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What’s at the top in the top-down control of action? Script-sharing and ‘top-top’ control of action in cognitive experiments

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Abstract

The distinction between bottom-up and top-down control of action has been central in cognitive psychology, and, subsequently, in functional neuroimaging. While the model has proven successful in describing central mechanisms in cognitive experiments, it has serious shortcomings in explaining how top-down control is established. In particular, questions as to what is at the top in top-down control lead us to a controlling homunculus located in a mythical brain region with outputs and no inputs. Based on a discussion of recent brain imaging experiments, we argue for the need to factor the interaction between the experimenter and the experimental participant into a realistic understanding of top-down control. We suggest these interactions involve a ‘sharing of scripts’ for perception and action that may be described as ‘top-top processes.’ We thereby expand the understanding of the homunculus to include elements of social cognition. This conceptual reconfiguration may grant some sort of asylum for a—not very omnipotent—homunculus.

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Abbreviations

WCST:

Wisconsin card sorting task

DLPFC:

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

RPS:

Rock-paper-scissors

CRT:

Choice reaction time task

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Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge helpful suggestions from Jakob Hohwy, Anthony Jack, and two anonymous reviewers. Andreas Roepstorff was supported by a grant from the Danish National Research Foundation to the Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience. Chris Frith is supported by the Wellcome Trust and the James S McDonnell Foundation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Building 30, 44 Nørrebrogade, 8000, Aarhus, Denmark

    Andreas Roepstorff

  2. Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, UK

    Chris Frith

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  1. Andreas Roepstorff
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  2. Chris Frith
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Correspondence to Chris Frith.

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Roepstorff, A., Frith, C. What’s at the top in the top-down control of action? Script-sharing and ‘top-top’ control of action in cognitive experiments. Psychological Research 68, 189–198 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-003-0155-4

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