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Bush’s Policy Shift and February 13 Action Plan

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Abstract

A reorientation of the Bush administration’s nuclear non-proliferation policy toward North Korea is discussed in this chapter. Taking prevailing accounts for why Washington began to soften its posture toward the regime in Pyongyang into consideration, the chapter brings the IRT into the context to test if it generates a more convincing analysis for the redirection of the Bush administration’s stance toward North Korea in its second term. The chapter additionally has a focus on the influence of domestic public opinion on states’ foreign policy making. The nexus between agents and structures is extensively discussed by offering the description of how the changed social structure due to the US role-taking influenced Japan’s perceptions and its subsequent foreign policy behavior. The Roh government’s enduring North Korea policy despite strong resistance from the conservative party and the media conglomerates is also analyzed with regard to the changed public attitude toward North Korea.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Though Bush could find no enthusiasm in China and South Korea for tough action toward North Korea, he successfully passed “the toughest sanctions on North Korea since the end of the Korean War” (Chinoy 2010). However, it did not take too long for Bush to allow Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea.

  2. 2.

    Karen DeYoung and Glenn Kessler, “Policy Success – or U-Turns,” Washington Post, (11 March 2007); Brian Beutler, “Chart: Bush Policies Dominant Cause of National Debt,” Talking Point Memo DC, (25 May 2011).

  3. 3.

    Sidney Blumenthal, “Bush knew Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction,” Salon, (6 September 2007). As the CIA intelligence was never shared with then Secretary of State Colin Powell, Powell made a presentation to the UNSC in February 2003 on the evidence of Saddam’s WMD , which was later proven to be false. In April 2006, Tyler Drumheller, the former CIA chief of clandestine operations for Europe, disclosed the fact that the Bush administration dismissed the information provided by the then Iraqi foreign minister that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction. During the interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes,” Drumheller said, “The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming, and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy.” The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report that came out in September 2006 also helped the American public realize that “the Bush administration’s strategy of invading Iraq to combat terrorism had been a failure, and the strategy had actually increased terrorism in Iraq and on a global basis” (Davis 2008: 126).

  4. 4.

    Pew Research, “Pessimism Grows As Iraq War Enters Fourth Year,” (16 March 2006). 44 percent of Americans think the war hurt the war on terrorism, while 38 percent said it helped the struggle against terrorism; Pew Research, “Public Disillusionment with Congress at Record Levels,” (20 April 2006).

  5. 5.

    Pew Research, “Iraq Looms Large in Nationalized Election,” (5 October 2006).

  6. 6.

    Dan Balz and Jon Cohen, “Independent Voters Favor Democrats by 2 to 1 in Poll,” Washington Post, (24 October 2006).

  7. 7.

    Lydia Saad, “Iraq War Positioned as Potent Election Issue,” Gallup, (20 September 2006); Adam Nagourney and Megan Thee, “With Election Driven by Iraq, Voters Want New Approach,” New York Times, (2 November 2006); CNN, “Poll: Opposition to Iraq war at all-time high,” (25 September 2006); Jonathan Weisman and Charles Babington, “House Approves Iraq War Resolution,” Washington Post, (17 June 2006).

  8. 8.

    The poll taken by the Pew Research Center in early September 2006 showed that about 60 percent of the public were dissatisfied with the war in Iraq (McMahon 2006).

  9. 9.

    Jonathan Weisman and Charles Babington, “House Approves Iraq War Resolution,” Washington Post, (17 June 2006); Bill Van Auken, “Democrats unveil midterm election platform: a blueprint for endless war,” World Socialist Web Site, (31 March 2006). Mr. Auken, Socialist Equality Party candidate for US Senate, argued that Democrats were merely utilizing the antiwar sentiment for their campaign with no intention to stop the war in Iraq. In fact, the vast majority of Democrats voted against the resolution proposing the rapid withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq. See Patrick Martin’s “American democracy in decay: US Congress debates the Iraq war,” World Socialist Web Site, (20 June 2006).

  10. 10.

    Patrick Martin, “The Democrats in the 2006 Elections: the Second Party of Reaction and War,” World Socialist Web Site, (4 November 2006).

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Rhodes Cook, “Democrats Made Gains in All Regions of the Country,” Pew Research, (14 November 2006).

  13. 13.

    CNN News, “Exit Polls: Bush, Iraq Key to Outcome,” (8 November 2006).

  14. 14.

    Andrew Kohut, “The Real Message of the Midterms,” New York Times, (13 November 2006). His research found out the least religious American voters made a difference to the outcome of the 2006 midterm election by giving 62 percent share of their vote to Democrats, up from 52 percent in 2002.

  15. 15.

    Perry Bacon Jr., “So Why Did the Democrats Win?” Time, (15 November 2006).

  16. 16.

    Adam Nagourney, “Democrats Seize Control of House; Senate Hangs on Virginia and Montana,” New York Times, (7 November 2006).

  17. 17.

    United States Senate Democrats, “Harry Reid: North Korea’s Actions Must Be Condemned,” (9 October 2006).

  18. 18.

    Glenn Kessler, “Democrats Blast Bush Policy on N. Korea,” Washington Post, (16 November 2006). At the Congressional Hearing in November 2006, Thomas Lantos, who later became the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, once again faulted the Bush administration’s exclusive reliance on the SPT and urged to pursue substantial bilateral contacts with North Korea to reach any deal.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Warren Hoge and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush Rebukes North Korea; U.S. Seeks New U.N. Sanctions,” New York Times, (10 October 2006).

  21. 21.

    In fact, North Korea’s nuclear explosion was more credibly portrayed as “rogue” than a direct consequence of Bush’s North Korea policy (Ter Molen 2013; Chung et al. 2008).

  22. 22.

    Bill Van Auken, “Democrats Unveil Midterm Election Platform: A Blueprint for Endless War,” World Socialist Web Site, (31 March 2006); Stephen Zunes, “The Democrats’ Support for Bush’s War,” Foreign Policy in Focus, (31 May 2007).

  23. 23.

    Ewen MacAskill and Julian Border, “Democrats Demand Troops Out of Iraq by 2008,” Guardian, (9 March 2007); Louis Fisher, Ryan Hendrickson, and Stephen R. Weissman, “Congress at War,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2008 Issue); Robert Sutter, “The Democratic Victory in Congress: Implications for Asia,” Brookings East Asia Commentary, No. 4, (December 2006).

  24. 24.

    Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Challenges Facing the United States in the Global Security Environment,” Council on Foreign Relations, (31 October 2006).

  25. 25.

    Council on Foreign Relations, “The Candidates on North Korea Policy,” (23 October 2008).

  26. 26.

    A renowned neoconservative and prime architect of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy Paul Wolfowitz served as Deputy Secretary of Defense until 2005 when he was appointed to head the World Bank. He was finally ousted in June 2007 due to mounting pressure for his resignation. He strongly believed North Korea could be dealt with choking the regime by economic pressure.

  27. 27.

    Those hardliners thought that buying time may be a good idea because of the likelihood of regime collapse in North Korea amidst continued pressure. Especially, John Bolton was the one who reiterated the overthrowing of the Kim Jong-il regime as well as brought the alleged North Korea’s uranium-enrichment activities to a head with the aim of shattering the Agreed Framework in 2002 (Bolton 2007: 107).

  28. 28.

    He explains the Bush administration’s impotence regarding the North Korea challenge stemmed from a fundamental problem of badly split between senior advisors within the Bush administration.

  29. 29.

    Joshua Micah Marshall, “Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003 Issue. Marshall argues “one crucial legacy of the Bush revolution is that it will not be possible to say something similar about neo-conservatism. Rarely in American history has such a cohesive and distinctive group managed to exert so decisive an influence on such a crucial issue as the neocons did on Iraq from the collapse of the twin towers through the early stages of the occupation of Baghdad almost two years later.”

  30. 30.

    David Farber (2010) explained “the 2004 US presidential election showed Bush’s leadership in the ‘war on terror’ figured prominently in his victory, despite the evident failures in policy and the false justifications of the pre-emptive war in Iraq, a majority of voters preferred the hard-line security measures proffered by President Bush and American conservative.” See his book “The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History,” page 250.

  31. 31.

    Barbara Slavin and Susan Page, “Cheney is Power Hitter in White House Lineup,” USA Today, (28 July 2002).

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    Philip H. Gordon, “The Truth about Colin Powell,” The Boston Globe, (17 November 2004).

  34. 34.

    Barbara Slavin and Susan Page, “Cheney Is Power Hitter in White House Lineup,” USA Today, (28 July 2002).

  35. 35.

    Neil A. Lewis, “Libby Guilty of Lying in C.I.A. Leak Case,” New York Times, (7 March 2007). Mr. Libby was convicted of intentionally and illegally disclosing the identity of a covert CIA agent, Ms. Plame, after her husband Joe Wilson accused the Bush administration of deliberately ignoring his findings that Saddam Hussein did not seek to acquire nuclear weapon-grade uranium.

  36. 36.

    Marc Pitzke, “US Midterm Elections: America Looks for a Way forward,” Spiegel Online, (9 November 2006).

  37. 37.

    Marcus Baram, “Rumsfeld’s Resignation: ‘I Have Benefited Greatly from Criticism,” ABC News, (8 November 2006).

  38. 38.

    Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jim Rutenberg, “Rumsfeld Resigns as Defense Secretary After Big Election Gains for Democrats,” New York Times, (8 November 2006). A few days earlier the announcement, Bush affirmed that Rumsfeld would remain on the job until the end of Bush’s second term.

  39. 39.

    Tom Bowman, “With Republican Defeat, Rumsfeld Steps Down,” NPR, (8 November 2006). The President said that “he and Rumsfeld agreed that progress had been too slow in Iraq, and it was time for a change and new perspective at the Pentagon.”

  40. 40.

    Max Boot, “The Worst,” New Republic, (17 March 2011).

  41. 41.

    The Public Record, “McCain Spins Public on Iraq Troop Surge,” (28 September 2008); Donald Rumsfeld , “Iraq Policy –TNew Phase – A Proposal: Accelerate the Transition, Refocus the Partnership, and Stabilize the Region,” Declassified Authority EO 12958, (8 December 2006).

  42. 42.

    Peter Baker, “Hagel’s Departure Bears Little Likeness to Rumsfeld’s Removal,” New York Times, (25 November 2014).

  43. 43.

    Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Tony Jones Speaks to John Bolton,” (22 February 2007).

  44. 44.

    Dafna Linzer, “Bolton May Not Return as U.N. Envoy,” Washington Post, (10 November 2006).

  45. 45.

    Julian Borger, “Bush loses another ally as UN ambassador Bolton resigns in face of Senate hostility,” Guardian, (5 December 2006).

  46. 46.

    Mark Tran, “US ambassador to UN John Bolton resigns,” Guardian, (4 December 2006).

  47. 47.

    Robert Sutter, “The democratic victory in Congress: implications for Asia,” Brookings East Asia Commentary, (December 2006).

  48. 48.

    Karen DeYoung and Glenn Kessler, “Policy Success – or U-Turns,” Washington Post, (11 March 2007); Dafna Linzer, “Bolton’s Tough Style, Record Face Scrutiny,” Washington Post, (11 April 2005).

  49. 49.

    Karen DeYoung and Glenn Kessler, “Policy Success or U-Turns,” Washington Post, (11 March 2007).

  50. 50.

    David E. Sanger and Norimitsu Onish, “U.S., in Shift, Plans Talks in North Korea on Arsenal,” New York Times, (20 June 2007), p. A-8.

  51. 51.

    Nelson Report, (6 February 2007).

  52. 52.

    Frontline, “James Jeffrey: Iraq Was a ‘Historic Dramatic’ Failure for Bush and Obama,” (29 July 2014).

  53. 53.

    Stephen Hadley, “How Bush Started and Ended the Iraq War,” Frontline, (29 July 2014).

  54. 54.

    CBS, “The War within the White House,” (7 September 2008). Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vU-aJSs_RBc.

  55. 55.

    CBS, “The War within the White House,” (7 September 2008).

  56. 56.

    Fred Barbash, “Bush: Iraq Part of Global Democratic Revolution,” Washington Post, (6 November 2003).

  57. 57.

    The Bush administration was incapable of finding a way out from Iraq. Even with a troop surge option of increasing US military strength from 132,000 to 153,000 in Iraq in January 2007, there was no guarantee of success in achieving stability and security in the field, leaving the US leadership in great distress (Cordesman 2007).

  58. 58.

    The figures become Lilliputian. Entering the year of 2013, Iraq and Afghan wars were expected to cost American taxpayers $4 trillion to $6 trillion. See Linda Bilmes’ “The financial legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How wartime spending decisions will constrain future national security budgets,” Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, (March 2013).

  59. 59.

    Jonathan Weisman, “Projected Iraq War Costs Soar,” Washington Post, (27 April 2006).

  60. 60.

    Vikas Bajaj, “U.S. Economic Growth Rises Sharply,” New York Times, (28 April 2006). Consumer spending was in fact largely fueled by the housing bubble and expanding consumer debt.

  61. 61.

    He was appointed as assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasian affairs in May 2009.

  62. 62.

    Amanda Lilly, “Why the Six-Nation Talks,” Washington Post, (18 June 2009).

  63. 63.

    Helene Cooper, “Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean Curbs,” New York Times, (27 June 2008).

  64. 64.

    At an NSC meeting in October 2006, Condoleezza Rice urged for a “real negotiation” with the DPRK. See David E. Sanger’s The Inheritance (2009), p. 329.

  65. 65.

    BBC News, “North Korea Talks Set to Resume,” (31 October 2006).

  66. 66.

    Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill , Press Conference at U.S. Embassy, Beijing, (31 October 2006).

  67. 67.

    Carol Giacomo, “Rice Hints at Flexibility on North Korea,” Reuters, (16 December 2006).

  68. 68.

    Thomas Omestad, “Looking for a Deal This Time?” U.S. News & World Report, (4 February 2007).

  69. 69.

    Michael Abramowitz, “Cheney’s Influence Lessens in Second Term,” Washington Post, (20 February 2007)

  70. 70.

    Thomas Omestad, “Looking for a Deal This Time?” U.S. News & World Report, (4 February 2007).

  71. 71.

    US Department of State, “North Korea Nuclear Agreement: Can It Work?,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 84, (Spring 2007).

  72. 72.

    Michael Abramowitz, “Cheney’s Influence Lessens in Second Term,” Washington Post, (20 February 2007).

  73. 73.

    Ibid.

  74. 74.

    David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal,” New York Times, (15 February 2007).

  75. 75.

    Karen DeYoung and Glenn Kessler, “Policy Success or U-Turns,” Washington Post, (11 March 2007).

  76. 76.

    David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal,” New York Times, (15 February 2007).

  77. 77.

    Demetri Sevastopulo and Andrew Yeh, “Rice Helped Unfreeze N. Korean Funds,” Financial Times, (21 March 2007).

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    Challenge and Response in Northeast Asia: Fulfilling the Jeju Process, (2008). JPI Joint Workshop Research Series. Chapter 2: The Prospect for the Institution of Multilateral Conflict Prevention in Northeast Asia.

  80. 80.

    ROK Ministry of Unification, “Result of the 13th Round Meeting of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee,” (22 April 2007); ROK Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean Policy Issues: Trade and Economic Cooperation.” Available at: http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1792 .

  81. 81.

    Jung-A Yang, “100 Days after Feb 13 Agreement, Has the U.S. Fallen into a Ditch?” Daily NK, (23 May 2007).

  82. 82.

    At the initial stage of the SPT, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement explicitly saying that “A package solution based on the principle of simultaneous action is the core issue to be agreed upon between the DPRK and the US, being the key to solving the nuclear issue.” KCNA, (6 December 2003).

  83. 83.

    KCNA, “Full Implementation of February 13 Agreement Depends on U.S. and Japan,” (15 July 2007).

  84. 84.

    Stephen Costello, “Summit to Highlight Smart Engagement Agenda,” Korea Times, (27 September 2007).

  85. 85.

    Guardian, “Kim Dae-jung: South Korean president whose ‘sunshine policy’ tried to lead the North toward reform,” 18 August 2009. In his inaugural address, Roh outlined his new Peace and Prosperity Policy which will maintain the general framework of the Sunshine policy while aiming at a more widespread national consensus and bipartisan cooperation, two areas that the previous Kim Dae-jung administration neglected.

  86. 86.

    Stephen Costello, “2007 Summit to Highlight Smart Engagement Agenda,” Korea Times, (27 September 2007).

  87. 87.

    White Papers on Korean Unification, 2005, p. 75. http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000204001001000 .

  88. 88.

    Pressian, “국방부, 국방백서 ‘주적’ 표현 10년 만에 삭제 (Department of Defence, removed the term ‘main enemy’ from Defence White Paper),” (28 January 2005).

  89. 89.

    Norimitsu Onish, “Pledging peace, Koreans agree on economic projects,” New York Times, (4 October 2007).

  90. 90.

    Pressian, “유시민 “한국이 피난민 정서 벗어나야 남북화해 가능 (Rhyu Si-min: North-South rapprochement is possible when Korea strips off its ‘refugee sentiment’),” (18 November 2013).

  91. 91.

    Hankyoreh, “‘동북아 균형자론’ 국회서 뭇매 (The Concept of the Balancer Harshly Criticized in the Parliament),” (12 April 2005).

  92. 92.

    Han Hwa-gap, “기로에 선 한반도 (The Korean Peninsula on the Crossroads),” Speech at Chonnam University, (21 April 2005).

  93. 93.

    Hankyoreh, “‘동북아 균형자론’ 국회서 뭇매 (The Concept of the Balancer Harshly Criticized in the Parliament),” (12 April 2005).

  94. 94.

    In the geopolitical terms employed by American academics, “balancer” refers to an attempt of lesser powers to form alliances to counterbalance American global influence. Thus the Roh government’s intent to play a balancing role was ill-received, since it was interpreted as an attempt to balance against the United States by cooperating with China and Russia (Pastrieich 2005).

  95. 95.

    Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. Keeps Grumbling As Summit Looms,” 9 June 2005.

  96. 96.

    Author’s interview with Lee Jong-seok, the former Minister of Unification and chairman of the National Security Council (NSC), (January 2014). Critics argued that the summit was hastily arranged to give the progressive party an electoral boost, but Roh’s advisers brushed the criticism aside, saying Roh Moo-hyun was eager to fulfill his presidential campaign pledge of reaching a peace pact with the North.

  97. 97.

    Kyonghyang Weekly, “[직격 인터뷰] 이수훈 동북아시대 위원장 (Interview with Lee Su-hoon, Chairman of Presidential Committee on Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative),” (11 September 2007). Available at: http://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&artid=15389&code=115 .

  98. 98.

    Bruce Klinger, “Korean Summit High-Risk Gambit?” Korea Times, (16 September 2007). They understood Roh’s proactive North Korea policy as a political maneuver to secure a personal legacy and to alter domestic political landscape to benefit the progressive presidential candidate.

  99. 99.

    Minjog21, “개성에서 부산으로 물류혁명 첫 걸음 뗐다 (From Kaesong to Pusan: Revolution in Distribution),” (1 January 2008).

  100. 100.

    Author’s interview with Hitoshi Tanaka (September 2013).

  101. 101.

    Junko Takahashi, “Kim admits abductions: Four Japanese alive, six dead; normalization talks to resume,” Japan Times, (18 September 2002).

  102. 102.

    Three main lobbies or associations have been directly involved in the abduction issue. One is the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN or Kazokukai) consisting of family members of the abductees. The second group is the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN or Sukuukai) made up of conservative politicians and intellectuals. Closely working with Kazokukai, the Sukuukai has been active in disseminating the message through public seminars, publications, demonstrations, and media coverage. The third association is the Diet Members Alliance for the Early Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Rashi Giren) where high-profile politicians were involved including Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo.

  103. 103.

    Izumikawa (2011) notes that in December 2002, targeting North Korean entity, hardliners “began to discuss introducing a bill to amend the Foreign Exchange and Trade Act (FETA) to enable Japanese government to unilaterally halt financial transactions.”

  104. 104.

    Kazokukai is the association of the families of victims kidnapped by North Korea, and Sukuukai is a national association of several local groups throughout Japan with the objective of providing support for Kazokukai through a range of public relations and lobbying activities. Yet, the two organizations disliked the way Japanese politicians exploited the abduction issues for their political gains but had no choice but to cooperate with them to expedite the return of the abductees.

  105. 105.

    Weston S. Konishi, “Washington Japanwatch/Japan Stuck on Abduction Issue,” Daily Yomiuri Online, (30 August 2005). Koizumi himself was convinced that North Korea has a true intension to give up its nuclear program, and he was also deferring other states’ requests not to disrupt the SPT (Schoff 2006: 18). Additionally, around the fourth round of the SPT, Japan was preoccupied with the issue of privatizing the Japan Postal Service Public Corporation over which Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives and threw out for the general election conducted on 11 September 2005.

  106. 106.

    Norimitsu Onishi, “South Korea and Japan Split on North Korea Pact,” New York Times, (15 February 2007).

  107. 107.

    Author’s interview with Prof. Masao Okonogi, (October 2013). Though MOFA people acknowledged North Korea’s abduction of Japanese was not a relevant issue to discuss in the SPT, they had no choice but to raise the abduction problem during the course of the SPT due to domestic pressures.

  108. 108.

    Author’s interview with Prof. Masao Okonogi, (October 2013).

  109. 109.

    Norimitsu Onishi, “South Korea and Japan Split on North Korea Pact,” New York Times, (15 February 2007).

  110. 110.

    Xinhua News, “Roh: Japanese Abduction Not Proper to Be Discussed in Six-Party Talks,” (25 January 2007).

  111. 111.

    Xinua News, “Premier expects to ‘melt ice’ during Japan tour, warns against shrine visits,” (4 April 2007).

  112. 112.

    Author’s interview with a senior researcher in CIIS, Beijing, (February 2014).

  113. 113.

    Ibid.

  114. 114.

    Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (19 December 2006).

  115. 115.

    The Japanese abduction issue was one of the key rationales for the Bush administration keeping North Korea on the terrorism-supporting list after the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002. When President Bush met PM Koizumi in May 2003, he stated that “abduction is an abominable act. The US supports Japan completely until we find out the whereabouts of each and every Japanese citizen who was abducted by North Korea” (Niksch 2007: 4).

  116. 116.

    Chris Hogg, “N. Korea abductions hamper Japan,” BBC News, Tokyo, (3 March 2008).

  117. 117.

    Pyongyang in fact had continuously demanded the US governments remove the DPRK from the terrorism-support list since 2000. The Clinton administration heeded the urgings from Japan to keep North Korea on the terrorism list; in 2004 the Bush administration proposed to negotiate over the terrorism list, if North Korea would undertake specified actions toward denuclearization (Niksch and Perl 2004). The DPRK was added to the list of states supporting terrorism in 1987 when it bombed a South Korean airliner, which killed 115 passengers and crew. Since then, North Korea was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts (Niksch 2007, 2010). For North Korea, Robert Carlin and John Lewis, senior scholars at Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies, said that removal from the so-called terrorist list is important not in itself, but because of its implications about Washington’s political will toward the North Korean regime. Carlin and Lewis assert that what Pyongyang really desires is “a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States” driven by “a cold, hard calculation based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in Pyongyang” (2008: 21).

  118. 118.

    Bush’s planned removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism made Japan feel betrayed as there had been a tacit agreement between Bush and Koizumi. At their summit in Texas in May 2003, “Koizumi gave Bush his ‘heart-to-heart’ promise to send the troops required ... In return, for the first time, Bush declared his own ‘unconditional’ support for the Japanese position on the families of the North Korean abductees – that North Korea would have to satisfy Japanese demands before there could be any easing of sanctions. It was, as a senior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) official admitted, a deal: Japanese forces to Iraq in exchange for US support for Japan’s position on North Korea issues” (McCormack 2004). Koizumi was taking a great risk, since the US invasion and occupation in Iraq was never endorsed by the Security Council, and Japan was one of the less than 40 of the General Assembly’s 191 countries that offered support.

  119. 119.

    Kyodo News, “Rice voices regret over rape case, reaffirms efforts on N. Korea,” (28 February 2008).

  120. 120.

    Yonhap News, “Japanese abductions unlikely to stop U.S. from removing N. Korea,” (6 September 2007).

  121. 121.

    Demetri Sevastopulo and David Pilling, “Japan rejects N. Korea nuclear proposal,” Financial Times, (10 October 2008).

  122. 122.

    Lee Chi-dong, “No deal Yet in Verifying Undeclared N. Korean Nuke Facilities: Minister,” Yonhap News, (10 October 2008).

  123. 123.

    Helene Cooper, “Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean Curbs,” New York Times, (27 June 2008).

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    Article III of the February 13 Agreement states “in principle, progress in one working group shall not affect progress in other working group.”

  126. 126.

    All the Internet links were accessed on 28 April 2015 to confirm the availability.

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Hur, My. (2018). Bush’s Policy Shift and February 13 Action Plan. In: The Six-Party Talks on North Korea. Palgrave, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7113-3_4

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