

# Linear Algebra with Sub-linear Zero-Knowledge Arguments

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**Abstract.** We suggest practical sub-linear size zero-knowledge arguments for statements involving linear algebra. Given commitments to matrices over a finite field, we give a sub-linear size zero-knowledge argument that one committed matrix is the product of two other committed matrices. We also offer a sub-linear size zero-knowledge argument for a committed matrix being equal to the Hadamard product of two other committed matrices. Armed with these tools we can give many other sub-linear size zero-knowledge arguments, for instance for a committed matrix being upper or lower triangular, a committed matrix being the inverse of another committed matrix, or a committed matrix being a permutation of another committed matrix.

A special case of what can be proved using our techniques is the satisfiability of an arithmetic circuit with  $N$  gates. Our arithmetic circuit zero-knowledge argument has a communication complexity of  $O(\sqrt{N})$  group elements. We give both a constant round variant and an  $O(\log N)$  round variant of our zero-knowledge argument; the latter has a computation complexity of  $O(N/\log N)$  exponentiations for the prover and  $O(N)$  multiplications for the verifier making it efficient for the prover and very efficient for the verifier. In the case of a binary circuit consisting of NAND-gates we give a zero-knowledge argument of circuit satisfiability with a communication complexity of  $O(\sqrt{N})$  group elements and a computation complexity of  $O(N)$  multiplications for both the prover and the verifier.

**Keywords:** Sub-linear size zero-knowledge arguments, public-coin special honest verifier zero-knowledge, Pedersen commitments, linear algebra, circuit satisfiability.

## 1 Introduction

It has long been known [Kil92] that zero-knowledge arguments (with computational soundness) can have very low communication. However, known examples of communication-efficient zero-knowledge arguments tend to get their efficiency at the cost of increased computational complexity. Obtaining zero-knowledge arguments that are efficient with respect to *both* communication *and* computation is considered one of the important challenges in theoretical computer science [Joh00]. We address this challenge by constructing zero-knowledge arguments for statements related to linear algebra over finite fields that have sub-linear communication and at the same time also have low computational complexity.

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## 1.1 Our Contribution

We consider row vectors of elements from a finite field  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ , where  $p$  is a large prime. Using a generalization of the Pedersen commitment we can commit to a vector of  $n$  elements from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . Each commitment consists of a single group element. A set of  $n$  commitments, can be considered a commitment to the  $n$  rows of an  $n \times n$  matrix. This paper is about zero-knowledge arguments for a set of committed vectors and matrices satisfying a set of linear algebra relations, for instance that a committed matrix is the product of two other committed matrices. We give zero-knowledge arguments with a communication complexity of  $O(n)$  elements, i.e., the square-root of the size of the matrices. In addition, the arguments are computationally efficient for both the prover and the verifier. The verifier is a public-coin verifier and does not need to take much action until the end of the argument, where the small size of the arguments makes it possible to verify the correctness using only little computation.

Our sub-linear size zero-knowledge arguments work for a wide range of linear algebra relations. We can commit to single field elements, vectors of field elements and square matrices of field elements. Our results also hold for non-square matrices, however, for simplicity we focus just on square matrices here. Given commitments to field elements, vectors and matrices we can prove relations such as a committed field element being the dot product of two committed vectors, a committed matrix being the product of two other committed matrices, or a committed vector being the Hadamard product (the entry-wise product) of two other vectors. Being able to prove such linear algebra relations makes it possible to address many other statements frequently arising in linear algebra. We can for instance prove that committed matrices are upper or lower triangular, have a particular trace, compute the sums of the rows or columns or prove that a committed matrix is the inverse of another committed matrix. We can also permute the entries of a matrix using either a public or a hidden permutation. Using the linear algebra relations, we also get sub-linear size zero-knowledge arguments for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits and for the satisfiability of binary circuits demonstrating the generality of our results.

## 1.2 Related Work

Recent work on zero-knowledge proofs [IKOS07] give us proofs with a communication complexity that grows linearly in the size of the statement to be proven and [IKOS07, KR08, GKR08] also give us proofs with size that depend quasi-linearly on the witness-length. If we consider arguments, the communication complexity can be even lower and Kilian [Kil92] gave a zero-knowledge argument for circuit satisfiability with polylogarithmic communication. His argument goes through the PCP-theorem [AS98, ALM<sup>+</sup>98, Din07] and uses a collision-free hash-function to build a hash-tree that includes the entire PCP though. Even with the best PCP constructions known to date [BSGH<sup>+</sup>05] Kilian's argument has high computational complexity for practical parameters. In contrast, our goal is to get short zero-knowledge arguments that are simple and efficient enough for both prover and verifier to be used in practice.

Groth and Ishai [GI08] gave a zero-knowledge argument for correctness of a shuffle [Cha81] of  $N$  ElGamal ciphertexts. We rely on techniques developed by Groth and

Ishai and as described below also develop several new techniques. For comparison, we believe it would be possible to modify their argument into an argument for circuit satisfiability with a sub-linear communication of  $O(N^{2/3})$  group elements, but the corresponding computational complexity for the prover would be a super-linear number of exponentiations.

### 1.3 Our Techniques

The generality of our results relies on using randomization and batch-verification techniques to reduce linear algebra relations to equations of the form

$$z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i,$$

where  $\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i$  are committed vectors in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^n$ ,  $z$  is a committed field element, and  $*$  :  $\mathbb{Z}_p^n \times \mathbb{Z}_p^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  is a bilinear map. Besides greatly simplifying the task, the bilinear map also helps reduce computation because it maps pairs of  $n$ -element vectors into single field elements giving the prover less to commit to.

Groth and Ishai [GI08] gave a sub-linear size public-coin zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle of  $N$  ElGamal ciphertexts, with a communication complexity of  $O(N^{2/3})$  group elements. We use similar techniques but by making more careful use of the public-coin challenges, we can reduce the communication complexity for our zero-knowledge arguments to  $O(\sqrt{N})$  elements. The difference from Groth and Ishai's work is that they choose a set of challenges at random, whereas we let the prover process the verifier's challenges to get a more structured set of challenges. This processing consists of taking a challenge  $e \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  from the verifier and using it to generate a set of challenges  $(1, e, e^2, \dots)$ , which is a row of a Vandermonde matrix. In the zero-knowledge argument, we then arrange the challenges from the Vandermonde vector in such a way that it leads to many terms cancelling out with each other.

Groth and Ishai's shuffle argument suffered from an increase in the prover's computation complexity in comparison with shuffle arguments that do not have sub-linear size. The same effects apply to some extent to our zero-knowledge arguments when using a constant number of rounds, however, by allowing a logarithmic number of rounds we can eliminate the computational overhead. This is of interest in scenarios where round complexity matters less than computation, for instance in cases where the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is used to make the zero-knowledge argument non-interactive by letting the prover use a cryptographic hash-function to compute the verifier's challenges.

## 2 Preliminaries

Given two functions  $f, g : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  we write  $f(\kappa) \approx g(\kappa)$  when  $|f(\kappa) - g(\kappa)| = O(\kappa^{-c})$  for every constant  $c$ . We say that  $f$  is *negligible* when  $f(\kappa) \approx 0$  and that it is *overwhelming* when  $f(\kappa) \approx 1$ .

We write  $y = A(x; r)$  when the algorithm  $A$ , on input  $x$  and randomness  $r$ , outputs  $y$ . We write  $y \leftarrow A(x)$  for the process of picking randomness  $r$  at random and setting

$y = A(x; r)$ . We also write  $y \leftarrow S$  for sampling  $y$  uniformly at random from the set  $S$ . We write  $(e_1, \dots, e_m) \leftarrow \text{Van}_m(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  when we pick  $e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  and define  $e_1, \dots, e_m$  by  $e_i = e^{i-1} \bmod p$ , corresponding to  $(e_1, \dots, e_m)$  being a row of a Vandermonde matrix.

### 2.1 Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge

We are interested in zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for statements involving linear algebra. We define an argument of knowledge as an argument that has witness-extended emulation, which means we can emulate the entire zero-knowledge argument and at the same time extract a witness. For simplicity, we focus on special honest verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) arguments in the common reference string model. There is no loss of generality here: by using a coin-flipping protocol the SHVZK arguments can be converted into arguments with full zero-knowledge against a cheating verifier and the cost of this conversion is insignificant [Gro04]. Moreover, the common reference string may be a random string and may even be chosen by the verifier. We refer to the full paper for further discussion and formal definitions.

### 2.2 Homomorphic Commitments

The central tool in our SHVZK arguments is a homomorphic commitment to  $n$  elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ , where  $p$  is a  $\kappa$ -bit prime. Any homomorphic commitment scheme can be used, but for simplicity and for the sake of making a concrete efficiency analysis, we will in this paper use a generalization of Pedersen commitments [Ped91]. This commitment scheme is length-reducing; a commitment is a single group element no matter how large  $n$  is. The length-reduction is crucial, by working on short commitments instead of long vectors we get SHVZK arguments with sub-linear communication complexity.

The generalized Pedersen commitment scheme works as follows. The key generation algorithm  $K$  generates a commitment key  $ck = (G, g_1, \dots, g_n, h)$ , where  $g_1, \dots, g_n, h$  are randomly chosen generators of a group  $G$  of prime order  $p$  with  $|p| = \kappa$ . The message space is  $\mathbb{Z}_p^n$ , the randomizer space is  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  and the commitment space is  $G$ . We require that  $G$  is a group where it is easy to determine membership and compute the binary operations and assume parties check that commitments are valid, by checking  $c \in G$ .<sup>1</sup>

To commit to a vector  $(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  we pick randomness  $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  and compute the commitment  $c = h^r \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i}$ . As a matter of notation we will write  $\text{com}_{ck}(x; r)$  when committing to a vector  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  using randomness  $r$ . In some cases we will commit to less than  $n$  elements; this can be accomplished quite easily by setting the remaining messages to 0. When committing to a single element  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  using randomness  $r$ , we write  $\text{com}_{ck}(x; r)$ . The generalized Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding

<sup>1</sup> If the commitments belong to a group  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  batch verification techniques can be used to lower the cost of checking group membership of many commitments. See also [Gro03] for a variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme over  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$  that makes it possible to almost eliminate the cost of verifying validity. If  $G$  is an elliptic curve of order  $p$ , then the validity check just consists of checking that  $c$  is a point on the curve, which is inexpensive.

since no matter what the messages are, the commitment is uniformly distributed in  $G$ . The commitment is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption; we will skip the simple proof.

The common reference string in our SHVZK arguments will be a commitment key  $ck$ . We remark that for typical choices of the group  $G$ , the commitment key can be easily sampled from a common random string and it is easy to verify that  $ck$  is a valid commitment key. It may even be chosen by the verifier, provided the prover and verifier use a  $p$  for which it is possible to generate groups where the discrete logarithm problem is hard.

The generalized Pedersen commitment is homomorphic. For all  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}' \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  and  $r, r' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  we have

$$\text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x}; r) \cdot \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x}'; r') = \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}'; r + r').$$

KNOWLEDGE OF CONTENT OF COMMITMENTS. There are standard techniques for proving knowledge of the opening of many commitments, see the full paper. This can be done in 3 rounds and costs little in terms of communication and computation. Therefore, we will for simplicity and without loss of generality often assume without explicitly stating it that the prover knows the openings of the commitments that she sends to the verifier.

### 2.3 Multi-exponentiation Techniques

Multi-exponentiation techniques allow computing products of the form  $\prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i}$  faster than computing  $n$  single exponentiations. Multi-exponentiations appear frequently in the paper, for instance when computing the generalized Pedersen commitment described earlier. Pippenger [Pip80] developed a general theory of multi-exponentiations; we recommend Lim’s presentation [Lim00] of concrete multi-exponentiation techniques with a complexity of less than  $2n\kappa/\log n$  multiplications in  $G$ , when  $n$  is large.

## 3 Equations with Matrices and Vectors

We wish to commit to matrices and vectors of elements from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  and make SHVZK arguments for them satisfying equations commonly arising in linear algebra. We first consider the following 6 types of equations over committed matrices  $X_i, Y_i, Z \in \text{Mat}_{n \times n}(\mathbb{Z}_p)$ , committed row vectors  $\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  and committed elements  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ , with public  $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ .

$$\begin{array}{lll} \mathbf{z}^\top = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top & Z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X_i Y_i & Z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X_i \circ Y_i \\ z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top & \mathbf{z} = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i Y_i & \mathbf{z} = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i \circ \mathbf{y}_i, \end{array}$$

where  $\circ$  is the Hadamard product (entry-wise product). In this section, we will show how to reduce a set of such equations to a couple of equations of the form

$$z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i,$$

where  $*$  :  $\mathbb{Z}_p^n \times \mathbb{Z}_p^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  is a bilinear map. One bilinear map we will use is the standard dot product of vectors  $\mathbf{x} * \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^\top$ . Another bilinear map we will use is given by  $\mathbf{x} * \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{y} \circ \mathbf{t})^\top$ , where  $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  is a public vector chosen by the verifier.

The first step in the reduction is very simple. Since we have committed to row vectors, the three types of equations in the top involving matrices  $X_i$  are actually just sets of  $n$  equations of the types below. We can therefore focus on the three types of equations on the bottom.

### 3.1 Reducing Many Equations of the Form $z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top$ to a Single Equation

Randomization can be used to reduce  $Q$  equations of the form  $z_q = \sum_{i=1}^{m_q} a_{qi} \mathbf{x}_{qi} \mathbf{y}_{qi}^\top$  to one single equation of the form  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m z_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top$ , where  $m = \sum_{q=1}^Q m_q$ . The verifier selects  $(r_1, \dots, r_Q) \leftarrow \text{Van}_Q(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  (observe this only requires the verifier to transmit one field element) and require the prover to demonstrate

$$\sum_{q=1}^Q r_q z_q = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i=1}^{m_q} (r_q a_{qi} \mathbf{x}_{qi}) \mathbf{y}_{qi}^\top.$$

This is a comparison of two degree  $Q - 1$  polynomials in the challenge consisting of a field element. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, there is probability at most  $\frac{Q-1}{p}$  for the test to pass unless indeed all the equations hold. Setting  $z = \sum_{q=1}^Q r_q z_q$  and  $\mathbf{x}'_{qi} = r_q a_{qi} \mathbf{x}_{qi}$ , whose commitments can easily be computed using the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme, we get the following equation of the desired form

$$z = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i=1}^{m_q} \mathbf{x}'_{qi} \mathbf{y}_{qi}^\top.$$

### 3.2 Reducing $z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i Y_i$ to the Form $z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top$

We will now give a 3-move reduction of  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i Y_i$  to the form  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top$ . The verifier picks  $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \text{Van}_n(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and asks the prover to demonstrate

$$z\mathbf{t}^\top = \left( \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i Y_i \right) \mathbf{t}^\top = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i (Y_i \mathbf{t}^\top).$$

By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, there is at most probability  $\frac{n-1}{p}$  of this test passing unless indeed the values satisfy the equation. The problem is that the verifier does not have

a straightforward way to compute commitments to  $Y_i \mathbf{t}^\top$  since we have commitments to the rows of the matrices, but here the verifier is asking for a linear combination of the columns. Choosing  $\mathbf{t}$  and sending it to the prover is therefore only the first round of the reduction; there will be two more rounds.

For each matrix  $Y_i$  the prover creates a new commitment to  $\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{t} Y_i^\top$  and sends it to the verifier. The equation can now be reduced to the form

$$\mathbf{z} \mathbf{t}^\top - \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{y}_i^\top = 0,$$

which is of the desired form. In the process we have for each matrix  $Y_i$  introduced an additional equation  $\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{t} Y_i^\top$  that we need to prove too. We pick  $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \text{Van}_n(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and ask the prover to demonstrate

$$\mathbf{y}_i \mathbf{s}^\top = (\mathbf{s} Y_i) \mathbf{t}^\top.$$

This is the key idea in this reduction,  $\mathbf{s} Y_i$  is a combination of row vectors from  $Y_i$  and thus easily computable. Using the homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme both the prover and the verifier can compute a commitment to  $\mathbf{s} Y_i$ .

We remark that since the last step in this reduction simply consists of the verifier picking a challenge  $\mathbf{s}$ , we can run the last round in parallel with the reduction in Section 3.1, so our reduction only costs 2 additional rounds. Further, we note that for all  $Y_i$  in all equations, we can use the same  $\mathbf{s}$  and  $\mathbf{t}$ . In the randomization step in the reduction in Section 3.1 we can use the homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme to combine all the vectors that we combine with respectively  $\mathbf{s}$  and  $\mathbf{t}$ . The main cost of the reduction is therefore the computation of the  $\mathbf{y}_i$ 's and the  $\mathbf{s} Y_i$ 's and the commitments to  $\mathbf{y}_i$ , the rest has modest cost.

### 3.3 Reducing Equations with Hadamard Products to a Single Equation with a Bilinear Map

We will now reduce a set of  $Q$  Hadamard equations of the form

$$\mathbf{z}_q = \sum_{i=1}^{m_q} a_{qi} \mathbf{x}_{qi} \circ \mathbf{y}_{qi}$$

to a single equation. The verifier picks  $(r_1, \dots, r_Q) \leftarrow \text{Van}_Q(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and requires the prover to give an argument for

$$\sum_{q=1}^Q r_q \mathbf{z}_q = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i=1}^{m_q} (r_q a_{qi} \mathbf{x}_{qi}) \circ \mathbf{y}_{qi}.$$

Setting  $\mathbf{x}'_{qi} = r_q a_{qi} \mathbf{x}_{qi}$  and  $\mathbf{z}' = \sum_{q=1}^Q r_q \mathbf{z}_q$ , whose commitments can be computed using the homomorphic properties, this gives us the equation  $\mathbf{z}' = \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{i=1}^{m_q} \mathbf{x}'_{qi} \circ \mathbf{y}_{qi}$ .

Consider now a Hadamard equation of the form  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i \circ \mathbf{y}_i$ . We can simplify this equation by picking  $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \text{Van}_m(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and requiring the prover to show

$$z\mathbf{t}^\top = \left( \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i \circ \mathbf{y}_i \right) \mathbf{t}^\top = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i (\mathbf{y}_i \circ \mathbf{t})^\top.$$

Defining the bilinear map

$$* : \mathbb{Z}_p^n \times \mathbb{Z}_p^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \quad (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \mapsto \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{y} \circ \mathbf{t})^\top,$$

we have reduced the equation to

$$0 = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i - z * \mathbf{1}.$$

## 4 SHVZK Arguments for a Vector Product Equation

We saw in the previous section that equations involving matrices and vectors could be efficiently reduced to an equation of the form

$$z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i,$$

where  $*$  is one of the two bilinear maps  $\mathbf{x} * \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^\top$  or  $\mathbf{x} * \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{y} \circ \mathbf{t})^\top$ . In this section we will give a SHVZK argument of knowledge of openings  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and  $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_m, \mathbf{y}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  satisfying such an equation.

### 4.1 The Minimal Case

We first give a well-known argument for the minimal case  $m = 1$ . We have three commitments  $a, b, c$  to  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  and  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  respectively and the prover wants to convince the verifier that  $z = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^\top$ . The prover's private input in the argument consists of the openings  $(\mathbf{x}, r)$ ,  $(\mathbf{y}, s)$  and  $(z, t)$  of  $a, b$  and  $c$  respectively.

**P**  $\rightarrow$  **V**: Pick  $\mathbf{d}_x, \mathbf{d}_y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n, d_z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  and randomizers  $r_d, s_d, t_1, t_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ .  
Send to the verifier the commitments

$$\begin{aligned} a_d &= \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{d}_x; r_d) & b_d &= \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{d}_y; s_d) \\ c_1 &= \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x}\mathbf{d}_y^\top + \mathbf{d}_x\mathbf{y}^\top; t_1) & c_0 &= \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{d}_x\mathbf{d}_y^\top; t_0). \end{aligned}$$

**P**  $\leftarrow$  **V**: Send challenge  $e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  to the prover.

**P**  $\rightarrow$  **V**: Send to the verifier the following answer

$$\mathbf{f}_x = e\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{d}_x \quad \mathbf{f}_y = e\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{d}_y \quad r_x = er + r_d \quad s_y = es + s_d \quad t_z = e^2t + et_1 + t_0.$$

**V**: Accept the argument if

$$a^e a_d = \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{f}_x; r_x) \wedge b^e b_d = \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{f}_y; s_y) \wedge c^{e^2} c_1^e c_0 = \text{com}_{ck}(\mathbf{f}_x \mathbf{f}_y^\top; t_z).$$

**Theorem 1.** *The protocol above is a 3-move public-coin argument of knowledge of committed values  $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, z$  so  $z = \mathbf{x} * \mathbf{y}$ . The argument has perfect completeness, perfect SHVZK and witness-extended emulation.*

We refer to the full paper for a proof.



## 4.2 Constant-Round Reduction to the Minimal Case

Next, we give a SHVZK argument that uses a 2-round communication-efficient reduction to the minimal case  $m = 1$ .

**Common input:** Commitment key  $ck$  and a statement consisting of commitments  $a_1, b_1, \dots, a_m, b_m, c$ .

**Prover's input:** Openings of commitments  $\mathbf{x}_1, r_1, \mathbf{y}_1, s_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_m, r_m, \mathbf{y}_m, s_m, z, t$  so  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$ .

**Argument:**

**P**  $\rightarrow$  **V:** Prover picks randomizers  $t_\ell \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  for  $0 \leq \ell \leq 2m - 1$ , setting  $t_{m-1} = t$  though.

Prover computes  $c_0, \dots, c_{2m-2}$  as

$$c_\ell = \text{com}_{ck} \left( \sum_{i,j : \ell=m+i-j-1} \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_j ; t_\ell \right).$$

Observe, by construction  $c_{m-1} = c$ .

Prover sends  $c_0, \dots, c_{2m-2}$  to verifier.

**P**  $\leftarrow$  **V:** Verifier sends prover random challenge  $e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ .

**P**  $\leftrightarrow$  **V:** Define

$$a' = \prod_{i=1}^m a_i^{e^{i-1}} \quad b' = \prod_{j=1}^m b_j^{e^{m-j}} \quad c' = \prod_{\ell=0}^{2m-2} c_\ell^{e^\ell}.$$

Prover computes openings

$$\mathbf{x}' = \sum_{i=1}^m e^{i-1} \mathbf{x}_i \quad r' = \sum_{i=1}^m e^{i-1} r_i \quad \mathbf{y}' = \sum_{j=1}^m e^{m-j} \mathbf{y}_j \quad s' = \sum_{j=1}^m e^{m-j} s_j$$

and

$$z' = \sum_{\ell=0}^{2m-2} e^\ell \sum_{i,j : \ell=m+i-j-1} \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_j \quad t' = \sum_{\ell=0}^{2m-2} e^\ell t_\ell.$$

Prover and verifier run the minimal case SHVZK argument from Section 4.1 on  $a', b', c'$ .

**Theorem 2.** *The argument above is a public-coin argument for knowledge of openings so  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$ . The argument has perfect completeness, perfect SHVZK and computational witness-extended emulation.*

We refer to the full paper for a proof. Below, we will sketch the main ideas in the construction and why it works.

The important part in the reduction to the minimal case is to use the verifier’s challenge in a way such that the prover only needs to send  $2m - 2$  commitments to the verifier. We do this by computing  $a', b'$  as multi-exponentiations of  $a_1, b_1, \dots, a_m, b_m$  with exponents that are carefully chosen powers of the challenge  $e$ . The product of the openings of  $a'$  and  $b'$  is

$$\left( \sum_{i=1}^m e^{i-1} \mathbf{x}_i \right) * \left( \sum_{j=1}^m e^{m-j} \mathbf{y}_j \right) = \sum_{\ell=0}^{2m-2} e^\ell \left( \sum_{i,j : \ell=m+i-j-1} \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_j \right).$$

This is the key observation to show that the argument is perfectly complete.

The part corresponding to  $\ell = m - 1$  gives us exactly the sum we are after, but we have some extra coefficients of the polynomial corresponding to  $\ell \neq m - 1$ . To cancel them out, the prover makes  $2m - 2$  commitments to these values before seeing the challenge  $e$ . Suppose we know openings of all the commitments let us argue that there is negligible probability of correctly answering the challenge  $e$  unless indeed  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$ . Since all commitments are chosen by the prover before seeing the challenge  $e$ , by the binding property of the commitment scheme this shows

$$\sum_{\ell=0}^{2m-2} e^\ell \left( \sum_{\ell=m+i-j-1} \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_j \right) = \sum_{\ell=0}^{2m-2} e^\ell z_\ell,$$

for random  $e$  where  $z = z_{m-1}$  since  $c = c_{m-1}$ . But if  $z \neq \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$  the Schwartz-Zippel lemma tells us this can happen with probability at most  $\frac{2m-2}{p}$ .

**EFFICIENCY.** The prover sends  $2m - 2$  commitments to the verifier. Computing the commitments requires the prover to make  $2m - 2$  double-exponentiations and naïvely  $m^2$  bilinear map evaluations to compute the entries to the commitments. Naïvely this requires  $m^2n$  multiplications, but using more advanced techniques such as organizing the vectors in  $m \times n$  matrices and using Strassen’s matrix multiplication algorithm to compute  $XY^\top$  to get the  $m^2$  dot products the cost can be further reduced. However, it is not known how to bring the cost down to  $O(mn)$  multiplications.

### 4.3 Trading Computation for Interaction

Let us again look at the equation

$$z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i.$$

When  $m$  is large, the computational overhead of doing the multiplications in the SHVZK argument in the previous section may be prohibitive. In this section, we will trade computational complexity for round complexity by giving a  $2 \log m$ -round reduction to the minimal case that only requires  $4mn$  multiplications for the prover.

To illustrate the source of the gain, look at the matrix containing the  $m^2$  products  $\mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_j$ . An example of an  $8 \times 8$  matrix is given below.

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc|cc|cc|cc} \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_2 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_3 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_4 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \hline \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_5 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_6 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_7 * \mathbf{y}_8 \\ \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_1 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_2 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_3 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_4 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_5 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_6 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_7 & \mathbf{x}_8 * \mathbf{y}_8 \end{array} \right)$$

We want to argue knowledge of  $c$  being a commitment to the trace of the matrix. In the SHVZK argument we gave in the previous section, all the  $2m - 1$  lines that are parallel with the diagonal correspond to entries that have the same degree in the polynomial in  $e$ . For instance the sum of the diagonal entries is the coefficient of  $e^{m-1}$  whereas the sum of the entries with  $i - j = 1$  is the coefficient of  $e^m$ . In the SHVZK argument in the previous section, we computed all these  $m^2$  products. Since they each cost  $n$  multiplications to compute, we end up using  $m^2n$  multiplications. Even with the best known advanced matrix-multiplication techniques the cost is still significantly higher than  $\omega(mn)$  multiplications. As an example, in the  $8 \times 8$  matrix above we end up computing 64 vector products. We are only interested in the 8 entries along the diagonal, so the remaining computation is just waste that we need to discard in the argument. We will devise a method that allows us to compute larger sub-matrices at once, instead of taking each individual entry at a time. Looking again at the example, if we can discard  $2 \times 2$  matrices and  $4 \times 4$  matrices, we only need to discard 14 sub-matrices instead of the 56 entries we need to discard in the reduction in the previous section.

Below, we give a SHVZK argument that reduces the statement to the minimal case  $m = 1$  through  $\log m$  recursive calls to itself. For simplicity we assume that  $m = 2^\mu$ . We can do this without loss of generality, because we can always fill up with dummy elements consisting of zero-vectors and trivial commitments, which do not carry any computational overhead.

The idea in the recursive call is to handle the  $2 \times 2$  matrices along the diagonal at once. We already have a commitment  $c$  to the sum of the diagonal entries. In addition, the prover sends commitments  $c_l, c_u$  to the verifier, containing respectively the sum of the lower-left corners of the sub-matrices and the sum of the upper-right corners of the sub-matrices along the diagonal.

The verifier responds with a random challenge  $e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ . The prover now reduces her set of vectors to half, by computing

$$\mathbf{x}'_i = \mathbf{x}_{2i-1} + e\mathbf{x}_{2i} \qquad \mathbf{y}'_i = e\mathbf{y}_{2i-1} + \mathbf{y}_{2i}.$$

The homomorphic properties of the commitments enables the verifier to compute commitments to these vectors as  $a'_i = a_{2i-1}a_{2i}^e$  and  $b'_i = b_{2i-1}^e b_{2i}$ . We also compute  $c' = c_i^e c^e c_u$ , which is a commitment to the sum of the diagonal entries in the new matrix obtained from the vectors  $\mathbf{x}'_1, \mathbf{y}'_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}'_{m/2}, \mathbf{y}'_{m/2}$ .

The prover and the verifier now engage in a SHVZK argument with these new commitments and vectors for  $c'$  containing the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix. The implication is that for random  $e$  we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m/2} (\mathbf{x}_{2i-1} + e\mathbf{x}_{2i}) * (\mathbf{y}_{2i-1} + \mathbf{y}_{2i}) = e^2 z_l + ez + z_u,$$

where  $z_l$  and  $z_u$  are the contents of  $c_l$  and  $c_u$ . By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma this implies with overwhelming probability  $z = \sum_{i=1}^{m/2} (\mathbf{x}_{2i-1} * \mathbf{y}_{2i-1} + \mathbf{x}_{2i} * \mathbf{y}_{2i})$ , which is what we wanted to prove.

**Common input:** Commitment key  $ck$  and commitments  $a_1, b_1, \dots, a_m, b_m, c$ , with  $m = 2^\mu$ .

**Prover's input:** Openings of commitments  $\mathbf{x}_1, r_1, \mathbf{y}_1, s_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_m, r_m, \mathbf{y}_m, s_m, z, t$  so  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$ .

**Argument:**

**If  $m = 1$ :** Run the SHVZK argument from Section 4.1 with common input  $ck, a_1, b_1, c$  and prover input  $\mathbf{x}_1, r_1, \mathbf{y}_1, s_1, z, t$  to show  $z = \mathbf{x}_1 * \mathbf{y}_1$ .

**Else if  $m > 1$ :** Define  $m' = m/2$  and do

**P  $\rightarrow$  V:** Prover picks  $t_l, t_u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  and sends to verifier

$$c_l = \text{com}_{ck} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{m'} \mathbf{x}_{2i} * \mathbf{y}_{2i-1}; t_l \right) \quad \text{and} \quad c_u = \text{com}_{ck} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{m'} \mathbf{x}_{2i-1} * \mathbf{y}_{2i}; t_u \right).$$

**P  $\leftarrow$  V:** Verifier picks random challenge  $e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  and sends it to prover.

**P  $\leftrightarrow$  V:** Recursively run argument with common input  $ck, a'_1, b'_1, \dots, a'_{m'}, b'_{m'}, c'$  given by

$$a'_i = a_{2i-1} a_{2i}^e \quad b'_i = b_{2i-1}^e b_{2i} \quad c' = c_l^{e^2} c^e c_u.$$

The prover's private input is  $\mathbf{x}'_1, r'_1, \mathbf{y}'_1, s'_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}'_{m'}, r_{m'}, \mathbf{y}'_{m'}, s_{m'}, z', t'$  with

$$\mathbf{x}'_i = \mathbf{x}_{2i-1} + e\mathbf{x}_{2i} \quad r'_i = r_{2i-1} + er_{2i} \quad \mathbf{y}'_i = e\mathbf{y}_{2i-1} + \mathbf{y}_{2i} \quad s'_i = es_{2i-1} + s_{2i}$$

$$z' = e^2 \sum_{i=1}^{m'} \mathbf{x}_{2i} * \mathbf{y}_{2i-1} + ez + \sum_{i=1}^{m'} \mathbf{x}_{2i-1} * \mathbf{y}_{2i} \quad t' = e^2 t_l + et + t_u.$$

**Theorem 3.** *The argument above is a public-coin argument for knowledge of openings so  $z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$ . The argument has perfect completeness, perfect SHVZK and computational witness-extended emulation.*

The proof can be found in the full paper.

**EFFICIENCY.** Each recursive call to the SHVZK argument with  $m > 1$  makes the prover send 2 commitments to the verifier. The main computational cost for the prover is the computation of  $m = 2m'$  new vectors costing around  $mn$  multiplications and  $m$  bilinear map evaluations costing around  $n$  multiplications each. Summing up over  $\log m$

recursive calls, we get a total communication of  $2 \log m$  commitments from the prover to the verifier and a computational cost for the prover of  $4mn$  multiplications in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . The verifier can wait until the proof is over to compute anything; this permits the verifier to use multi-exponentiation techniques for computing the commitments  $a, b, c$  that are used in the final call to the minimal case SHVZK argument where  $m = 1$ . As a consequence, the verifier uses the equivalent of  $4m\kappa / \log m$  multiplications.

## 5 Zero-Knowledge Arguments for Linear Algebra Equations

We now have several tools to deal with committed matrices and vectors. We can add matrices and vectors using the homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme and we have SHVZK arguments for equations involving multiplications of matrices and vectors and Hadamard products of matrices and vectors. We will sketch how to use these tools to get sub-linear zero-knowledge arguments for equations often arising in linear algebra.

**INVERSE.** To prove committed matrices satisfy  $Y = X^{-1}$  or equivalently  $XY = I$ , we let the verifier pick  $s \leftarrow \text{Van}_n(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and the prover give a SHVZK argument for  $(sX)Y = s$ .

**TRANSPOSE.** To prove that a committed matrices satisfy  $Y = X^\top$ , we let the verifier pick  $s, t \leftarrow \text{Van}_n(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and the prover give a SHVZK argument for  $(sX)t^\top = (tY)s^\top$ .

**EIGENVALUES AND EIGENVECTORS.** To show that we have a commitment to an eigenvalue  $\lambda$  and an eigenvector  $\mathbf{y}^\top$  of  $X$ , we first commit to  $\mathbf{z} = \lambda\mathbf{y}$ . There are standard SHVZK arguments for  $\mathbf{z} = \lambda\mathbf{y}$ , so the prover can show the committed  $\mathbf{z}$  is correct. Now the verifier picks  $s \leftarrow \text{Van}_n(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and we also give a SHVZK argument for  $s\mathbf{z}^\top = (sX)\mathbf{y}^\top$ .

**SUMS OF ROWS AND COLUMNS.** Computing the sum of all row vectors or all column vectors of a matrix corresponds to computing  $X\mathbf{1}^\top$  and  $\mathbf{1}X$  respectively, where  $\mathbf{1} = (1, \dots, 1)$ . The sum of all entries in a matrix can be computed as  $\mathbf{1}A\mathbf{1}^\top$ . With our techniques we get efficient SHVZK arguments for the correctness of these computations.

**HADAMARD PRODUCTS OF ROWS AND COLUMNS.** Let us give a SHVZK argument for a committed vector  $\mathbf{z}$  containing the Hadamard product of all the rows  $\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n$  of committed matrix. The prover commits to vectors  $\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{x}_1 \circ \dots \circ \mathbf{x}_i$ , using  $\mathbf{y}_1 = \mathbf{x}_1$  and  $\mathbf{y}_n = \mathbf{z}$ . By demonstrating for  $1 \leq i < n$  that  $\mathbf{y}_{i+1} = \mathbf{y}_i \circ \mathbf{x}_{i+1}$  we convince the verifier that  $\mathbf{z}$  is the Hadamard product of the row vectors in  $X$ . We remark that it is easy to get a SHVZK argument for  $\mathbf{z} = \prod_{i=1}^n z_i$ , where  $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$ , so we can extend our SHVZK argument to prove  $\mathbf{z}$  is the product of all entries in the matrix. In case we want to show  $\mathbf{z}^\top$  is the Hadamard product of all the columns, we can commit to  $X^\top$ , using the SHVZK for transposition to prove correctness, and show  $\mathbf{z}$  is the Hadamard product of all the rows.

**TRIANGULARITY.** The Hadamard product enables us to prove that a subset of the entries in a committed matrix  $X$  consists of all zeroes. Let  $S$  be the matrix that has 1 in all entries belong to the subset and has 0 in all other entries. We give a SHVZK argument

for  $S \circ X = 0$ . This SHVZK argument can for instance be used to demonstrate that a committed matrix is lower triangular, upper triangular or diagonal.

**TRACE.** To show committed values satisfying  $z = \text{trace}(X)$  we give a SHVZK argument for  $z = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i x_i^\top$ , where  $s_i$  is the  $i$ th row vector of  $I$ .

**ABSOLUTE VALUE OF DETERMINANT.** We can commit to an  $LUP$  factorization of a matrix  $X$ . Proving lower and upper triangularity we already know how to do. It is also easy to prove that we have a committed permutation matrix  $P$ , for instance by showing that the matrix is a hidden permutation of  $I$  (see Section 5) and that  $\mathbf{1}P = \mathbf{1}$  and  $P\mathbf{1}^\top = \mathbf{1}^\top$ . Since we can single out the diagonal elements of  $L$  and  $U$  we can compute the determinants of these matrices. We know that  $P$  has determinant  $-1$  or  $1$ . We therefore get the determinant up to the sign. We leave it as an open problem to give a sub-linear zero-knowledge argument for the permutation matrix  $P$  having determinant  $-1$  or  $+1$ .

**KNOWN PERMUTATION OF A MATRIX.** Consider a publicly known permutation  $\pi$  over  $\mathbb{Z}_n \times \mathbb{Z}_n$  and two committed matrices  $Y = \pi(X)$ , meaning for all pairs  $(i, j)$  we have  $y_{ij} = x_{\pi(ij)}$ . To give a SHVZK argument for this, the verifier first picks  $R \leftarrow \text{Van}_{n^2}(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  and we ask the prover to show

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n r_{ij} x_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n r_{\pi(ij)} y_{ij},$$

which by the Schwartz-Zippel fails with probability  $\frac{n^2-1}{p}$  unless indeed  $Y = \pi(X)$ . Define  $S = \pi(R)$  and call the row vectors of the matrices respectively  $r_i, s_i, x_i, y_i$ . The statement above is equivalent to

$$\sum_{i=1}^n r_i x_i^\top = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i y_i^\top,$$

for which we already know how to give a SHVZK argument.

**HIDDEN PERMUTATION OF A MATRIX.** To show that there is a secret permutation  $\pi$  so  $Y = \pi(X)$ , we use the fact that polynomials are identical under permutation of the roots; an idea that stems from Neff [Nef01]. The verifier picks  $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  at random and we let  $R$  be the matrix that has  $r$  in all entries. We then use the SHVZK argument from Section 5 to show that the product of the entries in  $X - R$  equals the product of the entries in  $Y - R$ . In other words, we show for a random  $r$  that

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \prod_{j=1}^n (x_{ij} - r) = \prod_{i=1}^n \prod_{j=1}^n (y_{ij} - r),$$

which by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma demonstrates that the two polynomials are identical and thus there exists a permutation  $\pi$  so  $x_{ij} = y_{\pi(ij)}$ .

This type of SHVZK argument is useful in the context of shuffling [Cha81] and one of the main contributions of Groth and Ishai [GI08] was to show how to give an argument with sub-linear communication. Their SHVZK argument had a communication complexity that could be brought down to  $\Theta(n^{4/3})$  group elements at the cost

of a super-linear computation complexity of  $\Theta(n^{8/3})$  exponentiations.<sup>2</sup> In comparison, our SHVZK argument has a communication complexity of  $\Theta(n)$  field elements and even for the constant round protocol we get a much better computation complexity of  $n^3$  multiplications. Using a logarithmic number of rounds, we can bring that down to  $2n^2\kappa/\log n$  multiplications, beating even the best non-sublinear shuffle argument [Gro03].

## 6 Circuit Satisfiability

Let us consider an arithmetic circuit built from  $N$  addition and multiplication gates over a field  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . We want to give a SHVZK argument for the existence of input values to the circuit that makes it evaluate to 1. All gates have two input wires and one output, some of which may be known constants. By introducing dummy gates we can without loss of generality assume  $3N = n^2$  and that the number of multiplication gates  $M$  and the number of addition gates  $A$  are multiples of  $n$ .

1. We number the addition gates 1 through  $A$  and the multiplication gates  $A + 1$  through  $A + M$ . We arrange the inputs and outputs such that the first two rows contain input values to the first  $n$  addition gates and the third row contains the corresponding output values, then follows another two rows of input gates and one row of output gates, *etc.* Arranging the circuit in this way, the first  $3A$  rows are used for addition gates, while the last  $3M$  rows are used for multiplication gates. The prover commits to all these values.
2. For the addition gates, we create the commitment to row  $3i$  as the product of the commitments to row  $3i - 2$  and  $3i - 1$ . By the homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme, this shows that the addition gates are satisfied by the committed wires.
3. For the multiplication gates we can use the SHVZK argument for Hadamard products, to show that the commitment to row  $3i$  is the Hadamard product of the commitments to rows  $3i - 2$  and  $3i - 1$ . This shows that all the multiplication gates are satisfied by the committed values.
4. Some of the values in the matrix may be publicly known constants. By introducing dummy gates and organizing the matrix such that constants appear in the same row, we can without loss of generality assume that we have entire rows that have publicly known constants. We can make these commitments with trivial randomness so the verifier easily can check that the right constants appear in the right places.
5. Finally, we need to demonstrate that all wires appearing many places in the matrix have the same value assigned to them. The output wire of one gate, might for instance appear elsewhere in matrix as an input wire of another gate; we need to give a SHVZK argument for them having the same value. Let us first look at just one wire that appears many places, say coordinates  $(i_1, j_1), (i_2, j_2), \dots, (i_m, j_m)$ . We can create a directed Hamiltonian cycle on this set of indices. Let now  $\pi$  be a permutation that contains directed Hamiltonian cycles for all wires in the circuit.

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<sup>2</sup> The computational complexity of Groth and Ishai's shuffle argument can be reduced at the cost of increasing communication.

We use our SHVZK argument for known permutations to show that  $X = \pi(X)$ . This proves that the committed values are consistent, giving the same value to the same wire everywhere in the matrix.

### 6.1 Binary Circuits

We have given a SHVZK argument for arithmetic circuit satisfiability, demonstrating the generality of our techniques. The argument consists of committing to a matrix and using some of the SHVZK arguments we have developed in the paper, so it inherits the low communication complexity from the previous sections. The computational complexity of the arithmetic circuit is dominated by the commitment to the wires, costing the prover  $O(N\kappa/\log N)$  multiplications.

If we look instead at a binary circuit, where the wires can be 0 or 1, we can reduce the computational complexity. Committing to a binary matrix requires only  $O(N/\log N)$  multiplications of group elements. Giving a satisfiability argument for a binary circuit requires demonstrating that we have committed to binary values only. This can be done quite easily by demonstrating the committed matrix satisfies  $X = X \circ X$ .

## 7 Efficiency

In the following table, we give efficiency estimates for SHVZK arguments we have considered in the paper. We use the parameters  $\kappa, \kappa'$  and  $n$  to represent respectively the size of a field element, the size of a group element and the number of elements in a vector. We assume  $n$  is large, since this is where efficient zero-knowledge arguments are most needed and ignore small terms. We measure communication in bits and computation in multiplications in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . We let  $\rho, \epsilon$  be the costs of respectively a multiplication in  $G$  and an addition in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  measured in multiplications in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ .

SHVZK argument	Rounds	Communication	Prover computation	Verifier computation
$z = \mathbf{x} * \mathbf{y}$	3	$2n\kappa$	$4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$2n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
$z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$	5	$2n\kappa + 2m\kappa'$	$m^2 n + 4m \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log m} + 4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$8m \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log m} + 2n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
$z = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i * \mathbf{y}_i$	$2 \log m + 3$	$2n\kappa$	$4mn + 4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$4m \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log m} + 2n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Inverse $Y = X^{-1}$	4	$2n\kappa$	$n^2 + 4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Transpose $Y = X^T$	6	$2n\kappa$	$2n^2 + 4n\kappa\rho/\log n$	$6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Eigenv. $\lambda \mathbf{y}^T = X \mathbf{y}^T$	5	$5n\kappa$	$n^2 + 12n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Triangularity	6	$2n\kappa + 2n\kappa'$	$n^3\epsilon + 4n^2 + 8n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$10n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Triangularity	$2 \log m + 4$	$2n\kappa$	$6n^2 + 4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Trace( $X$ )	5	$2n\kappa + 2n\kappa'$	$n^3\epsilon + 2n^2 + 8n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$10n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Trace( $X$ )	$2 \log n + 3$	$2n\kappa$	$4n^2 + 4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Hadamard of rows	7	$2n\kappa + 2n\kappa'$	$n^3 + 2n^2 \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$10n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Hadamard of rows	$2 \log n + 5$	$2n\kappa$	$2n^2 \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Known $Y = \pi(X)$	6	$2n\kappa + 4n\kappa'$	$4n^3 + 12n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$3n^2 + 14n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Known $Y = \pi(X)$	$2 \log n + 4$	$2n\kappa$	$9n^2 + 4n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$3n^2 + 6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Hidden $Y = \pi(X)$	8	$2n\kappa + 2n\kappa'$	$n^3 + 2n^2 \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$10n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Hidden $Y = \pi(X)$	$2 \log n + 6$	$2n\kappa$	$2n^2 \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$	$6n \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log n}$
Arithmetic circuit	7	$O(\sqrt{N}(\kappa + \kappa'))$	$O(N^{3/2} + N \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$	$O(N + \sqrt{N} \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$
Arithmetic circuit	$\log N + 5$	$O(\sqrt{N}\kappa)$	$O(N \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$	$O(N + \sqrt{N} \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$
Binary circuit	7	$O(\sqrt{N}(\kappa + \kappa'))$	$O(N^{3/2}\epsilon + N + \sqrt{N} \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$	$O(N + \sqrt{N} \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$
Binary circuit	$\log N + 5$	$O(\sqrt{N}\kappa)$	$O(N)$	$O(N + \sqrt{N} \frac{\kappa\rho}{\log N})$



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