Abstract
This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the external conditions of realizability of function ascription. The work of DNP has a strong programmatic aspect and much of its foray into metaphysics is tentative, so the intent of my argument is partly synthetic: to sum up these issues as they are presented in the literature and highlight some recognized problems. But I also go beyond that, suggesting that these problems are foundational, arising from the very way in which DNP poses the question of artifact metaphysics. Although it sets out to incorporate objective aspects of technology, DNP places a strong focus on the intentional side of the purported matter-mind duality, bracketing off materiality in an irretrievable manner. Thus, some of the advantages of dualism are lost. I claim that DNP is dualistic, not merely based on “duality”, but that its version of dualism does not appropriately account for the material “nature” of artifacts. The paper ends by suggesting some correctives and alternatives to Dual Nature theory.
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Notes
Actor–Network theorists claim that materiality and agency should be treated symmetrically, but this point should be seriously contested (as does McGrail 2008, a paper that will be discussed in the conclusion). Other theorists ask us to embrace “material agency”: see Kirchoff (2009), Knappett and Malafouris (2008), Pickering (1995), and Latour (1999 esp. chp 6).
Despite a large body of work, the basic premises of DNP are consistent, so I will refer to it as one single “thesis.” However, this does not mean that there are no differences of opinions and diversity of interests. The arguments of specific papers and authors will be indicated when appropriate.
DNP uses “structural features,” “physicochemical properties”, and other terms interchangeably. I will follow this usage, adding “materiality” as a quick way to refer to the physical side of the duality. I leave this term deliberately vague to refer to the unfathomable, in-itself dimension of artifacts.
According to Kroes and Meijers, the aims of the Project are: “… to give an indepth conceptual analysis of the notion of technical function; to compare this account with the accounts of function given in other areas, especially biology and the social sciences; to develop an account of the relation between technical function and physical structure, particularly the sense in which the physical structure constrains the technical function; to develop an account of the intentional aspects of technical functions and of their relation to the intentionality and actions of designers and users; to examine the epistemological consequences of these intentional aspects of functions; to investigate the normative judgments that apply to the functioning of artifacts and the origin of this normativity; to clarify the ontological commitments that are involved in describing and using artifacts; to develop an account of the process of designing technical artifacts and of the way the structural description of the artifact-as-physical-object and the functional description of the object-as-intentionally-formed-artifact are combined during this process; and to examine how technical explanations in design are related to the various types of explanation that are traditionally distinguished in the philosophy of science” (2002, 6–7).
The term “epistemology” shall be employed rather broadly to refer to all aspects of the knowledge and beliefs about artifacts. Later, we shall see that DNP discusses a social, communicational dimension.
There is also a forthcoming volume dedicated to these aspects, which, unfortunately, I will not be able to discuss here: Franssen et. al. (forthcoming). The other papers will be discussed shortly.
In addition, functional norms entail a drastic narrowing of the scope of “artifact” to exclude, for example, malfunctioning and broken artifacts, failed prototypes, artifacts with no practical function, working artifacts that are never used, found artifacts that are not designed, animal-made artifacts, and functional artifacts that are the cumulative result of unintentional, collective action (see Sperber 2007, 124–6).
We should emphasize that, for DNP, the material side remains inert and changeless. “There appears to be no change on the object side, i.e., in the physical properties, of artifacts, but only on the designer- or user-side” (Houkes and Vermaas 2004, 56).
In fact, Vermaas provides a number of extended or modified versions (a unified epistemic theory, a unified ontological theory, etc.) but the form just cited addresses the relevant, salient aspects of Vermaas’ views in the context of our argument.
The term is from Rozenburg and Eekels (1995), 53.
Malafouris speaks of a “chrono-architecture” and a “temporal anatomy of action” (32) based on feedback loops that take place at an interface between brain, body and matter. That is, agency and intentionality are a matter of perspective; below a certain spatiotemporal threshold, they cease to have any explanatory basis or power. Thus, we could easily conceive of the clay guiding the movement of the fingers, rather than the other way around.
Mumford argues for an alternative, internalist metaphysic. This theory would be realist about causal powers and capacities, and would assume “necessary connections between distinct existences but which were internal to the distinct existences” (77). It follows that the distinction between a structure (with no intrinsic necessary connection to other things) and function would be “chimerical.” Mumford writes: “A structure can be understood as a structure of functions, therefore—a structure of essentially functional elements—hence not as something that contrasts metaphysically with function. …. There is not necessarily a dual nature to be found here but only things of the same nature standing in different relations of realization” (78). This argument is presented as part of a larger argument, which claims that we need to understand capacities in terms of functions, since the last term is a “more wide-ranging” concept than disposition or capacity. However, Mumford’s argument reveals a tacit bias in the underlying metaphysics of artifact dualism.
Wouters defends such a systemic approach. Function is a relational type of explanation: a thing performs a function in function of what it does in the context of a specific organized assemblage. This view is aligned with what Wouters calls “organizational teleology.” According to this understanding, “function talk derives its content from the way in which organisms are organized. Function talk is useful to explain the manner of organization, but it is not implied that the organization or its elements were brought about in order to perform that function” (129). And: “According to the systemic approach the function of an item is the role of that item in bringing about an activity or capacity of a complex system of which that item is a part” (135).
Arthur argues that “technology is self-creating” and can be compared to “a living webwork that weaves itself out of itself” (2009, 189): “This account of self-creation of technology should give us a different feeling about technology. We begin to get a feeling of ancestry, of a vast body of things that give rise to things … In its collective sense, technology is not merely a catalog of individual parts. It is a metabolic chemistry, an almost limitless collective of entities that interact to produce new entities—and further needs” (188–9).
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Vaccari, A. Artifact Dualism, Materiality, and the Hard Problem of Ontology: Some Critical Remarks on the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program. Philos. Technol. 26, 7–29 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-011-0059-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-011-0059-y