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Social threshold aggregations

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Abstract

A problem of axiomatic construction of a social decision function is studied for the case when individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m ≥ 3. It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms of Pairwise Compensation, Pareto Domination and Noncompensatory Threshold and Contraction is the threshold rule.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics for Economics, State University Higher School of Economics, Myasnitskaya Street 20, Moscow, 101000, Russia

    Fuad T. Aleskerov

  2. Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    Fuad T. Aleskerov

  3. Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, State University Higher School of Economics, Bol’shaya Pechërskaya Street 25/12, Nizhny Novgorod, 603155, Russia

    Vyacheslav V. Chistyakov & Valery A. Kalyagin

Authors
  1. Fuad T. Aleskerov
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  2. Vyacheslav V. Chistyakov
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  3. Valery A. Kalyagin
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Correspondence to Fuad T. Aleskerov.

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Aleskerov, F.T., Chistyakov, V.V. & Kalyagin, V.A. Social threshold aggregations. Soc Choice Welf 35, 627–646 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0454-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0454-9

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