Conclusion
The theoretical view of our knowledge or belief about other minds is perfectly safe from Young's criticism. This criticism demands of Privatus' “theory” of other minds conditions that would be far too excessive were they demanded of the theorizing that goes on in physics and chemistry. But the criticism has been an excellent foil to test my theoretical view against an empirical assumption that is crucial to philosophical analysis. This empirical assumption is ultimately anchored on profound aspects of human nature.
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Castañeda, H.N. The acceptance of theories, conceptual analysis, and other minds. Philosophical Studies 26, 301–312 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368498
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368498