Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) have traditionally been measured starting in preschool and share a similar developmental progression into childhood. Although there is some research examining early ToM and EF in the first 3 years, further empirical evidence and a theoretical framework for a ToM-EF relationship from infancy to preschool are necessary. In this paper we review the ToM-EF relationship in preschoolers and provide evidence for early development in ToM, EF, and the ToM-EF relationship. We propose that models of cognitive control (i.e., Hierarchical Competing Systems Model: Marcovitch & Zelazo (Journal of Cognition and Development 7:477–501, 2006), (Developmental Science 12:1–25, 2009)); and Levels of Consciousness Model: Zelazo (Trends in Cognitive Science 8:12–17, 2004) account for the ToM-EF relationship across childhood through domain-general developments in the ability to form and reflect on relevant representations that can guide behavior in both ToM and EF situations. The combination of these models also presents unique, domain-general considerations for interpreting early ToM from infancy to preschool.
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Notes
Although similar, there are important distinctions between the A-not-B task and VOE false belief tasks. For example, in the A-not-B task, children must respond to where the object is, whereas in the VOE false belief task infants must respond to where the object is not. These differences in responses are likely due to the different nature of the representations formed within the task. In the A-not-B task, infants link the object to a location (initially at location A), whereas in VOE false belief task infant link the agent to an object (i.e., object directed behavior). After the switch to a new location (A-not-B) or new location outside the actor’s presence (false belief), children must continue to either form strong object-location representations in A-not-B tasks (e.g., object is now at location B) or agent-object representations in false belief tasks (e.g., the agent-object relationship is linked to the old location) to overcome prepotent responses. In addition, although both tasks assess infant’s actions, A-not-B measures manual search whereas the false belief measures looking time. Current representational ability, habit strength, and mode of response are all important considerations, and can be modeled within the habit based and representational system of the reflection framework (e.g., searching motor habits may be stronger than looking motor habits). Importantly, despite these fluctuations across tasks, important age-related changes still emerge (e.g., they both pass these task around the same age), which the reflection framework suggests can be accounted for via an underlying ability in representation and reflection.
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Miller, S.E., Marcovitch, S. How Theory of Mind and Executive Function Co-develop. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 597–625 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0117-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0117-0