition” (*jñānasya utpattiḥ*) bears “the semblance (*nirbhāsa*) of the object [to be cognized]” and occurs due to this semblance (image, copy—*nirbhāsa*). The same *jñāna* is both the instrument of valid cognition and this cognition.

The above argument, stating that a *pramāṇa* is itself a cognition possessing the copy, or image, of the object to be cognized (*prameya*), is the second of the Buddhist opponent’s arguments for the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its result. We know that according to Dignāga’s PS together with PSV, a valid cognition (*pramā*) is caused by a mental image of the object to be cognized, and thus a *pramā*, a cognitive result (*phala*), is not different from the *pramāṇa* that causes it. A *pramāṇa* is a mental image of the object to be cognized. From the worldly point of view, it is endowed with activity, or function (*vyāpāra*), to produce a valid cognitive result (see the PS and PSV, chapter 1, *kārikā* 8cd).³⁸

³⁷ The term *jñānasya utpattiḥ* appearing in the YD probably has its roots in the compound *buddhi-janman* from the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*’ definition of perception, given in *sūtra* I, 1, 4. This compound, which can be interpreted in different ways, was widely discussed by Indian philosophers. In *Mīmāṃsā*, it is considered in *Śābarabhāṣya*, *Ślokovārttika*, and other texts—see Taber (2005, pp. 17–15, 66–70). In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, too, the definition of perception speaks about perception as the cognition that arises, though the word “cognition” is omitted—see Taber (2005, p. 188, note 55). It is quite probable that both the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* understood perception not as a *karaṇa* producing a valid cognitive result but as a process of cognizing that arises due to appropriate factors. See also the *Nyāyasūtras*’ (I, 1, 4) definition of perception, which describes perception as the cognition (*jñāna*) that arose (*utpanna*). In the PS and PSV, the meaning of the compound *buddhi-janman* from the *Mīmāṃsā* definition of perception is discussed in chapter 1, section 6, *kārikās* 6b and 9–10 (*kārikās* 39b and 42–43 in PS (2), 2005). See footnote 36, in which I attach *kārikā* 9 from section 6 of chapter 1.

³⁸ Cf. the YD passage, Wezler and Moteġi (1998, p. 77.17–19), to the PS and PSV passage. I cite the PS, chapter 1, *kārikā* 8cd, together with part of the commentary. Hattori’s English translation runs as follows—see PS (1), (1968, p. 28):

8cd. [we call the cognition itself] “pramāṇa” [literally, a means of cognizing], because it is [usually] conceived to include the act [of cognizing], although primarily it is a result.

Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (*pramāṇa-phala*) differs from the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (*savyāpāra*). For this reason, it is metaphorically called *pramāṇa*, the means of cognition, although it is [ultimately speaking] devoid of activity (*vyāpāra*).

I attach also Steinkellner’s reconstruction into Sanskrit (see PS [2], 2005, pp. 3–4) together with my translation:

savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṃ phalam eva sat || 8 ||

na hy atra bāhyakānām iva pramāṇād arthāntaram phalam. tasyaiva tu *phalabhūtasya* jñānasya viṣayākāratayā utpattyaḥ savyāpārapratītiḥ. tām upādāya pramāṇatvam upacaryate nirvyāpāram api sat.

[A valid cognition] is [called] *pramāṇa* because it is considered as that which performs an operation (*savyāpāra*) [from the worldly point of view]; [however, from the ultimate point of view,] there is (*sat*) only the result (*phala*).

Unlike those who are “external”, we do not [accept] that the result is different from the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). But as the rise (*utpatti*) of that cognition which is the result is [itself] a [mental] form of the object (*viṣayākāratā*), it is considered as that which performs an operation

Though it is not my task to assess the arguments of the Buddhist opponent, I will present one critical remark on each of them. The first of these arguments says that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical because the cognitive result is achieved through the rise of this very cognition, that is, through its own rise. This argument assumes that the rise of the cognition, treated as a *pramāṇa* with its operation (*vyāpāra*) from the worldly point of view, is the same as this cognition because it is this very cognition that arises. If we look critically at this argument, we can object that a cognition that is arising (i.e., coming into being) is not identical to this cognition after it has arisen. A state of coming into being of a mental or physical phenomenon is not identical to the state of its actual existence. Objecting to the Buddhist opponent, we can also add that even from the worldly point of view, it is inappropriate to treat a cognition that is still coming into being as a *pramāṇa*. A cognition must first come into being, and only after that it can function as a *pramāṇa*, or a *karāṇa* producing a valid cognitive result. In Sāṃkhya epistemology, the rise of a valid cognition is in fact a cognitive process with different stages. For example, the rise of perceptual cognition, that is, the process of perceptual cognizing, includes such stages as a sense organ's getting into contact with its object and carrying out its own specific function by different cognitive organs/faculties/powers, the highest of which is the *buddhi*. However, for the Buddhist opponent, who advocates the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), the rise of the cognitive result is momentary, it has no duration in time, which means that we deal with a single cognitive event, indivisible into stages. For the Buddhist opponent, the state of a cognition's coming into being and this cognition's fully manifest state are not two separate states but the same momentary state.

The second argument of the Buddhist opponent for the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its result is that a valid cognition is caused by a mental copy (image, semblance) of the object to be cognized. A *pramāṇa* is this mental copy, which is a valid cognition (*pramā*) itself. We can object to this argument that even if this mental image had

Footnote 38 continued

(*savyāpāra*). Because of it [that is, because of its rise], [the result] is figuratively called *pramāṇa*, although [from the ultimate point of view,] there is (*sat*) [only the result] devoid of [any] operation (*nirvyāpāra*).

In this PSV passage, the word *viśayākāratā* appears. A marginal note of two YD manuscripts is worth attention. It says that “being a *pramāṇa* is indeed being the form of the object” (*viśayākārataiva pramāṇatvam*)—see Wezler and Motegi (1998, p. 77, note [1]). This comment explains how a *pramāṇa* is understood by the Buddhist opponent.

PS and PSV 8cd–11ab was translated by Dreyfus and Lindtner (1989, pp. 36–37). Their translation is based on Hattori's edition of these texts, published in PS (1), 1968. Most of PS and PSV 8cd–12 was translated by Kellner (2010), who cites Steinkellner's reconstruction PS (2), 2005 and takes into account also the Tibetan translations, Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, and other important sources. In this article, Kellner presents a careful and detailed analyses of Dignāga's exposition of the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its *phala*. The most recent translation known to me is in Yiannopoulos' doctoral dissertation. The dissertation contains a translation of PS and PSV 2–16 (2020, pp. 505–515); the *kārikā* numbers are given according to Steinkellner's reconstruction: PS (2), 2005. Yiannopoulos writes that the translation was done by him in the co-authorship with J. Dunne (2020, p. 505). In his dissertation, Yiannopoulos provides a thorough analysis of Dignāga's and his followers' view on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result. His main focus is the position of Dharmakīrti (2020, pp. 157–230).

already been present in our psyche before the cognitive event occurred, it had been unconscious. Even if all mental images are in our psyche, not all of them become conscious *pramā*. An unconscious mental trace is not the same as a vivid conscious *pramā*, and a real *karaṇa*, being something different from the unconscious mental image, is needed to make this trace a conscious *pramā*.

What is the YD's response to the Buddhist opponent? The response contains two arguments. Both of them rely on the basic premises of the Sāṃkhya doctrine. The first argument is the following: a *pramāṇa* and its result are different from one another because their substrata (*adhikaraṇa*) are different. A *pramāṇa* is located in the *buddhi*, which means that it is located in *prakṛti*, whereas the *pramā*, the result, is located in *puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are the two ultimate, eternal, and fundamentally different principals of Sāṃkhya dualist ontology. A *pramāṇa* is a modification (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi* ('intellect,' 'discernment'), the highest and subtlest psychic organ, which is a product of *prakṛti*. As to *pramā*, a *pramāṇa*'s result, the author of the YD calls it the 'favor' (*anugraha*)³⁹ done for *puruṣa* by a *pramāṇa*.

Why does the difference of the substrata of a *pramāṇa* and its result prove that they are different from one another? It is because according to Sāṃkhya, any *prakṛtic* physical or mental phenomenon is a transformation of its substratum; it is this substratum itself, not anything else. The *buddhi*'s cognition is not a quality that is different from the *buddhi* itself, its substratum, or bearer. A *pramāṇa* is the *buddhi* itself. Unlike the *buddhi*, *puruṣa* does not undergo transformations and cannot assume the form of the object.

The second argument of the author of the YD is the following: the Buddhist opponent's view that both a *pramāṇa* and its result are the same cognition (*jñāna*) that has the form of apprehension (*adhigama-rūpa*) is unproved. In the opinion of the author of the YD, not every cognition has the form of apprehension. A cognition cannot be an apprehension without *puruṣa*'s intelligence (*pratyaya*). A mere *jñāna*, without *puruṣa*'s intelligence, is not an *adhigama*. A mere *jñāna* is an unconscious modification of the *buddhi*; only thanks to *puruṣa*, this modification becomes a conscious *adhigama*, which is the cognitive result. The author of the YD holds that the *buddhi* can grasp different objects, for example, pots, acquiring their form, but only thanks to *puruṣa* a cognition achieved by the *buddhi* can become a conscious cognitive result. (Would modern Sāṃkhyas recognize that unconscious cognitions of the *buddhi* are similar to cognitions of artificial intelligence?).⁴⁰ According to Sāṃkhya teaching, *prakṛti* and all of its products, including the *buddhi*, are unconscious, while *puruṣa* is consciousness (*cetanā*). With this in mind, the Sāṃkhya proponent claims that nothing can be apprehended, that is, cognized consciously, without *puruṣa*'s intelligence (*puruṣa-pratyaya*). Thus, a *pramāṇa*, which is an unconscious modification of the *buddhi*, and its result, which is conscious thanks to *puruṣa*, are different from one another.

³⁹ On the notion of *anugraha* in Sāṃkhya, see Kimball (2011, pp. 203–214, 222–228, and 2013, pp. 607–613).

⁴⁰ On the *buddhi*'s cognitions and the role of *puruṣa*, see Larson (1983).

At the end of this polemic, the author of the YD attaches the Buddhist opponent's objection that *puruṣa* does not exist.⁴¹ He answers this objection by referring to SK 17, which is the *kārikā* presenting Sāṃkhya arguments for the existence of *puruṣa* (*ātman*).

Critical Evaluation of the *Yuktidīpikā*'s Position on the Relationship Between a *Pramāṇa* and Its Result

The response of Sāṃkhya to the Buddhist identification of a *pramāṇa* and its result was pioneering, and it probably sparked further debate. It does, however, evoke critical remarks. I will present them and assess whether the *Yuktidīpikā*'s position is Sāṃkhyan, that is, whether it agrees with Sāṃkhya teaching.

1. My first critical remark is that the YD's response to the Buddhist identification of a *pramāṇa* and its result undercuts the Sāṃkhya theory of *pramāṇas*. Sāṃkhya accepts three *pramāṇas*: perception (*dṛṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and reliable verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*). *Kārikās* 4–6 of the SK together with classical Sāṃkhya commentaries on these *kārikās* present the three *pramāṇas* and their definitions. The YD's position undercuts Sāṃkhya's attempt to show a specific character of each of its three *pramāṇas*. If we accept, together with the author of the YD, that a *pramāṇa* is a modification of the *buddhi* that has the form of the object, the difference between particular *pramāṇas* will fade.

The YD's understanding of a *pramāṇa* in this polemic agrees with YD's interpretation of the expression *trividhaṃ pramāṇam* ("the threefold *pramāṇa*") from SK 4. Among all extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* till Aniruddha's *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*, the YD is the only text that interprets *trividhaṃ pramāṇam* as stating that there is, in fact, only one *pramāṇa*, which is "*sattva* taking the form of the *buddhi*" (*buddhi-lakṣaṇam sattvam*). The author of the YD directly rejects the view that there are three separate *pramāṇas*—perception, inference, and reliable verbal testimony (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 69.1–6).

Among the above-mentioned Sāṃkhya texts, there is one more text undercutting the specifics of each of the *pramāṇas*. This is Vācaspati Miśra's TK, the last classical Sāṃkhya commentary. Giving a general definition (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of a *pramāṇa* in TK 4, he characterizes it as *citta-vṛtti*, the modification of the *citta*, by which the *antaḥ-karaṇa* ('the internal instrument'), constituted by the three highest psychic organs (*manas*, *ahaṃkāra*, and *buddhi*), is meant. He distinguishes this modification from the cognitive result, *pramā*. In TK 5, Vācaspati describes perception as the *sattvic* modification (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi*, distinguishing this *pramāṇa* from its result, which is called by him—like by the author of the YD—the 'favor' (*anugraha*) done for *puruṣa* by a *pramāṇa*.⁴²

Though Vācaspati—like the author of the YD—undercuts Sāṃkhya's theory of *pramāṇas* by saying that a *pramāṇa* is a modification of a psychic organ, which

⁴¹ The Buddhist does not acknowledge unchanging and everlasting *ātman/puruṣa*.

⁴² I also refer to this passage from TK 5 below, in the next subsection of this paper (presenting my next critical remark).

entails that *pramāṇas* are not different from one another, he—unlike the author of the YD—never states directly that there is only one *pramāṇa*. Contrarily, Vācaspati states directly that there are three different *pramāṇas* (TK 4). The other classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, too, acknowledge three separate *pramāṇas* (see their commentaries on SK 4).

The YD's position is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya theory of *pramāṇas*, and among Sāṃkhya texts taken into account in this study, it is the only text declaring such position. To substantiate that a *pramāṇa* and its result are different from one another, it is not at all necessary to take a standpoint undercutting Sāṃkhya's theory of *pramāṇas*. The author of the YD could, for example, describe a *pramā* as the modification (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi* that is influenced by *puruṣa*, and a *pramāṇa* as the necessary, specific and most important causal factor in the cognitive process, that is, in the process of achieving this or that particular type of *pramā*. Such understanding of a *pramāṇa*, an instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of a *pramā*, follows from Sāṃkhya teaching. For example, in the case of perception (*dṛṣṭa*, *pratyakṣa*), the *karaṇa* could be described as the contact of a sense with its respective object, and in the case of reliable/authoritative verbal testimony (*āpta-vacana*), as a reliable/authoritative sentence (this follows from the Sāṃkhya epistemology presented in SK 4–8 together with the commentaries, as well as *Kramadīpikā* 22 and *Sāṃkhyasūtras* I, 88–91, 100–103, 108–113 together with Aniruddha's *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*).

2. My next critical remark is as follows. The author of the YD claims that *puruṣa* is a substratum (*adhikaraṇa*), or locus (*āśraya*), of a valid cognitive result (*pramā*). According to Sāṃkhya, *puruṣa* does not undergo any changes. All changes are transformations (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti* (see SK 11, 19–20 together with the commentaries). From the Sāṃkhya perspective, it is hardly possible to satisfactorily explain how unchangeable *puruṣa* can be a substratum of changing cognitions.⁴³ Kumar observes, “Sāṃkhya-Yoga does not admit that the soul knows the objects directly or it is locus of knowledge” (1984, p. 1).

The YD's view on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result and calling *puruṣa* a substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) / locus (*āśraya*) of a valid cognitive result highlights one of the basic problems of the Sāṃkhya system. This problem follows from its ontological dualism of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, two eternal (*nitya*), independent (*svatantra*, *anāśrita*), and fundamentally different principles (see SK 10–11 together with the commentaries; *Tattvasamāsa* and *Kramadīpikā* 1–3; *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* I, 22; I, 61). *Puruṣa* is conscious (*cetana*), changeless (*aparīṇāmin*), not an agent (*akarṣṭr*) / passive (*udāsīna*), and completely isolated from *prakṛti* and all its products (SK 11, 19, and 20 together with the commentaries; TK 18; *Kramadīpikā* 3; *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* I, 145–146; I, 148; I, 160–164; *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* VI, 54). *Prakṛti* is unconscious (*acetana*) and active (*karṣṭr*); it is the process of continuous transformation (*pariṇāma*) of three *guṇas* (SK 11, 16, 20 together with the commentaries; *Kramadīpikā* 1; *Sāṃkhyasūtras* and *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* I, 126–128; III, 58–62). This theory makes it difficult or even

⁴³ *Ślokavārttika* IV, 67, for example, says that *ātman* is the substratum (*āśraya*) of cognition (see Taber 2005, p. 74). In Mīmāṃsā and in Nyāya, cognition is a quality (*guṇa*) of *ātman*, which is the substance (*dravya*) cognition resides in, and *ātman* can also exist without its qualities. Such theory, however, is alien to Sāṃkhya.

impossible to explain our experience of the *prakṛtic* world. Neither conscious but changeless *puruṣa* nor changing but unconscious *prakṛti* can experience the world, for being the experiencer requires both being conscious and being a subject of changing experiences. Does the *buddhi* become conscious under the influence of *puruṣa*, or is *puruṣa* a subject of these experiences? Sāṃkhya gives different answers to the question about a subject of changing experiences. The first one is that *puruṣa* experiences the world (see, for example, SK 17, 19–21, 55, 65–66). The second one is that our experiences are modifications of the *buddhi* (see, for example, SK 23, 62–63). The third one is that both the *buddhi* and *puruṣa* experience the world: the *buddhi* delivers its own experiences to *puruṣa* (SK 37). Sāṃkhya's attempts to explain the role of the *buddhi* and *puruṣa* in experiencing the world and the interaction between them (that is, how they can influence one another) drew the attention of philosophers of other *darśanas*, who criticized the Sāṃkhya views,⁴⁴ and of many researchers.⁴⁵

Though Sāṃkhya has the above-mentioned difficulties with explaining our experiences of the world and establishing the experiencer, it, however, tries to avoid stating that there are real changes in *puruṣa*. The position of the author of the YD in the polemic on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result implies that *puruṣa* is the real substratum of changing cognitions, which is unacceptable for Sāṃkhyas. It is worth noting that the author of the YD himself rejects this position in another place of his commentary. In the commentary on the 20th *kārikā*, he says that changing experiences of the *buddhi* are only figuratively ascribed to *puruṣa*, which is changeless. This happens because *puruṣa* and the *buddhi* stay in the vicinity (*sannidhāna*) of one another. Though *puruṣa* is the experiencer (*bhoktr*), it does not undergo any changes (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 181.26–182.12). From this passage of the YD, it follows that *puruṣa* is not a substratum or locus of cognitions.⁴⁶

To demonstrate that Sāṃkhya does not acknowledge any real changes in *puruṣa* and therefore tries to avoid calling *puruṣa* a substratum or locus of changing experiences, I will refer to one more passage from classical Sāṃkhya commentaries. I have already referred to this passage from TK 5 in the previous subsection of my

⁴⁴ On this criticism, see, for example, Bhattacharyya (1939) and Kumar (1983, pp. 102–109; 1984, pp. 8–20, 32–36).

⁴⁵ I mention only several of their studies: Catalina (1968, pp. 61–88), Bastow (1978), Larson (1979, pp. 167–176; 1983, pp. 219–233; 1987, pp. 73–83), Kumar (1984, pp. 1–8, 21–32), Parrott (1985; 1986), Burke (1988), Murakami (1999), Burley (2007, pp. 77–81, 124–132, 150–162; Burley gives new interpretations of central Sāṃkhya-Yoga conceptions, which are contrary to the received interpretations), Łuczyszyna (2011), Jakubczak (2013, pp. 102–106, 115–168, 211–227).

⁴⁶ Cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* on *Sāṃkhyasūtras* I, 87. Vijñāna says that a *pramāṇa* is a *vṛtti* of the *buddhi* and is thus located in the *buddhi*, whereas a *pramā*, the result of a *pramāṇa*, is located in *puruṣa*. He further states, however, that a *pramā* only seems to be located in *puruṣa* because *puruṣa* cannot undergo any changes. According to Vijñāna, changeless *puruṣa* does not take on the form of the object and is not a real substratum of changing cognitions. *Puruṣa* is merely a witness of experiences. Vijñāna explains that the *buddhi* is reflected in *puruṣa* as an object is mirrored in water—the *buddhi* throws its reflection in *puruṣa* without causing any real transformations in him. Though Vijñānabhikṣu (whose texts are beyond the scope of my study) treats Sāṃkhya as part of his own Vedānta system and not as an independent system of thought, he gives valuable explanations of many Sāṃkhya conceptions.

article, while pointing out the common ideas expressed by Vācaspati Mīśra and by the author of the YD. Another likeness between the YD and the TK is that in both commentaries, the passage about the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result, calling the result the ‘favor’ (*anugraha*) done for *puruṣa* by a *pramāṇa*, says that the *buddhi*’s modifications are unconscious and therefore *puruṣa*, consciousness, is a necessary condition of a cognitive result. However, unlike the author of the YD, Vācaspati adds that *puruṣa*, not connected with any modifications of *prakṛti*, only *seems* to possess cognitions.

3. And one more critical remark. Though the author of the YD tries to contrast his position to that of the Buddhist opponent, by accepting that a *pramāṇa* is a cognition having the form of the object, he makes the Sāṃkhya view close to the view of the Buddhist opponent.

According to Sāṃkhya, the *buddhi*, the highest psychic organ, takes on the form of the object to be cognized.⁴⁷ We learn this from SK 36 with the commentaries. In this *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that during a cognitive process, the psychic organs (*indriya*, *manas*, and *ahaṃkāra*) whose functioning precedes the *buddhi*’s modification (*vṛtti*) “put [the object that was grasped by them] upon the *buddhi*” (*buddhau prayacchanti*).

The author of the YD holds that such modification of the *buddhi*, considered by him as unconscious cognition (*jñāna*), is a *pramāṇa*, and its result, a *pramā*, is this modification transmitted to *puruṣa* in some way. According to both the YD’s author and the Buddhist opponent, a *pramāṇa*, first, is a cognition, second, this cognition has the form of the object to be cognized.

It is worth noting that Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa pointed out the similarity of the Sāṃkhya and Buddhist perspectives in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (*Nyāyamañjarī* 1969, pp. 69–70). He observes that in Sāṃkhya: a *pramāṇa* is a modification of the *buddhi* (*buddhi-vṛtti*) that has the form of the object (*viśayākāra*); *puruṣa* becomes influenced (literally, ‘coloured’—*uparakta*) by the *buddhi*’s *vṛtti*; *pramāṇa* and its result have different substrata (*adhikaraṇa*), for a *pramāṇa* is in the *buddhi* whereas its result is in *puruṣa*.⁴⁸ Jayanta then concludes that the Sāṃkhya standpoint does not differ much from “the doctrine of cognition with the form” (*sākāra-jñāna-vāda*) of the Buddhists.⁴⁹

However, though there are conspicuous similarities between the Buddhist and Sāṃkhya positions, the deep difference between them becomes clear if we rely on the Sāṃkhya ontology of *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, and *prakṛti*’s products. For the Buddhist opponent, who holds that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical, also a *pramā* is a cognition having the form of the object. In Sāṃkhya, the difference of the substrata

⁴⁷ It is difficult, however, to imagine the *buddhi*’s assuming the form of the object in the case, for example, of fire in general. The result of inference (*anumāna*) is fire in general, not a concrete fire.

⁴⁸ It is most likely that the YD’s polemic explored in this study was the source of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s account of the Sāṃkhya view of a *pramāṇa*. He illustrates Sāṃkhya’s view that a *pramāṇa* is a modification of the *buddhi* by giving the Sāṃkhya definition of perception. This definition, as well as his observations that I mention here, has conspicuous parallels with the presentation of the Sāṃkhya position in the YD.

⁴⁹ On whether the Buddhist epistemologists adopted the concept of *ākāra* from Sāṃkhya, see Kellner (2016, pp. 128, 148–149).

of a *pramāṇa* and its result claimed by the author of the YD excludes their identity. A *pramāṇa* is the *buddhi*'s *vṛtti* that has the form of the object, but this cognition cannot retain the same form after being transmitted to *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is fundamentally different from *prakṛti* and its products. Unlike the *buddhi*, *puruṣa* is changeless and unlimited. Therefore, unlike the *buddhi* and other *prakṛti*'s products, which change and have size, *puruṣa* does not assume any shapes.⁵⁰ To cite Harzer, “But the Sāṅkhya is a *sākāravādin* only to a certain extent, that is, the sense faculty assumes the form of the sense-content, or the sense-content is delivered up by the sense faculties so that the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) could perform its *adhyavasāya*, Consciousness, according to Sāṅkhya, stays distinct and does not take on an *ākāra* In this respect the Sāṅkhya has to be labelled as a *nirākāravādin*. Apparently, the Sāṅkhya was both *sākāravādin* and *nirākāravādin* at the same time” (2006, p. 113, note 34).⁵¹ In his commentary on the 20th *kārikā*, the author of the YD states directly that the *buddhi* takes on the form of the object (*viśaya-rūpa*), but changeless *puruṣa* does not assume this form (Wezler and Motegi 1998, pp. 181.26–182.12).

Perspectives for Future Research

The YD may be helpful for understanding the position of Dignāga. In the YD's polemic explored in this study, the Buddhist opponent, who is almost undoubtedly Dignāga, holds that a *pramāṇa* is a mental image of the object to be cognized, and a *pramā* is a cognition of this object. In the PS and PSV, in the famous passage on the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its result (chapter 1, *kārikās* 8cd–10), Dignāga presents two positions. The first one is the same as the standpoint of the Buddhist in the YD,

⁵⁰ YD 17 cites “the followers of Vārṣaganya” (*vārṣaganāh*), a teacher of preclassical (that is, pre-*kārikā*) Sāṃkhya, who say that *puruṣa*, “possessed of the modification of the *buddhi*” (*buddhivṛtyā āviṣṭah*), follows it (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 171.12–14). Their view may be interpreted as claiming that not only the *buddhi* but also *puruṣa* takes on the form of the object. Such interpretation of the view of the followers of Vārṣaganya is given by Frauwallner, who writes, “[I]t had been taught without any scruple that like the sense-organs and the faculty of knowledge (*buddhiḥ*), the soul also assumed the form of the concerned object and knows the object concerned” (Frauwallner 1973, p. 312). However, it is necessary to be cautious in interpreting this citation. It is not said there how exactly *puruṣa* follows the *buddhi*'s modification; the citation could mean that *puruṣa* follows the *buddhi*'s *vṛtti* in some other way than by assuming its form. Assessing Frauwallner's interpretation of this citation, Kellner observes that it does not follow from this citation that *puruṣa* takes on the form of the object (Kellner 2016, p. 145). Right after citing the followers of Vārṣaganya, the YD attaches two other stanzas (their source has not been identified yet) that may seem to imply that *puruṣa* assumes the form of the object, transmitted to *puruṣa* by the *buddhi* (Wezler and Motegi 1998, p. 171.15–18). Frauwallner gives his interpretation of these two stanzas too (1973, p. 312). Kellner (2016, p. 147) writes that they do not allow us to conclude that *puruṣa* and the *buddhi* take on the object's form. Kellner provides a valuable, pioneering, and cautious analysis of the view of the followers of Vārṣaganya and of the above-mentioned stanzas (2016, pp. 144–147). This view and the stanzas need further research.

⁵¹ On the concept of *ākāra* in pre-*kārikā* Sāṃkhya, see Kellner (2016). She comes to the conclusion that the *Śaṣṭitantra* commentaries “contain the view that the sense transforms into the form of the object”, and that neither the *Śaṣṭitantra* nor its commentaries provide evidence that *puruṣa* or other cognitive organs take on the form of the object (Kellner 2016, pp. 147–148). Thus in preclassical Sāṃkhya, unlike in the SK and its classical commentaries, only sense organs assume the form of the object.

namely, that a *pramāṇa* is a mental image of the object, and a *pramā* is this object's cognition. The second position is that a *pramāṇa* is a cognition of the object, and a *pramā*, its result, is the self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*, *svasaṃvedana*) of the object's cognition.⁵² The question whether these are two separate positions or not, and what Dignāga's position is, is open.

In the YD, the Buddhist opponent states the first of these two positions only, and there is no mention of self-awareness. Does this confirm Kataoka's opinion that for Dignāga, a *pramāṇa* is a mental image of the external object and a *pramā* is a cognition of this object (Kataoka 2016)? Or does this also evidence that since for Dignāga, self-awareness was an inseparable aspect of every cognition, there was no need to mention this aspect separately?⁵³

Conclusion

Sāṃkhya's *Yuktīdīpikā* challenges the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*), a valid cognition (*pramā*), are identical to one another. The opponent the YD polemicizes against is most likely Dignāga: his arguments are Dignāga's arguments as set forth by him in his PS and PSV. Sāṃkhya's response to Dignāga was pioneering, being one of the two earliest answers to the Buddhists in the polemic on the relationship between a *pramāṇa* and its result. (The other earliest response was provided by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa in the *Ślokavārttika*.)

In the discussion presented in the YD, the Buddhist opponent gives two arguments for the identity of a *pramāṇa* and its result. The first one is that the cognitive result, characterized by him as "having the form of apprehension" (*adhigama-rūpa*), is achieved through its own rise. The rise of the cognition (*jñānasya utpattiḥ*), interpreted as a *pramāṇa* which performs an operation

⁵² Researchers propose different interpretations of *svasaṃvitti*, or *svasaṃvedana*, in Dignāga and his followers. See, for example, the opposing interpretations of Kellner (2010) and Yiannopoulos (2020, pp. 370–485). According to the Buddhists, *svasaṃvitti*, or *svasaṃvedana*, is a cognition revealing our mental states, including valid cognitions, and it is not separate from these states. The Buddhists hold that every cognition is self-illuminating: a cognition of an object and a cognition of this object's cognition are not two distinct cognitions but two forms/aspects of the same cognition. In this paper, I accept the translation of the terms *svasaṃvitti* and *svasaṃvedana* as "self-awareness". Exploring the Buddhist notion of *svasaṃvitti* (*svasaṃvedana*) is beyond my study.

⁵³ In the polemic against the Buddhist, the author of the YD argues that a cognition (*jñāna*) cannot be an apprehension (*adhigama*) without *puruṣa*'s intelligence (*pratyaya*). This does not evidence that the author of the YD thinks that the opponent considers a cognitive result as devoid of *svasaṃvitti* (*svasaṃvedana*). The author of the YD is brilliantly acquainted with Dignāga's thought. By "*puruṣa*'s intelligence" (*puruṣa-pratyaya*), he means consciousness. According to Sāṃkhya, *prakṛti* and all of its products, including the *buddhi*, whose modification (*vṛtti*) is an ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*), and the *ahaṃkāra* (literally, 'the I-maker'), which is responsible for self-awareness, are unconscious, whereas *puruṣa* is consciousness (*cetanā*). Nothing can be apprehended, that is, cognized consciously, without *puruṣa*. Neither self-awareness nor ascertainment of the object of valid cognition (*prameya*) are conscious without *puruṣa*; there is no *pramā*, a conscious cognitive result, without *puruṣa*. Sāṃkhya distinguishes between consciousness, *puruṣa*, and self-awareness, which is produced by *ahaṃkāra*. The author of the YD criticizes the Buddhist opponent not for his not accepting the self-awareness of cognitions but for his not accepting consciousness, which is, according to Sāṃkhya, eternal, immutable, and transcendent.

(*vyāpāra*) from the worldly point of view, is the same as this cognition because it is this very cognition that arises. The second argument of the Buddhist opponent is that a *pramāṇa* is itself a cognition possessing the semblance (image, copy—*nirbhāsa*) of the object of valid cognition (*prameya*).

The Sāṃkhya proponent aptly questions Dignāga's standpoint. He asks how there can be an instrument / instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) that produces valid cognition in that case. By asking this question, he argues that an instrument is necessary for getting a valid cognition (*pramā*), and if a *pramāṇa*, which is understood as an instrument (*karaṇa*) for achieving a valid cognitive result in Indian philosophy, is the same as the result, then we would be in the position of having no instrument that produces the result. Even if we accept, together with the Buddhist opponent, that the object's mental image has been present in our psyche before the epistemic event, a real *karaṇa*, that is, a *karaṇa* being something distinct from this unconscious mental image, is necessary to make this image a conscious *pramā*.

The Sāṃkhya proponent also points out that the Buddhist opponent's view that a *pramāṇa* and its result are the same cognition (*jñāna*) having the form of apprehension (*adhigama-rūpa*) is unproved. The author of the YD holds that not every cognition (*jñāna*) is an apprehension (*adhigama*). In his view, the opponent's position does not satisfactorily explain the source of consciousness, which is what causes an unconscious mental image of the object of cognition (possessed by a *pramāṇa*) to become an apprehension, a conscious cognitive result.

The author of the YD presents his position, contrasting it with that of the Buddhist opponent. The Sāṃkhya proponent states that a *pramāṇa* and its result are different because their substrata (*adhikaraṇa*) are different: a *pramāṇa* is located in the *buddhi*, which is a product of *prakṛti*, whereas the *pramā*, its result, is located in *puruṣa*. In Sāṃkhya, stating this difference of the substrata of a *pramāṇa* and its result means a conspicuous difference between them: a *pramāṇa* is a modification (*vṛtti*) of the *buddhi*, which is the *buddhi* itself that assumed the form of the object, whereas *puruṣa* does not undergo any transformations and therefore cannot assume the object's form. It is thanks to *puruṣa*, who is consciousness (*cetanā*), that a *pramāṇa*, which is an unconscious modification of the *buddhi*, becomes a *pramā*, a conscious cognitive result.

Though the YD's position evokes several critical remarks, the pioneering input of the Sāṃkhya *darśana* into this polemic attests to Sāṃkhya's importance for Indian epistemology. Sāṃkhya questioned the Buddhist position that a *pramāṇa* and its result are identical, and presented the alternative view. To fully understand Indian thought, which developed in polemics and through the mutual influence of its *darśanas*, we must consider Sāṃkhya's contribution to it.

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