

# Semi-adaptive Security and Bundling Functionalities Made Generic and Easy

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**Abstract.** Semi-adaptive security is a notion of security that lies between selective and adaptive security for Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) and Functional Encryption (FE) systems. In the semi-adaptive model the attacker is forced to disclose the challenge messages before it makes any key queries, but is allowed to see the public parameters.

We show how to generically transform any selectively secure ABE or FE scheme into one that is semi-adaptively secure with the only additional assumption being public key encryption, which is already naturally included in almost any scheme of interest. Our technique utilizes a fairly simple application of garbled circuits where instead of encrypting directly, the encryptor creates a garbled circuit that takes as input the public parameters and outputs a ciphertext in the underlying selective scheme. Essentially, the encryption algorithm encrypts without knowing the ‘real’ public parameters. This allows one to delay giving out the underlying selective parameters until a private key is issued, which connects the semi-adaptive to selective security. The methods used to achieve this result suggest that the moral gap between selective and semi-adaptive security is in general much smaller than that between semi-adaptive and full security.

Finally, we show how to extend the above idea to generically bundle a family of functionalities under one set of public parameters. For example, suppose we had an inner product predicate encryption scheme where the length of the vectors was specified at setup and therefore fixed to the public parameters. Using our transformation one could create a system where for a single set of public parameters the vector length is not a priori bounded, but instead is specified by the encryption algorithm. The resulting ciphertext would be compatible with any private key generated to work on the same input length.

## 1 Introduction

Traditionally, in a public key encryption system a user will encrypt data  $m$  under a second user’s public key to create a ciphertext. A receiver of the ciphertext can decrypt the data if they possess the corresponding secret key; otherwise,

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they will learn nothing. Over the last several years there has been a dramatic re-envisioning of the expressiveness of encryption systems with the introduction of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [12, 19, 34], Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [32] and culminating in Functional Encryption (FE) [33], which encompasses IBE and ABE.

In these systems a setup algorithm produces a master public/secret key pair, where the master public key is made public and the master secret key is retained by an authority. Any user can encrypt data  $m$  using the public parameters<sup>1</sup> to produce a ciphertext  $ct$ . In parallel the authority may issue (any number of times) to a user a secret key  $sk_f$  that allows the user to learn the output  $f(m)$  of a ciphertext that encrypts data  $m$ . The message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and function space  $\mathcal{F}$  allowed depend on the expressiveness of the underlying cryptosystem.

The security of this class of systems is captured by an indistinguishability based security game between a challenger and an attacker.<sup>2</sup> In this game the challenger will first generate the master public key that it sends to the attacker. The attacker begins by entering the first key query phase where it will issue a polynomial number of key queries, each for a functionality  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ . For each query the attacker receives back a corresponding secret key  $sk_f$ . Next the attacker submits two challenge messages  $m_0, m_1$  with the restriction that  $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$  for all functions  $f$  queried on earlier. The challenger will flip a coin  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  and return a challenge ciphertext  $ct^*$  encrypting  $m_b$ . Next, the attacker will engage in a second set of private key queries with the same restrictions. Finally, it will output a guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$  and win if  $b = b'$ . For any secure scheme the probability of winning should be negligibly close to  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

The above game, called *full* or *adaptive* security game, captures our intuitive notion of what an indistinguishability based security game should look like. Namely, that an attacker cannot distinguish between two messages unless he receives keys that trivially allow him to — even if the attacker gets to adaptively choose what the keys and messages are. One issue faced by researchers is that when striving for a new functionality it is often difficult at first to achieve full security if we want to restrict ourselves to polynomial loss in the reductions and avoid relying on sub-exponential hardness assumptions. To ease the initial pathway people often consider security under a weaker notion of *selective* [17] security where the attacker is forced to submit the challenge messages  $m_0, m_1$  *before* seeing the public parameters. After gaining this foothold, later work can circle back to move from selective to adaptive security.

Over the past decade there have been several examples of this process in achieving adaptive security for IBE, ABE and FE. The first such examples were the “partitioning” techniques developed by Boneh and Boyen [10] and Waters [35] in the context of achieving Identity-Based Encryption in the standard model, improving upon earlier selectively secure realizations [11, 17]. While partitioning methods were helpful in realizing full security for IBE, they did not

<sup>1</sup> We use public parameters and master public key interchangeably.

<sup>2</sup> There also exists simulation-based notions of security [14, 30], but these will not be a focus of this work.

generalize to more complex functionalities. To that end a new set of techniques were developed to move beyond partitioning which include those by Gentry and Halevi [21, 22] and Waters’ Dual System Encryption [36] methodology. The latter which spawned several other works within that methodology, e.g., [27, 29, 39].

More recently, Ananth et al. [2], building upon the bootstrapping concepts of [38], showed how to generically convert an FE scheme that supports arbitrary poly-sized circuits from selective security into one that achieves full security.<sup>3</sup> Their result, however, does not apply to the many ABE or FE schemes that fall below this threshold in functionality. Moreover meeting this bar might remain difficult as it has been shown [3, 4, 9] that achieving functional encryption for this level of functionality is as difficult as achieving indistinguishability obfuscation [7, 20].

*Delaying Parameters and Semi-Adaptive Security.* One remarkable feature of almost all of the aforementioned works is that the security reductions treat the second key query phase identically to the first. Indeed papers will often simply describe the proof of Phase 2 key queries as being the same as Phase 1. Lewko and Waters [28] first departed from this paradigm in a proof where they gave an ABE scheme with a security reduction handled Phase 1 and Phase 2 keys differently. Central to their proof was what they called a “delayed parameters” technique that delayed the release of part of the public parameters in a way that gave a bridge for building adaptive security proofs utilizing selective type techniques. These ideas were extended and codified into a framework by Attrapadung [6].

Chen and Wee [18] introduced the definition of semi-adaptive security as a notion of security where an attacker discloses the challenge messages after it sees the public parameters, but before it makes any key queries. It is easy to see that this notion falls somewhere between selective and adaptive in terms of strength.

Most recently, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [16] gave an interesting circuit ABE scheme that was provably secure in the semi-adaptive model from the Learning with Error assumption [31]. Their cryptosystem and proof of security build upon the (arithmetic) circuit ABE scheme of Boneh et al. [13] and requires a somewhat elaborate two level application of these techniques integrated with a pseudorandom function (we note that some of the complexity is due to their parallel goal of bundling functionalities; we will return to this). Like the earlier work of [28], they also apply a “delayed parameter” concept, although its flavor and execution are significantly different.

## 1.1 Going from Selective to Semi-adaptive Security Generically

We now arrive at the first goal of this work.

*Can we generically transform any selectively secure attribute-based encryption or functional encryption scheme into one that is semi-adaptively secure?*

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<sup>3</sup> We note that FE for poly-sized circuits is achievable by bootstrapping FE for NC1 [23].

It turns out that this transformation is possible and moreover that the method to do so is quite simple. Here is our idea in a nutshell. Instead of encrypting the data outright, the encryptor will consider a circuit that fixes the message and randomness for encryption and takes the functional encryption scheme's public parameters as input. It then garbles this circuit and encrypts each pair of input wire values under pairs of standard PKE public keys provided by the authority. The garbled circuit plus pairs of encrypted wires comprise the ciphertext. In generating a secret key, the authority will output both the underlying functional encryption secret key as well as give one of the PKE secret keys for each pair corresponding to the underlying selectively secure FE public parameters. The decryption algorithm will first evaluate the garbled circuit to obtain the underlying ciphertext and then decrypt using the FE secret key. In this manner, the core FE parameters are literally not committed to until a key is given out.

We now elaborate our description. Let  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{sel}})$  be the underlying selectively secure FE scheme. Our semi-adaptively secure FE setup algorithm generates a master public/secret key pair  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}})$  using  $\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}$ , and chooses  $2\ell$  public/secret key pairs  $\{\text{pk}_{i,b}, \text{sk}_{i,b}\}$  for a semantically secure PKE scheme, where  $\ell = |\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}|$ . The public key of  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  consists of these  $2\ell$  PKE public keys  $\{\text{pk}_{i,b}\}$ , but *not* the public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ . To encrypt any message  $m$ , the encryptor constructs a circuit that takes as input an  $\ell$  bit string  $\text{str}$  and outputs  $\text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{str}, m; r)$  – an encryption of  $m$  using  $\text{str}$  as the public key and  $r$  as randomness. The encryptor garbles this circuit and encrypts each of the  $2\ell$  garbled circuit input wire keys  $w_{i,b}$  under the corresponding public key  $\text{pk}_{i,b}$ . The ciphertext consists of the garbled circuit and the  $2\ell$  encrypted wire keys. The secret key for any function  $f$  consists of three parts — the master public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ ,  $\ell$  PKE secret keys to decrypt half of the encrypted wire keys  $w_{i,b}$  corresponding to  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ , and  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$  to decrypt the actual  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  ciphertext. The key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$  is simply generated using the  $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}$  algorithm, and the  $\ell$  PKE secret keys released correspond to the bits of  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ . For decrypting any ciphertext, the decryptor first decrypts the encrypted input wire keys. Then, these wire keys are used to evaluate the garbled circuit. This evaluation results in an  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  ciphertext under  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ , which can be decrypted using  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$ .

The crucial observation here is that the underlying  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  is information theoretically hidden until any secret key is given out as the encryptor computes the ciphertext oblivious to the knowledge of  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ . Therefore, the semi-adaptive security proof follows from a simple sequence of hybrids. In the first hybrid, we switch the  $\ell$  encryptions of input wire keys (given out in the challenge ciphertext) which are never decrypted to encryptions of zeros. Next, in the following hybrid, we simulate the garbled circuit (given out in the challenge ciphertext) instead of constructing the actual encryption circuit and garbling it. After these two indistinguishable hybrid jumps, we could directly reduce the semi-adaptive security to selective security as the  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  public key is hidden. Our construction and security proof is described in detail in Sect. 4.

The overhead associated with our transformation to semi-adaptive security is readily apparent. Instead of evaluating the underlying encryption algorithm, the transformed encryption algorithm will need to garble the encryption circuit. The ciphertext will grow proportionally to the size of this garbled circuit. Similarly, the decryption algorithm will first have to evaluate the garbled circuit before executing the core decryption. In the description above one will replace each bit of the original public parameters with a pair of PKE public keys. However, if one optimizes by using IBE instead of PKE for this step, the public parameters could actually become shorter than the original ones. In many cases our transformation will incur greater overhead than non-generic techniques designed with knowledge of the underlying scheme such as [18].

*Interpreting Our Result.* It is useful to step back and see what light our result can shed on the relationship between selective, semi-adaptive and adaptive security. Ideally, we would like to claim that semi-adaptive security gives us a half-way point between selective and adaptive where the next idea could take us all the way between the two endpoints. While this might turn out to be the case, the way in which we delay parameters seems primarily to exploit the closeness of selective and semi-adaptive security as opposed to crossing a great divide. To us this suggests that the moral gap between selective and semi-adaptive security is much smaller than that between semi-adaptive and full security (at least for functionalities that fall below the threshold needed by [2]). We view illuminating this relationship as one of the contributions of this paper.

## 1.2 Bundling Functionalities

We now turn to the second goal of our work. Before doing so, we describe a more general definition of functional encryption, which will later help us to explain our idea of bundling functionalities. Any functional encryption scheme is associated with a message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and function space  $\mathcal{F}$ . In many scenarios, the function space  $\mathcal{F}$  and message space  $\mathcal{M}$  themselves consists of a sequence of function spaces  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$  and message spaces  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_n$  respectively, parameterized by the ‘functionality index’  $n$ . In our definition of functional encryption, we assume that the setup algorithm takes two inputs - the security parameter  $\lambda$  and the functionality index  $n$ . This notation decouples the security of the scheme from the choice of functionality it provides. We note that such terminology has appeared in several prior works. For example, Goyal et al. [25] have a setup algorithm that takes as input the number of attributes along with the security parameter. Similarly, in the works of Boyen and Waters [15] and Agrawal et al. [1], the setup algorithms also take the length of vectors as an input. And other works [13, 24] specify the maximum depth of a circuit in an ABE scheme during setup.

Using the above convention,  $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$  creates a master public/secret key for message space  $\mathcal{M}_n$  and function space  $\mathcal{F}_n$ . For example, in an inner product encryption scheme, the setup algorithm fixes the length of vectors to be encrypted once the master public key is fixed. However, one goal could be to allow more flexibility after the public key is published. In particular, would it be

possible to have all message and function spaces available even after setup? Continuing our example, we might want an inner product encryption scheme where the encryptor/key generator are allowed to encrypt/generate keys for arbitrary length vectors after the public parameters have been fixed.

Looking more generally, a natural question to ask is — “Can we generically transform any (standard) functional encryption scheme into one where a *single* set of public parameters can support the union of underlying message/function spaces?” We answer this in the affirmative, and show a generic transformation using identity based encryption, pseudorandom functions and garbled circuits, all of which can be realized from standard assumptions. More formally, we show how to transform an FE scheme with message space  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_n$  and function space  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$  to an FE scheme for message space  $\mathcal{M} = \cup_n \mathcal{M}_n$  and function space  $\mathcal{F} = \cup_n \mathcal{F}_n$ . The key for a function  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  can be used with a ciphertext for message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_n$  to compute  $f(m)$ . If  $f$  and  $m$  are not compatible (i.e.  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  and  $m \in \mathcal{M}_{n'}$ ), then the decryption fails.

As a simple instantiation, using our transformation, one can construct an inner product encryption scheme where the encryption algorithm and the key generation algorithm can both take arbitrary length vectors as input. However, given a secret key for vector  $v$  and an encryption of vector  $w$ , the decryption algorithm tests orthogonality only if  $v$  and  $w$  have same length; else the decryption algorithm fails. Similarly, our transformation can also capture the recent result of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [16]. They give a circuit ABE scheme where under a single set of parameters an encryptor can encrypt messages for an attribute of unbounded length. Later if a private key is given out and is tied to the same attribute length it can decrypt if the circuit matches. In our transformation we would start with a selective scheme for circuit ABE such as [24] where  $1^n$  denotes the number of attributes and then apply our transformation. We observe that we could even choose to obtain more flexibility where we might allow both the attribute length and circuit depth to depend on  $1^n$ .

*Our Transformation for Bundling Functionalities.* Our method for achieving such a transformation follows in a similar line to the selective to semi-adaptive transformation given above. In addition, it also amplifies to semi-adaptive security along the way for free. Recall, in the base scheme,  $\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}$  takes functionality index  $n$  as input and outputs master public/secret keys. Let  $\ell(n)$  denote the bit-length of public keys output by  $\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}$ . In our transformed scheme, the setup algorithm chooses IBE public/secret keys  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}})$  and sets  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  as the public key. To encrypt a message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_n$ , the encryptor first chooses randomness  $r$ . It then constructs a circuit which takes a  $\ell = \ell(n)$  bit input string  $\text{str}$  and outputs  $\text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{str}, m; r)$ . The encryptor then garbles this circuit, and each wire key  $w_{i,b}$  is encrypted for identity  $(n, i, b)$ . The final ciphertext consists of the garbled circuit, together with encryptions of wire keys. Note that  $\ell$  is not fixed during setup. It is defined (and used) during encryption, and depends on the functionality index of the message. The idea of using IBE to succinctly handle an unbounded number of public keys was also present in the work of [16].

The secret key for a function  $f \in \mathcal{F}_t$  is computed as follows. First, the key generation algorithm chooses pseudorandom  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  keys  $(\text{mpk}_t, \text{msk}_t)$  using  $\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^t)$ . Next, it computes IBE secret keys for identities  $(t, i, \text{mpk}_t[i])$ . Finally, it computes an  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  secret key for the function  $f$ . The decryption procedure is similar to the one described in Sect. 1.1. Let  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\})$  and  $\text{sk}_f = (\{\text{sk}_i\}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}})$ . First, note that it is important that the message underlying the ciphertext, and the function underlying the secret key are compatible. If so, the decryptor first decrypts  $\text{ct}_{i,b}$  to compute the garbled circuit wire keys. Next, it evaluates the garbled circuit to get an  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  ciphertext, which it then decrypts using  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$ . The proof of security is along the lines of selective to semi-adaptive transformation proof.

The overhead involved in this transformation is similar to the overhead in going from selective to semi-adaptive security, except that the size of the garbled circuit, and the number of wire keys grows with the functionality index. Overhead comparisons between our approach and the non-generic approach of [16] are less clear, since their approach requires increasing the maximum depth of the circuit to accommodate a PRF evaluation before evaluating the main circuit.

*Limits of Bundling Functionalities.* One should be careful to point out the limits of such bundling. The main restriction is that in order for decryption to do anything useful the functionality index used to encrypt must match that of the private key; otherwise they simply are not compatible. Suppose FE is a functional encryption scheme with functionality class  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}$  and message class  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}$ . Then, using our bundling approach, we get a functional encryption scheme for function space  $\cup_n \mathcal{F}_n$  and message space  $\cup_n \mathcal{M}_n$ . However, the secret key for a function  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  can only decrypt encryptions of messages in  $\mathcal{M}_n$ . So such a technique cannot be used to emulate a functionality such as ABE for DFAs [37] or Functional Encryption for Turing Machines [5] where the base private key is meant to operate on ciphertext corresponding to messages/attributes of unrestricted size. In general, our bundling approach cannot transform an FE scheme where secret keys decrypt bounded length encryptions to one where secret keys can decrypt arbitrary length ciphertexts.

### 1.3 Encrypt Ahead Functional Encryption

We conclude by discussing a final potential application of our techniques that we call “Encrypt Ahead Functional Encryption”. Our discussion is at an informal level and limited to this introduction.

Suppose that we would like to setup a functional encryption system and that a proper authority has already been identified. Furthermore suppose that several users have obtained data and are ready to encrypt. The only thing missing is the small detail that the algorithms comprising the cryptosystem have yet to be determined. Perhaps we are waiting on a security proof or maybe there is no reasonable candidate realization what so ever.

Normally, we would think that the lack of an encryption system would be a complete showstopper and that nothing could be done until it was in place.

However, as it turns out this need not be the case. Using a slight adaptation of our techniques an authority could publish the scheme’s public parameters and user’s could begin to encrypt data to create ciphertexts. The main idea is that the encryption algorithm will create a garbled circuit that takes a functional encryption scheme’s public parameters (as before) *as well as* a description of the encryption algorithm itself. It then encrypts the corresponding input wires (for both the parameters and scheme description) under pairs of public keys in a similar manner to what was done above. Later when the actual cryptography is worked out the secret keys corresponding to the bits of the public parameters and scheme description can be given out as part of the functional encryption secret key and these are used to construct the ciphertext before decrypting. We call this concept “encrypt ahead” as encryption can occur prior to deciding on a scheme.

There are important caveats to encrypting ahead in this manner. While the setup and outer encryption algorithm need not know what the eventual core encryption algorithm is, one has to at least guess and then work with an upper bound on the core encryption algorithm’s description and running time. If this guess turns out to be below the resources needed by the eventual scheme, the ciphertexts created will be unusable. Furthermore, until an actual scheme has been decided upon, the authority will be unable to create private keys and this aspect of the system will be stalled.

*Paper Organization.* We first introduce some preliminaries in Sect. 2. Next, in Sect. 3, we discuss functional encryption related preliminaries. In Sect. 4, we present our generic transformation from a selectively secure FE scheme to a semi-adaptively secure FE scheme. Finally in Sect. 5, we present our transformation for bundling functionalities.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Garbled Circuits

Our definition of garbled circuits [40] is based upon the work of Bellare et al. [8]. Let  $\{\mathcal{C}_n\}_n$  be a family of circuits where each circuit in  $\mathcal{C}_n$  takes  $n$  bit inputs. A garbling scheme GC for circuit family  $\{\mathcal{C}_n\}_n$  consists of polynomial-time algorithms *Garble* and *Eval* with the following syntax.

- *Garble*( $C \in \mathcal{C}_n, 1^\lambda$ ): The garbling algorithm takes as input the security parameter  $\lambda$  and a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ . It outputs a garbled circuit  $G$ , together with  $2n$  wire keys  $\{w_{i,b}\}_{i \leq n, b \in \{0,1\}}$ .
- *Eval*( $G, \{w_i\}_{i \leq n}$ ): The evaluation algorithm takes as input a garbled circuit  $G$  and  $n$  wire keys  $\{w_i\}_{i \leq n}$  and outputs  $y \in \{0, 1\}$ .

*Correctness:* A garbling scheme GC for circuit family  $\{\mathcal{C}_n\}_n$  is said to be correct if for all  $\lambda, n, x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ ,  $\text{Eval}(G, \{w_{i,x_i}\}_{i \leq n}) = C(x)$ , where  $(G, \{w_{i,b}\}_{i \leq n, b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C, 1^\lambda)$ .



*Security:* Informally, a garbling scheme is said to be secure if for every circuit  $C$  and input  $x$ , the garbled circuit  $G$  together with input wires  $\{w_{i,x_i}\}_{i \leq n}$  corresponding to some input  $x$  reveals only the output of the circuit  $C(x)$ , and nothing else about the circuit  $C$  or input  $x$ .

**Definition 1.** A garbling scheme  $GC = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$  for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C} = \{C_n\}_n$  is said to be a secure garbling scheme if there exists a polynomial-time simulator  $\text{Sim}$  such that for all  $\lambda, n, C \in \mathcal{C}_n$  and  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , the following holds:

$$\left\{ \text{Sim} \left( 1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^{|C|}, C(x) \right) \right\} \approx_c \left\{ (G, \{w_{i,x_i}\}_{i \leq n}) : (G, \{w_{i,b}\}_{i \leq n, b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C, 1^\lambda) \right\}.$$

While this definition is not as general as the definition in [8], it suffices for our construction.

### 2.2 Public Key Encryption

A Public Key Encryption (PKE) scheme  $\text{PKE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$  with message space  $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_\lambda\}_\lambda$  consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

- $\text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$ : The setup algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes security parameter  $\lambda$  as input and outputs a public-secret key pair  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk})$ .
- $\text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}, m \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ : The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes as inputs the public key  $\text{pk}$ , and a message  $m$  and outputs a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$ .
- $\text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ : The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes as inputs the secret key  $\text{sk}$ , and a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$  and outputs a message  $m$ .

*Correctness:* For correctness, we require that for all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $m \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ , and  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda)$ ,

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{sk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}, m)) = m] = 1.$$

*Security:* For security, we require PKE to be semantically secure, i.e. the adversary must not be able to distinguish between encryptions of distinct messages of its own choosing even after receiving the public key. The notion of semantical security for PKE schemes is defined below.

**Definition 2.** A PKE scheme  $\text{PKE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$  is said to be semantically secure if there exists  $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for every PPT attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  such that for all  $\lambda \geq \lambda_0$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{PKE}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{Exp-PKE}(\text{PKE}, \lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ , where  $\text{Exp-PKE}$  is defined in Fig. 1.

$\begin{array}{l} \text{Exp-PKE(PKE, } \lambda, \mathcal{A}) \\ (\text{pk, sk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda) \\ (m_0^*, m_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \text{pk}) \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}, m_b^*) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{ct}^*) \\ \text{Output } (b' \stackrel{?}{=} b) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Exp-IBE(IBE, } \lambda, \mathcal{A}) \\ (\text{mpk, msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda) \\ (m_0^*, m_1^*, \text{ID}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk}) \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}, m_b^*, \text{ID}^*) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{ct}^*) \\ \text{Output } (b' \stackrel{?}{=} b) \end{array}$
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**Fig. 1.** The PKE and IBE security games. In both the games, we assume that the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is stateful. And in the IBE security game, we also require that  $\text{ID}^*$  is not queried to the key generation oracle.

### 2.3 Identity-Based Encryption

An Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme  $\text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{IBE}})$  with message space  $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_\lambda\}_\lambda$  and identity space  $\mathcal{I} = \{\mathcal{I}_\lambda\}_\lambda$  consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

- $\text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{pp}, \text{msk})$ : The setup algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes security parameter  $\lambda$  as input and outputs  $(\text{pp}, \text{msk})$ , where  $\text{pp}$  are public parameters and  $\text{msk}$  is the master secret key.
- $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}, \text{ID} \in \mathcal{I}_\lambda) \rightarrow \text{sk}_{\text{ID}}$ : The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes as inputs the master secret key  $\text{msk}$ , and an identity  $\text{ID}$  and outputs a secret key  $\text{sk}_{\text{ID}}$ .
- $\text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{pp}, m \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda, \text{ID} \in \mathcal{I}_\lambda) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ : The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes as inputs the public parameters  $\text{pp}$ , a message  $m$ , and an identity  $\text{ID}$  and outputs a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$ .
- $\text{Dec}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{sk}_{\text{ID}}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_\lambda \cup \{\perp\}$ : The decryption algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes as inputs the secret key  $\text{sk}_{\text{ID}}$ , and a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$  and outputs a message  $m$  or  $\perp$ .

*Correctness:* For correctness, we require that for all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $m \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ ,  $\text{ID} \in \mathcal{I}_\lambda$ , and  $(\text{pp}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$ ,

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}, \text{ID}), \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{pp}, m, \text{ID})) = m] = 1.$$

*Security:* For security, intuitively, we require that if an adversary has keys for identities  $\{\text{ID}_i\}_i$ , and  $\text{ct}$  is a ciphertext for identity  $\text{ID}^* \neq \text{ID}_i$  for all  $i$ , then the adversary must not be able to recover the underlying message. This is formally defined via the following security game between a challenger and an adversary.

**Definition 3.** An IBE scheme  $\text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{IBE}})$  is said to be fully secure if there exists  $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for every PPT attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  such that for all  $\lambda \geq \lambda_0$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{IBE}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{Exp-IBE}(\text{IBE}, \lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ , where  $\text{Exp-IBE}$  is defined in Fig. 1.

### 3 Functional Encryption

The notion of functional encryption was formally defined in the works of Boneh et al. [14] and O’Neill [30]. A functional encryption scheme consists of a setup algorithm, an encryption algorithm, a key generation algorithm and a decryption algorithm. The setup algorithm takes the security parameter as input and outputs a public key and a master secret key. The encryption algorithm uses the public key to encrypt a message, while the key generation algorithm uses the master secret key to compute a secret key corresponding to a function. The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext and a secret key, and outputs the function evaluation on the message.

*The Functionality Index:* Every functional encryption scheme is associated with a message space which defines the set of messages that can be encrypted, and a function space which defines the set of functions for which a secret key can be generated. In most schemes, the message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and the function space  $\mathcal{F}$  consists of a sequence of message spaces  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and function spaces  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$ , both parameterized by the functionality index (the special case where  $\mathcal{M}_n = \mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{F}_n = \mathcal{F}$  for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  is discussed in Sect. 3.1).

*The Choice of Functionality Index:* A minor definitional issue that arises is with respect to the choice of functionality index. Some works use the security parameter itself to define a message space  $\mathcal{M}_\lambda$  and function space  $\mathcal{F}_\lambda$ . For example, in the inner product FE scheme of Katz et al. [26], the message space and function space are set to be  $\mathbb{Z}_q^\lambda$  during setup, where  $\lambda$  is the security parameter and  $q$  is an appropriately chosen modulus.

A more flexible approach is to decouple the security parameter and the *functionality index*, and allow the setup algorithm to take two inputs - a security parameter  $\lambda$  and a functionality index  $n$ . This additional parameter then defines the message space for the encryption algorithm and the function space for the key generation algorithm. Some existing works implicitly assume that the setup algorithm also receives such a parameter as input. For example, in the work of Goyal et al. [25], the universe  $\mathcal{U} = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  is defined as the universe of attributes for the ABE scheme. Other works, such as the inner product FE scheme of Agrawal et al. [1] explicitly mention this as an input to the setup algorithm. We will also use this approach in our formal definition of a functional encryption scheme.

*Formal Definition:* Let  $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ,  $\mathcal{R} = \{\mathcal{R}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be families of sets, and  $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_n\}$  a family of functions, where for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ ,  $f : \mathcal{M}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_n$ . We will also assume that for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , the set  $\mathcal{F}_n$  contains an *empty function*  $\epsilon_n : \mathcal{M}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_n$ . As in [14], the empty function is used to capture information that intentionally leaks from the ciphertext. For instance, in a PKE scheme, the length of the message could be revealed from the ciphertext. Similarly, in an

attribute based encryption scheme, the ciphertext could reveal the attribute for which the message was encrypted.

A functional encryption scheme FE for function space  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and message space  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  consists of four polynomial-time algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) with the following syntax.

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ : The setup algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the security parameter  $\lambda$  and the functionality index  $n$ , and outputs the master public/secret key pair  $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m \in \mathcal{M}_n) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ : The encryption algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the public key  $\text{mpk}$  and a message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_n$  and outputs a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$ .
- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f \in \mathcal{F}_n) \rightarrow \text{sk}_f$ : The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the master secret key  $\text{msk}$  and a function  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  and outputs a secret key  $\text{sk}_f$ .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_f, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \{0, 1, \perp\}$ : The decryption algorithm is deterministic. It takes as input a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$  and a secret key  $\text{sk}_f$  and outputs  $y \in \{0, 1, \perp\}$ .

*More General Definitions of Functional Encryption:* It is possible to consider more general definitions for functional encryption. For example, one could consider a definition where the setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter  $\lambda$ , functionality index  $n$  and a depth-index  $d$  that bounds the circuit depth of  $\mathcal{F}_n$ . For simplicity of notation we avoid such extensions, although we believe that our results can be generalized for all such extensions.

*Correctness:* A functional encryption scheme  $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$  is said to be correct if for all security parameter  $\lambda$  and functionality index  $n$ , functions  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ , messages  $m \in \mathcal{M}_n$  such that  $(f, m)$  are compatible, and  $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ ,

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f), \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m)) = f(m)] = 1.$$

*Security:* Informally, a functional encryption scheme is said to be secure if an adversary having secret keys for functions  $\{f_i\}_{i \leq k}$  and a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$  for message  $m$  learns only  $\{f_i(m)\}_{i \leq k}$ , and nothing else about the underlying message  $m$ . This can be formally captured via the following ‘indistinguishability based’ security definition.

**Definition 4.** *A functional encryption scheme FE is adaptively secure if there exists  $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  such that for all  $\lambda > \lambda_0$ ,  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $|\Pr[\text{Exp-adaptive}(\text{FE}, \lambda, n, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ , where Exp-adaptive is defined in Fig. 2.*

A weaker notion of security is that of selective security, where the adversary must declare the challenge inputs before receiving the public parameters.

$\text{Exp-adaptive}(\text{FE}, \lambda, n, \mathcal{A})$ $\begin{array}{l} (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \\ (m_0^*, m_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk}) \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_b^*) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{ct}^*) \\ \text{Output } (b' \stackrel{?}{=} b) \end{array}$	$\text{Exp-selective}(\text{FE}, \lambda, n, \mathcal{A})$ $\begin{array}{l} (m_0^*, m_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda) \\ (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_b^*) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{mpk}, \text{ct}^*) \\ \text{Output } (b' \stackrel{?}{=} b) \end{array}$
$\text{Exp-semi-adp}(\text{FE}, \lambda, n, \mathcal{A})$ $\begin{array}{l} (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \\ (m_0^*, m_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk}) \\ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_b^*) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{ct}^*) \\ \text{Output } (b' \stackrel{?}{=} b) \end{array}$	

**Fig. 2.** Experiments referred in Definitions 4, 5 and 6. We assume that the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is stateful,  $\epsilon_n(m_0^*) = \epsilon_n(m_1^*)$ , and for all key queries  $f$  queried by  $\mathcal{A}$  to KeyGen oracle,  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  and  $f(m_0^*) = f(m_1^*)$ .

**Definition 5.** A functional encryption scheme FE is selectively secure if there exists  $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  such that for all  $\lambda > \lambda_0$ ,  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $|\Pr[\text{Exp-selective}(\text{FE}, \lambda, n, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ , where Exp-selective is defined in Fig. 2.

Finally, we have an intermediate notion of security called semi-adaptive security, where the adversary must declare the challenge inputs before receiving any key queries.

**Definition 6.** A functional encryption scheme FE is semi-adaptively secure if there exists  $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  such that for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$  such that for all  $\lambda > \lambda_0$ ,  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $|\Pr[\text{Exp-semi-adp}(\text{FE}, \lambda, n, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ , where Exp-semi-adp is defined in Fig. 2.

### 3.1 Functional Encryption with Uniform Function and Message Space

In the previous section, we saw a definition for functional encryption schemes where the setup algorithm takes the functionality index  $n$  as input, and outputs a master public/secret key pair specific to the functionality index  $n$ . As a result, the encryption algorithm, when using this public key, can only encrypt messages in the message space  $\mathcal{M}_n$ . Similarly, the key generation algorithm can only generate keys in the function space  $\mathcal{F}_n$ .

However, if there is exactly one message space, and exactly one function space (that is  $\mathcal{M}_n = \mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{F}_n = \mathcal{F}$  for all  $n$ ), then we can assume the setup algorithm takes only the security parameter as input. The remaining syntax, correctness and security definitions are same as before.

## 4 Selective to Semi-adaptive Security Generically

In this section, we show how to construct semi-adaptively secure functional encryption schemes from selectively secure functional encryption schemes, semantically secure public key encryption schemes, and secure garbled circuits. At a high-level, the idea is to delay the release of the base FE scheme's public parameters until the adversary makes first key query, and since in a semi-adaptive security game the adversary must submit its challenge before requesting any secret keys, therefore we could hope to invoke the selective security of the underlying FE scheme after receiving the challenge. However, the simulator needs to provide enough information to the adversary so that it could still perform encryptions before sending the challenge. To get around this problem, the encryption algorithm is modified to output a garbled circuit which takes as input the  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  public parameters and outputs the appropriate ciphertext. Essentially, the encryption algorithm encrypts without knowing the 'real' public parameters. The encryption algorithm would still need to hide the input wire keys such that a secret key reveals only half of them. Below we describe our approach in detail.

### 4.1 Construction

Let  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{sel}})$  be a functional encryption scheme with function space  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$  and message space  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_n$ . We use the polynomial  $\ell(\lambda, n)$  to denote the size of the public key output by the  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  setup algorithm, where  $\lambda$  is the security parameter and  $n$  is the functionality index. We will simply write it as  $\ell$  whenever clear from context.

*Tools Required for Our Transformation:* Let  $\text{GC} = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$  be a garbling scheme for polynomial sized circuits, and  $\text{PKE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$  be a public key encryption scheme.

*Our Transformation:* We now describe our construction for semi-adaptively secure functional encryption scheme  $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{KeyGen})$  with message space  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_n$  and function space  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$ .

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ : The setup algorithm first runs the PKE setup to compute  $2\ell$  public/secret key pairs  $(\text{pk}_{i,b}, \text{sk}_{i,b})_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda)$ , independently and uniformly. It also runs  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  setup algorithm and generates master public/secret key pair  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ . It sets  $\text{mpk} = \{\text{pk}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}}$  and  $\text{msk} = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}})$ .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m \in \mathcal{M}_n) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ : Let  $\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^\ell$  be the canonical circuit which has message  $m$  and randomness  $r$  hardwired, takes an  $\ell$  bit input  $x$  and computes  $\text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(x, m; r)$ ; that is, it uses the input as a public key for the base FE scheme and encrypts message  $m$  using randomness  $r$ . The encryption algorithm constructs the circuit  $\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^\ell$  using uniform randomness  $r$ , and it computes the garbled circuit as  $(C, \{w_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow$

$\text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^\ell, 1^\lambda)$ . It then encrypts the garbled wire keys by computing  $\text{ct}_{i,b} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,b}, w_{i,b})$  for  $i \leq \ell$  and  $b \in \{0,1\}$ , where  $\text{mpk} = \{\text{pk}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}}$ . Finally, it outputs a ciphertext  $\text{ct}$  which consists of the garbled circuit  $C$  and the  $2\ell$  ciphertexts  $\{\text{ct}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}}$ .

- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f \in \mathcal{F}_n) \rightarrow \text{sk}_f$ : Let  $\text{msk} = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}})$ . The key generation algorithm first generates selective FE secret key corresponding to the function  $f$  by computing  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, f)$ . It outputs  $\text{sk}_f = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}\}_{i \leq \ell})$  as the key for function  $f$ .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_f, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \{0,1,\perp\}$ : Let  $\text{sk}_f = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \leq \ell})$  and ciphertext  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq \ell, b \in \{0,1\}})$ . The decryption algorithm first decrypts the appropriate garbled circuit wires. Concretely, for  $i \leq \ell$ , it computes  $w_i = \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{sk}_i, \text{ct}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]})$ . It then uses these  $\ell$  wire keys to evaluate the garbled circuit as  $\tilde{\text{ct}} = \text{Eval}(C, \{w_i\}_{i \leq \ell})$ . Finally, it uses the secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$  to decrypt the ciphertext  $\tilde{\text{ct}}$ , and outputs  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sel}}(\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \tilde{\text{ct}})$ .

*Correctness.* For all  $\lambda, n \in \mathbb{N}$ , message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_n$ , base FE keys  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ , and  $2\ell$  PKE keys  $(\text{pk}_{i,b}, \text{sk}_{i,b}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda)$ , the ciphertext corresponding to message  $m$  in our FE scheme is  $(C, \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\})$ , where  $(C, \{w_{i,b}\}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^\ell, 1^\lambda)$  and  $\text{ct}_{i,b} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,b}, w_{i,b})$ .

For any function  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ , the corresponding secret key in our scheme consists of  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}\})$ , where  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, f)$ . The decryption algorithm first decrypts the encryptions of garbled circuit input wires corresponding to the public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  as  $w_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]} = \text{Dec}_{\text{sel}}(\text{sk}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}, \text{ct}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]})$ . This follows from correctness of PKE scheme. Next, it computes ciphertext  $\tilde{\text{ct}} = \text{Eval}(C, \{w_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}\})$  which is same as  $\text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, m; r)$  due to correctness of garbling scheme. Finally, the decryption algorithm computes  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sel}}(\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \tilde{\text{ct}})$  which is equal to  $f(m)$  as the base FE scheme is also correct. Therefore, FE satisfies the functional encryption correctness condition.

*Security.* We will now show that the scheme described above is semi-adaptively secure.

**Theorem 1.** *Assuming  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{sel}})$  is a selectively-secure functional encryption scheme with  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$  and  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_n$  as function space and message space satisfying Definition 5,  $\text{GC} = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$  is a secure garbling scheme for circuit family  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_m\}_m$  satisfying Definition 1, and  $\text{PKE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$  is a semantically secure public key encryption scheme satisfying Definition 2, then FE forms a semi-adaptively secure functional encryption scheme satisfying Definition 6 for same function space and message space as the selective scheme.*

To formally prove our theorem, we describe the following sequence of games.

*Game 1:* This is the semi-adaptive security game described in Fig. 2.

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the PKE setup algorithm and  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  setup algorithm to generate public/secret key pairs as  $(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \text{sk}_{i,\beta})_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda)$  and  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ . It sets  $\text{mpk} = \{\text{pk}_{i,\beta}\}$  and  $\text{msk} = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}})$ , and sends  $\text{mpk}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$  to the challenger such that  $\epsilon_n(m_0^*) = \epsilon_n(m_1^*)$ , where  $\epsilon_n(\cdot)$  is the empty function.
  - (b) Challenger chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and computes the garbled circuit as  $(C, \{w_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m_b^*, r}^\ell, 1^\lambda)$ .
  - (c) It encrypts the wire keys  $w_{i,\beta}$  as  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, w_{i,\beta})$ .
  - (d) It sets challenge ciphertext as  $\text{ct}^* = \left( C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^*\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \right)$ , and sends  $\text{ct}^*$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  such that  $f(m_0^*) = f(m_1^*)$ .
  - (a) For each queried function  $f$ , challenger generates the selective FE secret key as  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, f)$ . It sets the secret key as  $\text{sk}_f = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}\}_{i \leq \ell})$ , and sends  $\text{sk}_f$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

*Game 2:* It is same as Game 1, except the way challenge ciphertext is created. In this game, while creating  $\text{ct}^*$ , challenger only encrypts garbled circuit wire keys corresponding to the bits of  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  and encrypts  $\mathbf{0}$  at all other places.

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the PKE setup algorithm and  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  setup algorithm to generate public/secret key pairs as  $(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \text{sk}_{i,\beta})_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda)$  and  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ . It sets  $\text{mpk} = \{\text{pk}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}}$  and  $\text{msk} = (\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, \{\text{sk}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}})$ , and sends  $\text{mpk}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$  to the challenger such that  $\epsilon_n(m_0^*) = \epsilon_n(m_1^*)$ , where  $\epsilon_n(\cdot)$  is the empty function.
  - (b) Challenger chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and computes the garbled circuit as  $(C, \{w_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m_b^*, r}^\ell, 1^\lambda)$ .
  - (c) It then encrypts half of the  $2\ell$  wire keys as  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, w_{i,\beta})$  if  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$ , and  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \mathbf{0})$  otherwise.
  - (d) It sets challenge ciphertext as  $\text{ct}^* = \left( C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^*\}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \right)$ , and sends  $\text{ct}^*$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)



- (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  such that  $f(m_0^*) = f(m_1^*)$ .
  - (b) For each queried function  $f$ , challenger generates the selective FE secret key as  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, f)$ . It sets the secret key as  $\text{sk}_f = \left( \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \{ \text{sk}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]} \}_{i \leq \ell} \right)$ , and sends  $\text{sk}_f$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

*Game 3:* It is same as Game 2, except the way challenge ciphertext is created. In this game, while creating  $\text{ct}^*$ , challenger simulates the garbled circuit instead of garbling the actual circuit.

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the PKE setup algorithm and  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  setup algorithm to generate public/secret key pairs as  $(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \text{sk}_{i,\beta})_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\lambda)$  and  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ . It sets  $\text{mpk} = \{ \text{pk}_{i,\beta} \}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}}$  and  $\text{msk} = \left( \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, \{ \text{sk}_{i,\beta} \}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \right)$ , and sends  $\text{mpk}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$  to the challenger such that  $\epsilon_n(m_0^*) = \epsilon_n(m_1^*)$ , where  $\epsilon_n(\cdot)$  is the empty function.
  - (b) Challenger chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ .  
It computes  $\tilde{\text{ct}}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, m_b^*)$  using uniform randomness.  
Next, it computes  $(C, \{w_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}\}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}(1^\lambda, 1^\ell, 1^k, \tilde{\text{ct}}^*)$  (here,  $k$  is the size of the canonical circuit  $\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^\ell$ ).
  - (c) It then encrypts half of the  $2\ell$  wire keys as  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, w_{i,\beta})$  if  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$ , and  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \mathbf{0})$  otherwise.
  - (d) It sets challenge ciphertext as  $\text{ct}^* = \left( C, \{ \text{ct}_{i,\beta}^* \}_{i \leq \ell, \beta \in \{0,1\}} \right)$ , and sends  $\text{ct}^*$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$  such that  $f(m_0^*) = f(m_1^*)$ .
  - (b) For each queried function  $f$ , challenger generates the selective FE secret key as  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_{\text{sel}}, f)$ . It sets the secret key as  $\text{sk}_f = \left( \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \{ \text{sk}_{i,\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]} \}_{i \leq \ell} \right)$ , and sends  $\text{sk}_f$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

**Analysis.** We now establish via a sequence of lemmas that no PPT adversary can distinguish between any two adjacent games with non-negligible advantage. To conclude, we also show that any PPT adversary that wins with non-negligible probability in the last game breaks the selective security of  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  scheme.

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be any successful PPT adversary against our construction in the semi-adaptive security game (Fig. 2). In Game  $i$ , advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^i = |\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - 1/2|$ . We then show via a sequence of claims that if  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage

is non-negligible in Game  $i$ , then it has non-negligible advantage in Game  $i + 1$  as well. Finally, in last game, we directly use  $\mathcal{A}$  to attack the selective security of underlying FE scheme. Below we describe our hybrid games in more detail.

**Lemma 1.** *If PKE is a semantically secure public key encryption scheme, then for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^1 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$  for some negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ .*

*Proof.* For proving indistinguishability of Games 1 and 2, we need to sketch  $\ell$  intermediate hybrid games between these two, where  $\ell$  is the length of master public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$ . Observe that in Game 1, ciphertexts  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^*$  are encryptions of garbled circuit input wire keys  $w_{i,\beta}$  for both values of bit  $\beta$ ; however, in Game 2, ciphertexts  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^*$  are encryptions of  $w_{i,\beta}$  if and only if  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$ , and they are encryptions of zeros otherwise. The high-level proof idea is to switch  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}$  from encryptions of  $w_{i,\beta}$  to encryptions of  $\mathbf{0}$  one-at-a-time by using semantic security of PKE scheme. This could be done because the secret key  $\text{sk}_{i,\beta}$  is revealed only if  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$ . Concretely,  $i^{\text{th}}$  intermediate hybrid between Game 1 and 2 proceeds same as Game 1 except that the first  $i$  ciphertexts  $\text{ct}_{j,\beta}^*$  is computed as  $\text{ct}_{j,\beta}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{j,\beta}, \mathbf{0})$  if  $\beta \neq \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[j]$ , i.e. for  $j \leq i$  and  $\beta \neq \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[j]$ ,  $\text{ct}_{j,\beta}^*$  are encryptions of zero, and for  $j > i$  or  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[j]$ ,  $\text{ct}_{j,\beta}^*$  are encryptions of wire keys  $w_{i,\beta}$ . For the analysis, Game 1 is regarded as  $0^{\text{th}}$  intermediate hybrid, and Game 2 is regarded as  $\ell^{\text{th}}$  intermediate hybrid. Below we show that  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage in distinguishing any pair of consecutive intermediate hybrid is negligibly small.

We describe a reduction algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  which breaks semantic security of the PKE scheme, if  $\mathcal{A}$  distinguishes between intermediate hybrids  $i - 1$  and  $i$  with non-negligible advantage. First,  $\mathcal{B}$  receives the challenge public key  $\text{pk}^*$  from the PKE challenger. Next,  $\mathcal{B}$  runs the Step 1 as in Game 1, except instead of running PKE Setup algorithm to compute public/secret key pair  $(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \text{sk}_{i,\beta})$  when  $\beta \neq \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$ , it sets  $\text{pk}_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]} = \text{pk}^*$ . After  $\mathcal{A}$  submits its challenge messages  $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$  to  $\mathcal{B}$ , the reduction computes garbled circuit  $C$  and ciphertexts  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}^*$  as in the  $(i - 1)^{\text{th}}$  intermediate hybrid, except to compute  $\text{ct}_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}^*$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $w_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}$  and  $\mathbf{0}$  as its challenge messages to the PKE challenger, and sets  $\text{ct}_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}^*$  as the PKE challenge ciphertext.  $\mathcal{B}$  runs the remaining game as in Game 1.<sup>4</sup> Finally, if  $\mathcal{A}$  wins ( $b = b'$ ), then  $\mathcal{B}$  guesses 0 to indicate that  $\text{ct}_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}^*$  was encryption of  $w_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}$ , else it guesses 1 to indicate that it was encryption of zeros.

Note that when  $w_{i,1-\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}$  is encrypted by the PKE challenger, then  $\mathcal{B}$  exactly simulates the view of intermediate hybrid  $i - 1$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise if  $\mathbf{0}$  is encrypted the view is of intermediate hybrid  $i$ . Therefore,  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage in any two consecutive intermediate hybrids is negligibly close as otherwise PKE scheme is not semantically secure. Hence, using  $\ell$  intermediate hybrids we have

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that  $\mathcal{B}$  can still answer the secret key queries during the reduction because it only needs the secret keys  $\text{sk}_{i,\beta}$  corresponding to the public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  (i.e.  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$ ). Since  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses all such secret keys, therefore it can answer  $\mathcal{A}$ 's secret key queries.

proved that switching  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta}$  from encryptions of  $w_{i,\beta}$  to encryptions of  $\mathbf{0}$  for  $\beta \neq \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]$  causes at most negligible dip in  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage in Game 1. Therefore if  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^1 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2|$  is non-negligible, then the PKE scheme is not semantically secure.

**Lemma 2.** *If GC is a secure garbling scheme, then for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$  for some negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ .*

*Proof.* The proof of this lemma follows from the security of our garbling scheme. First, note that the simulation based definition of garbling security can be viewed as a game based definition between a challenger and an adversary. An adversary sends a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}_m$  and input  $x \in \{0,1\}^m$ . The challenger then either honestly garbles the circuit, and sends the wire keys corresponding to  $x$ , or runs the simulator to compute the garbled circuit and the wire keys for  $x$ .

Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  such that  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3$  is non-negligible in  $\lambda$ . We will construct a reduction algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that uses  $\mathcal{A}$  to break the garbling security.  $\mathcal{B}$  first chooses  $2\ell$  public/secret key pairs and sends  $\{\text{pk}_{i,\beta}\}$  to the  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  also chooses the base FE scheme's master public/secret keys  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}})$ . Next,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends challenge messages  $m_0^*, m_1^*$ . The reduction algorithm chooses  $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ , randomness  $r$  and computes the circuit  $\text{ckt} = \mathcal{C}\text{-Enc}\text{-pk}_{m_b^*, r}^\ell$ . It then sends circuit  $\text{ckt}$  and input  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  to the garbling challenger, and receives a garbled circuit  $C$  and  $\ell$  wire keys  $\{w_i\}$ . The reduction algorithm then computes  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, w_i)$  if  $\beta = \text{mpk}[i]$ , else  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(\text{pk}_{i,\beta}, \mathbf{0})$ . Finally  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $(C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}\})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  as the challenge ciphertext. The key queries are identical in both Game 2 and Game 3. Finally, the adversary sends its guess  $b'$ , and if  $b = b'$ , the reduction algorithm guesses that  $\text{ckt}$  was honestly garbled, else it guesses that  $\text{ckt}$  and wire keys were simulated.

Note that if the garbling challenger honestly garbled circuit  $\text{ckt}$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  exactly simulates the view of Game 2 to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise the view is of Game 3. As a result, if  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3$  is non-negligible in  $\lambda$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  breaks the garbling scheme's security with non-negligible advantage.

**Lemma 3.** *If  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  is a selectively-secure functional encryption scheme, then for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3 \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$  for some negligible function  $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ .*

*Proof.* We describe a reduction algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  which plays the selective indistinguishability based game with  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  challenger, and simulates Game 3 for adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  runs the Step 1 as in Game 3, except it does not choose  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  master public/secret key pair. It only generates  $2\ell$  PKE public/secret key pairs, sets  $\text{mpk} = \{\text{pk}_{i,\beta}\}$ ,  $\text{msk} = \{\text{sk}_{i,\beta}\}$ , and sends  $\text{mpk}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Next,  $\mathcal{A}$  chooses two challenge messages  $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$ , and sends those to  $\mathcal{B}$ . Reduction algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  forwards  $(m_0^*, m_1^*)$  to the  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  challenger as its challenge messages. Note that  $\mathcal{B}$  is behaving as a selective adversary since it has not queried  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  challenger for a public key before sending its challenge messages. Now  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  challenger chooses a bit  $b^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ , runs the setup algorithm to compute key pair  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}})$ , computes  $\tilde{\text{ct}}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, m_{b^*}^*)$ , and sends public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  and ciphertext  $\tilde{\text{ct}}^*$  to  $\mathcal{B}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  receives  $\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}$  and  $\tilde{\text{ct}}^*$  from the challenger, and it simulates the garbled

circuit  $(C, \{w_i\}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}(1^\lambda, 1^\ell, 1^k, \tilde{\text{ct}}^*)$ . Next, it computes ciphertexts  $\text{ct}_{i, \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}^*$  as encryptions of  $w_i$ , and remaining ciphertexts as encryptions of  $\mathbf{0}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  sends the final challenge ciphertext  $\text{ct}^*$  as garbled circuit  $C$  and ciphertexts  $\{\text{ct}_{i, \beta}^*\}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . After receiving the challenge ciphertext,  $\mathcal{A}$  is allowed to make polynomially many secret key queries  $\text{sk}_f$  for functions  $f$ , which  $\mathcal{B}$  can answer by requesting corresponding secret keys  $\text{sk}_{f, \text{sel}}$  from  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  challenger, and releasing  $\{\text{sk}_{i, \text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}[i]}\}$  along with  $\text{sk}_{f, \text{sel}}$ . Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  to  $\mathcal{B}$ , and  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $b'$  as its guess for  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  challenger's bit  $b^*$ .

Note that  $\mathcal{B}$  exactly simulates the view of Game 3 to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Therefore,  $\mathcal{A}$ 's advantage in Game 3 is negligibly small as otherwise the underlying FE scheme is not selectively-secure. Thus if  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3$  is non-negligible, then the  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  scheme is not selectively-secure.

## 5 Bundling Functionalities

In this section, we show how to transform a (standard) FE scheme to one where the public parameters can support the union of underlying message/function spaces. This transformation is similar to the one outlined in Sect. 4. The only difference is that instead of public key encryption, we need to use identity based encryption for encrypting the garbled circuit wire keys, and the underlying FE scheme's master public/secret keys are chosen pseudorandomly during the key generation phase.

### 5.1 Construction

Let  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{sel}})$  be a functional encryption scheme with message space  $\{\mathcal{M}_n\}_n$  and function space  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$ , where for each  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ , the domain of  $f$  is  $\mathcal{M}_n$ . Let  $\ell\text{-pk}(\cdot, \cdot)$  denote the polynomial representing the size of the public key output by the setup algorithm,  $\ell\text{-r}_s(\cdot, \cdot)$  the randomness required by  $\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}$  and  $\ell\text{-r}_e(\cdot, \cdot)$  the randomness used by  $\text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}$ . Here, all the above polynomials take the security parameter as the first input and functionality index as the second input. For simplicity of notation, we will drop the dependence of these polynomials on the security parameter.

*Tools Required for Our Transformation:* Let  $\text{GC} = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$  be a garbling scheme for circuit family  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}_n$  such that the wire keys output by  $\text{Garble}$  have length  $\ell\text{-w}(\lambda)$ , where  $\lambda$  is the security parameter. Let  $F$  be a pseudo-random function family with key space  $\{\mathcal{K}_\lambda\}_\lambda$ , input space  $\{\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}\}_\lambda$  and output space  $\{0, 1\}$ . Finally, we also use an identity based encryption scheme  $\text{IBE} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{IBE}})$  with identity space  $\{\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda+1}\}_\lambda$  and message space  $\{\{0, 1\}^{\ell\text{-w}(\lambda)}\}_\lambda$ .

*Our Transformation:* We will now describe our functional encryption scheme  $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{KeyGen})$  with message space  $\mathcal{M} = \cup_n \{(n, m) : m \in \mathcal{M}_n\}$  and function space  $\mathcal{F} = \cup_n \{(n, f) : f \in \mathcal{F}_n\} \cup \{\epsilon\}$ . Hence, each message in  $\mathcal{M}$  and function in  $\mathcal{F}$  has two components - the first component reveals the functionality index, and the second component is the actual message/function. For each  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  and  $\text{msg} = (n', m) \in \mathcal{M}$ , we define  $\text{func}(\text{msg}) = f(m)$  if  $n = n'$ ,  $\perp$  otherwise. The empty function  $\epsilon$  is defined as follows: for all messages  $\text{msg} = (n, m) \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\epsilon(\text{msg}) = (n, \epsilon_n(m))$  (recall  $\epsilon_n(\cdot)$  is the empty function in  $\mathcal{F}_n$ ).

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ : The setup algorithm first runs the IBE setup to compute  $(\text{pp}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$ . Next, it chooses a PRF key  $K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_\lambda$ . It sets  $\text{mpk} = \text{pp}_{\text{IBE}}$  and  $\text{msk} = (\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, K)$ .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ : Let  $\text{msg} = (n, m)$ ,  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ , and  $\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^t$  be the canonical circuit which has message  $m$ , randomness  $r$  hardwired, takes a  $t$  bit input  $x$  and computes  $\text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(x, m; r)$ ; that is, it uses the input as a public key for the base FE scheme and encrypts message  $m$  using randomness  $r$ . The encryption algorithm first chooses randomness  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell\text{-rc}(n)}$ . Next, it garbles the circuit  $\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^t$  by computing  $(C, \{w_{i,b}\}_{i \leq t, b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^t, 1^\lambda)$ . It then encrypts the garbled wire keys by computing  $\text{ct}_{i,b} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}, w_{i,b}, (n, i, b))$ . Note that both  $n$  and  $i$  can be represented as  $\lambda$  bit strings. The final ciphertext consists of the garbled circuit  $C$  and the  $2t$  ciphertexts  $\{\text{ct}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq t, b \in \{0,1\}}$ .
- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{func} \in \mathcal{F}) \rightarrow \text{sk}_{\text{func}}$ : Let  $\text{func} = (n, f)$ ,  $\text{msk} = (\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, K)$ ,  $s = \ell\text{-rs}(n)$  and  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ . The key generation algorithm computes an  $s$  bit pseudorandom string  $r = (F(K, (n, 1)), \dots, F(K, (n, s)))$ . Next, it uses  $r$  as the randomness to generate the base FE keys  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n) = \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n; r)$ . Note that the functionality index used for generating these keys is  $n$ , and therefore the size of  $\text{mpk}_n$  is  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ , and the amount of randomness required by  $\text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}$  is  $s = \ell\text{-rs}(n)$ . Next, it generates IBE secret keys corresponding to the identities  $(n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i])$  for  $i \leq t$ . It computes  $t$  secret keys  $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))$ . Finally, it generates an FE secret key corresponding to function  $f$  by computing  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ . It outputs  $(\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \leq t})$  as the key for function  $f$ .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_f, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \{0, 1, \perp\}$ : Let  $\text{sk}_f = (\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \leq t})$  and ciphertext  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\}_{i \leq t, b \in \{0,1\}})$ . The decryption algorithm first decrypts the appropriate garbled circuit wires. For  $i \leq t$ , it computes  $w_i = \text{Dec}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{sk}_i, \text{ct}_{i,\text{mpk}_n[i]})$ . It then uses these  $t$  wire keys to evaluate the garbled circuit. It computes  $\tilde{\text{ct}} = \text{Eval}(C, \{w_i\}_{i \leq t})$ . Finally, it uses the secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$  to decrypt the ciphertext. The output is  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sel}}(\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \tilde{\text{ct}})$ .

*Correctness:* Fix any  $\lambda$ , message  $\text{msg} = (n, m) \in \mathcal{M}$ , function  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  and IBE keys  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}})$ . Let  $(G, \{w_{i,b}\}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m,r}^{\ell\text{-pk}(n)}, 1^\lambda)$  and  $\text{ct}_{i,b} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_{i,b}, (n, i, b))$ . The ciphertext corresponding to message  $\text{msg}$  in our FE scheme is  $(G, \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\})$ . Now, let us consider the key for function

func. Let  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n)$  be the base FE scheme’s keys as computed in the key generation phase. The secret key for  $f$  in our scheme consists of IBE keys  $\{\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))\}$  and  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  key  $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ .

The decryption algorithm first decrypts the IBE ciphertexts to recover the garbled circuit’s wire keys  $\{w_{i, \text{mpk}_n[i]}\}$ . Next, using  $\text{Eval}(G, \{w_{i, \text{mpk}_n[i]}\})$ , we can compute  $\tilde{\text{ct}} = \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{mpk}_n, m; r)$ . Finally, the decryption algorithm computes  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sel}}(\text{sk}_{f, \text{sel}}, \tilde{\text{ct}}) = f(m)$ .

### 5.2 Security Proof

We will now prove that the IBE scheme described above is semi-adaptive secure, as per Definition 6. Our proof consists of a sequence of hybrids. Let  $n^*$  denote the functionality index of the challenge inputs. The first hybrid corresponds to the semi-adaptive security game. In the second hybrid, the challenger uses a truly random function instead of a pseudorandom function. In the third hybrid, we use the security of the IBE scheme to modify the ciphertexts output as part of the challenge ciphertext. Instead of encrypting all the garbled circuit wire keys, the challenger encrypts  $\mathbf{0}$  at positions that do not correspond to the base FE scheme’s public key. Here, it is crucial that the challenger never outputs IBE keys corresponding to these ‘off’ positions. In the fourth hybrid, the garbled circuit is simulated using the challenge ciphertext of the base FE scheme. At this point, we can use the security of the base FE scheme to complete our argument.

*Game 1:* This is the semi-adaptive security game described in Fig. 2.

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the setup algorithm by choosing  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$  and  $K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_\lambda$ . It sends  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  to the adversary.
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0 = (n^*, m_0), \text{msg}_1 = (n^*, m_1)$  such that  $\epsilon(\text{msg}_0) = \epsilon(\text{msg}_1)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and computes the garbled circuit and its wire keys as  $(C, \{w_{i, \beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0, 1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C\text{-Enc-pk}_{m_b, r}^{t^*}, 1^\lambda)$ , where  $t^* = |\ell\text{-pk}(n^*)|$ .
  - (c) It then encrypts the wire keys as  $\text{ct}_{i, \beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_{i, \beta}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i, \beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0, 1\}})$  and sends  $\text{ct}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $\text{func}(\text{msg}_0) = \text{func}(\text{msg}_1)$ . Let  $s = \ell\text{-r}_s(n)$ ,  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ .
  - (b) The challenger computes  $r = (F(K, (n, 1)), \dots, F(K, (n, s)))$  and  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n) = \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n; r)$ .
  - (c) It generates the IBE secret keys as  $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))$  and base FE scheme’s secret key  $\text{sk}_{f, \text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}} = (\text{sk}_{f, \text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\})$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

*Game 2:* This game is identical to the previous one, except that the challenger uses a truly random function  $F_{\text{rand}}$  instead of the pseudorandom function  $F$ .

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the setup algorithm by choosing  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$ . It sends  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  to the adversary.
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0 = (n^*, m_0), \text{msg}_1 = (n^*, m_1)$  such that  $\epsilon(\text{msg}_0) = \epsilon(\text{msg}_1)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and computes the garbled circuit and its wire keys as  $(C, \{w_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc}\text{-pk}_{m_b, r}^t, 1^\lambda)$ , where  $t^* = |\ell\text{-pk}(n^*)|$ .
  - (c) It then encrypts the wire keys as  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_{i,\beta}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}})$  and sends  $\text{ct}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $\text{func}(\text{msg}_0) = \text{func}(\text{msg}_1)$ . Let  $s = \ell\text{-r}_s(n)$ ,  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ .
  - (b) The challenger computes  $\underline{r} = (F_{\text{rand}}(n, 1), \dots, F_{\text{rand}}(n, s))$  and  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n) = \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n; r)$ .
  - (c) It generates the IBE secret keys as  $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))$  and base FE scheme's secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}} = (\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\})$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

*Game 3:* This game is identical to the previous one. Here, we are introducing some syntactical changes. In this game, the challenger chooses the base FE scheme's keys  $\text{mpk}_{n^*}, \text{msk}_{n^*}$  immediately after receiving the challenge messages.

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the setup algorithm by choosing  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$ . It sends  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  to the adversary.
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0 = (n^*, m_0), \text{msg}_1 = (n^*, m_1)$  such that  $\epsilon(\text{msg}_0) = \epsilon(\text{msg}_1)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_{n^*}, \text{msk}_{n^*}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^{n^*})$ .
  - (c) It chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and computes the garbled circuit and its wire keys as  $(C, \{w_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc}\text{-pk}_{m_b, r}^t, 1^\lambda)$ , where  $t^* = |\ell\text{-pk}(n^*)|$ .
  - (d) It then encrypts the wire keys as  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_{i,\beta}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ .
  - (e) The challenger sets  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}})$  and sends  $\text{ct}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $\text{func}(\text{msg}_0) = \text{func}(\text{msg}_1)$ . Let  $s = \ell\text{-r}_s(n)$ ,  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$  (if  $\text{msk}_n, \text{mpk}_n$  have already been computed before, then it simply reuses those keys).
  - (c) It generates the IBE secret keys as  $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))$  and base FE scheme's secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}} = (\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\})$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

*Game 4:* In this game, the challenger modifies the challenge ciphertext. Instead of encrypting the garbled circuit wire keys for all  $i \leq t, \beta \in \{0, 1\}$ , the challenger encrypts zeroes at positions  $(i, \beta)$  if  $\beta \neq \text{mpk}_{n^*}[i]$ .

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the setup algorithm by choosing  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$ . It sends  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  to the adversary.
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0 = (n^*, m_0), \text{msg}_1 = (n^*, m_1)$  such that  $\epsilon(\text{msg}_0) = \epsilon(\text{msg}_1)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_{n^*}, \text{msk}_{n^*}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^{n^*})$ .
  - (c) It chooses a random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , and computes the garbled circuit and its wire keys as  $(C, \{w_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m_b, r}^{t^*}, 1^\lambda)$ , where  $t^* = |\ell\text{-pk}(n^*)|$ .
  - (d) It encrypts wire keys at half the positions, and zeroes elsewhere.  
 For each  $i$ , if  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{n^*}[i]$ ,  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_{i,\beta}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ ,  
 else  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \mathbf{0}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ .
  - (e) It then encrypts the wire keys as  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_{i,\beta}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ .
  - (f) The challenger sets  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}})$  and sends  $\text{ct}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $\text{func}(\text{msg}_0) = \text{func}(\text{msg}_1)$ . Let  $s = \ell\text{-r}_s(n), t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$  (if  $\text{msk}_n, \text{mpk}_n$  have already been computed before, then it simply reuses those keys).
  - (c) It generates the IBE secret keys as  $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))$  and base FE scheme's secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}} = (\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\})$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

*Game 5:* In this game, the challenger simulates the garbled circuit when computing the challenge ciphertext.

1. (Setup Phase) The challenger first runs the setup algorithm by choosing  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$ . It sends  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  to the adversary.
2. (Challenge Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  sends two challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0 = (n^*, m_0), \text{msg}_1 = (n^*, m_1)$  such that  $\epsilon(\text{msg}_0) = \epsilon(\text{msg}_1)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_{n^*}, \text{msk}_{n^*}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^{n^*})$ .
  - (c) It first chooses  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , computes  $\tilde{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{sel}}(\text{mpk}_{n^*}, m_b)$ .
  - (d) It then uses  $\tilde{\text{ct}}$  to simulate the garbled circuit.  
It computes  $(\tilde{C}, \{w_i\}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}(1^\lambda, 1^{t^*}, 1^k, \tilde{\text{ct}})$ , where  $t^* = |\ell\text{-pk}(n^*)|$  and  $k$  is the size of the circuit  $\mathcal{C}\text{-Enc-pk}_{m_b, r}^{t^*}$ .
  - (e) It then encrypts the wire keys at half the positions, and zeroes at the remaining positions.  
 For each  $i$ , if  $\beta = \text{mpk}_{n^*}[i]$ ,  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, w_i, (n^*, i, \beta))$ , else  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \mathbf{0}, (n^*, i, \beta))$ .



- (f) The challenger sets  $\text{ct} = (C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}\}_{i \leq t^*, \beta \in \{0,1\}})$  and sends  $\text{ct}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- 3. (Key Query Phase)
  - (a)  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the challenger on polynomially many functions  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $\text{func}(\text{msg}_0) = \text{func}(\text{msg}_1)$ . Let  $s = \ell\text{-r}_s(n)$ ,  $t = \ell\text{-pk}(n)$ .
  - (b) The challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_n, \text{msk}_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$  (if  $\text{msk}_n, \text{mpk}_n$  have already been computed before, then it simply reuses those keys).
  - (c) It generates the IBE secret keys as  $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}(\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, (n, i, \text{mpk}_n[i]))$  and base FE scheme's secret key  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$ .
  - (d) The challenger sets  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}} = (\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\})$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- 4. (Guess) Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$  and wins if  $b = b'$ .

**Analysis.** Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be any PPT adversary against our construction in the semi-adaptive security game (Fig. 2) and  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^i$  denote the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in Game  $i$ . We will show that  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^i - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{i+1}$  is negligible in  $\lambda$  for all  $i$ .

**Lemma 4.** *Assuming  $F$  is a secure pseudorandom function, for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^1 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .*

*Proof.* The proof of this lemma follows from a simple reduction to the security of PRF  $F$ . Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  such that  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^1 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2|$  is non-negligible. We will construct an algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that uses  $\mathcal{A}$  to break the PRF security. The reduction algorithm chooses an IBE master public/secret key pair  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}})$  and sends  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$  to the adversary. Next, it receives challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0, \text{msg}_1$  with the restriction that  $\epsilon(\text{msg}_0) = \epsilon(\text{msg}_1)$ . It computes a challenge ciphertext and sends it to  $\mathcal{A}$  (this step is identical in both Game 1 and Game 2). Next, the adversary queries for secret keys. For each queried function  $f$ , the reduction algorithm first computes the functionality index  $n$  and  $s = \ell\text{-r}_s(n)$ . It then queries the PRF challenger for PRF evaluations at inputs  $(n, i)$  for  $i \leq s$ . It receives string  $r$ , which it uses as randomness to compute  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  master keys  $(\text{mpk}_{\text{sel}}, \text{msk}_{\text{sel}})$ . The remaining steps (computing IBE secret keys and  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}$ ) are identical in both Game 1 and Game 2. It sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , and  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$ . If  $b = b'$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  outputs 1, indicating that the oracle was a pseudorandom function, else it outputs 0, indicating that the oracle was a truly random function. Clearly, if the PRF challenger used a pseudorandom function, then  $\mathcal{A}$  participates in Game 1, else it participates in Game 2. This concludes our proof.

**Lemma 5.** *For any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^2 = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3$ .*

*Proof.* The advantage of any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is identical in Game 2 and Game 3. The only difference between the two games is that the challenger chooses  $(\text{mpk}_{n^*}, \text{msk}_{n^*})$  immediately after receiving the challenge messages, instead of waiting for the first key query where the function is in  $\mathcal{F}_{n^*}$ . This does not affect the adversary's advantage.

**Lemma 6.** *Assuming IBE is a secure identity based encryption scheme (Definition 3), for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^4| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  such that  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^3 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^4|$  is non-negligible. We will construct a reduction algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that uses  $\mathcal{A}$  to break the security of IBE. First,  $\mathcal{B}$  receives the IBE public key  $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$ , which it forwards to  $\mathcal{A}$ . The adversary then sends the challenge messages  $\text{msg}_0 = (n^*, m_0), \text{msg}_1 = (n^*, m_1)$ . Let  $t^* = \ell\text{-pk}(n^*)$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  chooses  $(\text{mpk}_{n^*}, \text{msk}_{n^*}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{sel}}(1^\lambda, 1^{n^*})$ . It then chooses  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$  and computes garbled circuit  $C$  together with wire keys  $\{w_{i,\beta}\}$  for message  $m_b$ . Next, it sends  $t^*$  challenge messages to the IBE challenger. For  $i = 0$  to  $t$ , let  $\beta'_i = 1 - \text{mpk}_{n^*}[i]$ . It sends challenge messages  $(w_{i,\beta'_i}, \mathbf{0})$  and challenge identity  $(n^*, i, \beta'_i)$ , and receives ciphertext  $\text{ct}_{i,\beta'_i}$ . The reduction algorithm constructs the remaining ciphertexts by itself and sends  $(C, \{\text{ct}_{i,\beta}\})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Next,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends key queries for functions in  $\mathcal{F}$ . Let  $\text{func} = (n, f) \in \mathcal{F}$  be such a function. The reduction algorithm needs to send IBE secret keys as part of the secret key for  $\text{func}$ . If  $n \neq n^*$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  can simply query the IBE challenger for secret keys. If  $n = n^*$ , then the reduction algorithm needs to query the IBE challenger for keys corresponding to  $(n^*, i, \text{mpk}_{n^*}[i])$  only. In particular, the reduction does not need to query IBE keys for the challenge identities. After receiving the IBE secret keys  $\{\text{sk}_i\}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sel}}(\text{msk}_n, f)$  and sends  $\text{sk}_{\text{func}} = (\text{sk}_{f,\text{sel}}, \text{mpk}_n, \{\text{sk}_i\})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its guess  $b'$ , and  $\mathcal{B}$  forwards this guess to the IBE challenger.

**Lemma 7.** *Assuming GC is a secure garbling scheme (Definition 1), for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^4 - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^5| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .*

The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 2.

**Lemma 8.** *Assuming  $\text{FE}_{\text{sel}}$  is a selectively secure functional encryption scheme for function space  $\{\mathcal{F}_n\}_n$  (Definition 5), for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^5 \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .*

The proof of this lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.

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